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The objective of this dissertation is to reinstate the significance of Hegel’s 
thought to the theory of International Relations (IR). It seeks to demonstrate that 
Hegelian thought can offer an alternative conceptualisation of agency, freedom 
and ethics which enriches our understanding of inter-state relations, citizenship, 
security and international development. Although Hegel’s insights have inspired 
certain IR scholars before, yet their approaches are limited, mainly because they 
underplay his notion of Spirit (Geist) and the contribution of Hegel’s method of 
immanent critique and since they fail to take into consideration - coherently - the 
content of Hegel’s work. These IR scholars focus primarily on specific excerpts 
of the Philosophy of Right or the Phenomenology of Spirit and treat Hegel as a 
proto-realist thinker, ignoring Hegel’s notion of immanent critique and his 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). In that respect, these IR approaches are 
unable to follow Hegel’s thought consistently and fail to unveil not only Hegel’s 
intellectual wealth but also the contribution of his insights to the field of 
International Relations. In short, this dissertation after following Hegel’s thought 
consistently and taking into consideration Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit 
(Geist), seizes novelty as it: a) rectifies and enriches Hegelian thought in the field 
of IR; and b) forms an additional philosophical point of reference which was 
previously ignored by IR theorists. This Hegelian perspective is strong enough to 
counterbalance the highly influential Kantian and Foucaultian philosophical IR 
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approaches after exposing their theoretical shortcomings while providing a more 
complete, if not superior, philosophical alterative.  
Moreover, the consideration of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), reveals 
the distinctive contribution of immanent critique, which overcomes the 
separation between: 1) the subject from the object of knowledge; 2) the universal 
from the particular dimension (providing a content to empty supranational 
norms); 3) empiricism and idealism after re-approaching the conjunction of 
reality and reason. The value of these points which provide a deeper 
understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom, reality and reason become 
evident throughout the five chapters of this dissertation which enrich our 
conceptualization of agency, security, ethics and citizenship. Specifically: 
The first chapter, with the title - Revisiting Hegel’s Contribution On 
Interstate Relations, War and Security - traces the limits of IR thought with 
regard to subjectivity and the method of knowledge. Specifically, after focusing 
on the evolution of the consciousness forms as found in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, it is stressed, how a flawed understanding of subjectivity is responsible for 
a flawed method of acquiring knowledge regarding interstate relations and the 
issue area of security. An immanent critique of the (neo)realist, the Copenhagen 
and the critical school of security unveils these flaws and demonstrates the 
shortcomings of separating the subject from the object of knowledge (point 1). 
Separating the subject from the object of knowledge conveys a problematic 
account of subjectivity which accommodates only a descriptive or a prescriptive 
approach to knowledge. Thus, Hegelian thought helps us see how IR thought and 
security studies are committed to a divide between prescriptive and descriptive 
theorizing, which is limiting and misleading.    
The second chapter, titled - The Shortcomings of Foucaultian Application 
In The Theory of International Relations From A Hegelian Perspective, departs 
from the point the previous chapter ended. Namely, how the problematic account 
of subjectivity and knowledge is echoed in Foucaultian thought. Specifically, it 
is argued that Foucault unsuccessfully attempted to reconsider reality without 
transcendental means via the notion of power. It is demonstrated that Foucault 
failed where Hegel’s immanent critique and his philosophical system of Spirit 
(Geist) succeeded as the Foucaultian notion of power is based on transcendental 
premises and forms a misleading account of subjectivity which separates 
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empiricism from idealism (point 3) rendering knowledge and subjectivity 
relativistic. Such a relativistic treatment of subjectivity promotes a self-alienated 
agent who is controlled by the administrative mechanisms of power and lacks 
consciousness. Thus, any attempt of the subject to emancipate itself is self-
defeating, since an infinite succession of Foucault’s power regimes, renders the 
subject eternally contingent and relativist. This chapter will in turn clarify the 
implications of Foucaultian approaches on IR thought. Specifically it is shown 
that IR scholars tend to take uncritically for granted Foucault’s concepts of 
power, subjectivity and freedom. Here, it is argued that an elaborate examination 
of these concepts, from a Hegelian perspective, reveals the intellectual flaws 
these concepts entail which IR scholarly debates leave unexamined. Foucaultian 
inspired IR scholars promote too a flawed understanding of subjectivity in the 
form of a relativistic and self-alienated individual that lacks self-consciousness 
and free will. Foucault’s notion of power is guilty of promoting a problematic 
account of subjectivity and freedom since it fails to promote the self-
consciousness of the subject.  
The third chapter titled - Hegel’s Contribution Towards Unveiling the 
Limits of Conceptualizing Freedom in Foucaultian, Kantian and IR Thought - 
elaborates further on Hegel’s understanding of freedom. Hegel’s notion of 
immanent critique unveils that Foucaultian, Kantian and IR thought 
accommodate a misleading account of freedom. In particular an immanent 
critique of Foucault’s and Kant’s perspective reveals that their conceptualisation 
of freedom rests on transcendental and contingent premises which promote a 
misleading conceptualisation of subjectivity and ethics. Highlighting Hegel’s 
enriched account of subjectivity and consciousness (point 1) as well as the 
interplay between the universal and the particular dimension (point 2) 
demonstrates not only the limits of Kantian and Foucaultian thought, but also 
how a problematic understanding of subjectivity and freedom is promoted in IR 
thought too by the scholars who are inspired by Foucault and Kant. The 
transcendental premises of their thought which immanent critique reveals, 
separate the universal from the particular dimension and promote a misleading 
understanding of freedom with excluding and non-emancipating effects. 
Similarly the IR scholars who separated the universal from the particular 
dimension and promoted a misleading understanding of consciousness such as 
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Mervyn Frost and David Chandler promote too a self-defeating understanding of 
freedom. Their understanding of freedom too is responsible for nourishing liberal 
ideals with socially excluding effects which promote coercion and undermine the 
agents’ free will.    
The fourth chapter titled - Hegel’s Contribution Towards a Richer 
Understanding of Citizenship - stresses how an immanent critique of certain 
universalist or cosmopolitan perspectives on citizenship unveils their 
transcendental theoretical premises. Specifically, Hegel’s immanent critique and 
his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), allows us to see how the distinction 
between the universal and the particular dimension of citizenship is misleading, 
demonstrating the significance of (point 2). The universal approaches of 
citizenship which celebrate only one the two dimensions are based on the 
promotion of the cosmopolitan character of (liberal) rights. Hegel’s insights 
unveil how the separation of the universal from the particular dimension 
contributes to the inaccurate understanding of citizenship. The theoretical flaws 
of these approaches to citizenship are associated to: i) The treatment of abstract 
principles such as ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘(human) rights’ which are founded 
on transcendental premises as normative truths; ii) The incorporation of a self-
defeating understanding of nation(alism), culture, values and duty based on 
empty formalisms. On the other hand Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
which rests on his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) provides and alternative 
account of citizenship, capable of rectifying these flaws after: putting forward a 
theory that is neither descriptive nor prescriptive which rejects transcendental 
normative truths. Moreover, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
overcomes the empty formalism of universal supranational values and the 
abstract foundations of (human) rights. Thus, the insights of Hegel’s immanent 
critique which rest on his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), allow us to 
overcome the shortcomings which emerge from the distinction of citizenship 
between the universal and particular dimension after incorporating both 
dimensions.  
The last chapter titled - An Empirical Analysis of Hegel’s 
Conceptualization of Citizenship: On the Alternative Implications of Economy 
and the Market in Singapore - adds a case study unlike the previous chapters. 
This case study is added to demonstrate that the metaphysical dimension of 
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Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), upon which the contribution of immanent 
critique lies, does not rest on transcendental premises. Moreover, the case study 
reveals the practical application of Hegel’s immanent critique which promotes an 
alternative understanding of knowledge that is not founded on the authority of 
the subject (or theorist) after avoiding the separation between the subject from 
the object of knowledge (point 1). In that respect, the case study of Singapore 
which reveals how the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) actualises and evolves, 
clarifies that Hegelian thought is not founded on transcendental but immanent 
premises since it is tied to the evolution of history and the contingency of the 
theoretical object. Just as the Philosophy of Right portrays the explanatory 
strength of immanent critique after elaborating on the evolution of the subject’s 
self-consciousness - without transcendental premises - via the development of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state; similarly the case study of Singapore is 
introduced to illustrate the explanatory strength of Hegelian philosophy in 
practical and immanent terms rather that abstract ones. The case study of 
Singapore elucidates immanent critique’s practical contribution after portraying 
the civic evolution of the Singaporeans from opportunistic individuals (which 
echoes the incomplete moment of civil society) to selfless citizens which 
suggests a primitive form of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Finally, since Singapore 
celebrates capitalism without sharing the traits of liberal democracies, the island-
state serves as and ideal example to explain the implications for citizenship of 
Singapore’s development from a Hegelian perspective which the liberal-
capitalist inspired analyses of Singapore have failed to grasp.  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Contribution	  of	  Hegel’s	  Philosophical	  System	  of	  
Spirit	  (Geist)	  and	  Immanent	  Critique	  	  
 
To begin with, this chapter will be divided in three parts. The first part, 
reviews the approaches of certain scholars who attempt to substantiate a 
Hegelian account of IR, after focusing solely on specific excerpts of the 
Philosophy of Right without taking into consideration the Hegelian notion of 
Spirit (Geist). Specifically, these scholars tend to rely primarily on the third 
section (‘The State’) of the Philosophy of Right and sometimes on the ‘Lord and 
Bondsman’ dialectic, in order analyse interstate relations, conflict and war. 
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Therefore these scholars treat Hegel as political realist since the excerpts they 
rely on, portray interstate relations as anarchic and antagonistic whereas the 
effectiveness of international law is dismissed. However, Hegel’s association 
with political realism is challenged here as it stems from an incomplete reading 
of the Philosophy of Right which is disorientating and lacks depth. Moreover, 
applying Hegelian theory in a prescriptive manner to explain interstate relations 
is not valid as it attributes to Hegel a theoretical role he dismisses. Ultimately, it 
will be argued that it is misleading to borrow solely from the Philosophy of Right 
in order to form a Hegelian account of IR, as that provides an incomplete 
approach to Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). In that respect, this 
part enriches Hutchings’s approach, which argues that it is misleading to ignore 
Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit and rely on certain ideas conveyed in the 
Philosophy of Right without taking into consideration the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. The following part explains how Hegelian philosophy can make a greater 
contribution to IR theory, after dismissing Hegel’s association to political realism 
while taking into account his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) as well as his 
notion of immanent critique.  
Since Hegelian philosophy attracts the attention of many scholars, 
Hegel’s thought invites various interpretations. The second part of this chapter 
stresses that Hegel’s immanent critique brings to our attention a number of 
insights when approaching subjectivity, consciousness, knowledge and ethics. 
These insights can add value to our analysis and further stimulate the 
problematization of subjectivity as well as the interplay between: reason and 
reality; idealism and empiricism; rationalism and histroricism; the subject and 
object of knowledge. Scholars like Taylor, Rosen, Buchwalter and Benhabib 
have treated Hegel as the philosopher of immanent critique. This part therefore 
delineates the scholarly approaches of Hegel’s immanent critique before 
elucidating the concept of immanent critique. It is noted that Benhabib’s 
approach which treats Hegel’s immanent critique as ambivalent, takes only into 
consideration his early work (the 1802 essay On Natural Law) without 
considering his late work, namely the Phenomenology of Spirit and the 
Philosophy of Right. Rosen’s analysis stresses too that Hegel’s immanent critique 
nourishes a paradox. However, he argues how this paradox can be overcome 
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once Hegel’s immanent critique is viewed as determinate negation and the notion 
of Spirit (Geist) is taken into consideration.  
The third part of this chapter elucidates what is metaphysics and the 
notion of Spirit (Geist) according to Hegel while explaining that immanent 
critique cannot be realized without considering Hegel’s metaphysical dimension 
and his notion of Spirit (Geist). After referencing Buchwalter’s, Taylor’s and 
Beiser’s work it becomes clear that the conceptualization of Hegel’s immanent 
critique necessitates the consideration of Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) while 
avoiding the separation of his method from his system. Ultimately it is argued 
that such an understanding of Hegel’s immanent critique can enrich our 
conceptions of subjectivity, freedom, ethics and citizenship while contributing to 
a more complete account of acquiring knowledge. This part elaborates further 
how immanent critique allows us to acquire a more complete understanding of: 
1) subjectivity after overcoming the separation between the subject and the 
object of knowledge; 2) ethics and norms after avoiding the separation of the 
universal and the particular dimension while providing a content to the (empty) 
form; 3) historicism and rationalism after elaborating further on the interplay 
between empiricism and idealism rather than their mutual exclusion while re-
approaching the conjunction of  reality and reason from the perspective of 
immanent critique. 
The contribution of these insights which rest on Hegel’s philosophical 
system of Spirit (Geist) and his notion of immanent critique, will become clear in 
the following chapters of this dissertation which unveil the conceptual 
shortcomings of subjectivity, knowledge, freedom, ethics and citizenship that IR 






I.	   Implications	   of	   Hegelian	   Inspired	  Approaches	   to	   IR	  which	  Downplay	  
the	  Philosophical	  System	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  	  
 
The following paragraphs review a number of Hegelian influenced IR 
approaches to inter-state relations, conflict and war. It appears that these IR 
scholars tend to form a Hegelian account of IR without considering Hegel’s 
philosophical system and the notion of Spirit (Geist). Instead, they rely on 
particular excerpts of Hegel’s work. Specifically, Jaeger, Brooks, Vincent and 
Smith rely primarily on the Philosophy of Right’s third section (the State) and the 
Phenomenology’s ‘Lord and Bondsman’ dialectic. The conclusions often drawn 
from such a selective reading of Hegel’s work, relate to the classification of 
Hegel as a proto-realist after stressing the impossibility of international law; 
perceiving the state as an individual in a state of nature while glorifying war as a 
mean of civic education.   
It is true that one might end up with similar conclusions should one 
exclusively focus on specific extracts of the Philosophy of Right. However, such 
a selective reading is inaccurate, since it fails to take into account Hegel’s 
philosophical system within the realm of Spirit (Geist) and ends up portraying 
Hegelian theory - deceptively - as a prescriptive and descriptive account of 
interstate relations.  
 To begin with, according to Brooks’ earlier work, Hegel’s theory verifies 
the ideals of (neo)realism. However, it needs to be noted that in his latest work, 
Brooks admits that the Philosophy of Right should be understood within the 
context of Hegel’s larger philosophical system and in particular the notion of 
logic.1  Nevertheless, in his earlier work Brooks parallels Hegel to (neo)realism, 
since in the last part of the Philosophy of Right the states: i) appear to behave as 
unitary-rational actors; ii) the relations between them are akin to the state of 
nature; iii) fail to establish permanent international treaties between them 
whereas  international law is not applicable as there is no higher adjudicator. In 
Brookes’ words, Hegel assumes the role of a pure realist.2  
                                                
1 Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading Of The Philosophy of Right 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2013), 3-5 
2 Thom Brooks, ‘Hegel’s Theory of International Politics: A Reply to Jaeger’, Review of 
International Studies (2004), 30,149 
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Unlike Brooks, Jaeger describes Hegel as a ‘reluctant realist’. Although 
certain Hegelian ideas comply with (neo)realism, Jaeger avoids classifying Hegel 
as a pure realist. Indeed Jaeger holds that much of what Hegel says about state 
relations, international anarchy, the absence of common jurisprudence and 
international law, echo (neo)realism. Jaeger also adds that Hegel’s treatment of 
war as the primary mean to resolve conflicting interests among states, while 
dismissing the Kantian idea of perpetual peace through a league of nations which 
presupposes a moral and religious bond among states, reflects Hegel’s realism.3 
Yet Jaeger takes Hegel to be a ‘reluctant realist’ as the Hegelian notion of 
recognition relies on the mutual recognition among sovereign states which 
prevents their rigid demarcation and autonomy, rendering both their association 
as well as their interaction necessary. For Jaeger, Hegel advances a peculiar kind 
of realism as Hegel’s understanding of international relations via recognition is 
founded on the states’ interaction and mutual dependence rather than conflict.4   
 After citing the third part of the Philosophy of Right, Brooks dismisses 
Jaeger’s position and acknowledges Hegel as a pure realist rather than a 
‘reluctant’ one. According to Brooks, in the Philosophy of Right, the state is 
explicitly described as an independent and sovereign entity despite the dimension 
of recognition. Brooks contends that Hegelian recognition among states takes a 
purely formalistic form that is confined by temporary treaties. This implies the 
impossibility of international law and the weakness of international institutions. 
Moreover, after quoting a number of references as found in the Philosophy of 
Right, Brooks adds that Hegel parallels the state with the individual in the state 
of nature. Ultimately, states may only be able to settle conflicts through war.5  
Despite their differences, Brooks and Jaeger after relying primarily on the 
Philosophy of Right, attribute to Hegel a realist-friendly descriptive account of 
IR theory. For both, Hegel’s realism is echoed after identifying the states as the 
sole agents of IR in an anarchic state of nature, where war serves as the only 
mean to resolve their differences, prescribing an antagonistic form of interstate 
relations.   
                                                
3 Hans-Martin Jaeger, ‘Hegel’s Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalism of Civil Society’, 
Review of International Studies (2002), 28, 504-508 
4 Jaeger, Hegel’s Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalism of Civil Society, 479-499 
5 Brooks, Hegel’s Theory of International Politics: A Reply to Jaeger, 150-151 
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Vincent is another scholar who draws only on the Philosophy of Right in 
order to develop another Realist-friendly version of Hegel. Vincent too relies 
primarily on the Philosophy of Right’s paragraphs 321-340 to highlight the 
Realist points of Hegelian thought. Vincent draws the conclusion that Hegel’s 
understanding of the state and interstate relations is summarized as follows: a. 
there is a plurality of nation-states with sovereign wills; b. the only international 
law that can be formulated is ‘treaties ought to be kept’; c. However since each 
state has its own conceptions of welfare, any notion of international law is not 
coercive, simply remains an ought to be.6  
Beyond the critique of International Law and the understanding of the 
state as an individual in the state of nature, Hegel is again referenced in IR 
thought to promote another dimension of political realism, namely the 
essentiality of war and the conflicting nature of inter-state relations. In the 
Philosophy of Right, war appears to be projected as an inevitable phenomenon 
which provides a necessary form of civic education, underscoring the 
impossibility of International Law.7  In that respect, Smith and Avinieri draw on 
the Philosophy of Right to describe war as an inevitable phenomenon with an 
ethical and educative purpose celebrating Hegel as proponent of realism.      
Steven B. Smith stresses that Hegel’s analysis of war has a civic 
educational dimension, reasserting the primacy of the state over and above 
private interests. Only in times of war or severe national crisis, the chief end or 
function of the state can be fulfilled, namely the marshalling of civic obligation 
in a selfless manner. The state for Hegel, according to Smith, is not an instrument 
for the achievement of material ends and purposes but a mode of relating which 
stresses shared values and common sacrifice at the expense of individual 
interests. The Hegelian notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) indicates how the 
community’s interests are paired with the individual’s.8 Smith notes that Hegel 
far from viewing war as something accidental, attempts to give it a metaphysical 
foundation built into the very nature of things. Smith focuses on the ‘Lordship 
and Bondage’ chapter in the Phenomenology to argue that for Hegel the 
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8 Smith, Hegel’s Views on War, State and International Relations, 625-627 
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archetypical relation between human beings is one of conflict and struggle for 
recognition. Individuals are apparently not isolated or self-sufficient from nature 
but come to develop a personality or identity through a protracted period of 
opposition with one another. Enmity, not friendship is by far the most 
characteristic condition of human beings and states. Moreover, Hegel, continues 
to think of war as a necessary means to preserve the state from the internal 
tensions generated by civil society and its market economy. War becomes a type 
of school for the civic education of the modern bourgeois. This is not to 
romanticize war, but to turn it into a means for promoting certain types of civic 
virtues for citizens who in normal times are used to consult only their private 
interests.9  
It is true that if one emphasizes certain parts of the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel’s thought resembles realism. To be more precise, in paragraph 322, Hegel 
indeed appears to equate the individual with the state, stressing the relation 
among states as independent units: 
‘ ...individuality is awareness of one’s existence as a unit in sharp distinction 
from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of 
which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others. This autonomy, embodies mind’s actual 
awareness of itself as a unit and hence it is the most fundamental freedom which people 
possess as well as its highest dignity’.10  
Moreover, in paragraph 334, it is highlighted that due to the state’s 
individuality, their relations are settled by war and long-term peace is harmful for 
the state: 
‘...if states disagree, and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter 
can only be settled by war. A state through its subjects has widespread connections and 
many-sided interests and these may be readily and considerably injured but it remains 
indeterminate as to which of these injuries is to be regarded as a specific breach of treaty 
or as injury to the honour or autonomy of the state [...] the state may regard its infinity 
and honour at stake [...] and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more 
its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a 
sphere of activity abroad’.11 
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In paragraphs 324-325, the inevitability of war is stressed as well as its 
civic educational impact. The occurrence of war is associated with the 
undermining of individualistic behaviour and the cultivation of selfless virtues 
such as sacrifice for the community’s sake:  
‘War is not to be regarded as absolute evil and as purely external accident. It is 
to say that is by nature that accidents happen and the fate whereby they happen is a 
necessity. Here as elsewhere, the point of view from which things seem pure accidents 
vanishes if we look at them in the light of the concept and philosophy, because 
philosophy knows accident for a show and sees it as necessity. It is necessary that the 
finite  -property and life- should be definitely established as accidental because 
accidentality is the concept of the finite. This necessity appears in the form of the power 
of nature’.12 
‘The individuals substantive duty, is the duty to maintain this substantive 
individuality, the independence and sovereignty of the state, at the risk and the sacrifice 
of property and life. An entirely distorted account of the demand for this sacrifice results 
from regarding the state as mere civil society and from regarding tis final end as only the 
security of the individual life and property [...] War deals in earnest with the vanity of 
temporal goods and concerns. War has the higher significance that by its agency  ‘the 
ethical health of the people is preserved in their indifference to the stabilisation of the 
finite institutions. So corruption in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone 
perpetual peace.’13  
The previous excerpts from the Philosophy of Right appear to associate 
Hegel with political realism, since: the state is identified as an individual agent in 
a state of nature, international law is rendered impossible and war is considered 
to be unavoidable if not necessary; verifying the approaches of scholars like 
Brooks, Jaeger, Vincent and Smith. Although these excepts draw a parallel 
between Hegel and realist thought, yet they lack depth since they stem from an 
incomplete understanding of Hegel’s philosophical system and fail to provide a 
reliable guide for the understanding of international relations. Unlike Brooks, 
Jaeger, Vincent and Smith, it is argued here that Hegel’s objective was neither to 
develop a prescriptive nor a descriptive account of interstate relations. 
Descriptive or prescriptive theorizing, violates Hegel’s conceptualization of 
knowledge and ignores his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Moreover as 
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Hegel himself contends, in the preface of the Philosophy of Right, his study does 
not contain the science of the state but is an endeavour to apprehend the state as 
something inherently rational within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Thus, the 
instruction of the Philosophy of Right does not consist of teaching what the state 
ought to be but how the state is to be understood.14  
Therefore, after understating the notion of Spirit (Geist), the existing 
Hegelian IR approaches end up promoting a (neo)realist friendly interpretation of 
Hegel. Unlike these interpretations, this dissertation - in accordance to 
Hutching’s remarks - argues that the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s notion 
of Spirit (Geist) should be treated as the point of departure in order to 
comprehend the Philosophy of Right. The consideration of Spirit (Geist) prevents 
the treatment of Hegel in a realist vein. Moreover, it clarifies that Hegel is 
neither offering a prescription for contemporary international politics nor his 
comments on state sovereignty, international law and war serve to describe 
interstate norms. After the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit is considered 
coherently and the importance of Spirit (Geist) is acknowledged, Hegel’s 
remarks in the Philosophy of Right cease to appear descriptive or prescriptive. 
Thus, the Philosophy of Right is meant to be understood from the perspective of 
Spirit (Geist), which helps us acquire a complete understanding of how 
consciousness and subjectivity is formed via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the 
limits of the state and how inter-state relations serve the accomplishment of the 
subject’s self-consciousness within the state.   
In that respect, after considering Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) it 
becomes clear that Hegel rejects abstract a priori normative claims which 
prevent him from developing a prescriptive theory of interstate relations or a 
normative account of universal values or norms. On the other hand, the evolution 
of the subject’s forms of consciousness, as presented in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, is tied with the concept of Spirit (Geist) and challenges the treatment of 
the theorist as a self-dependent subject who puts forward normative truths. Hegel 
rejects such normative truths in an attempt to indicate a dynamic relation 
between the theorist and the theoretical object. As Hutchings notes, for such 
relations to be dynamic, the subject as theorist cannot have a pre-determined or a 
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fixed point of view. Such a fixed point of view is offset by the subject’s abstract 
normative claims and provide a generalized descriptive account of theory which 
rests on abstract (universalistic) premises that lacks a particular content.15 Thus, 
Hegel’s analysis elucidates that it is misleading to treat the object of study as 
passive. In Hutchings’ words, ‘the theorists must recognize themselves as 
patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge’.16  
Therefore, as the following part elaborates, Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
(Geist) is a crucial part of Hegel’s (late) corpus which does not only provide an 
accurate understanding of the state but also an accurate understanding of 
immanent critique which enriches our understanding of what knowledge is and 
how it is acquired with respect to the subject and the state. Immanent critique 
which demonstrates the shortcomings of separating the subject from the object of 
knowledge, becomes an invaluable tool which enriches our understanding of 
consciousness, agency, reality, reason and citizenship. Hegel’s immanent critique 
has attracted numerous scholarly interpretations some of which do not stress the 
importance of Spirit (Geist). The next paragraphs contend that the strength and 
contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique rests on the consideration of his 
Philosophical system of Spirit (Geist).    
II.	  Delineating	  the	  Approaches	  Which	  Treat	  Hegel	  as	  the	  Philosopher	  of	  
Immanent	  Critique	  
 
Hegel’s immanent critique allows us to reexamine reality not with 
arbitrary or transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality 
itself. In that respect, Hegel via immanent critique was capable of 
conceptualizing reason and subjectivity in a non-transcendental vein, after 
transforming the understanding of “what is” into a process. This process is 
generated empirically and historically and elevates reality to what Hegel defines 
as the concept (Begriff). The following paragraphs elaborate how this process 
which assists reality to rise and meet the concept (Begriff), contributes not only 
to the decomposition of a-priori transcendental preconditions but also to the 
                                                
15 Kimberly Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1999), 101-102 
16 Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, 103 
 18 
revelation of empirical misconceptions, after eliminating the conflict between 
reality and its true essence. Therefore, Hegel via imminent critique conjoins 
reason and reality and avoids the separation of the subject with the object of 
knowledge in order not to legitimate but judge the existing empirical conditions 
with empirical and historical tools. Although according to Hegel’s immanent 
critique the conjunction of reality and reason is not transcendental, yet it is 
stressed that immanent critique can only be realized via Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
(Geist). The following section after delineating a diversity of scholarly 
approaches to immanent critique, explains why the notions of determinate 
negation and restlessness are important in order to realize the evolutionary 
dimension of Hegel’s immanent critique, dialectic and Spirit (Geist). 
Scholars like Taylor, Rosen, Buchwalter and Benhabib acknowledge 
Hegel as the philosopher of immanent critique. However, Benhabib challenges 
the efficiency of Hegel’s immanent critique. For Benhabib, Hegel’s exercise of 
immanent critique found at his early work, namely the essay On Natural Law 
(written in 1802), appears to be ambivalent and self-defeating. Benhabid does not 
refer to Hegel’s late work (The Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of 
Right) and downplays Hegel’s metaphysical dimension as well as his notion of 
Spirit (Geist) with respect to immanent critique.  
This part commences with Benhabib’s approach to immanent critique, 
suggesting that the failure to consider Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and his 
notion of Spirit (Geist) as found at his late work, undermines the intellectual 
contribution of immanent critique. Then Buchwalter’s and Rosen’s approach will 
be elaborated in order to explain: 1) what immanent critique is; 2) the paradox it 
entails; 3) how Hegel’s late work and his metaphysical dimension are crucial for 
the appropriate conceptualization of immanent critique. Ultimately, it will be 
explained how such a conceptualization of immanent critique can enrich our 
understanding of subjectivity, ethics, rationalism and empiricism after re-
conceptualizing reality and reason.  
Benhabib stresses that Hegel’s essay on Natural Law, illustrates the 
shortcomings of the normative foundations of natural law theories. For 
Benhabib, Hegel develops in this essay a methodological critique of certain 
procedures of normative argumentation. He maintains that the use of contrary-to-
fact thought experiments, like the “the state of nature” is objectionable. The 
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utilization of such procedures always results to a fallacy in which a conclusion is 
taken for granted. Such argumentations presuppose or take for granted precisely 
what they set out to prove. Benhabib notes that the conceptual problem addressed 
by Hegel in the Natural Law essay associates to the concerns voiced in his essay 
The Difference Between the Fichtean and the Schellingian Systems of 
Philosophy, written in 1801. In these works, empiricist and transcendental 
philosophies are criticized for separating concept and intuition; form and content; 
unity and multiplicity; identity and difference; finitude and infinity. For Hegel, 
argues Benhabib, the presence of these dichotomies in philosophy is the 
expression of a deeper rift within cultural life.17 Benhabib adds that Hegel in 
order to avoid the naivety of prescriptive conclusions stemming from normative 
natural law approaches, develops a method of immanent critique. The purpose of 
this critique is to demystify the apparent objectivity of social processes by 
showing them to be constituted by the praxis of the knowing and acting subject. 
Thus, Hegel develops the method of immanent critique in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of criteriological and foundationalist inquiries both in moral and political 
philosophy. His essay on Natural Law uses a similar argument to criticize 
empiricist and formalist theories of modern natural right. Benhabib observes that 
Hegel’s  immanent critique rejects modern natural right theories after criticizing 
their internal inconsistencies and contradictions.18  
According to Benhabib, Hegel’s argument against the “state of nature” 
can be put as follows: if a theory begins by resorting to a counterfactual 
abstraction, then the theorist must possess criteria in light of which certain 
aspects of the human condition are ignored while others are included in the initial 
abstraction. But any such criteria will themselves be normative for they will 
depend on what the theorist considers essential or inessential aspects of human 
nature. When one examines the normative criteria in these early natural right 
theories, one sees how humans in modern bourgeois society become the guiding 
criterion in determining what they ought to be or might have been like in the 
state of nature. This counterfactual abstraction from which the theorist proceeds 
does not justify the concept of human nature and reason that he subscribes to. 
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Hegel’s main concern in the essay on Natural Law is to show that the 
abstractions to which these theorists resort, destroy any genuine conception of 
ethical life.19  
Nevertheless, Benhabib concludes that Hegel’s exercise of immanent 
critique is ambivalent and self-defeating. She argues that while Hegel on the one 
hand criticizes the dogmatism of modern natural rights theories in reifying 
present social relations, on the other hand, Hegel admits that there is no moment 
in the present upon which to anchor the view of a unified ethical life. The ideal 
of ethical life is not an immanent but a transcendent ideal, in the sense that it 
involves looking back to the past. This means for Benhabib that the normative 
standard governing Hegel’s critique is a retrospective one, drawn from memory. 
In that respect Benhabib contends that Hegel’s critique of natural right theories is 
not immanent either for it is unclear to her why the view of a unified ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) should be considered less dogmatic an assumption in the face of the 
realities of the modern world that the assumptions of the natural right theories.20   
Benhabib argues that Hegel sees meaning in social life to reside in “the 
perspective of a third, of an observer-thinker”21 which she refers to as “trans-
subjectivity”.22 She criticizes Hegel for not analyzing how “trans-subjectivity” 
can be translated back into the lived perspective of social actors. Instead she 
accuses Hegel of appealing to an epistemological standpoint which is objectivist 
and remote from the social actors.  This for her is responsible for portraying 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as a transcendent totality, alienating itself from itself in 
history.23  
Benhabib’s analysis of immanent critique focuses solely on Hegel’s early 
work which merely criticizes (successfully) the normative criteria of natural law 
theories without advancing an analysis of the conjunction between reason and 
reality that his late work covers. Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of reason 
and reality which takes place at his late work, namely the Phenomenology of 
Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, rests on his metaphysical dimension and the 
notion of Spirit (Geist) which theoretically enriches immanent critique. 
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Therefore as Buchwalter stresses, the metaphysical dimension needs to be taken 
into consideration in order to comprehend Hegel’s conjunction between reason 
and reality and conceptualize immanent critique.  
As Buchwalter argues Hegel’s immanent critique, evaluates reality not 
with alien principles of rationality but with principles intrinsic to reality itself. 
Reality is challenged not with arbitrary constructions of transcendental 
rationalism but with norms which are part of the reality itself. Thus, Hegel’s 
synthesis of thought (Reason) and being (Reality) furnishes a social criticism 
which overcomes the dichotomy of descriptive and prescriptive approaches.24 
Moreover, Buchwalter emphasizes that the metaphysical dimension upon which 
the conjunction of Reason and Reality is based, forms the precondition of 
immanent critique. As he mentions “Hegel’s conception of this conjunction is 
virtually identical to the concept of immanent critique […] without denying that 
there is a metaphysical dimension to Hegel's conception of the relationship of 
reason and reality, I contend that, properly understood, this dimension, far from 
obstructing development of a meaningful concept of immanent critique, actually 
is its precondition”.25  
Buchwalter notes that Hegel’s immanent critique assist the decomposition 
of preconditions and assumptions as well as their cleansing of their adventitious 
impurities in order to understand “what is” and meet the demands of Hegel’s 
philosophical truth. However, this truth for Hegel is not the capitulation of 
thought to given reality but the elevation of reality to the concept (Begriff). Thus, 
the comprehension of “what is”, is not the positing of reality out of concepts but 
a process in which the material generated empirically and historically is brought 
to the concept. In that respect, Hegel conjoins reason and reality not to legitimate 
existing conditions but in order to judge them.26 Therefore, as Buchwalter 
summarizes, Hegel’s true reality or actuality establishes: Firstly, a developmental 
order of conceptual categories (different from empirically generated 
phenomena); and Secondly, new categories via a conceptual reconstruction, 
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expanding categories and principles which have been ascertained in an empirical 
manner.27 
At this point, as Buchwalter observes, Hegel’s immanent critique might 
strike one as paradoxical. This Hegelian reconstruction of actuality or true 
reality, judges reality not on its own standards but on a speculative concept of 
reason  that relies on a metaphysical dimension which allows one to suggest that 
it obstructs the critique of the real in its own terms.28 
Rosen too analyses extensively this seemingly paradoxical dimension of 
Hegel’s immanent critique from a different scope, referring to it as the post 
festum paradox. Nevertheless, Rosen argues that this paradox ceases to exist once 
Hegel’s dialectical method is treated as determinate negation within his 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). The confusion Hegel’s conceptualization 
of actuality and the concept (Begriff) raises is associated to Hegel’s 
understanding of the absolute, whole and truth.29  According to Hegel, “the true 
is the whole. But the whole is only the essence which completes itself through its 
development. It is to be said of the absolute that is essentially a result, that only 
at the end is it that which it is in truth […] the true form in which the truth exists 
can only be as its scientific system”.30 
As Rosen explains, if the truth requires a system, then it properly exists at 
the point of the completion for the system and what precedes it is only partial. 
Rosen notes that what interests us is how this point of completion is attained and 
whether we have arrived at it legitimately or not. However, he contends that 
since the standpoint of truth, can only be attained when this system is completed, 
we are not in a position to fully comprehend the method by which it was 
reached.31 Therefore, in Rosen’s words we are facing the following paradox, “to 
criticize Hegel is to claim that the system does not attain validly its point of 
completion […] but to critics any other than the point of completion violates a 
crucial presupposition of the system itself, namely, that only someone who has 
really attained its final point can perceive that rationality of its attainment. I shall 
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call this the post-festum paradox”. 32  According to Rosen the only way to 
overcome this paradox is to treat Hegel’s dialectical method as immanent 
critique. Such a dialectical method should be perceived as determinate negation, 
incorporating the previous opposing systems without discharging them as 
worthless illusions but as lower yet necessary standpoints which ultimately 
contribute to the formation of a complete philosophical system that is open, 
evolutionary and positive. 
Hegel’s dialectical method is premised on the notions of negativity and 
restlessness which are the key to acquire an accurate understanding of Hegel’s 
Spirit (Geist) and immanent critique. After taking into consideration negativity 
and restlessness, Hegelian dialectic can be perceived as sublation (Aufheben). 
According to Hegel, sublation (Aufheben) is a reconciliation of opposites that 
does not eliminate the two opposites within it. In that respect, Hegel’s dialectical 
method, maintains the unity of the opposites, while carrying its own 
contradiction within itself which explains how it assumes an evolutionary role.  
The excerpt below indicates that the notions of restlessness and 
determinate negation underlie not only Hegel’s dialectical method but also his 
conceptualization of Spirit (Geist). Hegel, in paragraph 377 found in the 
Philosophy of Mind contends that: 
Spirit is not an inert being but on the contrary, absolutely restless, being pure 
activity, the negating or ideality of every fixed category of the abstractive intellect; not 
abstractly simple but in its simplicity at the same time distinguishing of itself from itself; 
not an essence that is already finished and complete before its manifestation, hiding 
itself behind its appearances but an essence which is truly actual only through the 
determinate forms of its necessary self-manifestation.33     
Nancy cites this excerpt too in order to argue how the Spirit (Geist) 
nourishes the notions of negativity and restlessness which permit the conjunction 
between reason and reality in immanent terms rather than transcendental via the 
dialectical process. As Nancy observes, for Hegel the (empirical) world - the 
realm of the finite - is sheltered and revealed in the infinite work of negativity. 
According to Hegel, this empirical world is not a simple fact which can be 
understood directly through a descriptive empirical approach. Also, for Hegel the 
                                                
32 Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, 24 
33 Georg W. F. Hegel , Philosophy of Mind, trans. A. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 3 
 24 
empirical reality can not be perceived or determined by a transcendental a-
priorism driven by a prescriptive idealistic approach. Hegel, via the evolutionary 
realm of Spirit (Geist) conceptualizes the empirical world in terms of its own 
movement and restlessness. It is in the restlessness of the immanent empirical 
world that the Spirit actualizes.34 As Nancy argues, ‘the Spirit neither seeks 
itself, it neither finds itself but effectuates itself: it is the living restlessness of its 
own concrete effectivity’. 35  Finally, the subject becomes the means which 
permits the Spirit to actualize itself in the immanent empirical world. 
Specifically, the subject’s self-consciousness which is seized according to Hegel 
via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, allows the Spirit to actualize itself.  
Moreover the reading of the dialectic as restless and sublating (Aufheben) 
from the perspective of determinate negation has an impact on Hegel’s 
subjectivity. Hegel’s understanding of subjectivity also reflects the notions of 
negativity and restlessness. As Nancy contends, ‘the subject is what it does, in its 
act and its doing is the experience of the consciousness of the negativity of 
substance as the concrete experience and consciousness of the modern history of 
the world’.36 Thus, for Hegel, the self is not an autonomous or a self-determining 
entity. On the contrary the self’s consciousness is a process characterized by 
evolutionary moments, including that of separating from itself while maintaining 
a relation with the empirical world. The development of self-consciousness 
reflects a relation whose terms are not given, marking a separation from itself 
which liberates itself not in transcendental terms but in terms of the immanent 
empirical reality.  
At this point it is important to stress that the treatment of Hegel’s 
dialectic as restless does not suggest that the dialectic has contingent effects due 
to the realization of reason and subjectivity in terms of the immanent empirical 
world which is ephemeral. On the contrary, the understanding of Hegel’s notion 
of subjectivity which is formed via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, 
illustrate the positive effects of Hegel’s dialectical method. Therefore, Hegel’s 
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), subjectivity and reason can be perceived via 
immanent critique which in turn elevates reality the concept (Begriff).  
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Rosen stresses too the positive dimension of Hegel’s dialectical system. 
For Rosen, the positive dimension of this system is assumed after the dismissal 
of dialectic’s skeptical dimension and the production of a positive outcome that 
rests on the evolutionary mode of Hegel’s system. Rosen insists that Hegel’s 
dialectical method cannot be separated from his system. The Hegelian method 
cannot be extracted. The object of Hegel’s science is the system of truth and the 
notion of the concept (Begriff).37 As Hegel argues ‘Now only the communication 
of the scientific method but even the notion (Begriff) of the science itself belongs 
to the [Logic’s] content and constitutes indeed its final result’. Therefore, after 
treating immanent critique as a dialectic of determinate negation, it becomes 
clear how the post-festum paradox is overcome and why Hegel’s dialectical 
method cannot be separated from his system. In that respect the inability to reply 
“what is” in advance is neither nourishing a paradox nor applying an objectivist 
or transcendental criterion of attaining knowledge beyond reality. Hegel’s 
alternative treatment of reality and reason via the dialectic as determinate 
negation brings out this knowledge within reality as its last element and 
completion.  
As Rosen notes, such an understanding of the dialectical method appears 
to defuse the paradox’s destructive implications. The dialectical method, does 
not pose a method in the sense of a procedure, presupposed and intersubjectively 
acknowledged prior to the commencement of its investigation. In Rosen’s words 
the dialectic is a ‘law into itself’. 38  Being a law into itself, dialectic is 
autonomous which is not the same thing as being arbitrary. Dialectic can escape 
this charge of arbitrariness by returning to its roots in the sense of a purposeful 
discussion, dialogue, debate.39 On this view the dialectic is methodologically 
open, positive and autonomous, generating binding principles from its own 
resources which are neither arbitrary nor transcendental, supporting the 
understanding of dialectic as immanent critique. As Hegel notes ‘the general 
remark has already been made elsewhere with regard to the refutation of a 
philosophical system, that the erroneous conception must be excluded by which 
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the system is to be presented as entirely false and as if the true system by contrast 
was merely opposed to the false one’.40  
Therefore for the dialectic as determinate negation, opposing systems are 
not just worthless illusions, they are rational enterprises, albeit imperfect ones. 
The true system develops and vindicates itself by including these lower 
standpoints within itself. But it must not do that ‘externally’. It must establish 
common ground with them, and this means participating in their assumptions.41 
Thus, the doctrine of determinate negation amounts to the claim that negation in 
the course of the dialectic is positive. As Hegel notes ‘the only prerequisite for 
the acquisition of scientific progression – is the acquisition of the logical 
proposition that the negative is equally positive or that which contradicts itself 
does not dissolve into zero but essentially into the negation of its particular 
content or that such a negation is not all negation but the negation of the 
determinate subject-matter which dissolves and is thus determinate negation’.42  
This thesis about the nature of immanent critique that leads to a positive 
result is fundamental to Hegel’s understanding of the nature of his philosophical 
system. Moreover the treatment of the dialectical method as immanent critique 
which assumes the doctrine of determinate negation allows Hegel to overcome 
the sceptical dimension of his philosophical system. This understanding of 
criticism in purely negative terms, makes formal philosophy the ally of 
scepticism.43  But Hegel’s philosophical system avoids this by producing a 
positive result which is clearly stressed in Hegel’s late work. As Hegel notes in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘true philosophy includes the sceptical principle as 
a subordinate function of its own in the shape of dialectic. In contradiction to 
scepticism however, philosophy does not remain content with the purely negative 
result of the dialectic. Scepticism mistakes the true value of its result when it 
holds fast to it as mere, that is to say abstract negation. The negative, as the result 
of the dialectic is at the same time positive; it contains what it results from 
absorbed into itself and does not exist without it’.  Rosen adds that, the 
‘scepticism’ of the natural consciousness which denies the possibility of a 
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positive result from immanent critique is displayed in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, as ‘one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness that has already been 
left behind. In that respect, scepticism is taken to be an incomplete pattern of 
consciousness which is succeeded by a higher and more complete stage of 
consciousness within the sequence of determinate negation which transforms 
Hegelian dialectic into a positive process.44  
The previous paragraphs explained how the treatment of Immanent 
Critique as a dialectical process of determinate negation, defuses the post-festum 
paradox and the allegation according to which Hegel’s conjunction of reason 
with reality lies on a transcendental dimension which obstructs the critique of the 
real in its own terms. The following paragraphs, after citing Beiser’s 
interpretation of Hegel, explain how Hegel’s metaphysical dimension should not 
be equated to transcendentalism. Moreover, from this analysis it will become 
clear that immanent critique as a dialectical process of determinate negation 
which escapes scepticism and the implications of the post-festum paradox, can 
only be perceived from such a metaphysical dimension and the notion of the 
Spirit (Geist). This conceptualisation of metaphysics allows the dialectic to 
assume a positive role within Hegel’s system, after including the lower 
standpoints of consciousness within itself, contributing to the conjunction of 
reason and reality that does not rest on a transcendental dimension.  
III.	  On	  Hegel’s	  Metaphysics,	  the	  Notion	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  and	  the	  
Contribution	  of	  Immanent	  Critique	  
 
Let us recall that, according to Buchwalter, Hegel’s immanent critique 
evaluates and challenges reality not with arbitrary constructions but with norms 
which are part of the reality itself. Immanent critique, eliminates the conflict 
between reality and its true essence, resting on Hegel’s metaphysical dimension 
and the notion of Spirit (Geist), without however depending on a transcendental 
notion of reason.  
Therefore, in order to acquire a more complete understanding of the 
immanent critique, it is important not only to consider Hegel’s metaphysical 
dimension but also to understand how Hegel perceives metaphysics and the 
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notion of the Absolute. As Beiser stresses, “Hegel’s philosophy is not 
metaphysical in the sense proscribed by Kant […] Hegel denied the experience 
of the transcendent, the purely noumenal or supernatural. Hegel’s own concept of 
the infinite or unconditioned is entirely immanent, the infinite does not exist 
beyond the finite world but only within it”.45 
It has already been argued that immanent critique contributes to the 
understanding of actuality after decomposing the preconditions that form our 
incomplete understanding of reality, via the notion of the pure concept (Begriff) 
which rests on Hegel’s conceptualization of the Absolute.46  
For Hegel, the notion of Absolute is tied to metaphysics without alluding 
to a transcendental or a theological dimension. As Beiser explains, Hegel’s 
metaphysics differ from theology since Hegel argues that the Absolute should be 
the result, not the starting point of doing philosophy.47 Unlike theology, Hegel 
insists that it is only after an investigation that the philosopher understands that 
the object and subject matter of philosophy has been all along the Absolute.48 
According to Hegel the object and subject of knowledge are embodiments of the 
Absolute and not meant to be separated. The notion of the Absolute, allows 
Hegel to overcome this dualism denying that there should be a separation 
between: the subjective and objective, the ideal and the real, the mental and 
physical, the universal and particular, affirming instead that they are distinct 
moment of the same process. This becomes clear in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
elaborating on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge 
challenging ordinary experiencing. That the subject is distinct from the object 
(meaning that the object is given and produces representations independent of 
our will) is a fact of ordinary experience. Nevertheless, Hegel contends that 
philosophy should not dismiss this appearance as an illusion but it should explain 
and show its necessity. Philosophy is capable of explaining the opposition 
between the subject and object of knowledge as an incomplete pattern of 
consciousness entailed in ordinary experience which is succeeded by a higher 
and more complete stage of consciousness which overcomes this distinction.49  
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As Hegel overcomes the separation between the subject and object of 
knowledge, similarly he treats the universal and particular as complementary. 
Beiser notes that according to Hegel, universals do not exist as such but only en 
re in particular things. In that respect the content of the universal forms is 
occupied by the particular, bridging the gap between empiricism and idealism. 
According to Hegel’s notion of the Absolute, the dispute between empiricism 
and idealism is misconceived. The Absolute is neither subjective nor objective, 
neither founded on idealism nor on empiricism, neither universal nor particular. 
The combination of these dimensions: subjective-objective, idealism-empiricism, 
universal-particular, are equally essential and necessary condition for the self-
realisation of the Absolute. This becomes clearer in the Philosophy of Right.  
Hegel contents that the subject seizes self-consciousness and freedom via the 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state, suggesting that the Absolute, fully 
realises itself in the realm of history and the state in the domain of culture, art, 
and ethics.  In that respect, the Hegelian notion of the Absolute is neither 
dualistic nor transcendental, but immanent.50   
Finally, Beiser stresses that Hegel’s notion of the Absolute proceeds from 
an evolutionary organic vision of the world. Hegel understands the Absolute in 
organic terms. The organic view of the world appears throughout Hegel’s system 
and plays a fundamental role in its logic, ethics, politics and aesthetics. The 
significance of this organic vision is also evident from Hegel’s conceptualisation 
of the dialectic as determinate negation which rests on the unity of the opposites, 
while maintaining them, ultimately forming an identity-in-difference. All these 
concepts grew from his organic concept of nature and presuppose, what Beiser 
defines as a triadic schema; “unity, difference, unity-in-difference”. The 
oxymoronic aspect of these concepts derives from the thesis that organic 
development is essentially a movement between opposites: unity and difference; 
essence and appearance; idealism and empiricism; universalism and 
particularism.51  
Hegel’s organic world view is also tied to the philosophical system of 
Spirit (Geist). As Beiser observes, Hegel never understood the notion of the 
Spirit (Geist) as something transcendent and associated the Spirit with the 
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evolution of history, society and human within the state.52 Singer argues that 
Hegel has always been concerned with the nature of mind or consciousness and 
its relation to the physical world avoiding the division of human nature between 
senses and reason, body and mind.53 Taylor stresses that the epistemological gap 
between man and nature expresses itself in its best known form in the Kantian 
distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. The latter were in 
principle unknowable. Hegel directs a powerful polemic against the thing-in-
itself, rejecting transcendentalism, as he was against this abstract segregation 
between man and nature, senses and reason, body-mind. In brief, this opposition 
is overcome in the fact that our knowledge of the world turns ultimately into the 
Spirit’s  (Geist) self-knowledge. For we come to discover that the world which is 
supposedly beyond thought, is really posited 54  by thought, that it is a 
manifestation of rational necessity. As Taylor argues, for Hegel, this dualism 
between subject and world, rationalism and empiricism is overcome after 
perceiving the world as the necessary expression of thought while seeing 
ourselves as the medium that assists the actualisation of this thought (in the 
physical world) at the point where it becomes conscious.55  
According to Hegel, the misleading dualism between infinite-finitude, 
man-nature, senses-reason, body-mind, can be overcome once the Spirit’s 
infinite dimension is realised via the finite subject. For Hegel, the finite subject 
must be a part of a larger organic order. But since this is an order deployed by an 
unconditional rational necessity it is at no point foreign to ourselves as rational 
subjects. The rational agent loses none of her freedom in coming to accept (that 
she becomes the medium of the Spirit’s actualisation in the physical world) this 
vocation as vehicle of cosmic necessity. Nor does this union with the Spirit only 
accommodate us as subjects of rational thought at the expense of our empirical 
desiring nature. The Spirit as an infinite subject is such that in order to be, it must 
have an external embodiment. The infinite subject can only be through a finite 
one. Two related essential features of the Hegelian solution follow from this. The 
first is that the unity of man and world, the finite and infinite subject does not 
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abolish the difference but ultimately retains the difference in it. We remain finite 
subjects over against the world and Spirit, subjects with all the particularities of 
our time, place and circumstances, even as we come to see this particular 
existence as part of a larger plan, as we come to be the mediums which assist the 
actualisation of the Spirit.56 As Taylor notes, humans are not merely a part of the 
infinite world. In another way humans reflects the organic whole: the Spirit 
(Geist) which expresses itself in the external reality of nature, only comes to 
conscious expression and self-awareness in humans.57 
The finite person’s relation to this infinite creative force - Spirit (Geist) - is 
reflected in the notion that human consciousness does not simply represent a 
passive part determined by nature but an active one that completes or perfects it. 
On this view, the Spirit (Geist), which unfolds in the physical world, is striving 
to complete itself in conscious self-knowledge and the locus of this self-
consciousness is the mind of humans. So the Spirit (Geist) reaches its fullest 
expression in self-awareness. But this is not achieved in some transcendent realm 
beyond humans. This is achieved, as Hegel elaborates in the Philosophy of Right, 
once the individual seizes her self-consciousness and freedom via the realm of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the State.58 In that respect, Hegel’s notion of 
Spirit is not essentially transcendental but associates to the society’s and the 
state’s evolution.  
Therefore, Hegel did not annul the dualism between finitude-infinity, 
man-nature, body-mind, senses-reason. On the contrary, he treated this dualism 
as something which unites rather than something that separates. Hegel’s notion 
of Spirit (Geist) made that possible. This idea of duality, which is overcome 
without being abolished, finds expression in two Hegelian terms sublation 
(Aufhebung) and reconciliation which help articulate the treatment of Hegel’s 
dialectic as determinate negation. These terms imply that although the dualism 
remains, its opposition is overcome. Ultimately, the distinction between: 
finitude-infinity, man-nature, senses-reason is overcome only after supporting 
that the Spirit’s (Geist’s) self-awareness is formed via the humans’ self-
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consciousness in the physical world (formed via the ethical life/ Sittlichkeit in the 
state), undermining any transcendental conceptualisation of the Spirit.59  
The	  Contribution	  of	  Immanent	  Critique	  After	  Conceptualizing	  Hegel’s	  
Metaphysics	  and	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  from	  a	  non-­‐Transcendental	  Dimension	  
 
The previous analysis elaborated that immanent critique does not appear 
paradoxical once Hegel’s metaphysical dimension and the philosophical system 
of Spirit (Geist) ceases to be ignored. The paradoxical impression, according to 
which immanent critique assumes a transcendental status which obstructs the 
critique of the real in its own terms, is challenged after emphasising on an 
interpretation of Hegel’s philosophical system which takes into consideration the 
dimension of metaphysics and the realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s philosophical 
system of Spirit (Geist) is founded upon an organic vision of the world that 
promotes an evolutionary notion of dialectics which rests on the following triadic 
schema: unity-difference-unity in difference. Such a dialectical schema avoids 
the dualism which keeps separate: the subject from the object of knowledge, 
reason from reality, rationalism from empiricism, the universal from the 
particular, contributing to a non-transcendent conceptualisation of the Absolute 
and of the Spirit (Geist).  
As Buchwalter stresses, the non-transcendent conceptualisation of 
immanent critique succeeds in reconciling reality with reason, empiricism with 
idealism and the Universal with the Particular. According to Buchwalter, 
immanent critique is not purely transcendental since for Hegel the reality of the 
logic (Sache der Logik) can only provide access to the logic of reality (Logik der 
Sache).60 Only with an account of the appropriate concept (begriff) can one judge 
the adequacy of any empirical conjunction of form and content. Thus, the 
evaluation of an empirical condition in terms of the subject’s own cognition, is 
an incomplete process of acquiring knowledge and perceiving reality.61 As 
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Buchwalter adds, immanent critique for Hegel presupposes a metaphysical 
approach to reality, one focused not on given definitions of reality determined by 
the subject alone but ‘on those pertaining to what the object is in and of itself’. 
Only by focusing on the essential and underlying nature of things, does one 
analyze an entity in terms of its own intrinsic concept.62 As Hegel argues in the 
Philosophy of Right, a concept of critique focused on an immanent analysis of 
the relation of a thing to its true essence, does not attend to standards contained 
"in the subject’s ideas and language" but to those conforming to "the essential 
nature of the thing itself".63   
The previous paragraph illustrated that an understanding of immanent 
critique, which is premised on the notion of Spirit (Geist) provides us a more 
complete understanding of subjectivity and empirical reality. The following 
paragraphs outline how this approach of Hegel’ immanent critique can enrich our 
understanding of ethics, freedom and citizenship, designating the limits of 
Kantian, empirical or liberal ideas.    
Let us remind ourselves that immanent critique exposes and eliminates 
the contradiction between reality and its true essence, explaining how the real is 
elevated to the pure concept (Begriff) rather than a concept determined solely by 
reality.64 This contradiction pertains not to the wholesale falsity of existing 
reality but to the disparity between existing reality and its true nature which 
separates empiricism from idealism. Hegel’s understanding of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) explains how the real is elevated to the pure concept (Begriff) 
reconciling empiricism with idealism. 
The forth chapter elaborates in detail the implications of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) on citizenship after re-examining reality and reason from the 
perspective of Hegel’s immanent critique, after citing Patten, Molland and 
Dickey. According to Dickey, Hegel treats ethical life (Sittlichkeit) not as a 
transcendental ideal but as an ideal situated within a historically-specific 
constellation of socioeconomic forces. Nevertheless, Hegel’s objective was to 
rectify the bourgeois socio-economic implications associated with a purely 
materialistic approach to economy that lead to the promotion of liberal ideals and 
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the alienation of citizens. For Dickey, Hegel resisted the Scottish scholars who 
insisted on treating individuals as social beings whose nature was essentially 
economic. Thus, Hegel’s conception of ethical life is essentially formed through 
the interplay between the moral and economic aspects of his thought which 
aspire to overcome the disparity between existing reality and its true nature.65 
From this perspective, Hegel’s concern with values and dispositions such as 
honour, courage and the notion of patriotism aim at redressing the purely-
economic-materialist approach that produces egotistic citizens alienated from 
their state.  
As Patten notes the aim of Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is therefore to 
integrate dispositions such as selflessness, patriotism and honour in regard to the 
community and the state founded on an alternative conceptualisation of freedom. 
Hegel’s notion of freedom, unlike Kant’s, is formed via the development of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the state, within the realm of Spirit. According to Kant, 
the subject alone is able to seize freedom. The Kantian subject attains freedom 
only via the exercise of reason, diminishing the influence of the senses, 
dispositions, social institutions and the immanent empirical world. Thus, from a 
Hegelian perspective Kant formulates an incomplete notion of subjectivity 
according to which the subject is perceived in the form of an individual ego that 
is autonomous and self-determining. Moreover, Hegel argues that Kant’s 
categorical imperative, upon which his notion of freedom rests, is abstract and 
vacuous, reproducing an empty formalism. By contrast, Hegelian thought 
overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom by offering an 
alternative account of subjectivity and freedom – one which is tied to his concept 
of Spirit (Geist) and determined by his notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the 
state.66 
To be rational, self-determining and free in the Hegelian sense, an agent 
must strive to synthesize his choices into rational harmony with his desires. 
According to Hegel, there are specific dispositions, feelings and motivations that 
an agent must possess in order to acquire self-consciousness via the ethical life 
within the state. Thus, Hegel places emphasis not exclusively on reason, but also 
                                                
65 Laurence Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 280-281 
66 Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 49-51   
 35 
on disposition. Hegel rejects Kant’s proposition that a moral action should be 
motivated by a transcendental notion of reason or duty alone, rather than by an 
inclination or desire on the part of the agent. Hegel argues that Kant’s doctrine of 
‘duty for the duty’s sake’ not only impedes understanding of how action arises at 
all, but also appears to underestimate the ethical significance of certain emotions 
and dispositions. For Hegel, it is only when an agent performs the right action 
with the right disposition (not any contingently-given desire) that she attains an 
awareness of the rationality of her activity and thus becomes a rationally self-
determining free subject.67 
Hegel’s notion of freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist) is a process - 
not merely an absence of dependence on the other, won outside of the other, but 
won within the other and actualized within the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the 
state. This notion of otherness which is maintained and forms a unity-in-
difference, echoes the sublating (Aufheben) effect of the dialectic as determinate 
negation. The same effect is also reflected on the fact that Hegel does not dismiss 
the civil society of alienated and antagonistic individuals but maintains it as an 
incomplete moment of ethical life.  
As Buchwalter adds it is true that Hegel treats civil society as a necessary 
moment of a process which leads to the development of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
via the evolutionary notion of Spirit (Geist). Yet this metaphysical consideration 
is necessary not to transcend the given but to actualize its true being, rendering it 
immanent.68 Similarly, Hegel’s immanent critique contributes to an alternative 
conceptualization of freedom, elucidated below, after attacking a concept of right 
which is based on an abstract universalist juridical restraint that safeguards 
private interests from external interference. Hegel maintains that true freedom is 
realized in a communitarian account of social relations, where others are 
regarded not as limitations but as conditions for the individual’s self-
consciousness and self-realization within the state.69 
These insights allow Hegel to differentiate from liberalism after 
challenging the liberal understanding of private right without jettisoning the 
concept of right itself. Hegel’s critique of liberal individualism which shapes the 
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notion of private rights, contributes to an enriched conceptualization of 
citizenship that will be elaborated in the following chapters. As Franco argues, 
Hegel offers a way out of the atomism and narrow self-interest of the traditional 
liberal theory. He offers us a conception of ethics (Sittlichkeit) and the social 
good which is more inspiring than simply securing life and property. He does all 
this without sacrificing the individual rights and liberties which constitute the 
central ideals of liberalism. With respect to these ideals, Hegel sets them in a 
larger context which endows them with a meaning, purpose and ethical conduct 
beyond the ordinarily given in traditional liberal theory.70 In Franco’s words 
‘Hegel’s subjective freedom, particularity, and even arbitrariness are not seen as 
ends in themselves but rather as essential elements in a much grander conception 
of the nature and overall destiny of human beings’.71 
As Hegel notes in the Philosophy of Right ‘if the state is confused with 
civil society and its determination is equated with security and protection of 
property and personal freedom, the interest of the individuals as such becomes 
the ultimate end for with they are united and follows from this that membership 
to the state is an optional matter. But the relationship of the state to the individual 
is of a quite different kind. Since the state is objective Spirit, it is only through 
being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth and 
ethical life. Union as such is the true content and end and the destiny of 
individuals is to lead a universal life’.72  
Also according to Buchwalter’s perspective, Hegel demonstrates that the 
liberal concept is unintelligible without a public dimension. Central to his 
argument is the concept of autonomous personality, the principle he claims 
informs modern principles of rights and liberties. For Hegel, the concept of 
personhood presupposes an established political community committed to the 
importance of every individual’s will. Personal rights have no meaning in a state 
of nature, where social relations are ruled by force, violence, and caprice. They 
require, instead, a lawfully ordered community and institutions that allows and 
encourages individuals freely to pursue their own conceptions of well-being. And 
because institutions guaranteeing personal autonomy are effective only to the 
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extent that individuals acknowledge the legitimacy of those institutions and 
contribute to their continued existence, rights are themselves meaningful only if 
individuals self-consciously embrace public duties within the state. Therefore, 
rights cannot simply be claimed; they have to be earned and won through the 
endless mediation of discipline acting upon the powers of cognition and will.73 
Rights have real meaning only when individuals recognize duties to uphold just 
institutions. As Hegel notes, ‘a man has rights insofar as he has duties, and duties 
insofar as he has rights".74 In short, personal rights are, for Hegel, intelligible 
only against the backdrop of a reciprocal relationship between individual and 
community within the state.  
The previous analysis suggested that Hegel’s alternative 
conceptualization of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom and ethical life can 
overcome the limits of  Kantian, liberal and empirical inspired approaches which 
strongly influence IR thought. Kantian thought is often referenced among 
prescriptive IR scholars who promote a universalist dimension which celebrates 
the cosmopolitanism of (human) rights and the transcendental sense of duty upon 
which a theory of transnational institutions can be founded. On the other hand, 
empiricism characterises descriptive IR approaches which rest on certain axioms 
which stem from the perspective of a self-determining subject of theory. These 
empirical approaches after treating the theorist as a self-determining subject, 
separate the subject from the object of theory and nourish a misleading account 
of knowledge.  
 On the contrary, Hegel’s immanent critique promotes an alternative 
understanding of subjectivity and freedom, based on the notion of Spirit (Geist), 
which can reveal the shortcomings of the IR approaches driven by Kantian, 
liberal or empiricist insights. Specifically, this Hegelian inspired thesis 
challenges the universalist effects of Kantian thought. Hegel’s insights will 
demonstrate in the following chapters that the application of Kantian thought to 
IR, fails to support the universalism of cosmopolitan norms and (human) rights 
which rely on a vacuous sense of duty. This vacuous notion of duty is not 
genuinely universal but often rests on particular (liberal) ideals with politically 
excluding effects. Similarly, this thesis will seek to show that the appropriation 
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of Foucault’s philosophy to IR thought which takes into consideration the 
particularities of diverse sociopolitical historical contexts, nurtures a relativistic 
account of subjectivity and knowledge which on occasion paves the way to the 
promotion of liberal ideals. As in the case of Kant, these liberal ideals trigger 
political exclusions which undermine the theoretical contribution of the 
Foucaultian inspired IR perspectives.  
Therefore, Hegel’s insights can expose the limits of Kantian and 
Foucaultian inspired IR thought while revealing how an incomplete 
understanding of subjectivity and freedom, formed by empirically descriptive or 
prescriptive theorising is responsible for nourishing liberal ideals. Hegel 
differentiates himself from liberalism after dismissing the individualistic self-
determination of the liberal subject by criticizing the liberal purpose of the state 
which prioritizes the protection of the individual’s life, liberty and property. 
Thus, the will of an individualistic, self-determining subject is not free, 
according to Hegel, since the agent’s sociopolitical choices rest on options 
determined by liberal ideals rather than the subject itself. Moreover the same 
liberal ideal which are neither neutral nor Universal, fail to promote 
sociopolitical diversity, pluralism and free will, triggering socio-political 
exclusions.  
Finally, this dissertation reaffirms the contribution of Hegelian thought 
after considering the significance of his notion of Spirit (Geist) towards the 
understanding of subjectivity, freedom, ethics and the state. Therefore an 
understanding of immanent critique that takes into consideration Hegel’s 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), allows us to acquire a more complete 
understanding of: 1) subjectivity after overcoming the separation between the 
subject and the object of knowledge; 2) ethics and norms after incorporating the 
universal and the particular dimension which avoids the separation between the 
form and its content; and 3) the interplay between empiricism and idealism 
which overcomes the treatment of knowledge and subjectivity as relativistic with 
regard to particular contexts.  
The next section illustrates how exactly Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
accommodates the interplay between: 1) the subject and the object of knowledge; 
2) the universal and the particular dimension; 3) empiricism and idealism.  
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How	  Hegel’s	  notion	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  Accommodates	  and	  Reconciles	  the	  
Interplay	  of	  Antithetical	  Dimensions	  
 
The previous part elucidated that Taylor, Beiser and Buchwalter take into 
consideration Hegel’s concept of Spirit (Geist) whose actualisation rests on the 
development of the subject’s consciousness via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the 
state; overcoming the examination of reality with transcendental means. Such a 
non-transcendental notion of Spirit (Geist), which unveils the contribution of 
immanent critique, accommodates the interplay between: 1) the subject and the 
object of knowledge; 2) the universal and the particular dimension; 3) 
empiricism and idealism. Before these three key points are analysed, it is 
important to comprehend how exactly the notions of Geist and Sittlichkeit were 
developed by Hegel in order to cope with certain philosophical dead-ends of his 
time. The notion of Spirit (Geist) and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) were Hegel’s reply 
to approaches which celebrated the division of human nature between body and 
mind as well as the limits of Kantian thought. Not only Hegel, but also Fichte75 
and Schiller, 76  rendered Kantian thought problematic. The shortcomings of 
Kantian thought are associated with: a misleading account of subjectivity and the 
intellectual nourishment of an empty formalism. 
Broadly, Hegel agrees with Kant and Fichte about this relationship 
between freedom, reason, and desire but departs from their framework. Hegel 
puts forward a different understanding of reason. Where Kant, for instance, looks 
to a formal principle such as the categorical imperative77 which in order to 
determine what reason demands, draws a distinction between man’s reason and 
passions. On the other hand, Hegel develops a richer, more concrete account of 
the ends and duties prescribed by reason, resting on the customary morality of 
the community (Sittlichkeit). 78  Hegel also thinks that the Kantian view of 
freedom underestimates the ethical significance of various emotions and feelings. 
                                                
75 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was a philosopher, one of the founding scholars of 
German idealism. 
76 Friedrich Von Schiller (1759-1805), German philosopher and poet. In his work Duty and 
Inclination he reconciles human senses with reason. 
77 Kant affirms the existence of  an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. The 
application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a 
sense of duty which is emancipating, instead of the individual desires which prohibit the subject’s 
self-control and determination. 
78 Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 43-45 
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Via Sittlichkeit the aim is to integrate dispositions such as selflessness, honour in 
one’s estate and patriotism into a theory of freedom and into ethics more 
generally. Hegel’s point is not that the objectively free agent is motivated by 
reason but that s/he is motivated by a desire that is reasonable or appropriate for 
her to have in the circumstances stemming from Sittlichkeit.79 
For Hegel, Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is a form of morality, the content of 
which is derived from social institutions (family, civil society, state). Thus, the 
subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself with community within 
the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel attempts to promote an alternative 
understanding of freedom based on an alternative conceptualisation of the 
subject and the state - within the realm of Spirit (Geist) - which stems from 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit). In this manner, Hegel provides an alternative 
conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity, which rests on the society and the 
culture of a community rather than on a self-determining and transcendent 
subject. Unlike Hegel, Kant equated the subject to a self-constituted individual 
and argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than 
senses or whims, in accordance to the categorical imperative. The application of 
categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a 
sense of duty, which is emancipating. However, the content of this sense of duty 
is vague in Kant’s thought.80 Hegel gives a concrete content to Kant’s seemingly 
abstract requirement of freedom. The categorical imperative is a vague universal 
duty that promotes and sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity, which is 
alienated from the community. On the contrary, Hegelian freedom overcomes the 
alienation of the self-determining subjects, which nourish the tension between 
the individual and her community and promotes the understanding of freedom 
via ethical life (Sittlichkeit). According to Hegel’s thought ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) is the customary morality of the community where the content of 
freedom is derived from the levels of society (family, civil society, state).81  
As Taylor notes, the notion of Spirit (Geist) which is responsible for 
promoting an alternative account of subjectivity, statehood, freedom and ethical 
life, grounds Hegel’s philosophy of history and politics in an ontological vision. 
                                                
79 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 54-56  
80 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 128-
132 
81 Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, 135-140 
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Via Spirit (Geist), Hegel develops a certain conception of the direction of history 
and of the shape of the fully realized state. The goal towards everything is the 
self-comprehension of Spirit or Reason. But the full realization of Spirit 
presupposes a certain development of man in history. Man starts off as an 
immediate being, sunk in his particular needs and natural drives. This is another 
way of putting the point that Spirit is initially divided from itself and has yet to 
return to itself. If man is to rise to the point where s/he can be the vehicle of this 
return, s/he has to be transformed, to undergo a long cultivation or formation 
(Bildung).82 This transformation is not seized by the individual subject alone but 
it is developed via the society as the subject’s self-consciousness is nourished by 
the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that is formed within the limits of the state.   
In other words, it is necessary for man to evolve culturally and politically 
in order to seize his/her free will and self-consciousness and assist the 
actualisation of Spirit (Geist). Thus, Sittlichkeit and the state become the means 
of this evolutionary process. This evolution rests on man’s attainment of a social 
life. Just as man does not acquire consciousness alone but socially; similarly the 
Spirit (Geist), can only know itself in the world after bringing about an adequate 
embodiment in human life, in which it can recognize itself. The goal of world 
history is that Spirit (Geist) comes to a knowledge of what truly is and realizes 
itself in a world which lies before it. In order to realize Spirit’s (Geist) fulfilment, 
humans need to envision themselves as a part of a larger life. And that requires 
as a living being to be socially integrated into a larger life. The state is the real 
expression of that universal life which is the necessary embodiment for the 
vision of the absolute. Thus, society and the state are essential to Spirit’s (Geist) 
and man’s progress. This is what Hegel means in that famous line of the 
Philosophy of Right ‘that the state is the march of God through the world’, which 
triggered various interpretations, often treating Hegel as the anti-liberal apologist 
of the Prussianism.83  
1) Regarding the interplay between the subject and the object of 
knowledge, the philosophical system of Spirit helped to clarify that Hegel did 
neither promote the understanding of the subject in the form of the indeterminate, 
                                                
82 Charles Taylor, Hegel And Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
72 
83 Taylor, Hegel And Modern Society, 73 
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relativistic individual nor in the form of the individual self-determining, 
autonomous ego. Both forms rest on Hegel’s incomplete moments of will, which 
once abstracted from the realm of Spirit (Geist) and treated independently, they 
contribute to a lack of self-consciousness and free will. To begin with, Hegel 
doesn’t treat self-consciousness, free will and reason as something (naturally) 
predetermined or entailed upon the individual. As Taylor stresses, a developed 
self-consciousness and rationality is not something a human starts with but 
something he comes to. This means two things: first, beyond the hierarchy of 
forms of life, there is a hierarchy of modes of thought. As a person’s rational 
consciousness of herself evolves, so her mode of expression of this self-
consciousness is altered. A person’s language, art, religion, philosophy must 
change; for thought cannot alter without a transformation of its medium. Thus, 
there must be a hierarchy of modes of expression in which the higher one is more 
accurate, lucid and coherent than the lower one. The fact that rationality and 
consciousness are something a human achieves rather than starts with, means 
that the formation of subjectivity is contingent and has a history. In order for the 
subject to acquire self-consciousness and freewill, s/he has to work her way with 
efforts and struggle through the various stages of lesser or more distorted 
consciousness or in Hegel’s terms succeed the moments of will. S/he starts as a 
primitive being and has to acquire consciousness and a social culture painfully 
and slowly. This, as it has already been stressed, does not rest on the subject’s 
individual efforts but develops socially within the realm of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) that is nourished in the state.  
In that sense Hegel does not associate subjectivity with the autonomous 
individual ego who is self-determining. For Hegel, the subject’s self-
consciousness can only be developed socially, not independently, within the 
limits of the state and its particular community. A particular ethical life 
(Sittlichheit) is nurtured in the state, which assists the progression of the subject’s 
self-consciousness and freedom. We can thus see that this transformation over 
time involves more than the ascent up of a hierarchy of consciousness modes. It 
requires that the subject evolves her (self-)consciousness after transforming the 
immediate dispositions via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) into an appropriate 
disposition which expresses the demands of rationality and freedom. 
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In this regard, self-consciousness and subjectivity are contingent due to the 
evolution they undergo but are not relativist. Contingency is reflected in the first 
moment of will (Indeterminacy) which is incomplete but unavoidable since it 
allows the subject to progress and acquire self-consciousness and free will in 
terms of a particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Although the development of the 
ethical life echoes the particularity of a culture within the limits of a specific 
state, this does not render the formation of subjectivity relativistic. The formation 
of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the limits of particular states, rests on a specific 
culture but they all serve the evolution of subject’s consciousness within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist). Thus, the incorporation of Spirit (Geist) allows us to 
overcome any culturally or contextually relativistic account of subjectivity, since 
the subject’s ultimate goal is the seizure of its self-consciousness, free will and 
freedom which is absolute; whereas the cultural particularities of the each state’s 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) only serve as mediums for subject’s evolution.  
2) Regarding the interplay between the universal and particular, Hegel’s 
analysis helps us overcome the empty formalism of Kant’s approach which stems 
from the separation of the universal and the particular. The following chapters 
will demonstrate that both the approach of Kant himself as well as the Kantian 
inspired cosmopolitan approaches, separate the universal from the particular 
dimension and provide a misleading definition of ethics, duty, reason and 
freedom. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) has a crucial role here. Spirit (Geist) 
presupposes a certain development of man in history, so that man can evolve and 
form a self-conscious entity that assists the actualisation of the Spirit. In order to 
know itself in the world, the Spirit has to bring about an adequate embodiment in 
human life in which it can recognize itself. The state is essential for both man’s 
progress as well as the Spirit’s fulfilment. Since the goal of world history is that 
Spirit comes to a knowledge of what truly is, this can only take place via the 
evolution of the subject’s self-consciousness which is formed via the ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) of the state.84  
Sittlichkeit refers to the moral obligations the subject has towards the 
community. It is due to this interaction between the subject and the community 
of the State the subject belongs to that obligations emerge; and the fulfilment of 
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these obligations which stem from Sittlichkeit is what sustains and keeps it in 
being. Hence, in Sittlichkeit there is no gap between what ought to be and what 
is. In contrast to that, with Kantian morality (Moralität) the opposite holds. In 
Kant’s case we have an obligation to realize something which does not exist. The 
abstractness of the universality involved in the categorical imperative dismisses 
particularity and promotes an empty sense of duty.  The categorical imperative’s 
sense of duty which is promoted as an vacuous ought to be, contrasts to what is. 
And connected to this, the obligations of the subject are not formed by the 
community but from an individualistic rational will. Hegel’s critique of Kant can 
then be put in this way: Kant identifies ethical obligation with Moralität and 
cannot get beyond this. For he presents an abstract, formal notion of moral 
obligation which holds of man as an individual and which being is defined in 
contrast to nature as an endless opposition to what is.85 
Finally, the problem with Kant’s criterion of rationality is that he has 
purchased radical autonomy at the price of emptiness. Kant attempted to avoid 
any appeal to the way things are. The criterion of right is to be purely formal. 
Moral autonomy has been purchased at the price of vacuity. Kant’s concrete 
content of duty is deduced from the very idea of freedom itself. Because Kant 
only has a formal notion of freedom, he cannot derive his notion of the polity 
from it. His political theory ends up borrowing from the utilitarians. Its input is 
the utilitarian vision of a society of individuals, each seeking happiness in their 
own way. The problem of politics is to find a way of limiting the freedom of 
each so that it can co-exist with that of all others under an abstract, universal law 
which has a form but lacks a content derived from the polity.86  
3) Finally, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) accommodates the interplay 
between empiricism and idealism which prevents the development of subjectivity 
and reason on transcendental premises and dismisses a relativistic treatment of 
knowledge. Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) overcomes the relativistic treatment 
of knowledge after incorporating historicism without lapsing into relativism 
which allows the interplay between empiricism and idealism. As Beiser notes, 
the concept of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to pursue a philosophical enquiry 
which is neither descriptive (prioritizing empiricism) nor prescriptive 
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(prioritizing idealism). Hegel’s objective is not to construct ideals but understand 
what is actual. Spirit (Geist) assists Hegel to exhibit the rationality or reason 
which has informed the development of history. The fundamental claim behind 
this conception is that any universal concept or value such as reason, ethics or 
nation are embodied in the culture and language of people at a specific place and 
time.87 The co-existence of particularity with universality in Hegel’s social 
historical teleology is maintained as Hegel preserves the truths and cancels the 
errors of idealist and historicist traditions. Hegel, without dismissing the 
idealist’s formalism that values are objective (entailing a universal status) he 
accuses them of seeing the values as eternal norms above history or as static 
essences within nature. Rather, these values are realized only in history and 
through the activity of particular individuals. In plain terms, according to Hegel, 
the actualization of (universal) values can only take place within (particular) 
historical contexts. Also, from a Hegelian perspective, the historicists were 
correct to see the norms embodied in the way of life of a people but their flaw 
lies in the identification of norms or values solely with particular contexts. 
Certain scholars accused the historicists of confusing the historical explanation 
of values with their demonstration. Historical explanation merely focuses on 
factual causes (particularity). On the other hand Hegel’s approach emphasizes on 
an evolutionary development of history which underlines the formation of 
particular norms or values within the realm of Spirit (Geist).88  
In that respect, the notion of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to bridge the gap 
between idealism and empiricism and overcomes the treatment knowledge as 
relativistic with regard to the contingency of historical events. This allows Hegel 
to form a more complete account of subjectivity and knowledge. The following 
chapter demonstrates this point in detail after revealing the shortcomings of 
descriptive and prescriptive IR approaches to security. The superiority of Hegel’s 
conceptualisation of subjectivity and knowledge concerning interstate relations 
and security becomes clear after avoiding the separation of the subject from the 
object of theory.  
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CHAPTER	  1:	  Hegel’s	   Contribution	  On	   Interstate	  Relations,	  
War	  and	  Security	  via	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Immanent	  Critique	  
Overview	  
 
The previous chapter elucidated how immanent critique avoids the separation of 
the subject from the object of knowledge thanks to Hegel’s dialectical method 
(determinate negation) and his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s 
method of immanent critique promotes an alternative understanding of 
subjectivity and knowledge which overcomes the limits of descriptive and 
prescriptive approaches. Let us recall that immanent critique avoids the 
examination of reality with arbitrary or transcendental means, avoiding the 
shortcomings of descriptive empirical approaches and the flaws of normative 
prescriptive theories. Therefore, this chapter after applying the insights of  
Hegel’s method of immanent critique on a diversity of IR approaches to security, 
illustrates that these approaches promote a misleading account of reality and 
knowledge because they rest on a flawed notion of subjectivity which stems from 
the separation of the subject from the object of study.  
The current chapter is divided in two parts. The first part focuses on the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) which serves as the 
theoretical premise of immanent critique. Immanent critique provides an 
enriched understanding of reality and knowledge, after Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
(Geist) it taken into consideration. According to Hegel, knowledge and 
subjectivity undergo an evolutionary process within the realm of Spirit (Geist) 
which rests on the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit delineates this evolutionary process between the 
subject and the object of knowledge, which prevents us from treating Hegel as a 
descriptive or prescriptive philosopher who offers an empiricist or normative 
account of contemporary politics, interstate relations, war and security. In that 
respect it is argued that Hegelian thought can provide a greater contribution to IR 
theory after taking into consideration his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). 
Therefore, this part enriches Hutching’s argument, according to which the 
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Phenomenology of Spirit should be taken into consideration in order to 
comprehend Hegel’s political philosophy (the Philosophy of Right) and acquire 
an enriched account of subjectivity which complements an insightful critique of 
IR thought.  
The second part further unveils the contribution of immanent critique to the 
IR field. After the previous part demonstrated why Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
(Geist) needs to be incorporated to our analysis, this part discloses that a 
diversity of IR approaches to security which separate the subject from the object 
of study, form an incomplete account of subjectivity and knowledge. 
Specifically, after analyzing (neo)Realism, the Copenhagen School and the 
Critical Security perspectives, it becomes clear that these approaches separate the 
subject from the object of knowledge. This becomes clear after taking into 
consideration the stages of consciousness as portrayed in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit which describe how the evolutionary process of knowledge and 
subjectivity is shaped after delineating the interplay between the subject and the 
object of knowledge.  
I.	   Implications	   of	   Considering	   Hegel’s	   Notion	   of	   Spirit	   (Geist)	   and	  
Prioritizing	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  	  
 
The previous chapter explained that immanent critique rests on the consideration 
of Hegel’s dialectical method (determinate negation) and his philosophical 
system of Spirit (Geist) whereas this part focuses on a detailed analysis of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist). According to 
Hegel the development of the subject’s self-consciousness and knowledge 
undergoes a process. This evolutionary process is founded on the interplay 
between the subject and the object of knowledge within the realm of Spirit 
(Geist) which permits a more accurate understanding of reality beyond 
transcendental or arbitrary means. As the following paragraphs illustrate, 
approaching reality and knowledge via transcendental or arbitrary means is 
misleading and rest on a flawed account of subjectivity which detaches the 
subject from the object of knowledge. According to the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and knowledge depends on the 
interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge. Therefore, once the 
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Phenomenology of Spirit is taken into consideration, one is capable of perceiving 
Hegel’s enriched understanding of subjectivity and knowledge which avoids the 
separation of the subject from the object of study, verifying the merits of 
immanent critique.  
 
On	  Hegel’s	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  and	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  
 
Hegel’s ideas should be taken into consideration within the philosophical 
system of Spirit (Geist) he is trying to develop. The Phenomenology of Spirit 
portrays the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and knowledge within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist). As Hutchings has already noted, the Phenomenology of 
Spirit should be treated as the point of departure in order to comprehend the 
Philosophy of Right.  After prioritizing the reading of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit and the notion of Spirit (Geist), it becomes clear that Hegel’s objective is 
neither descriptive nor prescriptive.1 As Hegel himself contends, in the preface of 
the Philosophy of Right, his study does not contain the science of the state but is 
an endeavour to apprehend the state as something inherently rational within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist). Thus, the instruction of the Philosophy of Right does not 
consist of teaching what the state ought to be but how the state is to be 
understood.2 
From this perspective, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ceases to appear as a 
study on inter-state relations, war and the limits of international institutions and 
law. Instead, it is an inquiry into how the subject’s self-consciousness emerges 
within the  ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is formed in the State, within the realm 
of Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit makes clear that rationality and self-
consciousness are not something a person starts with, but something she comes 
to. This means two things: First, beyond the hierarchy of the forms of life there is 
a hierarchy of the modes of thought. As a person’s rational consciousness of 
herself grows, her mode of expression of this self-consciousness evolves. Also, 
the fact that rationality and self-consciousness are something that a person 
                                                
1 Kimberly Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1999), 101 
2Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ,  10-11 
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achieves rather than starts with, means that she has a history.3 However, history 
is perceived here within the realm of Spirit (Geist) as a teleological process that 
serves the evolution of the subject’s knowledge and consciousness towards 
seizing freedom. In that sense, Hegel avoids using history as an infinite socio-
historical process that merely assists the subject to improve her cognitive 
capabilities, since that would promote a relativistic account of history and 
subjectivity. 
The Phenomenology of Spirit involves a description of how the forms of 
consciousness evolve historically, serving as an instructive process within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist). In that work, Hegel analyses the development of all forms 
of consciousness (Consciousness - Self Consciousness- Unhappy Consciousness) 
which describe the evolution of subjectivity and of obtaining knowledge within 
the realm of Spirit (Geist). According to Hegel consciousness evolves, one form 
succeeds the other. One starts with a simple form of consciousness that takes 
itself to be genuine knowledge. This simple form of consciousness will however 
prove itself to be something less than genuine knowledge and so will develop 
into another form of conscience and the process will continue until we reach true 
knowledge. The succession of one form of consciousness by another reveals a 
teleological process towards the subject’s seizure of self-consciousness and 
freedom.4 Again it is recalled that it is important to treat these forms in a 
cohesive manner, stressing the evolution of man’s consciousness rather than 
separate them and focus on a specific form, isolating it from the others just as 
certain scholars do with the lord-bondsman dialectic.   
The next section analyses Hegel’s forms of consciousness as found in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  The First one - ‘Consciousness’ - includes the 
moments of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Perception’ and ‘Understanding’. The Second 
one, - Self-Consciousness - includes the moments of ‘Lord-Bondsman dialectic’, 
‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’ while the third one - Unhappy Consciousness - 
ultimately leads to ‘Reason’ and the revelation of Spirit (Geist).  
 
                                                
3 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
20-21 
4 Peter Singer, Hegel: A Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 65-71 
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On	  Consciousness:	  ‘Sense	  Certainty’,	  ‘Perception’,	  ‘Understanding’	  
 
Hegel’s ‘Consciousness’ is divided into the moments of ‘Sense 
Certainty’, ‘Perception’, ‘Understanding’. In ‘Consciousness’, Hegel examines 
the subject-object relation and challenges the self-determining understanding of 
the subject. In that respect, Hegel argues how all possible models of experience, 
imagined from the point of view of the experiencer are neither accurate nor 
coherent. Hegel’s Phenomenology involves a process of imagining all possible 
models of experience. The moments of ‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Perception’, and 
‘Understanding’ illustrate that when experience is imagined from the point of 
view of the experiencer as a self-determining subject, is neither coherent nor 
possible and leads to a mis-orientating account of knowledge. 5  
Sense	  Certainty	  
 
Sense certainty makes no attempt to order or classify information. It has a 
claim to be a genuine knowledge for it is directly aware of ‘this’ without 
imposing on it the distorting filters of a conceptual scheme involving space, time 
or other categories. However, what is the ‘this’ Hegel wonders? If we take the 
‘this’ in the twofold shape of its being as ‘Now’ and ‘Here’, the dialectic it has in 
it, will receive a form as intelligible as the ‘this’ itself is.6  
To the question ‘what is now’, the answer eg is ‘Now is night’. This self-
preserving ‘Now’ is not immediate but mediated. This as well as that - such a 
thing we call a universal. So it is in fact the universal that is the true (content) of 
sense certainty. The universal is the true content of sense certainty and language 
expresses this true content alone, it is just not possible for us to ever to say or 
express in words, a sensuous being that we mean. Again therefore the ‘this’ 
shows itself to be a mediated universality.7 Now is in truth a plurality of ‘Now’s’ 
taken altogether and the pointing out this, the experience of learning that Now is 
a universal. Here is similarly a plurality of Heres. It is clear that the dialectic of 
                                                
5 Robert B. Pippin, Hegel on Self Consiousness:Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of 
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6 G F Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, 158-159 
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sense certainty is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its 
experience and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this history.8 
As Taylor comments, if being aware of something is being able to say 
something about it, then it involves grasping the objects before us through 
aspects they have in common or have in common with other things, rather than in 
their own particularity. It is this impossibility of bare knowledge of the particular 
that Hegel devotes most attention to in this chapter. Hegel’s argument for the 
necessary mediation of knowledge through a concept or universal has basically 
two stages: In the first, he imagines the protagonist of the sensible certainty 
answering the request to say by pure demonstratives (this-here-now). These must 
be inadequate expressions of what I am aware of. Such expressions could apply 
indifferently to many different contents and hence shows that there can be no 
immediate knowledge of the particular-knowledge unmediated by general or 
universal terms.9 
In brief, Sense-certainty, collapses through its own incoherence. We were 
led to appreciate the impossibility of knowledge of pure particulars and thus the 
necessity of bringing particular sense-experiences under some form of 
conceptual scheme, a scheme that classifies what we experience under a 
universal aspect.  
Perception	  
 
In the previous section the main argument was that we can grasp these 
particular objects of sense certainty by ‘pointing’. But the experience of pointing 
is that in trying to grasp one thing we show the fleeting, un-seizable nature of the 
particular and we can recover it and hold it before our gaze only by subsuming it 
under a universal. However, as Hegel notes, two moments occur: one being the 
very same movement of pointing out or the act of perceiving, while the other 
being the object perceived. And the object is the apprehended togetherness of the 
moments.10  
As Hegel mentions, at first, I become aware of the object as a particular, 
as a One. If in the course of perceiving it, something turns up which contradicts 
                                                
8 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 64 
9 Charles Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.142-143 
10Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 67-68 
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it, this is to be recognized as a reflection of mine.11 In other words, instead of 
pointing out as ‘this’ with the immediate certainty of sensation, this moment of 
knowledge sees a common feature among many ‘this’ and begins to take them as 
many appearances of the same thing, undermining the particular features or the 
‘oneness’ of this object while attributing to it a universal dimension.12 But this 
universal treatment of the object since it originates from us, it is essentially 
conditioned by us and hence the object ceases to be a self-identical universality 
at all.13 
 
Understanding	  or	  Intellect	  
 
Before we proceed to ‘Understanding’ or ‘Intellect’ (as it is referred in 
the Philosophy of Mind) an attempt will take place to summarize in simpler terms 
what has been discussed so far in Stace’s words.   
In sense-certainty the object has taken an independent position. It is this 
independence of the object which first gets recognition. It is not yet realized that 
the object is in its truth only a projection of myself. It is at first seen as a 
completely external, independent and alien from the subject. Thus, the object is 
isolated and unrelated to anything. For example, I perceive ‘this’ chair. But I 
perceive it as a chair, as a member of a class of things designated as chairs. The 
object purports to be ‘this’. An absolutely unrelated, unmediated sense-unit. But 
what is ‘this’? This is invested with a universal character, the very opposite of 
what it is supposed to have. So sense certainty refutes itself and breaks down. 
What the senses alone can apprehend is the object elevated with universality.14 
In ‘Perception’ the subject apprehends the chair, the table, the man, as 
members of the various classes of objects to which they belong. It apprehends 
them in class nature, their universal nature. The contradiction which it develops, 
is that between the individual and the universal. But at the same time its only 
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truth and meaning have already been shown, to consist in the fact that it is not an 
individual but a universal.15 The ‘truth’, can only be pure universality with the 
element of singleness dropped out altogether. Hence, consciousness now takes 
pure universality for its object which ceases to be an individual thing, and 
becomes a pure universal.16 
In the moment of ‘Intellect’, the subject evolves beyond ‘Perception’ as 
the mind necessarily passes to pure universals, which are not perceived as non-
sensuous universals. For instance, we can not see, or touch or sensuously 
perceive for example law, gravity etc. These are pure universals. When the mind 
takes for its object such pure universals it has become intellect, it seizes the 
process of Understanding. Thus, the intellect draws a distinction between reality 
and appearance (sensuous objects). It regards the universal as reality. However it 
is still aware of the single individuals of sense as appearance.17  
To sum up, in ‘Consciousness’, Hegel wishes to stress the limits posed to 
knowledge after treating the subject as a self ascribed authority. The forms of 
‘Sense Certainty’, ‘Understanding’ and ‘Intellect’ underscore the problematic 
account of knowledge which stems from the (self-determining) subject – object 
relation. According to Hegel, in ‘sense certainty’ the subject treats the object as a 
pure particular without imposing on it the distorting filters of a conceptual 
scheme such as space, time or other categories. Here, the subject makes no 
attempt to order or classify information. Yet, this form of consciousness fails to 
provide a reliable account of knowledge as the subject is led to appreciate the 
impossibility of knowledge after treating the object as pure particular. Eventually 
the subject is led to the necessity of bringing particular sense-experiences under 
some form of conceptual scheme that classifies what the subject experiences 
under a broader or universal category which dismisses the object’s 
particularity.18  
However, the treatment of the object in its particularity, as completely 
independent and alien from the subject, did not add to the subject’s knowledge 
according to Hegel. Thus, ‘sense certainty’ was succeeded by other forms of 
consciousness - namely ‘understanding’ and ‘intellect’ - in the subject’s attempt 
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to overcome the flaws of ‘sense-certainty’. The subject ended up establishing 
specific categories in order to classify the object and apprehend it. Once the 
object was placed under specific categories or classes via the subject’s ‘intellect’, 
the element of its particularity is dropped out altogether and assumed a universal 
dimension via its categorisation and classification.19 However, this moment of 
consciousness, which Hegel calls ‘Understanding’, appeared also to be 
incomplete too as the acquired knowledge of the object, consisted entirely in the 
universal and dismissed the object’s particular dimension.  
Yet, the moment of ‘intellect’ unveils the tension which exists between 
appearance and reality within the object’s inner truth as the object bears the 
antithesis between the universal (nourished by the categories of the subject’s 
mind) and the particular (nourished by the world of the senses). 20 Hence, it 
becomes clear that ‘Consciousness’ nurtures an incomplete account of 
knowledge due to the self-determining nature of the subject.  
On	  Self-­‐Consciousness:	  ‘The	  Desiring	  Subject’,	  ‘The	  Lord	  and	  Bondsman	  
Dialectic’,	  ‘Stoicism’	  and	  ‘Scepticism’	  	  
 
After Hegel demonstrating that knowledge which stems from the self-
determining subject and based on the subject-object interaction is incomplete, he 
proceeds to Phenomenology’s chapter four, entitled ‘Self-Consciousness’. This 
form of consciousness, succeeds the previous one marking the transition from 
Hegel’s subject-object relation to the subject-subject relation.  
In ‘sense-certainty’, ‘understanding’ and ‘intellect’ the subject was 
projected as a motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. However, Hegel in the important 
paragraphs 167 and 175, unveils the double nature of self-consciousness which is 
influenced by the object’s reception. Specifically, the consciousness of an object, 
as this-such (particular) and the non-positional consciousness awareness of my 
taking it to be this-such (object under a universal category) triggers a tension to 
self-consciousness which needs to be overcome. While describing this apparent 
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antithesis of self-consciousness, Hegel introduces us to the treatment of self-
consciousness as desire.21 
Hegel, notes that the subject is aware of a distinction between 
‘appearance’ and ‘reality’. The first addresses to the diversity stemming from the 
particularity of the independent theoretical object as such (Particularity). The 
second addresses the singularity of the real, which is formed by the subject that 
attempts to develop a prescriptive theory (Universal) and which neglects the 
objects’ particular characteristics as the subject aspires to control them after 
categorising them and classifying them. However, a self-conscious subject is 
aware that the distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is illusory, as the 
singularity of reality, when  emptied of all particular content (of theoretical 
objects) is a mere blank, whereas the pluralism of appearance when separated 
from the reality is a blind and unintelligible medley. Thus, for Hegel the 
conditions for the subject’s self-consciousness includes a double antithetical 
nature: i) the consciousness of a theoretical object as such, in itself; and ii) the 
theorist’s awareness of her/his thinking it to be as such. This is why for Hegel 
self-consciousness is desire. For the subject in order to acquire its self-certainty 
or prescriptive role needs to undermine the object’s independence upon which 
the subject is dependent. Although the subject acknowledges the illusory 
separation between ‘appearance’ (Particularity) and ‘reality’ (Universality) and 
tries to reject it; the subject re-introduces it in every attempt to become 
prescriptive and acquire self-certainty by undermining the independence of the 
object upon which it is depended on.22   
The ‘subject of Desire’ gives rise to three additional problematic forms of 
self-consciousness which spawn an flawed perception of knowledge and 
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Lord	  and	  Bondsman	  Dialectic	  
 
After analyzing the ‘desiring subject’, Hegel proceeds to the ‘lord-
bondsman dialectic’ describing the implications of the subject-subject relation 
while both attempt to seize their self-consciousness.  For Hegel each subject 
needs the other to establish her own awareness of herself, requiring 
acknowledgement or recognition. The demand for recognition is mutual however 
not equal, taking the form of the ‘Lord and Bondsman’. 
According to Hegel, self-consciousness exists in and for it-self when and 
by the fact that it so exists for another. At first is exhibited the side of the 
inequality of the two, as opposed to one another. One is being only recognized 
while the other is only recognizing. Each has indeed certainty of its own self, but 
not of the other. Hence, as individual self-certainties, the only truth they have is 
their own being-for-self. Therefore, they must engage in a struggle, for they must 
raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth both in the case of the other 
and in their own case. The demand for recognition is mutual however not equal, 
taking the form of the ‘Lord and Bondsman’. Since to begin with they are 
unequal and opposed, their reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved, they 
exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent 
consciousness (Lord) whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the 
dependent consciousness (Bondsman) whose essential nature is simply to live 
and be for another. In both of these moments the Lord achieves his recognition 
through another self-consciousness. However, according to Hegel, this form of 
self-consciousness is problematic too as the outcome is a recognition which is 
one-sided and unequal. The Lord acquires a recognition from a subject he does 
not acknowledge as equal and independent.23   
However, the outcome is a recognition which is one-sided and unequal. 
What now really confronts the lord is not an independent consciousness but a 
dependent one. On the other hand, the bondsman through his service he rids 
himself of his attachment to natural existence and become a ‘stoic’. Through 
work the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. While fashioning the 
thing he produces, he become aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he 
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himself exists essentially and actually in his own right. It is precisely via work, 
wherein the bondsman nourishes an alienated existence that allows her to 
acquires a mind of her own, re-discovering herself by herself after detaching 
from natural existence, seizing ultimately ‘Stoicism’.24 
Stoicism	  
 
Although ‘stoicism’ attempts to bridge the gap between the ‘lord’ and 
‘bondsman’, yet this form of consciousness is again problematic. According to 
Hegel, the repressed slave who has come to full self-awareness through work, 
finds a type of recognition and freedom via the withdrawal from the external 
world, retreating into her own self consciousness. However, once one chooses to 
remain simply in touch with oneself, ultimately, her thought is cut off from the 
real world, thus the subject remains solely in communion with herself.25 This 
type of freedom is called ‘stoicism’ where the subject appears to be indifferent to 
natural existence. 
The freedom of stoicism, nourishes away of thinking which has only pure 
thought as its truth, a truth lacking content and the fullness of life. Hence, the 
stoic freedom is only the notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom 
itself.26 According to Hegel, a Stoic is perplexed when she is asked for what is 
‘the criterion of truth as such’ is or in other words which is the content of thought 
itself. Hegel notes that for a stoic:   
[…] The true and the good shall consist in reasonableness but this self identity 
of thought is again only the pure form in which nothing is determined.’ The True and 
Good, wisdom and virtue, are general terms beyond which stoicism can not get and 
since in fact they can not produce expansion of the content, they soon become tedious.27 
Therefore for Hegel, ‘Stoicism’ represents an empty formalism and 
content-less thought as it is detached from the real world, contributing to a 
problematic form of consciousness.28  
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Finally, the moment of ‘scepticism’ succeeds stoicism as well as the 
subject’s notion of seeking freedom and recognition detached from the real 
world.  
The skeptic self-consciousness challenges the stoic indifference towards 
the real world as well as the stoic subject’s unchanging and genuine certainty of 
itself. On the contrary sceptic self-consciousness is itself is an absolute 
dialectical unrest. Due to this unrest, sceptic consciousness instead of being self-
identical it is transformed into a confused medley, the dizziness of a perpetually 
self-engendered disorder. Sceptic consciousness is aware of this as it maintains 
and creates this restless confusion. This consciousness rambles back and forth 
from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness, to the other extreme of 
the contingent consciousness. At one time it recognizes that its freedom lies in 
rising above all the contingency of existence and at the other admits to a relapse 
into occupying itself with what is unessential.29 As Hegel notes in paragraph 206: 
 In skepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as internally contradictory. 
From this experience emerges a new form of consciousness which brings together the 
two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart [...] this new form is therefore, one which 
knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself, as self liberating, unchangeable as well 
as self-bewildering, changeable and self-perverting, growing the awareness of this self-
contradictory nature of itself [...] In Scepticism this freedom becomes a reality, negates 
the other side of determinate existence, but really duplicates itself and now knows itself 
to be a duality. Unhappy consciousness of the self as a dual nature, is a merely 
contradictory being.30 
In plain terms, scepticism emerges when the subject although it aspires to 
be independent of the material world, at the same time it recognizes that it is part 
of the material world as her physical desires, pains and pleasures are real and 
inescapable. Thus, scepticism nourishes subject that fails to acquire self-
consciousness too as since is self-alienated and divided against itself.31  
Hegel’s analysis makes clear that all previous forms of consciousness 
nurture an incomplete account of knowledge, stressing how the self-conscious 
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and free subject is not something preexisting or a-priori. The subject’s self-
consciousness which ultimately leads to freedom, is gradually seized after an 
evolutionary process within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which is formed after the 
succession of the incomplete moments of the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’, 
‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’.  
Implications	  of	  Prioritizing	  Hegel’s	  Notion	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  and	  the	  
Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  on	  the	  Conceptualization	  of	  Subjectivity	  and	  
Knowledge	  	  
 
Therefore, once the Phenomenology of Spirit is taken into consideration, 
one is capable of perceiving Hegel’s enriched understanding of subjectivity and 
knowledge which avoids the separation of the subject from the object of study, 
verifying the merits of immanent critique. The Phenomenology of Spirit, allows 
us to understand that Hegel’s point of departure was an enquiry of (self-
)consciousness, subjectivity and obtaining knowledge. Before Hegel, most 
philosophers nourished the separation of: the subject from the object of theory; 
the universal from the particular; and reason from senses, rendering knowledge 
and (self-)consciousness problematic. In particular, Hegel addressed to Kant’s 
distinction between phenomena and the things-in-themselves. Hegel saw this 
distinction as part of the problem since the things-in-themselves obstructed 
knowledge as they were in principle unknowable. Hegel was against of this 
abstract separation between man - nature, senses - reason, body-mind. In brief, 
according to Hegel this opposition which echoes the ‘stoic’ form of 
consciousness can be overcome only after seeing the world as the necessary 
expression of the subject’s thought and rational necessity.32As the following part 
elaborates, Hegel accommodates rationalism with empiricism after taking into 
consideration the universal and the particular dimension within the realm of 
Spirit (Geist). As Beiser observes, for Hegel the universals exist only in 
particular things. The fundamental claim behind this conception is that any 
universal concept or value such as reason or ethics are embodied in particular 
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empirical contexts. The universal effects of these values is realized only in 
empirical terms and through the activity of particular individuals.33 
According to Hegel, the flaws of Kant’s thought are associated to the 
individualist notion of self-determining subjectivity which separates the subject 
from the object of knowledge while promoting an abstract understanding of 
freedom as Hegel observes in paragraph 135 found in the Philosophy of Right.34 
Kant argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than 
senses or whims, in accordance to a sense of duty he terms as categorical 
imperative.35 However, that content of this sense of duty is an empty formalism, 
argues Hegel.36 He instead provides a concrete content to Kant’s seemingly 
abstract requirement of freedom via what he defines as ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 
Ethical life is the customary morality which emerges in the community and 
develops in the state. This bridges the gap between senses-reason, reality-world 
of ideas and provides a communitarian dimension to Kant’s self-determining 
subject.37  
The actualization of Hegelian freedom in the state via ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit), unveils the limits of the Kantian sense of duty and morality upon 
which certain universalist or cosmopolitan approaches are founded. Hegel makes 
clear that a sense of duty and moral values cannot be based on abstract universal 
principles, empty of content, while illustrating the perils such approaches entail 
after he refers to the emergence of terror during the French revolution.38 
Therefore, when Hegel alludes to the key role of war and conflict-prone state 
relations; his point is not to stress in a descriptive manner the Hobbesian state of 
nature of inter-state affairs and prescribe a non-pacifist policy conduct in a realist 
vein.  Instead the instability of inter-state relations which stems from the uneasy 
process of recognition, appears necessary since it contributes to the formation of 
the state’s independent and sovereign status and allows the development of an 
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ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which contributes to the formation of the subject’s self-
consciousness and freedom. Unlike Kant, for Hegel self-consciousness and 
freedom can only emerge in the empirical field of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which 
is developed only within the limits of a sovereign state that celebrates a particular 
identity after differentiating itself culturally from the rest.39 War sometimes 
serves as the unfortunate medium which reinforces the state’s particular cultural 
awareness and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) after toning the citizens’ communitarian 
perspective. War, argues Hegel, encourages citizens to look beyond their private 
interests while reconciling both between themselves and their state, boosting 
further their self-consciousness and freedom.40 
To sum up, after treating the Phenomenology of Spirit as the point of 
departure in order to comprehend Hegel’s political philosophy (The Philosophy 
of Right) it becomes clear that Hegel:  
a) puts forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive after 
rejecting abstract a priori or normative claims. Instead Hegel develops an 
enriched understanding of subjectivity which rests on the evolution of the forms 
of consciousness within the realm of Spirit, avoiding the separation of the subject 
from the object of knowledge. The interplay between the subject and the object 
of theory permits the analysis of reality without arbitrary or transcendental 
means, verifying the contribution of immanent critique.  
b) develops an (immanent) understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and 
freedom which is not based on transcendental premises after elucidating that the 
subject’s self-consciousness and freedom is formed within the limits the 
sovereign state. More importantly, the Hegelian insights of the first point (a), 
serve as an invaluable intellectual tool which unveil the theoretical shortcomings 
of certain IR approaches to security, as the next part elaborates.  
Furthermore, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit allows us to follow the 
evolution of the forms of consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist). 
Therefore, the next part contends that Hegel’s analysis of subjectivity does not 
restrict itself to the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’ but incorporates too the 
moments of ‘Stoicism’, ‘Scepticism’ and ‘Unhappy Consciousness’, since they 
all reflect incomplete moments of self-consciousness.  
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Besides the ‘Lord and Bondsman dialectic’, the moments of ‘Stoicism’ 
and ‘Scepticism’ are of special interest here as they breach one important 
principle of immanent critique. Specifically, they separate the subject from the 
object of knowledge and nourish a flawed account of subjectivity according to 
which the self-determining or relativistic treatment of subjectivity promotes the 
examination of reality with transcendental or arbitrary means. In the next part, it 
will be argued how this flawed account of subjectivity is reflected on certain IR 
approaches to security. In particular the shortcomings of the Lord-Bondsman 
dialectic which promotes an incomplete account of subjectivity, appear on the 
Copenhagen School’s self-determining subject, which gives rise to a prescriptive 
account of security.  
Stoicism refers to an autonomous subject that cut off from the empirical 
environment. This subject is associated with mere thinking for itself, which relies 
on abstract self-imposed empty principles, echoing Kant’s transcendental 
subject. This flawed account of subjectivity is encountered in the Kantian 
perspectives of Critical Security approaches.  
Scepticism refers to a subject that is contingent and divided against itself. 
This is a form of self-alienated and relativistic subjectivity which does not allow 
the subject to acquire self-consciousness. The subject aspires to be independent 
of the material world while at the same time it recognizes that it is part of this 
material world. The Foucaultian inspired Critical Security approaches promote 
such a flawed account of subjectivity. 
Thus, the aftermath of the ‘Lord-Bondman dialectic’, is not the solution 
but a part of the problem since Scepticism and Stoicism are responsible too for 
the formation of an incomplete form of consciousness. Without incorporating the 
notion of Spirit (Geist) our understanding of subjectivity is incomplete since the 
dualism which separates; the universal from the particular, the subject from the 





II.	  The	  Contribution	  of	  Phenomenology	  of	  Spirit	  to	  a	  Critique	  of	  Certain	  
IR	  Approaches	  to	  Security	  
 
The previous part, after focusing on the Phenomenology of Spirit, stressed 
that Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit rejects abstract a priori normative 
claims. Moreover it was noted that Hegel is neither putting forward a prescriptive 
theory of interstate relations nor a normative account of universal values and 
norms. The evolution of the subject’s forms of consciousness, as presented in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, is tied with the concept of Spirit (Geist) and challenges 
the treatment of the subject as a self-dependent theorist who puts forward 
normative truths. Hegel rejects such normative truths in an attempt to indicate a 
dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object. As Hutchings 
notes, for such relations to be dynamic the subject as theorist should not have a 
pre-determined or fixed point of view, treating the object of study as passive. 
Such a relation between the subject and the object of knowledge which rests on 
the subject’s abstract normative claims, provides a fixed, descriptive account of 
theory which rests on an abstract (universalistic) premise, lacking a particular 
content. Thus, the object of study should not be treated as passive. In Hutchings’ 
words, the theorists must recognize themselves as patients and participants in the 
processes they seek to understand and judge.41  
This part demonstrates the contribution of immanent critique after 
scrutinizing a diversity of IR security approaches. It is argued that these 
approaches nourish a misleading account of reality and knowledge after 
employing arbitrary or transcendental analytical tools. Thus, it is noted that the 
separation of the subject from object of knowledge is responsible for the 
shortcomings of descriptive and prescriptive approaches which verifies the 
insights of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the contribution of immanent 
critique.  
Although the (neo)realist, the Copenhagen School and the Critical 
security approaches have been criticized before, a Hegelian critique inspired by 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, allows us to go one step further and demonstrate 
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that these security approaches convey a problematic account of knowledge due to 
their flawed: a) understanding of subjectivity;  and b) treatment of the subject-
object of theory relation.  
Therefore, after considering the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
coherently via the notion of Spirit (Geist), it will be stressed, how an incomplete 
perception of subjectivity, leads to an inaccurate account of consciousness and 
knowledge. The IR security approaches that will be scrutinized belong in the 
(neo)realist tradition, the Copenhagen and the Critical school of thought. 
Although it is acknowledged that many scholars have written extensively on each 
school, here emphasis is drawn on Buzan’s, Weaver’s and Jaap de Wilde’s 
approach regarding the Copenhagen School. Regarding the Critical school, Ken 
Booth’s, Michael Dillon’s and Andrew Neal’s approaches are taken into 
consideration. The objective is evaluate these IR approaches to security on the 
basis of their understanding of subjectivity in order to stress, from a Hegelian 
perspective, that their account of knowledge and security is problematic. Below, 
a parallel is drawn between the succession of Hegel’s forms of consciousness 
and the emergence of diverse security approaches.  
 This theoretical diversity among security theories echoes the succession 
of the forms of consciousness. According to the Phenomenology of Spirit, these 
forms of consciousness progressed after each new form challenged the previous 
one in terms of the relation between the subject and object of study. Similarly, it 
is argued that the understanding of security underwent similar changes as one 
theory attempted to rectify the other on the basis of the relation between the 
subject/ theorist - object of theory relation. Therefore, the contribution of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit lies on the fact that it allows us to see that these security 
approaches still remain incomplete and convey an inaccurate account of 
knowledge and reality due to a flawed understanding of subjectivity they 
nourish. This flawed account of subjectivity which rests on the separation of the 
subject from the object of knowledge while maintaining the separation of the 
universal from the particular dimension, verifies the contribution of immanent 
critique. Immanent critique stresses allows us to acknowledge that the 
aforementioned separations, provide an misleading account of subjectivity and 





How	  the	  (neo)Realist	  Security	  Approach	  Lapses	  into	  ‘Intellect’	  
 
In contrast to the method of immanent critique, the separation of the 
subject from the object of study triggers a misleading analysis of reality and 
knowledge, based on transcendental or arbitrary means. Such analysis, takes the 
form of a descriptive or a (normative) prescriptive approach which rests on a 
flawed account of subjectivity.  Here, it will be argued that the (neo)realist 
school suffers from the scholar’s attempt to provide such a prescriptive account 
of knowledge. (Neo)realists rest on a transcendental  understanding of scientific 
knowledge which yields a form of knowledge beyond time and history. This 
form of knowledge is dictated by the self-determining subject which treats 
external reality objectively and neglects Hegel’s distinction between 
‘Appearance’ and ‘Reality’, echoing the mode of Intellect/Understanding. The 
(neo)realist approach to security entails the scholar’s calculating approach to 
politics, often in the form of a closed inter-state system and the prescription of 
non-pacifist policy conduct. Thus, after citing Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
the insights offered by using his method of immanent critique become clear with 
respect to the (neo)realists, as their approaches is founded on a flawed 
understanding of subjectivity which  delivers a misleading account of reality and 
knowledge.  
According to Booth, the (neo)realist approach of security is characterised 
by two elements: a) emphasis on military threats; and b) status quo orientation 
after focusing on the antagonism among states that seek to strengthen themselves 
in a contending environment. 42  Moreover, Smith added that certain realist 
approaches of security were paired with rational choice theory by assuming that 
the states are rational, self-interested and value maximizing agents.43 
Keith Krause and Michael Williams deepened their critique against 
(neo)realist security approaches via the addition of an epistemological 
dimension. For them, the history of security studies follows the model of a 
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particular understanding of the growth of scientific knowledge which yields a 
form of knowledge beyond time and history. Neorealists such as Walt portray 
this view as the apogee in a linear process of scientific progress, creating an 
explicit epistemic hierarchy. However, as Krausse and Williams note, such claim 
to authority is justified by a commitment to a form of knowledge that is 
presented as self evident and authoritative but never fully articulated. More often 
than not, (neo)realist argumentation is supported through a series of fundamental 
claims which are presented as unproblematic facts.44  
(Neo)realist theory projects a positivist conception of states and their 
actions, and this rests on a self-determining understanding of subjectivity as the 
(neo)realist scholars assume that they treat the external reality to which they 
relate objectively. In a conception most commonly originating from Hobbes, the 
individual subject is treated as an autonomous rational actor, confronted by an 
environment filled with other similar actors. These actors pose for the 
(neo)realists as a source of insecurity, hence the classic security dilemma of 
(neo)realist theories.45 Hence (neo)realism entails not simply a claim about the 
nature of international relations but a claim to know: specifically a scientific 
claim to know objectively the reality of international relations. This belief in the 
appropriateness of the physical sciences as the model of knowledge and the 
desire to separate objective truth from subjective opinion is misleading. In 
(neo)realist theory the key to understanding the rational nature of reality is 
rationality itself. In epistemological terms this means that the discipline must 
treat phenomena under consideration as passive objects. The (neo)realist theory 
of IR puts forward the concept of rational self-interest as universal and 
unchallenged.46 Krause and Williams argue that unlike (neo)realist thought, we 
must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded 
in concrete historical conditions and practices rather than in abstract assertions of 
transcendental actors and scientific methods.47  
Already, Krause, Williams and Booth have already underscored that 
(neo)realism’s methodology entails flaws which rests on abstract transcendental  
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key premises such as the rational self-interest or materialistic utilitarian benefits, 
which fail to attribute a proper amount of consideration to particular historical 
conditions and practices. The (neo)realist declaration that the state is the subject 
of security, whereas anarchy the eternal condition of IR, is neither premised on 
‘objective’ facts nor on empirical premises  but is grounded in a set of claims 
which stem from the stand point of the self-determining subject. Hegelian 
insights helps us acknowledge that the shortcomings of (neo)realism are 
grounded in; a) The understanding of human subjectivity as self-determined; and 
b) The nature of the theorist – object of study relation, according to which the 
self-determining subject bares the scientific claim to know the ‘objective’ reality 
of international relations, treating phenomena as passive objects. Therefore, from 
a Hegelian perspective (neo)realist thought celebrates a problematic account of 
knowledge as (neo)realist scholars rely on subject-object relation that echoes 
Hegel’s ‘Intellect’ which rests on a incomplete form of consciousness.  
According to Hegel, ‘Intellect’ is the processes in which the subject as 
theorist apprehends the object from a perspective of an abstract category 
(universal) that stems from the self-determined subject’s flawed consciousness, 
which denies the object’s particularity and independent nature. As Hegel 
observes, ‘Intellect’ is a mere moment in the evolution of the subject’s self 
consciousness.48 Therefore, the relation between theorist and the object of theory 
undergoes consideration and revision in order to form a more complete account 
of knowledge which overcomes the limits of the previous form, just as Krause 
and Williams did with (neorealism). The re-consideration of the subject-object 
relation brings to light Hegel’s ‘subject of desire’ and the distinction between 
‘reality’ and ‘appearance’. ‘Reality’ addresses to the acknowledgment of the 
theoretical object’s particular and independent characteristics (eg the state-in-
itself); whereas the ‘appearance’ to the theorist’s determination of the theoretical 
object in an attempt to develop a prescriptive theory.    
Via the ‘Subject of Desire’ which takes into consideration ‘appearance’ 
and ‘reality’, the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object 
becomes explicit with all the nuances this relation entails. For such relation to be 
dynamic, the subject as theorist can not be pre-determined or fixed after treating 
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the object of study as passive and providing a prescriptive account of theory. In 
more concrete terms this distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is 
highlighted when Krause and Williams argue that unlike (neo)realist thought, we 
must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security, problems as grounded 
in concrete historical conditions and practices rather than in abstract assertions of 
transcendental actors and scientific methods. Therefore it is precisely the 
acknowledgement of the dynamic relation between the subject and object via the 
‘Subject of Desire’ which renders the subject of ‘intellect’ responsible for a 
nurturing a flawed account of knowledge.   
It needs to be acknowledged that the mode of ‘intellect’ cannot be 
overcome as long as the subject is taken to be self-determining. As Hegel argued, 
that the limits of ‘intellect’ generated alternative modes of consciousness in 
relation to knowledge; similarly alternative approaches of security emerged in an 
attempt to overcome the shortcomings of (neo)realist approaches. Krause, 
Williams and Booth correctly noted that the (neo)realist scholar implements an 
artificial generalisation upon the object of study -which echoes Hegel’s 
‘intellect’- when the agents or states are treated as rational undifferentiated units 
that interact in an anarchic self-help system. After acknowledging the limits of 
the (neo)realist approach, the alternative security approaches  which emerged are 
still problematic from an Hegelian perspective. Their problems lie on the 
‘Subject of Desire’’s  distinction between ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ which 
reflects the nuances of the theorist - object of theory relation. This ambiguous 
relation offsets a diverse interpretation of both the subject and object, which 
triggers again a problematic account of knowledge due to the incomplete forms 
of consciousness which emerge.  
 Accordingly, below will be indicated how the scholar’s attempts to 
overcome the intellectual flaws of (neo)realist security approaches, via the 
Copenhagen School and the Critical Security Studies approach, lapse into the 
Hegelian modes of Lord-Bondsman dialectic, Stoicism and Scepticism.    
How	  The	  Copenhagen	  School	  Lapses	  into	  the	  Lord-­‐Bondsman	  Dialectic	  	  
 
The ‘Copenhagen School’ attempts to attribute a more contingent 
dimension to the theoretical object of security, toning down the subject’s 
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influence on the object of study. Security is treated as a speech act, which casts 
the issue of an existential threat, calling for extraordinary measures. A speech act 
does not relate to the theorist’s attempt to trace a number of threats and raise the 
issue of security; but instead constructs a shared understanding of what is to be 
considered a threat.49 However, the understanding of security as a speech act, 
begs the following questions: Who decides regarding this speech act? Who can 
perform or speak on security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions 
and with what effects? 
These questions allude to the significance of immanent critique according 
to which the separation of the subject from the object of study forms a 
misleading account of reality and knowledge based on transcendental or arbitrary 
means. The following paragraphs will explain that according to the Copenhagen 
school, the decision on security (object of study) in a state of emergency is 
ultimately conditioned by a transcendental notion of subjectivity. Such a 
transcendental and self-determining understanding of subjectivity ignores the 
particular conditions which have an impact on security and  portrays reality 
misleadingly.  
Specifically, according to the Copenhagen school, security means 
survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat 
is not the same across different sectors such as Military, Environment, Economy, 
Society and Politics.50 The Copenhagen School argues that threat perception and 
security cannot be determined by the subject itself or by fixed points of analysis. 
The exact definition of threat and security are constituted by an intersubjective 
establishment of an existential threat to a referent object which does not by itself 
create threats. In other words, it is not necessarily because a real existential threat 
exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat. Therefore, a successful 
approach to security, according to the Copenhagen School, necessitates the 
following three components: existential threats, emergency action and the effects 
on interknit relations by breaking free of rules.51  
However, when it comes to concrete analysis, the Copenhagen School 
contends that it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in 
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articulating security. Thus, ‘securitisation’, emphasizes on how threats are 
determined, on what issues, for whom (referent objects), why, with what results 
and under which conditions. The Copenhagen School, relies heavily on J L 
Austin’s theory of speech arts.52 The proponents of this school contend that the 
conditions for a successful speech act fall under two categories: 1) Internal or 
linguistic grammatical, by following the rules of the act (or as Austin argues the 
accepted conventional procedures must exist and the act has to be executed 
according to these procedures); and, 2) External contextual and social, by 
holding a position from which the act can be made (the particular persons and 
circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked).53  
Yet, Copenhagen school scholars admit that their approach links itself 
more closely to the existing actors, trying to understand their modus operandi 
and assume that the future management of security will have to include the 
handling these actors. Although their philosophical position appears in some 
sense more constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction 
in an effort to understand the modus operand they end up attributing to certain 
actors a determining role in formulating the security assumptions.54  
Williams has already argued how the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of security as an exceptional and indeterminate  phenomenon 
reminds us of Carl Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy division which attributes a 
protagonist role to the sovereign subject which ends up determining the 
theoretical object. However, Hegel’s insights allow us to understand how a) this 
flawed account of subjectivity; and, b) the theorist – object of theory relation it 
nourishes, is responsible for triggering an inaccurate account of knowledge.  
As Williams notes the Copenhagen School’s perception of security relies 
on the issue of an existential threat which calls for extraordinary measures 
beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics. The component of 
successful ‘securitization’ (existential threats, emergency action by an agent and 
the effects on interknit relations by breaking free of rules) echoes Schmitt’s 
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views, argues Williams.55 Schmitt’s concept of the political is defined by the 
friend-enemy relationship, which underscores the sovereign subject’s decision 
during the emergent states’ of exception. For Schmitt, sovereignty is defined by 
the act of decision and the capacity to definitely decide on contested legal or 
normative disputes within the state. Deciding when a threat to the political order 
has reached a point where it constitutes an ‘emergency’, requires the suspension 
of normal rules and procedures so that the political order itself can be preserved. 
The sovereign subject decides whether there is extreme emergency and what is to 
be done to eliminate it.56 Although the sovereign stands outside the normally 
valid legal system, she nevertheless belongs to it. For Schmitt, all rule-bound 
orders depend ultimately upon a sovereign subject’s decision that itself stands 
outside of the given structure of rules.57  
The Copenhagen School’s formulation of ‘securitisation’ as an 
exceptional and indeterminate  phenomenon, presented,  security with the logic 
of an existential threat and extreme necessity. This mirrors the intense condition 
of existential division of friendship and enmity which constitutes Schmitt’s 
concept of the political. Thus, under the condition of existential threat, a 
Schmittian logic of friends and enemies is invoked while necessitating a 
sovereign subject’s decision-making.  
The Copenhagen School’s argumentation entails a contradiction since 
although its philosophical position on security appears constructivist in holding 
security to be always a political construction beyond fixed points of analysis they 
admit that in their purposes they are closer to traditional security studies, 
declaring that in concrete analysis, it is important to be specific about who is 
more or less privileged in articulating security. Therefore, although the 
Copenhagen School does not support that security is only about the state, 
nevertheless the state is acknowledged as a privileged actor and that the 
existential security issues and decision-making should be dealt by top leaders.  
From a Hegelian perspective this contradiction, echoes the ambivalence 
of the the ‘Desiring Subject’. This ambivalence on the one hand stems from the 
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Copenhagen School scholars’ treatment of ‘securitisation’ as a practice beyond 
fixed agents allowing diversity of particular interpretations; while on the other 
admitting that some agents are more privileged to determine security and threats. 
Just as the ‘Subject of Desire’ attempts to treat the object of study as 
autonomous, but at the same time the subject revokes such treatment in order to 
secure its self-certainty and self-determination. In that respect, just as the 
‘Subject of Desire’ conflates ‘reality’ (a theorist claim to know prescriptively) 
with ‘appearance (the autonomy of the theoretical object), similarly the 
Copenhagen school accommodates this separation and tries to overcome it via 
the concept of ‘securitisation’. However, although  ‘securitisation’ entails the 
emergency action which allows for indetermination and breaking free from the 
‘rules’ of the social; yet  ‘securitisation’ ultimately grants decision-making to the 
sovereign subject acknowledging her as the protagonist of determining security.    
As Williams added, under the condition of existential threat, a Schmittian 
logic of friends and enemies is invoked and with it a politics of exclusion. A 
successful ‘securitisation’ of identity is precisely the capacity to decide on the 
limits of a given identity and to oppose it to what it is not identified as  security -
the other- through a  relationship of threat or enmity. The Copenhagen School’s 
scholars accommodation of ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ via ‘securitisation’, echoes 
a Schmittian driven understanding of security that lapses into Hegel’s Lord-
Bondsman dialectic.  
In the Lord-Bondsman dialectic each subject therefore encounters the 
other initially as an ‘object’, as a ‘thing’ to be integrated into the first’s plans and 
project’s. From the standpoint of these agents there is no way to reconcile these 
two subjective points of view into a third more objective point of view. Since the 
objective, impersonal point of view cannot be ‘discovered’, it must be itself 
‘constructed’ out of social practice. Therefore, the subjects themselves construct 
a ‘social’ point of view on the basis of which they will be able to reconcile the 
various conflicting judgements, generated out of their personal points of view.58 
However, no such universal objective point of view is available for these 
agents. The encounter between the two self-conscious agents is the attempt on 
the part of each to impose her own subjective point of view on the other and to 
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claim for her own subjective point of view the status of being ‘true’. The Lords’s 
point of view is thus dependent on the Bondsman’s having come to accept it as 
dominant. The Lord’s point of view has no epistemic priority over the 
Bondsman’s point of view but its dominance turns out to be a social fact. The 
Lord too has not established his own subjective point of view as the truth but 
managed to have the slave accept it as the truth. This unequal relation promotes 
an inaccurate account of knowledge.59  
Here the reference to Hegel’s Lord-Bondsman’s dialectic, serves as a 
medium to reveal the theoretical shortcomings of the Copenhagen School. The 
‘Subject of Desire’ via the distinction between ‘appearence’ and  ‘reality’ 
illustrated the tension inherent in the Copenhagen School’s ‘securitisation’ 
approach. Although the Copenhagen School  attempted to provide a 
constructivist and contingent definition to the theoretical object of security;  yet 
the definition of ‘securitization’ contributed to the prioritization of a self-
determining form of subjectivity. In particular, after defining  ‘securitization’ 
from the perspective of existential threats and decision-making via ‘states of 
emergency’, as Williams noted, this paved the way to acknowledge the states and 
their leaders as the sovereign agents who determine the decisions autonomously 
in regard to securitization due to the very  nature of the ‘state of exception’ and 
emergency. These types of decision-making rests on the form of self-determined 
subjectivity which according to Hegel is responsible for sustaining a flawed form 
of knowledge.  
Shortcomings	  of	  the	  Critical	  Security	  Studies	  Approaches	  
 
Below it will be argued how the flawed perception of subjectivity in the 
critical security approaches, leads to an inaccurate account of knowledge. Again, 
paralleling to Hegel’s forms of consciousness - namely stoicism and scepticism - 
it will be argued how certain critical approaches after treating the object of study 
in an empty formalistic manner (Kantian/ Habermasean driven perspectives) 
lapse into stoicism; whereas other critical approaches which attribute a solely 
contingent role both to the subject and the object of study (Foucaultian 
influenced perspectives) lapse to scepticism. Booth, as one of the pioneering 
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scholars of critical security studies, identified security as Emancipation, 
attempting to lift people as individuals and groups out of structural oppression. 
Security as emancipation has already been treated with some suspicion. Unlike 
previous critiques, here it will be stressed that Booth’s shortcomings emerge 
when he assumes Emancipation from a Kantian account of a self-determining 
subjectivity.  
Moreover the conceptualisation of security as emancipation entails 
further intellectual calamities which beyond Stoicism, can lead to Scepticism too. 
Stoic points of view are reflected by Linklater’s cosmopolitan ideas of ‘human 
security’, influenced by Kantian and Habermasian thought; whereas Sceptic 
points of view are reflected by Foucaultian security approaches which 
presuppose a self-alienated and incomplete subject. Thus, the following 
paragraphs after citing the Phenomenology of Spirit and Hegel’s forms of 
consciousness (stoicism and scepticism) confirm the insights of immanent 
critique according to which the separation of the subject from the object of study, 
delivers an inaccurate account of reality and knowledge. This inaccurate 
perception of knowledge and reality is triggered by a transcendental and 
contingent understanding of subjectivity which separates the universal from the 
particular dimension.   
On	  The	  Kantian	  Inspired	  	  ‘Security	  as	  Emancipation’	  and	  Stoicism	  	  
 
Before Booth defines security and his idea of emancipation, he ponders 
the reliability of our knowledge. He claims to re-approach security from the 
bottom up, constructing a critical security studies perspective after taking into 
consideration ontology (ideas about the nature of being) and epistemology 
(beliefs about what comprises ‘true’ knowledge). Beyond ontology and 
epistemology, he adds an orientation towards, praxis which is explicitly 
emancipatory that moves beyond statist orthodoxy, distancing himself from the 
Copenhagen School. Booth, does not equate security with survival or the 
maintenance of an enduring physical existence. Instead, he describes security as 
survival plus. The plus, according to Booth is the choice that comes from relative 
freedom from existential threats and it is this freedom that gives security its 
value. Booth holds that survival does not guarantee security because it does not 
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eliminate threats. For Booth, the equalisation of security with survival is a 
serious mistake, rejecting the Copenhagen School’s argument, according to 
which security is about survival. Instead, Booth contends that security should 
offers choices. Security should be an instrumental value that allows individuals 
and groups not just to establish a mere natural existence but provide options 
which diversify, and enrich rather than restraining their existence. As he puts it, 
survival is being alive; security is living, providing a contingent  definition of 
security.60  
Booth conceptualises security as emancipation. He approaches 
emancipation ‘as a discourse of politics that secures people from those 
oppressions which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to 
do’.61 Booth takes ‘security as emancipation’ to be a medium for inventing 
humanity. However, suspicions should be raised as soon as Booth’s 
emancipation and freedom are associated to an understanding of knowledge 
which is consonant with Kant’s enlightenment motto sapere aude (dare to 
know).62 Already, Foucault’s critique of Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment’ already 
underscored how Kantian enlightenment fails to promote freedom but instead 
reinforces subjection once it is viewed as a process which necessitates external 
assistance or intervention. Foucault argues that Enlightenment for Kant is not 
merely a personal evolutionary process according to which individuals should 
‘dare to know’. Enlightenment, for Kant simultaneously is to be perceived as a 
general process affecting all humanity and as an obligation prescribed to 
individuals. At this moment Kantian enlightenment appears to be a political 
problem too, argues Foucault, which necessitates the appropriate circumstances 
that permit the emergence of enlightenment. Thus, Enlightenment involves not 
only personal action bust also external assistance or intervention. Foucault, 
stresses with dismay how Kant ends up posing the example of the reign of King 
Frederick II of Prussia as the appropriate environment which permits the 
development of enlightenment.63 
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Moreover, Booth’s Kantian affiliation is further stressed when he defines  
freedom as the moment our noumenal selves control our phenomenal selves. In 
other words, freedom is when our actions are not the result of passion but are 
fully voluntary founded on reason.64  
Already Nunes has already commented that security as emancipation was 
criticised for being too idealistic and trying to impose western values due to its 
connection to liberalism and for assuming an individual-centered subjectivity. 
These criticisms seem to stress the assumption that security as emancipation 
promotes western ideals as ‘universal’ since it relies on the Enlightenment’s 
understanding of subjectivity and freedom.65 However, in order to avoid such 
critique, Booth did not restrict himself to the Kantian affirmation of freedom but 
introduced the difference between true and false emancipation. False 
emancipation is any conception that understands emancipation as timeless or 
static and avoids using emancipation as a cloak for the west’s power projection.66  
Yet Booth’s understanding of Freedom undeniably promotes a self-
determining understanding of subjectivity since he adopts the Kantian 
perspective of freedom and reason. Booth’s (Kantian inspired) reason may serve 
as the medium of universal emancipation as it can be seized by any (self-
determining) subject who choses to act on the merit of reason. Such 
cosmopolitan ideas of reason and subjectivity helped to trigger a cosmopolitan 
understanding of security, often  promoted by concepts such as Linklater’s 
‘human security’, which celebrates the self-determining subject and the 
predominance of reason.  
According to Linklater, critical theory links the discussion of security 
with the wider analysis of community and emancipation based on 
communicative action. He argues that viable sovereign states are not adequate 
forms of political community and security becomes for him inextricably linked 
with emancipation and a form of community beyond the state.67 For Linklater, 
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human security can be feasible  through the promotion of political frameworks in 
which communicative action (in a Habermasean sense) will be free to develop.68  
Linklater holds that Kant’s normative international theory - which takes 
subject to be self-determining - entails the possibility of transforming the 
conceptual framework that human beings apply to conflicts of interest and 
identity. Kant stressed the importance of developing conceptual systems that give 
expression to the human capacity for living in accordance to moral universals. 
Critical theory in the Kantian mode insists that these universals do not require a 
particular conception of the good as a universalist maxim. What is required is the 
willingness to engage in an open dialogue in which all human differences are 
treated with respect and in which no prior assumptions are made about where the 
dialogue will lead or about how ideally it should end.69 Therefore, ‘human 
security’ requires the establishment of political structures that guarantee the 
effective participation in dialogic arrangements.70  
From the preceding summary it becomes clear that Linklater’s definition 
of ‘human security’ is obscure. Although it was mentioned that ‘Human 
Security’ simply requires the appropriate dialogic arrangement and not a 
particular conception of the good as a universalist maxim still this strikes as an 
abstract (universal) form of ‘Human Security’ with cosmopolitan applicability 
lacking a (particular) content. An establishment of political structures which 
guarantee effective participation in dialogic arrangements and the extension of 
these arrangements towards the formation of an ideal community, strikes one as 
content-less. Linklater’s dialogic forms of life as the key to advance a Kantian 
ideal of a ‘cosmopolitan condition of general political security’ without 
providing more detail on how that might become practically applicable appears 
to be an empty formalism.  
This empty formalism bring to mind the characteristics Hegel attributed 
to Stoicism. According to Hegel, a stoic account of knowledge is flawed since it  
emerges from a self-determining subject that rests on an abstract sense of reason 
and fails to take into serious account the empirical world. The stoics claimed this 
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‘criterion’ of rationality upon which they could decide what was true and 
valuable. However, the empty formalism of their principles cannot provide this 
criterion. For the Stoic, nothing counts unless it can be brought into some scheme 
of rational thought. However, once reason is taken to be ‘impersonal’ and 
transcendental, it is transformed into a very abstract concept  which does not 
allow the stoic to provide it with a (particular) content, except the claim that it is 
‘rational’. The stoic comes to believe that freedom as well as the independence 
of thought for which she strives is not the imposition of her own subjective point 
of view on things, but rather an attempt to become indifferent to all particular 
things and to assume the point of view a ‘rational being in general’. Thus the 
stoic self-determined subject - upon which the Booth’s and Linklaters ‘security 
as emancipation’ lies - provides an inaccurate account of knowledge since it rests 
on a supposedly ‘universal’ rational form that is  emptied of any particular 
content and is detached from the empirical word of experience.71  
On	  the	  Foucaultian	  Inspired	  Critical	  Security	  Approaches	  and	  
Scepticism	  
 
In the previous section was analysed how Booth’s conceptualisation of  
security as emancipation’ lapses into stoicism. This incomplete stoic account of 
knowledge emerges after resting on Kantian subjectivity and freedom while 
developing an account of security based on an abstract universal form which 
lacks an empirically particular content.   
Williams reacted  towards Booth’s idea of security as emancipation that 
rested on Kant’s self-determining subject implying that Booth down-played the 
empirical world. For Williams, Booth’s approach needs to shift from the 
unquestioned reliance upon the (stoic) subject that is detached from the empirical 
world and lean towards the politics of materialisation. Moreover, Williams adds 
that Booth remained at a very abstract level as to what power is and does. 
Williams suggests that the missing materialist dimension can be added once the 
understanding of power in ‘security as emancipation’ is enriched by the 
Foucault’s account of power. Foucaultian  power as governmentality plays a 
fundamental role not just in repressing subjects but in constituting them while 
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adding the empirical materialist dimension which Booth’s analysis lacks. Thus, 
for the first time the understanding of security, via Williams, moves beyond the 
idea of a self-determining subject.72 Foucault’s understanding of power and 
government  provides the opportunity to conceptualise insecurities beyond the 
enumeration of threats from the standpoint of the individual subject. Instead, 
Williams’ Foucaultian understanding of security, emphasizes social relations and 
structures that constitute the condition of (in)security.  
For Foucault, governmentality signals a shift from the exclusive concern 
with the protection of the sovereign towards the optimisation of the natural 
capabilities of individuals and populations – in the name of an efficient and 
economic and political organisation. This means that power does not just repress 
subjects but plays a fundamental role in consisting them. Therefore, 
incorporating this view of power into security as emancipation’ allows us to 
recognise the effects of pre-dominant security arrangements, approach them 
empirically and after rendering them contingent, act upon them. Thus Williams 
contends that the incorporation of Foucaultian power to ‘security as 
emancipation’, perceives our understanding of security as contingent while 
allowing us to analyse how security is involved in the constitution of subjects, 
instead of  treating them as self-determining.73 
Moreover, Nunes adds how power as governmentality and ‘domination’ 
brings to light the unequal relationship according to which forces or groups are 
subordinated in order to secure reasonably good outcomes or results. Such 
domination prevents people from participating in determining their actions or the 
conditions of their actions. Thus, Foucaultian governmentality and domination, 
notes Nunes, allows for an inquiry into the context specific empirical world in 
order to seek the reasons behind the structural constraints which limit the actions 
of subjects. In brief, supplementing ‘security as emancipation’ with 
governmentality and domination, opens the ground for an empirical analysis due 
to the treatment of structures as unfixed in an attempt to explain how 
disadvantaged subjects that lack autonomy emerge. Moreover, the treatment of 
power as indeterminate power relations further attributes an unfixity upon the 
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object of analysis (security), rendering it free from the conceptual and 
definitional control of the subject. 74  Thus, power relations encourage an 
empirical approach of the object of study while rescuing it from the 
determination of the subject.  
However, it needs to be noted that unlike Williams and Nunes, for Bigo 
the question of security is not directly discussed by Foucault. Bigo stresses that 
Foucault’s analysis has less to do with security than with discipline.75 As it will 
be elucidated in the next chapter, according to Foucault, discipline breaks down 
norms dividing normal from abnormal. Bigo argues that Foucault’s security is an 
interplay of differential normalities, unlike discipline which puts forward a clear 
division between what is normal and not.76 Nevertheless, Williams’ and Nunes’ 
points are confirmed by Bigo since he puts forward too a Foucaultian inspired 
understanding of security as power relations. Implicating the contingency of 
power relations rather than decision making, it becomes clear that Foucaultian 
security begs for the empirical examination of power relations while challenging 
the self-determining subjectivity and opposing to Schmittian ideas of sovereign 
decision-makers that stem from the abstract ‘states of exception’ problematic 
tacitly implied by the Copenhagen School.77 
A Foucaultian treatment of security, challenges the unquestioned reliance 
of the self-determining subject while emphasizing too on an empirical analysis of 
power relations. For Foucault, power, knowledge and truth are inseparable, 
drawing attention to power relations and the regimes of truth which open up the 
possibility of alternative regimes. The treatment of power as fluid power 
relations begs for their empirical examination. Knowledge and truth may well be 
complicit not only with power but also with forces of resistance and struggle. 
Such an approach to power opens up new possibilities for thought and action 
rendering the subject as well as the object of analysis as contingent. This 
understanding of security, for Williams, Dillon and Nunes substantiates the 
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75 Michael Dillon & Andrew Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, (London: 
Palgrave-MacMillan,  2008), 96-97 
76 Dillon & Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 98-101 
77 Dillon & Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 110-114 
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fragility of transcendental (or universalist oriented) theories of security which 
rest on self-determined subjectivity. 
Yet it is argued here that a Foucaultian conceptualisation of security is 
still inefficient as it implicates too a problematic form of subjectivity unable to 
provide reliable knowledge. From a Hegelian perspective the Foucaultian subject 
of the power relations echoes the shortcomings of scepticism. According to 
scepticism the subject fails to provide a reliable account of knowledge as it 
becomes self-alienated. In our case, self-alienation emerges as soon as the  
subject realises its  entrapment within the unavoidable relativity which is formed 
by the contingent contextual basis of Foucault’s power relations. 
For Scepticism, nothing can count as stable, independent and ‘objective’ 
except the sceptics own consciousness of the relativity of everything else. 
Paradoxically, although scepticism stresses the absence of an ‘objective’ point of 
view, yet sceptics embrace as unrivaled and ‘objective’ the premise that affirms 
the existence of solely subjective points of view.78 The paradox in assuming that 
the ‘objective’ point of view is necessary to justify the subject’s (relativistic) 
claims to knowledge whereas the subject still takes itself as incapable of 
assuming that ‘objective’ point of view. For Hegel, this wavering between the 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is responsible for the stoic subject’s ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’ which triggers a flawed account of knowledge. The ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’ is formed when the stoic becomes aware of this paradoxical 
contradiction  but realises that there is no way out of the contradiction and must 
therefore live with it rather than avoid it whilst developing philosophical 
theories. The ‘Unhappy consciousness’ is divided within itself  and is often 
paralleled with Socrates’ ‘I know one thing: That I know nothing’. The Stoic 
subject accepts this paradoxical result but realizes that it can not abandon the 
‘objective’ point of view itself, since it is due to the application of that  
‘objective’ claim that scepticism was possible in the first place.79 
Foucaultian security scholars after criticizing the empty formalism of 
Kantian perspective, re-approached security as power relations, which adds an 
empirical dimension that was previously missing, while dismissing the self-
determining subject. From the Foucaultian perspective, the subject ceased to be 
                                                
78 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 68-69 
79 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, 72-76 
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self-determining and knowledge assumed an indeterminate role as it was tied 
with the contingent contextual basis provided by the power relations. Security 
too, as the object of study, turned contingent due to the fact that power relations 
were un-fixed, rendering impossible to determine security in an ‘objective’ way 
or define it in an transcendental manner. Yet, a Hegelian perspective helps us 
realise that such stoic treatment of subjectivity and the objectivity in a contingent 
manner - influenced by the relativity of the empirical realm - provides an 
indeterminate account of knowledge which echoes Hegel’s ‘Unhappy 
Consciousness’. Unhappy consciousness entails a paradox which renders its 
contribution to knowledge misleading.   
The paradox of ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ unveils the limits of 
Foucaultian thought in terms of knowledge and subjectivity. Imagining security 
as a dynamic form of power relations, always contingent and context specific, 
uncovers the discursive conditions of dominant regimes of truth. Treating 
security as product of unfixed power relations, leads the subject as a theorist to 
deny an ‘objective’ or a trascendental form of knowledge regarding security. 
Thus, knowledge becomes too contingent and context specific undetermined by 
the subject. Moreover, as the subject takes itself to be contigent too, is feeling 
entrapped within the relative contextual basis of these power relations, holding 
that there can be no ‘objective’ point of view at all. Therefore the sceptic subject 
treats all claims of knowledge as temporary. Nothing can count as stable and 
independent except the sceptic’s own consciousness of the relativity of 
everything else. Thus, according to the Foucaultian critical thinkers, the 
treatment of security as contingent and context specific power relations,  conveys 
only a temporary and subjective account of security which lacks ‘objectivity’, 










The objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the light Hegel’s method of 
immanent critique throws on a diversity of IR approaches to security. In 
immanent critique the separation of subject from the object of study triggers a 
misleading analysis of reality and knowledge which is based on transcendental or 
arbitrary means. The contribution of immanent critique - which is capable of 
overcoming this separation – is realized after Hegel’s philosophical system of 
Spirit (Geist) is considered. In that respect a detailed analysis of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, clarifies the insights offered through immanent critique 
as the Phenomenology provides an enriched account of subjectivity and 
knowledge after portraying the evolution of the subject’s consciousness and 
knowledge via the interplay of the subject and object of study within the realm of 
Spirit (Geist).  
The first part of the chapter, focused on the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
describing the evolution of the subject’s form of consciousness within the realm 
of Spirit (Geist) and Hegel’s alternative understanding of subjectivity. Following 
the insights of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it becomes clear how an inaccurate 
account of knowledge and reality emerges from: a) a flawed understanding of 
subjectivity; and b) the separation of the subject from the object of study. Thus, 
Hegel’s analysis which described the evolution of the forms of consciousness 
within the realm of Spirit, provides an enriched conceptualization of subjectivity 
which serves as an important intellectual tool which assists the assessment of 
reality and knowledge.   
The second part, demonstrated how the insights of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit unveil the theoretical shortcomings of various IR approaches to security. 
After comparing Hegel’s incomplete modes of consciousness to the notions of 
subjectivity these approaches nourish, it was argued that these IR perspectives 
separate the subject from the object of knowledge. This separation triggers an 
incomplete account of subjectivity, knowledge and reality, verifying the 
theoretical contribution of immanent critique. After focusing on the (neo)realist, 
the ‘Copenhagen School’ and the Critical Security approaches, it was argued that 
these theories succeed one another - in regard to their conceptualization of  
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subjectivity and the theorist-object of  theory interaction – in a way that echoes 
Hegel’s incomplete modes of consciousness, and knowledge. To be more 
precise, (Neo)realism, the Copenhagen School and the Critical approaches to 
security resemble Hegel’s ‘Intellect’, ‘Subject of Desire’, ‘Lord-Bondman 
dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’; all of which represent misleading modes 
of consciousness and knowledge, stemming from a flawed account of 
subjectivity. Just as Hegel’s ‘Desiring Subject’, lapses into the flawed stages of 
the ‘Lord-Bondsman dialectic’, ‘Stoicism’ and ‘Scepticism’; similarly the 
evolution of security theorizing appears to be following this sequence.  
The last section of this chapter explained that the treatment of the subject 
as relativistic, lapses into ‘Scepticism’ and provides a misleading account of 
knowledge. Thus, approaching security from the Foucaultian perspective of 
power relations provides an indeterminate form of knowledge. The shortcomings 
of the Foucaultian inspired IR approaches as well as the inherent limits of 
Foucaultian thought will be further elaborated in the next chapter. The 
application of Foucaultian thought to IR is a controversial issue among IR 
scholars. No matter, how valuable this IR debate might be yet it fails to explain 
that the problem does not lie in the application of Foucaultian concepts such as 
‘power’, ‘power relations’, ‘biopower’ but in the flaws these concepts entail. 
Thus, the next chapter elucidates, from a Hegelian perspective, that the limits of 
Foucaultian thought are associated to his understanding of power and 
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The last part of the previous chapter focused, inter alia, on the shortcomings of 
the Foucaultian-inspired security approaches. Their flaws rested on the 
perception of the subject in the form of a contingent, relativistic, self-alienated 
individual. This, from a Hegelian perspective, echoes Scepticism, which is an 
incomplete mode of consciousness as it fails to promote the subject’s self-
consciousness, knowledge and free will. Scholars such as Williams, Dillon and 
Neal adopted Foucault’s understanding of power and governmentality since their 
objective was the conceptualization of insecurity beyond the enumeration of 
threats. According to these scholars, incorporating Foucaultian power and 
governmentality was useful in identifying the social relations and structures 
which constitute that condition of insecurity. The application of the Foucaultian 
notion of power to IR security approaches also promoted the idea that power 
does not only repress subjects but also constitutes them. Just as Williams argues, 
for the first time IR security scholars via Foucault move beyond the idea of an 
individualist, autonomous and self-constituted subject. 1  However, as was 
previously noted, the Foucaultian-inspired perception of subjectivity promotes an 
understanding of the subject as a relativistic and self-alienated individual, 
suffering from what Hegel described as Unhappy consciousness which lapses 
into Scepticism.   
The current chapter elaborates further on Foucault’s thought and is 
comprised of two parts. The first reviews the diversity of Foucaultian-influenced 
approaches to IR. In this section, it becomes clear that Foucault’s contribution to 
IR thought is contested. Whereas certain IR scholars praise the Foucaultian 
contribution to IR thought in terms of an intriguing alternative understanding of 
                                                
1 Michael Williams, “Modernity, Identity and Security: A Comment on the Copenhagen 
Controversy”, Review of International Studies (24) 3, 438 
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power, war mobilization and human rights; others remain skeptical. It appears 
that the scholarly debate on Foucaultian IR is orchestrated to reply to the 
following question: is Foucault’s application appropriate in the field of 
International Relations or not?  
Here it is argued that this question is misleading since it fails to unveil the 
shortcomings of Foucaultian thought. Moreover, the critique of Foucaultian IR 
approaches from the perspective of Hegel’s immanent critique unveils limits of 
Foucault’s notion of power and subjectivity, as the following part indicates. 
Nevertheless, this debate among IR scholars proves useful as it discloses some of 
the flaws entailed in the appropriation of Foucaultian thought to IR theory.   
Instead, the second part of this chapter puts forward a different question, 
namely: how do Hegel’s insights unveil the intellectual flaws entailed both in 
certain Foucaultian IR approaches as well as Foucault’s thought?  
This question targets the nature of Foucault’s theory itself. It will be analyzed 
that Foucault’s objective – just like Hegel’s immanent critique – was to 
reconsider reality without transcendental means but with norms which are part of 
the reality itself, via the notion of power. However, this analysis will make clear 
that Foucault failed to meet this objective as his notion of power is based on 
transcendental premises which prevents him from examining reality without 
transcendental means. The limits of Foucault’s approach from the perspective of 
immanent critique associate to: a) The portrayal of power as an empty formalism 
which triggers a problematic conceptualization of subjectivity; and b) A flawed 
understanding of subjectivity according to which the subject is perceived as a 
relativistic individual who is subjected to power and fails to acquire self-
consciousness. 
Although it is noted here that Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s approaches 
also highlight the shortcomings of Foucault’s understanding of power and 
subjectivity, Hegel’s insights take us one step further. From a Hegelian 
perspective, it becomes clear that Foucaultian thought negates free will and 
undermines the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness. Besides unveiling 
the flaws of Foucaultian thought, Hegel’s immanent critique contributes to an 
alternative understanding of subjectivity and freedom which overcome these 
flaws. The superiority of Hegel’s method will become clear after we have 
criticized the shortcomings of Foucautlian IR approaches. Immanent critique 
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stems from the consideration of Hegel’s dialectical method and of his 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). The combination of the dialectical method 
and of the Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to reconsider reality after putting forward 
an alternative notion of subjectivity, self-consciousness, ethics and freedom 
which are interconnected and actualize in the state. In the last part of the chapter 
we demonstrate the transcendental premises of Foucault’s notion of power and 
the negative effects this has on Foucaultian IR thought. Hegel’s insights allow us 
to trace these shortcomings in: i) the uncritical reception of the Foucaultian 
concepts of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power-relations’; and ii) the 
uncritical application of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism that 
Foucaultian IR scholars refer to without further elaboration. Ultimately, this 
Hegelian inspired analysis illustrates that Foucault’s conceptualization of power 
and subjectivity is self-defeating as these Foucaultian concepts undermine the 
development of the subject’s consciousness and negate free will.  
 
I.	  Delineating	  The	  Foucaultian	  IR	  Debate	  	  
 
Approaches	  Espousing	  Foucault’s	  Application	  in	  IR	  	  
 
Certain IR scholars welcome the application of Foucault’s notion of 
power in the domain of the international. Accordingly, the application of 
Foucaultian theory in the field of International Relations is seen as assisting to: a) 
expose the limits of dominant IR approaches which rest on an understanding of 
subjectivity that is tied liberalism; b) reconsider understandings of human rights; 
c) promote an alternative perspective on war in contemporary IR after 
implicating the concepts of ‘docile bodies’ and ‘biopower’; and d) to enrich the 
understanding of power in IR thought in terms of Foucault’s ‘power relations’ 
which permits resistance and reinforces the formation of agency. 
With respect to the first function (a), scholars like Pasha, praise 
Foucault’s methods of inquiry into the making and unmaking of modern 
subjectivity. According to Pasha, Foucault helps us acknowledge the subject of 
Western IR as a liberal one, with all the accoutrements of historically-constituted 
social affirmations and negations. For Pasha, virtually the entire conceptual 
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apparatus (including notions of citizenship, sovereignty, rationality and interests) 
of IR derives from an unacknowledged recognition of liberal subjectivity as a 
universal reference. International practice takes this liberal subject both as the 
site and the agent of articulating relations between citizens and polities. The 
liberal modern subject is the originator and the recipient of projects of 
amelioration or self-help, pacification and the civilizing process. As Pasha notes, 
Foucault’s uncovering of the social production of the liberal subject opens up 
vast thinking spaces on the limits of Western IR.2   
In accordance with the second issue (b), certain IR scholars apply 
Foucault’s notion of power in order to analyze the global discourse of human 
rights. Manokha is one of the scholars who analyses this discourse from a 
Foucaultian perspective. He demonstrates that it has contributed to the 
transformation of human rights into a kind of a global standard or norm 
according to which agents increasingly evaluate themselves and are evaluated. 
Manokha employs the two dimensions of Foucault’s conception of power and 
elaborates on the way in which the global discourse of human rights conditions 
the behavior of different forms of agency. As Manokha stresses, Foucault’s 
conception of power has two features; firstly, power is not reducible to agents 
that exercise it, but rather mediates the dominant view of what constitutes normal 
and acceptable agency. Moreover, power influences the prevailing conventions 
which determine how to deal with those who deviate from the norm. Secondly, 
Foucault describes forms of power that are not based on repression, but instead 
produce a positive behaviour even in the absence of coercion, since agents 
exercise power over themselves in order to conform to the dominant norm. 
Manokha, focuses on Foucault’s positive, non-oppressive dimension of power in 
order to promote an alternative understanding of human rights. For Manokha, 
Foucault can enhance our understanding of  the operation of the global discourse 
of human rights in terms of the  causal power it retains  with respect to social 
practice. Manokha objects to certain human rights analyses in IR that neglect the 
Foucaultian conceptualization of power and treat the use of force in the name of 
                                                
2 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, “Disciplining Foucault”,  International Political Sociology (2010), Vol 
4 (2), 214-215 
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human rights as a justification fabricated by western states to dominate or 
colonize the world.3  
In contrast to such approaches, Manokha puts forward a number of case-
studies which in his opinion reveal that the promotion of human rights neither 
stemmed from the influence of western powers, nor amplified their interests. 
Specifically, he examines a number of instances  involving the exercise of power 
with reference to human rights which do not rest on western powers’ actions to 
perpetuate domination or colonization. These case-studies include the exercise of 
power with reference to human rights by: i) non-western states with respect to 
non-western states; ii) NGOs with respect to business enterprises; and iii) 
business enterprises with respect to non-western states..   
These examples provide the means for Manokha to suggest that non-
Western states, NGO’s and enterprises actively participate in the agenda-setting 
of international organizations, governments and corporations via the promotion 
of human rights. As a number of scholars observe, human rights have become a 
global norm which plays a causal role in structuring the behavior of different 
actors. Manokha quotes a number of scholars such as Risse, Popp and Sikknik 
who argue too that human rights have emerged as a global standard which 
increasingly governs the behavior of individuals and states. Human rights norms 
prescribe rules for appropriate behavior and assist in defining identities. 
Moreover, as Donnelly argues, regimes that do not at least claim to pursue 
popular political participation (democracy) and respect for the rights of their 
citizens place their national and international legitimacy at risk.4  
For Manokha, these instances illustrate Foucault’s second dimension of 
power, namely its positive dimension, by revealing how dominant discursive 
structures ‘produce’ behavior and how agents even in the absence of coercion, 
decide to transform themselves. Manokha does not suggest that corporations or 
certain non-western states, for example, have a genuine concern for human 
rights. It is highlighted only that they find it necessary to claim that they engage 
                                                
3 Ivan Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights”, 
Global Society, Vol 23, No. 4, October 2009, 450-451 
4 Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights”, 438-441 
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in the promotion of human rights and thereby contribute to the development of 
the global human rights discourse.5 
With relation to the third point (c), Reid among others, stresses the 
importance of Foucault’s thought in evoking an alternative perspective on the 
problem of war in contemporary international relations theory. Reid notes 
Foucault’s theoretical shift from Discipline and Punish to The History of 
Sexuality. Despite this shift, Reid appears to treat these two works as 
complementary, stressing the relevance of ‘tactics’ to ‘strategy’ which the two 
works put forward respectively. According to Reid, Discipline and Punish 
focuses on ‘tactics’, implying the formation of individuality via disciplining the 
body, while the History of Sexuality Vol.1 focuses on ‘strategy’ as the formation 
of collective bodies of populations via ‘biopower’. In the Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault demonstrated the role of discourses and practices derived from the 
military sciences. These discursive and practical tools reinforce the strategies of 
pacification that modern regimes pursue against their societies through the 
development of disciplinary power over life. Foucault later shifts his emphasis to 
how the development of ‘biopower’ mobilizes populations to wage war in the 
name of life necessity. It is in Foucault’s ‘biopower’ as opposed to disciplinary 
power that Reid locates the paradoxical logic through which modern regimes in 
the international sphere induce peace simultaneously with war.6  
Reid argues that it is in the final chapter of the History of Sexuality Vol.1, 
‘Right of Death and Power over Life’, that Foucault re-conceptualizes the 
relation of war to society. In Discipline and Punish, he shows that the 
development of military sciences had functioned to establish an absence of war 
in societies through the creation of docile bodies. In the History of Sexuality 
Vol.1, the focus shifts to address how the emergence of a form of power 
concerned with exercising control over life leads to a proliferation and 
intensification of the problem of war between societies.7 According to Reid, in 
the History of Sexuality Vol.1, Foucault shifts his focus from the relations 
between power and the individual to those between power and the population. 
                                                
5 Manokha, “Foucault’s Concept of Power and the Global Discourse of Human Rights”, 443 
6 Julian Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, 
in Michael Dillon & Andrew Neal (eds), Foucault on Politics, Security and War (London: 
Palgrave-MacMillan,  2008), 66 
7 Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, 71-72 
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Here, power over life evolved in two basic forms linked together by a whole 
intermediary cluster of relations. One of these forms centers on the ‘body as 
machine’. This involves the body’s disciplining, optimization of its capabilities, 
the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and docility, and 
its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls. The second form 
focuses on the ‘species body’, that is, the body imbued with the mechanics of life 
and serving as the basis of the biological process. This includes factors of 
propagation, birth - mortality, levels of health, life expectancy and longevity, as 
well as all the attendant conditions that can cause these to vary. The first form 
(the body as machine) focuses on the individual and is associated with what 
Foucault terms  ‘tactics’, while the second refers to the population and is 
associated with ‘strategy’. That new-found docility of the individual provides 
modern regimes with the ability to secure an absence of war within the civil 
societies they govern. However, where the development of biopolitical 
techniques focuses on the collective bodies of populations, Reid applies Foucault 
to argue that what is at stake in the contemporary world is the biological 
existence of a population. Accordingly, modern states afford themselves a new 
basis for the mobilization of war which is beyond the juridical existence of 
sovereignty, but which affects the survival of their population within the 
international domain.8 
According to Reid, for Foucault war as strategy is the continuation of 
politics. However, it must not be forgotten that ‘politics’ has been conceived as a 
continuation of war. In the History of Sexuality, disciplinary power evolves 
through the development of tactical measures which render the natural life of the 
individualized body as the object of power over life. Biopower evolves through 
the development of strategies which constitute individual bodies in relation to 
populations. There is no discontinuity between the functioning of ‘tactics’ and 
‘strategies’. In fact, one complements the other. Tactics contribute to the 
individuation of bodies via discipline and the operation of ‘strategies’. Through 
strategies, the social body is mobilized as a population. ‘Strategies’ are 
                                                
8 Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, 73-74 
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inconceivable in isolation from those tactical mechanisms that determine how the 
natural life of bodies comes to be individualized.9 
In summary, Reid applies Foucault’s ‘biopower’ to explain how modern 
politics become a continuation of war for the state. According to Reid, a 
mobilization for war is no longer related to sustaining the juridical sovereignty of 
the state, but rather, to the survival of the states’ population as well as the 
administrative domains which form that population. The states’ various 
administrative domains become re-conceived as the terrains of a struggle in the 
international sphere rather than as sources of domination or exploitation in the 
domestic sphere. The security of these institutions becomes the guiding criterion 
for the pursuit of war. According to Reid, this struggle for the security of the 
state’s administrative institutions thus constitutes the modern bio-political war 
within the modern international relations domain.10 
With respect to the final matter (d), certain IR scholars draw our attention 
to the implications of replacing the dominant understanding of sovereign power 
with Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’. Beyond the application of 
Foucaultian ‘biopower’ in the domain war, Edkins and Pin-Fat emphasize the 
impact of applying Foucault’s ‘power relations’ to IR thought. Challenging the 
concept of sovereign power in international relations and replacing it with the 
Foucaultian notion of power relations, the development of resistance forms is 
highlighted to permit the emergence of agency. After comparing power relations 
with sovereign power which sustains relations of violence, Edkins and Pin-Fat 
argue that the latter refuses agency to the forms of life it produces and controls, 
substantiating the absence of the political in the international domain.  
Without power relations, there is no possibility of resistance and no 
freedom. Freedom and resistance are found as part of power relations and such 
relations are productive of subjectivities. For Foucault, power relations comprise 
a specific form of social relation. The power relation is to be viewed as distinct 
from a relationship of violence. As Foucault notes, a relationship of violence acts 
upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys or it closes 
off all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be passive. A power relationship 
can be articulated purely on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it 
                                                
9Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, .76-83 
10Reid, Life Struggles: War Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault, .88-89 
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is to constitute a power relationship: that the ‘other’ - the one over whom power 
is exercised - is recognized and maintained to the very end as the subject who 
acts. That faced with a relationship of power enables the opening up of a whole 
field of responses, reactions, results and possible inventions.11  
Edkins and Pin Fat argue that sovereign power is not a form of power 
relations but rather a relationship of violence. Sovereign power seeks to refuse 
those whose lives it controls any valid political response, and therefore operates 
as a form of technologized administration. By distinction, a power relation is one 
that is accompanied by resistance, with the subjects produced acknowledged as 
part of that relation. Thus, their freedom to resist is a necessary component of 
that interaction. Sovereign power on the other hand attempts to rule out any 
possibility of resistance. A proper political power relation is not practicable 
under those circumstances. Accordingly, in challenging sovereign power we are 
not faced with a power relation but with a relationship of violence. Resistance as 
such would only be possible within a power relation. In circumstances of a 
relationship of violence, other forms of opposition must be found in order to 
reinstate a proper political relation which permits resisstance and  ultimately 
produce a form of power as a power relation.12  
Scepticism	  Regarding	  Foucault’s	  Application	  in	  IR	  	  
 
This section challenges the approaches which celebrated the application 
of Foucaultian thought in the field of IR. According to these approaches, the 
contribution of Foucaultian thought lies on the reconsideration of: a) subjectivity 
from a non-liberal perspective; b) human rights; c) the mobilization for war and 
d) power as a medium of resistance and agency. On the contrary, here it is argued 
that certain scholars doubt whether Foucault’s application is appropriate in the 
field of international relations. To be more specific, Neil’s argumentation focuses 
on Foucault’s theory and the contingency it entails, arguing that such 
contingency renders it incompatible to the fixed discipline of IR. Debris and 
Richmond write in a similar vein. More importantly, Selby and Chandler, unlike 
Pasha, contend that Foucaultian IR thought ends up promoting liberalism instead 
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Politics (London-New York: Routledge), 4-10 
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of exposing the limits of IR perspectives which rest on a liberal understanding of 
subjectivity. In particular, Selby argues that the understanding of Foucault’s 
power within the realm of globalization and the international sphere encourages 
an internationalist liberal understanding of world power which ultimately fails to 
interrogate liberalism. Chandler too arrives at a similar conclusion according to 
which Foucaultian IR thought not only fails to undermine liberalism but also 
unintentionally assists the perpetuation of the dominant liberal cosmopolitan 
paradigm.  
Towards the end of this section, it will be explained that although the arguments 
of Neil, Debris, Richmond, Selby and Chandler are indeed useful, they fail to 
address the reasons why Foucaultian notions of ‘power’ (according to Manokha), 
‘docile bodies’/‘biopower’ (according to Reid) and ‘power relations’ (according 
to Edkins and Pin-Fat) are adequate to explain how: a) human rights have 
transformed into a global standard which does not necessarily prioritize the 
promotion of western norms; b) the subject’s mobilization of war is triggered 
from an effort to protect the administrative mechanisms, and c) resistance and 
agency emerge from an alternative understanding of power as ‘power relations’. 
At that point, it will become evident that Hegel’s insights are useful in that they 
efficiently tackle the shortcomings of Foucault’s notions of  docile bodies’, 
‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’ which form a conceptualization of subjectivity 
that lacks self-consciousness and free will.  
Neil is among the scholars who openly challenge Foucault’s theoretical 
appropriation in the field of international relations. He notes that it is not 
consistent to apply Foucault in IR as he does not offer a general theory. Neil 
insists that in Foucault’s work, we confront particular interests of power and 
historically-specific systems of thought. Therefore, Foucault does not offer a 
generalizable theory or system of thought and to try to incorporate him into such 
a system will be unsuccessful. For Neil, it makes little sense to ask what Foucault 
can do for IR, when his critical achievement is to help make IR a less-disciplined 
discipline, as it were.13  
As Neil notes, Foucault studies rationalities of government. What seemed 
to intrigue Foucault was how new or altered rationalities of government emerge 
                                                
13 Andrew Neal, “Rethinking Foucault in International Relations: Promiscuity and 
Unfaithfulness”, Global Society, Vol. 23. No 4, October 2009, 543 
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in history in the form of practices rejecting ideologies or paradigms. Foucault 
looks for marginal figures or documents that might be unfamiliar. He is not a 
historian of facts who imposes a systematization on the raw matter of history. 
The difficulty, Neil stresses, with trying to make Foucault speak to questions 
regarding the international is that this entails strong disciplinary principles and 
authorities, as well as the provision of authority to those (international) 
concepts.14   
In other words, if we attempt to use Foucault in a manner consistent with 
the IR discipline, it is impossible to remain faithful to a fixed understanding of 
such a discipline. Simultaneously, this means that we become inconsistent with 
respect to Foucault. For Neil, engaging with Foucault equates to being unfaithful. 
Foucault shows no compassion in dismissing his previous work. We should 
therefore not allow Foucaultian concepts to become disciplinary when Foucault 
himself did not hesitate  before abandoning them. In the Birth of Biopolitics, his 
choice of method consisted of: a way of not taking as a primary, original, and 
already given object notions such as sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, 
the state and civil society. Thus, Neil concludes that Foucault does not allow us 
to give ontological or epistemological priority to any object, concept or category, 
including the ‘international’.15 
In a similar vein, Debrix and Richmond highlight that being a 
Foucaultian cannot be reduced to an identity. Therefore Foucault is incompatible 
with  IR which projects the idea and the belief that there must be one discourse,  
one modality of knowledge and one practice of the global. For Debrix, a genuine 
understanding of Foucault is inconvenient to IR’s need for utility and 
knowledge-accumulation. In order to make his point more powerfully, Debrix 
brings to our attention the following Foucaultian quote: ‘do not ask who I am and 
do not ask me to remain the same; leave it to the bureaucrats and the police to see 
that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write’.16  
Richmond argues that Foucault has reminded us that the study of power, 
knowledge, government, peace and war have their own inherent biases, 
                                                
14 Neal, “Rethinking Foucault in International Relations: Promiscuity and Unfaithfulness”, 539-
540 
15 Neal, “Rethinking Foucault in International Relations: Promiscuity and Unfaithfulness”, 541-
542 
16 Francois Debrix, “We Other IR Foucaultians”, International Political Sociology (2010), Vol 4 
(2), 198-199 
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explicated as practices in specific contexts. However, much of the development 
of mainstream theory in IR, peace and conflict studies, conflict resolution, peace-
building and state-building has been ambivalent to such an insight. IR often 
speaks of (Foucaultian) power via power as truth, converted into governmentality 
and increasingly, an approximation of biopolitics. Where debate begins, 
biopolitical governance and reflexive censorship intervene rather than reflexion 
and engagement with political agency.17  
Like the previous scholars, Selby argues that Foucault centered his 
analysis on asylums, prisons, hospitals and other sites of social discipline. Thus 
he did not focus on the juridical edifice of sovereignty, state apparatuses, 
ideologies or directly on international relations. Selby holds that Foucault in his 
work seems above all to be an abstract epistemologist of the relations between 
texts, truth and power, rather than an empirically-grounded theorist of historical 
shifts in the relations between knowledge, institutions and the constitution of 
subjects. According to Selby, the traditional concerns of international relations 
theory (war, interstate relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, security etc.) seem a 
long way from Foucault’s pre-occupation with the micropolitics of power 
relations and the constitution of the limits of subjectivity. Foucault emphasized 
the ontological primacy of those micro-physical architectures, techniques and 
procedures invented by liberal scholars such as Bentham over the macro-level 
called ‘state’. Foucault was an analyst of mechanisms and rationalities of 
governance and self-governance under conditions of formal freedom - that is, the 
historically-specific procedures of social control that are characteristic of liberal 
societies.18  
Selby criticizes Dillon who depicts global liberal governance as a form of 
global biopolitics. As Dillon puts it, ‘global liberal governance is a Foucaultian 
system of power/knowledge that depends upon the strategic orchestration of the 
self-regulating freedoms of populations […] we are now living in an era of 
global governmentality’. Selby argues that across the range of Dillon’s and 
Reid’s work, Foucault’s writings do not provide tools for analyzing discrete 
                                                
17 Oliver P Richmond, “Foucault and the Paradox of Peace-as-Governance Versus Everyday 
Agency”, International Political Sociology (2010), Vol 4 (2), 200-201 
18 Jan Selby, “Engaging with Foucault: Discourse, liberal Governance and the Limits of 
Foucaultian IR”, International Relations (2007), SAGE Publications, Vol 21 (3), 329-331   
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techniques and practices of liberal governance, but instead that they develop a 
newly Foucaultian picture of contemporary world order.19 
For Selby, powerful as these claims are, their translation and elevation of 
Foucault to a global plane is problematic in two regards. First, the 
internationalization and globalization of Foucaultian power is necessarily both 
premised upon and productive of a paradigmatically liberal internationalist 
understanding of world order. Effectively international relations are subjected to 
a double reading: they are read first as liberal and on the strength of this, political 
realities are analyzed as products of disciplinary and bio-political power. Without 
such a reading, the characterization of contemporary world as ‘globalized bio-
politics’ would be impossible. The result is that in Reid’s and Dillon’s work, 
Foucault is ultimately used less to interrogate liberalism than to support the 
reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics. Selby admits 
that although Dillon and Reid are far from liberal in many of their assumptions 
about politics and society, in relation to international politics where the most 
abiding opposition is between broadly liberal and realist perspectives, their 
globalization of the Foucaultian model of power insures a quintessentially liberal 
rather than a realist reading of IR. 
Chandler, like Selby contends that the fixity of the IR field necessarily 
disciplines and restrains Foucault’s (presumed) contingency, significantly 
limiting his theoretical contribution to IR. Moreover, Chandler adds that the 
unavoidable dogmatization of Foucault serves to promote the liberal problematic 
that governs IR thought. Chandler noted that unlike the discipline of political 
theory which implicates sovereignty, the framing of rights and law and the 
permeation of institutionalism; the IR discipline was defined precisely by its lack 
of content - an emptiness which contrasts the fullness of the world bounded by a 
sovereign state expressed in political theory.20 
For Chandler, IR could be portrayed as a discipline that promotes liberal 
assumptions after suggesting that the sovereign didn’t exist, that we inhabit a 
world of globalization, complexity and interdependence. A ‘liberal’ framing of 
institutionalism and IR in which there is nothing beyond the irreducible subject 
                                                
19 Selby, “Engaging with Foucault: Discourse, liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucaultian 
IR”, 334-335 
20 David Chandler, “Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault...”, International Political 
Sociology (2010), Vol 4 (2), 205  
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of individual interests and which thereby undermine the notion of state 
sovereignty, was now repackaged as a new discipline according to which the 
world becomes  globalized in the imagination. It was through IR that the 
blockages of political theory, the ‘boundaries’ of the sovereign, the framing of 
law and the permeation of institutionalism could be overcome and restructured. 
Chandler from the outset poses the rhetorical question: how do we govern in a 
world with no sovereign and no citizens, only homo-economicus of interest 
bearing individuals? This is a liberal inspired problematic which drives IR and 
transforms political theory into the philosophy of a world which no longer exists. 
According to Chandler, IR is a fixed discipline. Inevitably, the incorporation of 
Foucault into such a discipline serves its purpose and undermines the genuine 
Foucaultian contingency that promotes un-fixity and agency.21     
After Chandler indicating how the Foucaultian application in IR 
unintentionally serves to substantiate a liberal perspective, Chandler becomes 
more specific, arguing that liberal cosmopolitan and radical post-structural 
approaches have many similarities. In order to provide additional strength to his 
contention, Chandler criticizes the work of Douzinas and Jabri who adopt a post-
structural approach. For Chandler, the work of Jabri and Douzinas is melded 
with post-Foucaultian readings of cosmopolitan rights. Jabri and Douzinas read 
cosmopolitan rights as an exclusionary and hierarchical exercise of biopower.22  
The biopolitical critique of the discourse of cosmopolitan rights is that 
instead of a mechanism of empowerment, it acts as  an exercise of power. The 
post-structural critics wish to portray all human rights constructions in terms of 
the territorialized ‘citizen’ or the deterritorialized ‘human’ as equally oppressive 
and hierarchical. For both liberal cosmopolitan theorists and post-structuralists, 
rights regimes are understood to be constituted independently of and prior to the 
subjects of rights. For cosmopolitan advocates, it is precisely because the poor 
and the excluded cannot autonomously enforce their rights that an external 
agency needs to intervene to empower them. For post-structuralists, rights are 
also constituted independently and prior to their subjects. It is the declaration of 
rights which constitutes the subject, and rights are therefore understood as 
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preceding and interpolating the subject. Douzinas therefore stresses the darker 
side of rights, referring to the inexorable rise of registration, classification and 
control of individuals and populations.23  
Chandler argues that post-structuralist critics exaggerate the cosmopolitan 
claim that rights are independent from the subjects in order to view all rights 
claims as fictions. Therefore, in the frameworks of cosmopolitan and biopolitical 
theorists of post-territorial political community, the political community is no 
longer constituted on the basis of a framework of rights or autonomous subjects. 
Formal frameworks are held to be independent of the political subject, which is 
reinterpreted in Foucaultian terms as the object of administration and regulation, 
rather than as a subject of rights. For liberal cosmopolitans, the existence of 
rights prior to and independently of political subjects is held to legitimize 
regimes’ international intervention and regulation, while for post-structuralists, 
the autonomy of law is read as the autonomy of power to interpolate and create 
the ruled subject. Both approaches hint at the absence of subjectivity and 
territorial community. Finally, as Chandler argues, both cosmopolitan and post-
structural approaches are free to establish the existence of political community at 
the global level as a post-territorial construction. Again, such a community is 
closer to liberalism than realism and appears to serve the needs of the former.24  
 
II.	   Challenging	   The	   Foucaultian	   Inspired	   IR	   Approaches	   From	   the	  
Perspective	  of	  Hegel’s	  Immanent	  Critique	  
Overview	  
 
The previous section delineated the prevailing debate on Foucaultian IR 
approaches, arguing that such debate is triggered by the question of whether 
Foucault’s application in the international field is appropriate. Here it is noted 
that this question is disorientating. The attempt to provide a response revealed an 
ambivalence around the suitability of Foucault’s theory to IR. While certain 
perspectives support Foucault’s application to IR, other approaches contest it, 
                                                
23 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The limits of Biopolitical Approach’, 56 
24 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The limits of Biopolitical Approach’, 60-62 
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claiming that the contingency which Foucaultian theory employs is not 
compatible with the fixity of the IR discipline. This section challenges the 
prevailing debate of Foucaultian IR approaches and instead puts forward an 
alternative question: how can Hegel’s insights unveil the intellectual flaws 
entailed both in certain Foucaultian IR approaches as well as in Foucault’s 
thought?  
From the perspective of Hegelian immanent critique it becomes clear that 
the flaws of Foucaultian thought lie in his conceptualization of power and 
subjectivity. Foucault via the notion of power purports to reconsider reality 
without reference to transcendental means. However, from the perspective of 
immanent critique, it becomes clear that Foucaultian power rests on 
transcendental premises which does not only fail to reconsider reality beyond 
transcendental means but also nourishes a flawed account of subjectivity. 
Furthermore, scholars such as Rose, Allen, and Taylor criticize Foucault’s 
approach and confirm that his account of power has transcendental premises 
whereas his notion of subjectivity forms a contingent form of identity which 
alienates the subject from herself. According to Rose’s and Allen’s critique, 
Foucaultian power reflects an empty formalism which rests on the failure to 
overcome the transcendentalism of the Kantian notion of subjectivity. For Rose, 
Foucault’s concept of power constituted an attempt to provide an alternative 
approach to the Kantian self-determining and transcendental subject. Rose 
illustrates how the problematic account of Foucaultian power emerges as soon as 
Foucault lapses into the Kantian intellectual dead-ends he originally aspired to 
overcome. 
Taylor contends that Foucaultian power nurtures a relativistic account of 
subjectivity. Before elaborating further on Taylor’s scholarship, it is instructive 
to attempt to demonstrate the discontinuity of Foucault’s thought by comparing 
his early work (Discipline and Punish) with his late work (History of Sexuality 
and The Subject and Power). Foucault’s early work identifies power as the sole 
knowledge and subject producing force, whereas the latter re-introduces the 
concepts of freedom and subjectivity independently of power. However, as 
Taylor’s approach stresses, Foucault’s conceptualization of subjectivity retains 
flaws despite his attempt to revise his theory. 
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Although Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s critique of Foucault’s thought 
corresponds to the insights that immanent critique can produce, this part 
elaborates that Hegel’s insights allow us to go one step further, demonstrating 
that Foucault nourishes a flawed understanding of power and subjectivity which 
negates the subject’s self-consciousness and free-will. The final section of this 
part stresses the contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique, which succeeds 
where Foucault failed. Namely, the reconsideration of reality without 
transcendental or arbitrary means permits an alternative understanding of 
subjectivity and freedom which overcomes these flaws,. Hegel’s alternative 
conceptualization of freedom will be applied to expose the shortcomings of the 
Foucaultian-inspired IR approaches which uncritically adopt Foucault’s notions 
of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’. These approaches, by 
neglecting to incorporate a detailed analysis of free will, ultimately rely on a 
misleading understanding of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism. 
Tracing	  the	  Origins	  of	  Foucault’s	  Flawed	  Account	  of	  Power:	  How	  
Power’s	  Empty	  Formalism	  Rests	  on	  the	  Contingency	  of	  a	  Military-­‐
Theological	  Transcendentalism	  	  
 
This section examines where the problem in Foucault’s understanding of 
power lies. Foucault - just like Hegel with immanent critique - aspired to 
examine reality beyond transcendental means. Foucault applied his notion of 
power and the effects of power’s administrative mechanisms on the formation of 
subjectivity in order to reconsider reality beyond a transcendental dimension. 
However, the following paragraphs illustrate that Foucault’s notion of power has 
transcendental premises.  
From the perspective of immanent critique, the shortcomings of 
Foucaultian power emerge soon as it assumes a transcendental dimension that 
prevents it from examining reality with means which belong to the reality.  The 
analyses of Rose and Allen confirm that Foucault fails to re-examine reality 
beyond transcendental means after demonstrating that the notion of power 
replicates the Kantian shortcomings which Foucault originally aspired to 
overcome. Moreover, Taylor’s approach illustrates how Foucault’s 
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transcendental conceptualization of power contributes to a flawed account of 
subjectivity which lacks a contingent form of identity and self-consciousness.  
In that respect, after Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s analyses confirm the 
transcendental premises of Foucault’s notion of power which is responsible for 
triggering a flawed notion of subjectivity, the superiority of Hegel’s immanent 
critique is confirmed. Immanent critique accommodates Hegel’s dialectical 
method and his philosophical system of Spirit which reconsider reality with 
means and norms which stem from reality itself while promoting  an alternative 
conceptualisation  of subjectivity, self-consciousness and freedom which 
overcome the flaws of Foucaultian thought.  
 Rose’s and Allen’s analyses make clear that the empty formalism of the 
Foucaultian conception of power rests on power’s contingent transcendentalism. 
Foucault portrays power as the new location of the origin of knowledge with its 
mix of force, generality and transcendentalism.25  Rose and Allen do not treat 
Foucault’s The Order of Things as discontinuous from Discipline and Punish.  
Rather, it is claimed that Foucault’s objective was, among others, to overcome 
the transcendentalism of Kantian Subjectivity, though it nonetheless ultimately 
introduced another form of abstract transcendentalism. This transcendentalism 
took either the form of the a priori rules of scientific discourse according to 
Allen, or the form of power’s control over knowledge and bodies, in to Rose’s 
terms.  
Rose argues that in The Order of Things, Foucault’s notion of history 
changes. This shift from the delineation of episteme to the delineation of 
‘powers’ as viewed in Discipline and Punish, marks a move from an interest in 
the idea of scientific regularities to one in power as an unjustifiable source which 
conforms to no regularity. These elisions of method and thesis, technology and 
technique, strategy and tactic, are the sleights of hand by which Foucault 
dissolves politics into ‘powers’.26 
In the Order of Things Foucault abandoned the problem of the causes 
behind transformations and chose to describe the transformations themselves, in 
the belief that this would be  an indispensable step if a theory of scientific 
                                                
25 See, Amy Allen, “The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the Death of The 
Subject”, The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2000, p.125, and Gillian Rose, 
Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, 172-175 
26 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law, 172 
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language and epistemological causality was to be constructed. In short, Foucault 
attempted  to explore scientific discourse not from the agents’ point of view, but 
from the perspective of the rules that come into play in the very existence of such 
discourse. As Foucault emphasizes, ‘if there is one approach I do reject [...] it is 
that which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes, a 
consistent role to act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all 
historicity which leads to a transcendental consciousness’.27 Such a remark 
clearly rejects the Kantian transcendental subject. 
Foucault speculates on the establishment of classifications, for example, 
posing the question that when we say that a cat and a dog resemble each other 
less that two greyhounds do, what is the ground upon which we are able to 
establish the validity of such classification with complete certainty?  For him, it 
is not a question of linking consequences, but of grouping and isolating, of 
analyzing, and of matching concrete contents; there is nothing more tentative, 
nothing more empirical that the process of establishing an order among things. 
The Order of Things, provides an analysis that does not belong to the history of 
ideas or science. It is an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis 
knowledge and theory became possible, within what space of order knowledge 
was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori and in the element of 
what positivity ideas can appear, sciences can be established, experience can be 
reflected in philosophies and rationalities be formed, only to dissolve afterwards. 
Foucault is not concerned with describing the process of knowledge towards an 
objectivity in which today’s science can finally be recognized. What he is 
attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field - the episteme in which 
knowledge (envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value 
or its objective forms) grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history 
which is not that of its growing perfection.28 
Thus, in the Order of Things, Foucault designates the importance of the 
rules of scientific discourse after rejecting the absolute prioritization of the 
transcendental observing (Kantian) subject as the basis of knowledge. Certainly, 
Foucault’s objection to Kant’s subject, one who permeates all historicity and 
                                                
27 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Knowledge, (London: Tavistock 
Publications Limited 1970), xiv 
28 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Knowledge, xix-xx 
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forms a transcendental consciousness, reflected a point of critique and theoretical 
departure from which to develop his theory on scientific discourse.   
According to Allen too, Foucault’s argument is that subjectivity should 
not be conceived as the necessary fixed point, as Kant and Descartes much 
earlier claimed. Allen contends that Foucault shifts the conceptualization of 
subjectivity from the position of that which explains, to the position of that 
which must be explained, from explanans to explanandum. Foucault maintains 
that the modern, humanist conception of subjectivity is contingent at this 
particular point in history and requires explanation. If Foucault is trying to shift 
the subject from its usual position to the position of ‘to be explained’, then we 
must set aside the preconceived notions of the subject. Thus, it becomes 
important to understand how the subject is constituted in a particular way and in 
this particular cultural and historical mileu. According to Allen, after initially 
negating transcendental forms of subjectivity via the concept of power,  
Foucault’s project appears to be delineating the ways in which a historically-
specific discourse makes possible particular modes of subjectivity.29 
Yet, Allen notes that as Foucault criticizes the Kantian transcendental 
subject, he paradoxically falls victim to a different form of transcendentalism. 
Foucault differentiates his approach to the constitution and self-constitution of 
the human subject from Kant’s. Accordingly, he holds that criticism is no longer 
going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but 
rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves and to recognize ourselves as a subject of what we are doing, thinking 
and saying. In this sense, his criticism aspires to be that of non-transcendental 
nature. In other words, it involves laying out the historically, socially and 
culturally-specific conditions of possibility for subjectivity. Nevertheless, Allen 
underlines that although Foucaultian critique does not appear transcendental in 
this respect, it becomes transcendental in another sense, at exactly the moment 
Foucault seeks to specify what he defined as the historical a priori, or the rules 
of scientific discourse. As Allen notes, Foucault objects to Kantian 
transcendental subjectivity as the condition of possibility for experiencing. 
Instead, he focuses his attention on the search for the historically-contingent and 
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constitutive conditions of the possibility of subjectivity. Foucault is interested in 
laying-out the historically a priori conditions for the possibility of subjectivity.30 
Rose also contends that Foucault’s attempt to overcome Kant’s 
transcendental subject ‘entraps’ him in a different form of transcendentalism. She 
notes that just as Foucault’s notion of history changes from the delineation of 
episteme to the delineation of ‘powers’, similarly, this marks a shift from 
scientific regularities to power as the unjustifiable source which conforms to no 
regularity. Rose maintains that Foucault treats knowledge as the sole resource of 
power, disabling him from drawing a distinction between different forms of 
apprehension. Among these forms, the notion of critical self-reflexion is 
essential, since such forms of apprehension are preoccupied with their 
connection  to the position from which they speak as well as  their form of 
speaking.31 
 As a result, after treating power as the sole resource of knowledge 
without  acknowledging the forms of apprehension that necessitate critical self-
reflexion, the command of power is left alone to recommend and to employ the 
object or actuality to be apprehended. Therefore, the function of the previously 
transcendental subject of Kant is replaced by the material reality of power’s 
(transcendental) control over bodies. But this materialism is spurious, argues 
Rose, as it deliberately revives the theological and Kantian opposition of the 
body and reason.32 
Rose argues that although Foucault’s genealogy was founded to transcend 
the finite and anthropological Kantian dichotomy of transcendental vs empirical 
by dropping both the thing-in-itself and the transcendental subject, Foucault 
unintentionally reproduces this dichotomy. In his effort to overcome it, Foucault 
becomes resolved to a mathesis of the origin, the historical a priori, upon which 
he replicates the Kantian dichotomy. This attempt to replace the Kantian 
oppositions with the mathesis and the historical a priori via the notion of power 
takes shape in Discipline and Punish. The idea is that the mathesis is retained, 
but all associations with the question of justification or validity, and even with  
regularity, are abandoned and replaced by power. For Foucault assures us that 
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power has nothing to do with politics, but preceded all political and 
epistemological validity. Ultimately, Foucault transforms power into the anarchic 
terminology of warfare without politics.33 
As Rose notes, Foucault’s conceptualization of power underlines an 
infinite and eternal disorder rather than order. Power as the new location of the 
origin of knowledge, with its mix of force and generality, if not 
transcendentalism, alludes to the mystery of Kant’s categorical imperative: 
inconceivable but absolute. Power as force and generality is re-exploited as a 
multiplicity without a rule. This further explains why Foucault works so hard to 
divorce power from politics in an effort to neutralize and promote it as an 
impartial and unavoidably transcendental force upon which knowledge is 
dependent.34 
Unveiling	  the	  Shortcomings	  of	  Foucault’s	  Conceptualization	  of	  
Subjectivity	  
  
This section focuses on the shortcomings of Foucault’s understanding of 
subjectivity. Taylor’s analysis discloses that the relativism of the Foucaultian 
subject is nurtured by the ‘neutrality’ and contingency of the power-relations 
which form it.  
 Before analyzing how this relativism emerges and triggers an incomplete 
account of subjectivity, it is noted that Foucault does not appear to be treating 
subjectivity in a consistent manner throughout his work. Rather, his ideas seem 
to be discontinuous after comparing his early work (Discipline and Punish) with 
his late work (History of Sexuality Vol.2 and The Subject and Power). In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault appears to be identifying power as the exclusive 
knowledge and productive force of subjectivity, whereas in the History of 
Sexuality Vol.2 and the essay Subject and Power, he appears to be reintroducing  
subjectivity disentangled from the tight control of power, and thus permitting 
agency. At first, it seems that Foucault is attempting an alternative 
conceptualization of subjectivity. However, Taylor contends that Foucault’s late 
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work still promotes an understanding of the subject that is subjected to power’s 
control.  
Taylor’s analysis indicates that the relativism of the Foucaultian subject is 
maintained in spite of the fact that Foucault’s treatment of subjectivity changes 
throughout his work. Taylor makes clear that this relativism stems from 
Foucault’s conceptualization of power. For Taylor, Foucault’s early (Discipline 
and Punish) and late (History of Sexuality Vol.1 and Vol.2) work celebrates a 
conceptualization of subjectivity that fails to control itself efficiently and which 
is dominated by power’s control mechanisms. Taylor’s work  reveals that 
Foucaultian power predetermines the limits of the subject’s agency, where the 
purposeless succession of the (supposedly neutral) power regimes deprives the 
subject of the ability to form an identity for itself. This renders the subject 
relativistic since it adheres to the instability of the power regimes which form it.      
Foucault’s	  Account	  of	  Subjectivity	  in	  Discipline	  and	  Punish	  
 
In Discipline and Punish, published in 1975, power is treated as a force 
which produces a passive form of subjectivity via the notion of discipline, 
transforming the individual into a ‘docile body’ in order to control it.  
As Foucault outlines, the historical moment of discipline was the moment 
in which an art of the human body was born. This art was directed not only at the 
growth of the body’s skills, nor the intensification of its subjection, but the 
formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes the body more 
obedient as it becomes evermore useful. What was then being formed was a 
policy of coercions that act upon the body - a calculated manipulation of its 
elements, its gestures and its behavior. The human body was entering a 
machinery of power that explored it, broke it down and rearranged it. Such 
political anatomy was also a ‘mechanics of power’. Thereby, discipline came to 
produce subjected and practiced bodies; ‘docile’ bodies. Discipline, Foucault 
held, increases the forces of the body (in economical terms of utility) and 
diminishes these same forces (in the political terms of obedience). In short, it 
dissociates power from the body. On the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a 
‘capacity’ which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of 
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the energy, the power that might result from it and turns it into a relation of strict 
subjection.35 
Furthermore, Foucault elaborates how that the subjects, as docile bodies,  
are controlled by the disciplinary apparatuses of power. Via the workshop, the 
school, the army, individuals are subject to a whole micro-penality of time 
(lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, 
lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle 
character, insolence), of the body (‘incorrect’ attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of 
cleanliness), and of sexuality (impurity, indecency).36 Thus, under such processes 
the individual is doubtless the fictitious atom of an ideological representation of 
society. Yet he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power 
that Foucault has called ‘discipline’. He stresses that we must cease, once and for 
all, to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it excludes, it represses, it 
censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact, he argues, power produces. It 
produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The 
individual and the knowledge that might be gained about the individual belong to 
this production.37  
 According to Foucault, discipline is a form of power.  Because discipline 
can be identified with neither an institution nor an apparatus, it becomes a type of 
power, a modality of exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, 
procedures, levels of application and targets. Discipline is an anatomy of power, 
a technology, and it may be taken over by specialized institutions, or by 
institutions which use it as an external instrument for a particular end (schools, 
hospitals), as well as by pre-existing authorities that find in it means of 
reinforcing or re-organizing their internal mechanism of power. Finally, it may 
be taken over by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to 
ensure  that discipline reigns over society as a whole (the police).38  
 
                                                
35 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, (London: Penguin Books 
1991),137-138 
36 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, 178 
37 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, 194 
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Foucault’s	  Account	  of	  Subjectivity	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Sexuality	  Vol.2	  and	  
The	  Subject	  of	  Power	  
 
In The History of Sexuality Vol.2, published in 1984, Foucault re-
introduces the notion of subjectivity as agency via the term of ‘arts of existence’. 
By this phrase he means those intentional and voluntary actions by which men 
not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, 
to change themselves in their singular being, and to turn their lives into an oeuvre 
that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. These ‘arts 
of existence’, or ‘techniques of the self’ as Foucault describes, lost some of their 
importance and autonomy when they were assimilated into the exercise of 
priestly power with the development of Christianity. However, Foucault insists 
that the significance of the ‘arts of existence’ was again amplified during the 
Renaissance, signifying the permeation of subjectivity.39 
Using examples from ancient Greece, Foucault explains how morality 
relates to the practice of the self. For an action to be moral, it must not be 
reducible to an act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, law or a value. All 
moral action involves a relationship with reality and a relationship with the self. 
The latter is not self-awareness but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’.  There 
can be no forming of the ethical subject without the ‘modes of subjectivation’ 
and ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of self’ that support them. Moral action is 
indissoluble from these forms of self-activity. Here Foucault introduces two key 
words: engrateia and askesis. As in Aristotle’s analysis, engrateia is defined as 
self-mastery and victory, presupposing the presence of desires. 
Sophrosyne,defined as a state of virtue, does not imply suppression of desires, 
but rather their control. It is not abstinence from pleasures, but mastery over 
them. In classical Greek thought, the askesis that enabled one to make oneself 
into an ethical subject, was an integral part of the practice of the virtuous life. 
This was also the life of a ‘free’ man in the full, positive and political sense of 
the word.40  
                                                
39 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (London: Penguin 
Books 1992), 6-11 
40 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure,. 77-78 
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Sophrosyne was a state that could be approached through an exercise of 
self-mastery and through restraint in the practice of pleasures. Such self-mastery 
was affirmed, active freedom. In short, it represented a way of being, active in 
relation to what was by nature passive and ought to remain so. The development 
of the self, as an ethical subject, consisted in setting up a structure of virility that 
related oneself to oneself. This freedom-power combination that characterized 
the mode of being of the moderate man could not be conceived without a relation 
to truth. One could not practice moderation without a certain form of knowledge. 
One could not form oneself as an ethical subject in the use of pleasures without 
forming oneself at the same time as a subject of knowledge. As Foucault 
summarizes, whether it be  in the form of the hierarchical structure of the human 
being, a practice of prudence or of the soul’s recognition of its own being, the 
relation to truth consists of an essential element of moderation. This moderation 
was necessary for the measured use of pleasure and for controlling violence.41 
The above point marks a significant difference between Foucault and 
Kant, as the former rejects any form of universality. According to Foucault, 
moderation culminates within the limits dictated by a particular regimen. A 
regime should not be understood as a corpus of universal and uniform rules. It is 
more in the nature of a manual for reacting to situations in which one might find 
oneself - a treatise for adjusting one’s behavior to conform to specific 
circumstances. Such practice of the regiment forms an ‘art of existence’. Such 
‘arts of existence’ in turn form oneself as a subject.42 
Foucault examines subjectivity elsewhere beyond The History of 
Sexuality Vol.2. In one of his latest articles, The Subject of Power, his primary 
objective was to develop a history of the different modes by which human beings 
are transformed into subjects. Foucault maintains that there are certain modes of 
‘objectification’ which transform human beings into subjects. The first attempts 
to give itself the status of science. The second relates to ‘dividing practices’, 
through which the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others, 
for instance, through the division of the mad and the sane, the sick and the 
healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’. Thus for Foucault, subjectivity 
emerges only within a domain such as sexuality, or the penal system etc. 
                                                
41 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure,. 82-86 
42 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure,. 106-108 
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Foucault thereby no longer focuses on power, but on the subject which 
henceforth becomes the general theme of his research. The instant Foucault 
prioritizes the subject, his definition of power changes. What he now requires is 
an economy of power relations. Power relations consist in forms of resistance 
against different forms of power. Foucault uses resistance as a catalyst to: i) 
bring power relations to light; ii) locate their position and trace the point of their 
application. Such forms of resistance within the realm of power relations 
contribute to the development of subjectivity.43   
These struggles are not against the individual, but against the government 
of individualization. They are an opposition to the effects of power, which are 
linked to knowledge, competence and qualification: struggles against the 
privileges of knowledge. The main objective of these struggles is an attack, not 
on an institution of power, a group, elite or class, but rather on a technique, a 
form of power. According to Foucault, such a power relationship can only be 
articulated on the basis of two conditions: a) each pole of such struggle is 
necessary and indispensable, meaning that the ‘other’ (over whom the power is 
exercised) is thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person 
who acts; and b) within such relationships of power, a whole field of responses, 
reactions, results and possible inventions opens up. In this manner, the exercise 
of power is neither violence nor consent. Power relations instead form a total 
structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions.44  
Moreover, such power relations for Foucault consist in guiding the 
possibility of conduct and ordering the possible outcome. Power is essentially 
less a confrontation between two adversaries, and more a question of 
government. Foucault’s understanding of ‘government’ does not refer only to 
political structures. To govern is to structure the possible field of the action of 
others. To define the exercise of power as ‘government’, structuring a field of  
others’ actions necessitates one important element: freedom. Power is exercised 
only over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean 
individual or collective subjects who face a field of possibilities in which several 
ways of behaving permit several reactions to be realized. Consequently, there is 
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no confrontation between power and freedom but a complex interplay. In this 
game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power, since 
freedom must exist for power to be exerted.45  
How	  the	  Purposeless	  and	  ‘Neutral’	  Succession	  of	  Power	  Regimes	  
Promotes	  a	  Relativistic	  Account	  of	  Subjectivity	  	  
 
The arguments raised in Subject of Power entail certain aporias which 
bring us to the following questions: is Foucault’s subject indeed an agent or a 
limited actor? Do Foucault’s modes of objectification promote the understanding 
of a subject that is autonomous or conditioned by the power-relations? Is it 
restricting to assume that subjectivity emerges only within specific domains, 
such as sexuality or the penal system?  
Below, Taylor’s analysis suggests that Foucault’s understanding of 
power, no matter how he conceptualizes it throughout work, promotes a 
relativistic and passive account of subjectivity. Taylor argues that since the 
succession of power regimes is portrayed as purposeless, so too the truth that 
these power regimes convey is contingent and purposeless. This undermines the 
subject’s sense of identity which rests on power’s contingent truth regimes and 
promotes a relativistic form of subjectivity that is determined by the purposeless 
succession of power regimes.   
To be more precise, Taylor read Foucault’s The History of Sexuality as a 
work which promotes a perception of subjectivity according to which the subject 
is controlled and oppressed by power. For Taylor, the prerequisite of elaborating 
a specific domain where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his 
freedom in fact acts as a domain in which the individual submits herself to 
control. He contends that the incorporation of the idea of our nature as sexual 
beings, dictated by the domain of sexuality, is responsible for our (sexual) 
oppression, from which we strive to liberate ourselves..  
Taylor offsets his analysis by arguing that the link between the 
domination of nature and the domination of man has been developed previously.  
Schiller was among the first to develop a critique of enlightenment humanism, 
arguing  that objectifying our own nature and trying to bring it under the control 
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of reason divides what should be a unity. This introduces a master within - an 
internal relation of domination.. Foucault offers the Schillerian perspective 
another connection. The objectification and domination of man’s inner nature 
comes not only through a change of attitude, but also through training in certain 
disciplines. For Foucault, the disciplines which construct  this new way of being 
are social, such as the hospital, the school and the factory. Thus, individuals lend 
themselves to control  by others. The inculcation of self-discipline is often the 
imposition of discipline by others.46  
In The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, crucial aspects of the individual’s 
inner nature must be articulated within the acknowledgement of this nature as 
sexual, among other things. The acceptance that we have such a nature in turn 
makes us an object of control. As soon as our sexual nature is located, the 
expert’s intervention and the help is required, in whose care we must put 
ourselves. According to Taylor, the whole notion therefore emerges as a strategy 
of power, of engendering control. This  manifests as sexuality entails a crucial 
fulfillment of the human self. . The entire idea that we are sexually repressed and 
above all, in need  of liberation lures  us into self-entrapment. In striving for 
liberation, we see ourselves as escaping a power understood in terms of  the 
traditional model. Yet in fact we live under power of a new kind, and are 
therefore not escaping.  
Finally, Taylor holds that the modern idea of sexuality is part of a 
technology of control.47  He criticizes the idea of power without subject, arguing 
that Foucault’s power cannot be neutral. Foucault sets aside the old model 
according to which power is exercised by the subject. Power for him becomes 
nothing more than forms of domination. On this basis, Taylor argues that the 
doctor (power) – patient (subject) relation is defined by a supposed common 
goal. But this coming together as a common goal is inseparable from a relation of 
power founded on the presumption that one party knows and that the other has an 
overwhelming interest in taking advice. Such a relation of force is thus 
substantiated by a common goal. This constitutes a relation of power but not on 
the Hobbesian model. Taylor argues that such power can not be neutral because 
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although both parties are constrained, there is domination on the part of the 
Doctor.48   
Taylor is also critical of Foucault’s stance that the succession of power 
regimes is purposeless.  He dismisses such idea on the grounds that the agents 
involved in Foucault’s power relations require a purpose in order to act and to 
ignite such succession. Foucault’s (presumed) neutrality of power which is 
founded on purposelessness is incapable of stimulating the subjects’ conscious 
action upon which their agency is determined. An approach of strategies without 
projects is a useful formula for describing Foucault’s historiography. This is 
exemplified in the whole constitution  and maintenance of the system of control. 
Foucault speaks of its growth and self-domination in strategic terms. Such a 
notion of global strategies is essential to Foucault’s reversal of a Clausewitzian 
thesis of war as the continuation of politics with other means, into politics as the 
continuation of war with other means. However, as Taylot notes, 
‘purposelessness without purpose’ requires a particular explanation in order to be 
intelligible. The undersigned systematicity must be related to the purposeful 
action of agents in a manner that we can understand. This is required because the 
text of history which we are attempting to explain is comprised by purposeful 
human action. It is a mistake to think that the only intelligible relation between a 
pattern and our conscious purposes is that direct one in which the pattern is 
consciously willed. This idea is inherited from classical Cartesian-empiricist 
views of the mind and, Taylor argues, Foucault is right to ridicule it. While it is 
certainly not the case that all patterns are issued from conscious action, all 
patterns have nonetheless to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action.49 
Finally, Taylor criticizes the lack of equilibrium and judgment which run 
through Foucault’s succession of truth regimes within the realm of power. Taylor 
argues that the lack of judgment which characterizes the succession of the truth 
regimes, acts as a safety valve of Foucault’s power, sustaining its monolithism, 
protecting it from criticism, and reproducing its exercise of control. Taylor 
speculates on how a change can be perceived uncritically. Changes are discerned 
and losses are experienced. It is impossible to form an identity without the 
exercise of choice, yet in order to choose, a comparison needs to be drawn to 
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realize loss, thus developing a measure of comparison. This measure is precisely 
what forms an identity, argues Taylor. Within relativism, there cannot be an 
identity, only the perspective of an unaffected outsider which is of course, far 
from accurate.  
According to the Foucaultian thesis, moving from one context to another 
cannot be seen as liberation, argues Taylor, because there is no common measure 
between the impositions of one context and those of the other. The Foucaultian 
regime of the relativity of truth means that we can not raise the banner of truth 
against our own regime. So liberation in the name of truth  can only reflect the 
substitution of another system of power. As a result of such relativity, the 
transformation from one regime cannot be a gain in truth or freedom, as each is 
redefined in the new context. Foucault cannot envisage liberating 
transformations within such regimes because the relativity of the truth regimes 
makes them incomparable. However, such incomparability disqualifies any sense 
of loss or gain from the previous system to the next.  Taylor underscores the 
notion that our sense of both gain and loss depends on comparability and 
constitutes our understanding of identity. However, Foucault’s monolithic truth 
regimes do not permit comparison, or the discerning of gains or losses, and thus 
ultimately deny a development of identity. Monolithism and relativism are two 
sides of the same coin. One is just as necessary as the other to create this 
incomparability across changes in history. Taylor elaborates that Foucault’s 
monolithic relativism is only plausible if one adopts the outsider’s perspective. 
Without an a-priori identity, the individual could not begin to choose.50 
Finally, Taylor’s analysis assists to elucidate how the relativism of the 
Foucaultian subject emerges.  Foucault’s treatment of power as neutral serves to 
dominate the subject while rendering it relativistic. A subject that is formed by 
the purposeless succession of power regimes fails to develop an identity by itself 
as it is conditioned by the relativism of any change in such power regimes. As 
soon as the succession of power regimes is portrayed as purposeless,  it is 
impossible to stimulate a sense of comparison among the truths each power 
regime conveys. Thus, Foucault’s purposeless succession of power regimes 
nurtures a pluralism of truths beyond comparison, thereby undermining the 
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subject’s sense of consciousness and purposeful agency. The Foucaultian subject 
ends up relying on the contingency of power regimes rather than on itself, 
transforming it into a self-alienated and relativistic entity. Here, it is argued that 
the relativism of Foucault’s subject lacks self-consciousness and free will. For 
this reason, the insights of Hegelian thought are useful as an approach which 
elaborates extensively on the development of self-consciousness. In the 
following section, the shortcomings of Foucaultian IR approaches will be 
examined from the Hegelian perspective of self-consciousness and free will.  
Unveiling	  the	  Limits	  of	  Foucaultian	  IR	  Approaches	  From	  The	  Hegelian	  
Perspective	  of	  Self-­‐Consciousness	  and	  Free	  Will	  
 
 Rose’s, Allen’s and Taylor’s remarks have exposed the shortcomings of 
Foucault’s notion of power, which rests on transcendental premises and fails to 
consider reality from a non-transcendental dimension. Moreover, this 
transcendental foundation of power triggers a self-defeating conceptualization of 
subjectivity and freedom which negates the subject’s consciousness and free will, 
confirming the explanatory strength of Hegel’s immanent critique. Immanent 
critique succeeds in reconsidering reality by developing from it an alternative 
understanding of ethics and subjectivity which nourishes the subject’s self-
consciousness and free will within the state. In that respect Hegel’s insights 
unveil that Foucaultian thought fails to nourish   the subject’s self-consciousness 
after resting on a transcendental notion of power which portrays the succession 
of power regimes as purposeless, rendering the subject’s identity contingent with 
respect to the particular contexts it is affiliated.  
The next chapter exposes the flaws of Foucault’s understanding of 
freedom, after elaborating on Hegel’s understanding of free will, whereas the 
current chapter  notes that the incapacity of the Foucaultian subject to seize free 
will is responsible for the flaws of Foucaultian-inspired IR approaches. These 
flaws stem from the IR scholar’s uncritical reception of Foucault’s concepts 
‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power-relations’. In contrast to Neil, Debrix, 
Richmond, Selby and Chandler who considered the application of Foucaultian 
thought in IR inappropriate here it is stressed that from a Hegelian perspective, 
the inapplicability of Foucaulian theory to IR lies in the negation of free will.   
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It is worthwhile recalling that Debrix, Richmond, Selby and Chandler 
considered the application of Foucaultian thought to IR inappropriate on 
different grounds. Specifically, Neil, Debrix and Richmond noted that it is 
misleading to constrain Foucaultian thought to the discipline of IR since 
Foucault himself did not offer a generalizable theory or system of thought which 
permitted its incorporation to a specific discipline.  Moreover, Selby contends 
that the globalization of the Foucaultian notion of power and its incorporation 
into the international sphere contributed to the production of a liberal 
internationalist understanding of world order. For Chandler, Foucaultian post-
structuralist analyses fail to deliver an escape from  liberal IR approaches and 
instead  promote an argumentation that befitting of liberal cosmopolitianism. Yet 
the insights of these scholars, no matter how important, do not address in depth 
the approaches of Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat who celebrate the 
application of Foucaultian thought. Below, it is stressed that these approaches 
appear to be taking for granted the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’, 
‘biopower’, and ‘power relations’, while leaving unanswered some important 
questions. Here, after  attempting to respond to these questions, we are brought 
closer to the limits of Foucaultian thought which negates free will by 
undermining the development of the subject’s self-consciousness.  
Manokha, after focusing on the Foucaultian notion of power, promotes an 
alternative understanding of the global discourse of human rights. He dismisses 
the claim that human rights are a coercive means of western intervention and 
world-colonization. Instead, suggests that the dominant structures of power 
produce a behavior according to which the agents, in the absence of coercion, 
decide to conform voluntarily  to the human rights norms. 51  However, 
Manokha’s argument begs the following questions: how exactly does this 
consent emerge, and most importantly, is this consent a product of the agent’s 
free will?   
Edkins and Pin-Fat challenge the dominant understanding of sovereign 
power and propose replacing it with Foucault’s notion of ‘power relations’.  
Sovereign power is seen as a relationship of violence and its opposite pole as 
passive. However, the treatment of power as ‘power relations’ is based on the 
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interaction between two poles that are indispensable, permitting a field of mutual 
response. Thus, the notion of contingency upon which this understanding of 
power rests does not only permit resistance but also relies on it. According to 
Edkins and Pin-Fat, this  contingency assists in the promotion of agency and 
subjectivity.. However, the question posed here is whether this notion of 
contingency alone is adequate to promote an understanding of subjectivity that 
accommodates free will? 
Finally, the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’ and ‘biopower’ for 
Reid stimulate an alternative perspective on the problem of war and in particular, 
on the mobilization of war. Here it is nevertheless argued that what lies at the 
heart of Reid’s argumentation is a deeply biological, perhaps even a materialistic, 
argument. We are encouraged to believe that Reid’s biological and materialistic 
rationale behind war mobilization becomes evident in his suggestion that such a 
mobilization emerges in order to sustain the survival of the state’s population and 
the administrative domains constituting that population. This statement begs the 
following questions: if the subjects are not conscious of the administrative 
mechanisms that produce them, but simply experience them as coercive (just as 
Foucault’s ‘docile bodies’ suggest), why would they voluntarily fight and even 
die for these administrative mechanisms? Moreover, is it convincing enough to 
suggest that these administrative mechanisms nourish an appropriate disposition 
which in turn renders the subject willing to participate in an armed struggle, self-
consciously, freely and voluntarily?  
These questions make clear that IR scholars such as these take for granted 
the notions of consent, contingency and voluntarism, whereas our attention is 
drawn away from the concepts of free will and (self-)consciousness. Here it is 
instead suggested that consent, voluntarism and contingency demand a deeper 
examination and that Hegel’s conceptualizations of free will and self-
consciousness assist us towards this goal. Previously, the insights of Rose, Allen 
and Taylor revealed that Foucaultian thought entails a misleading understanding 
of power and subjectivity which rest on power’s empty formalism and the 
relativism of Foucault’s subject. However, Hegel’s method of immanent critique 
provides a superior conceptualization of subjectivity which overcomes the 
intellectual shortcomings of Foucault’s thought after elucidating the formation of 
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the subjects self-consciousness and free will via the notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) which emerges from the state. 
From a Hegelian perspective, Manokha’s approach entails weaknesses as 
he takes for granted notions of subjectivity and consent, without examining 
whether the agent’s consent to human rights discourse is a product of free will. 
Similarly Edkins’ and Pin-Fat’s approach does not appear to examine the 
dimension of subjectivity thoroughly, considering Foucault’s  ‘power relations’ 
and the notion of contingency it entails as the sole source of agency upon which 
subjectivity can be founded. However, Hegel’s insights suggest that the 
formation of a subject’s self-consciousness cannot rest only on the dimension of 
contingency. Contingency echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as 
indetermination and nourishes an incomplete account of subjectivity which fails 
to seize self-consciousness and free will. Similarly, with respect to Manokha’s 
approach, the subject’s consent to the human rights discourse is unsuccessful in 
substantiating that this consent is a product of the subject’s free will, resulting 
from the absence of coercion.  
For Hegel, free will is not a quality of the individual, but a process which 
presupposes three moments. The first moment (Indetermination) rest on 
contingency as it includes the element of pure indeterminacy and the will is 
content-less. The individual does not participate, nor is the will’s content  subject 
to any restriction. Its content is from the outset, confronted with nature, needs, 
desires and impulses. In this sense, the subject is contingent, relativistic and 
alienated from itself as it fails to control its will. 52  The second moment 
(Determination) includes the transition from a state of indeterminacy to 
differentiation and determination, positing a will with content. Although the will 
here is the product of an individual’s decision, it is not free because it adheres to 
a ‘selfish’ state of fixity as the ego intervenes to determine existence through this 
positing of itself as determinate.53 In the third moment, the will becomes the 
unity of the previous two moments and considers the genesis of the subject’s free 
will as a reciprocal action between individuals and the social world they form 
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within an evolutionary process dictated by the Spirit (Geist).54 Thus, from a 
Hegelian perspective, the Foucaultian subject that rests on contingency  and is a 
product of power relations portrays an infinitely restless moment that echoes the 
first moment of will (Indetermination). In this manner, Edkins and Pin-Fat who 
perceive the formation of agency solely from the dimension of the contingency 
of power-relations, give an incomplete account of subjectivity that is lacking 
(self-)consciousness and free will. Similarly, Manokha who also allies with 
Foucault’s subject-productive dimension of power-relations, rests on this 
dimension of contingency which echoes Hegel’s first moment of will. However, 
each moment of will cannot be treated separately. Instead, they must be viewed 
as complementary as all moments contribute to the formation of the self-
conscious subject. The first moment of will therefore manifests an incomplete 
form of subjectivity since the subject is unable to control its will and thus fails to 
seize its self-consciousness and free will.   
Reid applies Foucaultian theory in order to put forward an alternative 
approach to war mobilization. For Reid, the mobilization of war relates to the 
survival of the population and the subjects’ will to protect the administrative 
mechanisms of power  which form them. Reid’s argument, which neglects the 
dimension of the subjects’ self-consciousness and free will, appears to rest on 
biological and materialistic premises. He treats the administrative mechanisms as 
power’s means of producing a subject in the form of a ‘docile body’. Again, this 
understanding of subjectivity undermines the subject’s notion of self-
consciousness and free will. In this sense, he makes a very weak argument as to 
how an appropriate disposition can be formed that motivates the subject to wage 
war. Moreover, it is dubious to argue that a subject perceived in the form of 
‘docile body’ is consciously willing to sacrifice itself for an administrative 
mechanism, whose dependence upon which it is not conscious of owing to its 
function as a means of oppression.  
Reid describes administrative mechanisms as something abstract, yet 
efficient enough to produce the appropriate dispositions which will stimulate the 
subject’s sense of duty and mobilization to engage in war. However, these 
administrative mechanisms, formed via the notion of power-relations, strike one 
                                                
54 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 24 
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as an empty formalism. A form that lacks a particular content and dismisses the 
empirical dimension cannot provide us with an accurate explanation as to how 
these dispositions emerge. For Hegel, these dispositions cannot be formed 
independently of the notion of a particular society and of the state. Reid’s 
analysis gives the broad impression that these administrative mechanisms - as 
empty forms - shape the subjects’ dispositions in a top-down manner (after 
tampering with the subjects’ biological functions), without elaborating further on 
the subject’s free will and self-consciousness.   
Hegel’s analysis instead provides concrete content for these empty forms 
via his definition of ethical life (Sittlichkeit),  incorporating the interplay among 
the subject, the society and the state. Ethical life, he suggests, is the customary 
morality which emerges in society and develops in the state. This provides a 
communitarian dimension according to which the subject seizes self-
consciousness and free will through the state, though not in a passive manner.55 
Hegel’s distinction of the will into three moments and division of the realm of 
society into three parts (family, civil society and the state) does not aim to treat 
each moment or part separately, but as complementary, in the form of an 
evolutionary process. Such complementary treatment contributes to a view of the 
succession of each moment of will and of each part of society as a process 
leading to the formation of the individual’s self-consciousness and freedom, 
actualized within the state. Thus, the Hegelian subject seizes its self-
consciousness and freedom within the community’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit)- a 
life which is formed in state and not determined by abstract administrative 
forces.56  Furthermore, Hegel’s description of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) gives rise 
to the notion of Patriotism, a disposition which complements the development of 
the subject’s self-consciousness while reconciling it with the state, rendering the 
individual  ready to freely sacrifice for the state. 
For Hegel, patriotism is such a disposition, with the citizen nurturing a 
truthful and rationally-grounded devotion to the state. Patriotism is a 
consequence of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and of the institutions within the state - a 
                                                
55 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 135-
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56 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 22-26 
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volition which has become habitual.57 This Hegelian patriotism is grounded in 
freedom, but not of the liberal individualistic kind. The freedom Hegel conceives 
of is the free will which reconciles the individual with the community and the 
state. Hence, Hegel claims that patriotism is a consciousness that the subject’s 
substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and 
ends of another (the state), and in the latter’s relation to the individual. He notes 
that the modern state is based on the self-consciousness of citizens’ readiness to 
cooperate with each other and thus calls for increasingly less coercion. Here, 
neither coercion nor fear makes citizens social and free, but rather habit, volition 
and a rationally-grounded truth that are embodied in the irreducibly-collective 
institutions and practices of a modern state, such as the rule of law.58 Thus, 
Hegel’s analysis gives concrete content to the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 
This life emerges from the interplay among individuals, social institutions and 
the state,  and forms the disposition of patriotism, contributing to the subject’s 
self-consciousness and free will while shaping its willingness to sacrifice for the 
state. 
In summary, this section has contended that the terms of contingency, 
consent and voluntarism (all of which were applied by the approaches of 
Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat) demanded a more sustained examination. In 
an effort to scrutinize these terms further, this section implicated a Hegelian-
inspired analysis of the subject’s self-consciousness and free will. After 
considering Hegel’s insights regarding the formation of the subject’s self-
consciousness, it became clear that Foucaultian IR approaches relied uncritically 
on the Foucaultian notions of ‘docile bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations’. 
In particular, the neglect of Foucaultian IR scholars  to analyze free will before 
applying the concepts of contingency, consent and voluntarism, unveils the limits 
of a Foucaultian IR thought which undermines the formation the subject’s self-
consciousness and ultimately, negates free will.  
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This chapter demonstrated that the ambivalence of Foucaultian-inspired IR 
scholars toward Foucault’s applicability to IR is misleading. It is contended that 
this debate fails to shed light on the actual limits of Foucault’s thought. While 
Pasha, Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat celebrated the contribution of 
Foucault to IR thought to an alternative understanding of a non-liberal subject, 
war mobilization, human rights norms and power, other scholars remain 
skeptical. Broadly, the skepticism of Neil, Debrix and Richmond relates to their 
assertion that any effort to incorporate Foucautian thought into a particular 
discipline or a generalizable system of thought undermines the contingency on 
which Foucault’s theory rests. Moreover, Selby and Chandler go one step further 
in describing how Foucaultian-influenced post-structuralist approaches 
ultimately promote liberal cosmopolitanism, rather than undermine it.   
Regardless of how engaging the insights of these scholars might be, they 
fail in practice not only to criticize in detail the approaches of Manokha, Reid, 
Edkins and Pin-Fat, but also to trace the actual limits of Foucaultian thought.  
After taking into consideration Hegel’s method of immanent critique, it became 
clear that Foucault’s re-examination of reality from the perspective power not 
only fails to reconsider reality beyond transcendental means but also nourishes a 
self-defeating understanding of subjectivity and freedom. In this respect, the 
critique of Foucault by Rose, Allen, and Taylor confirms that Foucault’s account 
of power assumes a transcendental dimension which represents an empty 
formalism. Moreover, Taylor underscores that Foucault’s purposeless succession 
of power regimes triggers a contingent notion of subjectivity which is self-
alienating and lacks a self-conscious identity.  Specifically, Rose’s and Allen’s 
approach contributed in exposing where the exact limits of Foucault’s 
understanding of power lie. From their analysis, it becomes clear that this empty 
formalism rests on the transcendental premises of Foucault’s power, since it is 
portrayed as the new location of the origin of knowledge, with its mix of force, 
contigency and transcendentalism. Taylor’s approach discloses the shortcomings 
of Foucaultian subjectivity.  
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Although Foucault’s treatment of subjectivity and power does not appear 
to be consistent across his work, according to Taylor, it nonetheless remains 
problematic. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault appears to be identifying power 
as the exclusive knowledge and subject-productive force, whereas in The History 
of Sexuality Vol.2 and The Subject and Power, he re-introduces the concepts of 
freedom and subjectivity, disentangled from the tight control of power, and thus 
permitting agency. Nevertheless, The History of Sexuality Vol.1 and Vol. 2 are 
for Taylor both works which imply the subject’s dependence upon power’s 
control. Ultimately, Taylor’s work reveals how the relativism of the Foucaultian 
subject emerges. For Taylor, Foucault’s treatment of power as neutral and his 
concept of the purposeless succession of power regimes serve to dominate the 
subject while rendering it relativistic. This purposeless succession of the power 
regimes deprives the subject of the ability to form an identity for itself as it 
nurtures a plurality of truths. This plurality of truths in turn render the 
Foucaultian subject relativistic with respect to the diverse truth regimes, 
undermining the subject’s sense of consciousness and purposeful agency. 
Ultimately, Foucault’s relativistic account of subjectivity thereby negates the 
subject’s self-consciousness and free will. 
On the other hand, Hegelian immanent critique, which takes into 
consideration Hegel’s dialectical method (as determinate negation) and his 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist), permits the reconsideration of reality 
without transcendental means and succeeds where Foucault failed. Hegel, via 
immanent critique is capable of reconsidering reality without transcendental or 
arbitrary means and thereby introducing an alternative conceptualization of 
ethics and subjectivity which emerge within the state and allow the subject to 
acquire  self-consciousness and free will. Hegel’s conceptualization of free will 
was cited in this chapter to demonstrate the shortcomings of Foucault’s 
understanding of freedom, whereas the next chapter will analyze the notion of 
free will in detail. Here, Hegel’s notion of free will was applied to expose the 
shortcomings of IR scholars who celebrate the application of Foucaultian thought 
to IR. More precisely, it was argued that the approaches of Reid, Manokha, 
Edkins and Pin-Fat, by relying uncritically on Foucault’s notions of ‘docile 
bodies’, ‘biopower’ and ‘power relations, promoted a misleading understanding 
of the terms contingency, consent and voluntarism. In an effort to examine these 
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terms further, this section drew on a Hegelian-inspired analysis of the subject’s 
self-consciousness and free will. Hegel’s insights revealed that Foucaultian IR 
thought prevents the subject from acquiring self-consciousness, undermining the 
notions of consent and voluntarism they rely on.  
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CHAPTER	  3:	  Hegel’s	  Contribution	  Towards	  Unveiling	  the	  
Non-­‐Emancipating	  Effects	  of	  Freedom	  in	  Foucaultian,	  
Kantian	  and	  IR	  Thought	  	  	  
Introduction	  
 
The current chapter which is divided into two parts, elaborates further on Hegel’s 
notion of free will and enriches the previous chapter’s critique of Foucault. This 
chapter demonstrates than an immanent critique of Kant’s and Foucault’s 
thought shows that their understanding of subjectivity and freedom is self-
defeating since the Foucaultian notion of power and the Kantian 
conceptualization of the subject rest on transcendental premises. Also the 
implications of these transcendental premises are reflected on the Foucaultian 
and Kantian inspired IR approaches too. Hegel via immanent critique attempted 
to conceptualize subjectivity and freedom without arbitrary or transcendental 
means and promoted an alternative understanding of free will as a process which 
stems from the development of the state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Such a notion 
of free will avoids the separation between senses and reason as well as the 
separation between the universal and the particular dimension. In that respect 
Hegelian free will overcomes the empty formalism of Kantian ethics and the 
relativism of Foucaultian subjectivity, both of which deprive the subject of its 
self-consciousness and free will.   
Specifically, the first part explains why Foucaultian and Kantian thought 
fail to promote free will from the perspective of Hegel. Foucault’s and Kant’s 
understanding of subjectivity and freedom are undermined by Hegel’s 
conceptualization of free will within the realm of Spirit (Geist), which promotes 
the understanding of freedom as a process, formed by the three moments of will. 
Hegel’s discrimination of the three moments of will discloses how the 
shortcomings of Foucaultian and Kantian thought emerge. Hegel’s understanding 
of free will reveals a self-defeating conceptualization of freedom that is not only 
observed in Kantian and Foucaultian thought but also in contemporary IR 
thought.  This self-defeating understanding of freedom occurs when: i) the 
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subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-determining individual which 
reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and ii) freedom is understood as an 
unobstructed choice-making capacity. What this understanding of freedom 
misses is the failure to acknowledge that a subject’s ‘free’ options emerge from a 
particular domain, which is beyond the subject’s control. 
The second part elaborates how the understanding of freedom by certain 
IR approaches is not emancipating and paves the way to the promotion of liberal 
ideals. Hegel’s treatment of free will as a process comprised of three moments 
which are shaped by the development of the state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit), 
reveals how Sen’s, Chandler’s and Frost’s conceptualization of freedom is self-
defeating and nourishes liberal ideals.  Hegel’s free will unveils that Sen’s and 
Chandler’s approaches promote a non-emancipating definition of freedom. Sen’s 
treatment of the subject as a self-determining individual, echoes Hegel’s second 
incomplete moment of will, whereas the options which are portrayed as ‘free’, 
remain beyond the subject’s control. Chandler on the other hand treats the human 
subject as an entity lacking determination, bearing an infinite freedom with 
unlimited capabilities. However, this notion of an infinite freedom which lacks 
determination is not emancipating, echoing Hegel’s first incomplete moment of 
indeterminate will. Thus, Chandler’s and Sen’s approaches to subjectivity, 
negate freedom as they represent an incomplete development of the subject’s 
self-consciousness and free will. Moreover since they both treat the ‘free’ 
options as values stemming from the democratic liberal state paradigm, Sen’s 
and Chandler’s understanding of freedom ends up encouraging liberal ideals.  
Finally Frost’s analysis, after dismissing Hegel’s philosophical system of 
Spirit - upon which the Hegelian understanding of subjectivity and free will rest - 
he ends up treating the subject as a self-determining unit, echoing Hegel’s 
incomplete first moment of will. Frost, instead of adopting Hegel’s notion of free 
will within the realm of Spirit (Geist) and incorporating all three moments of 
will, he puts forward an alternative account of freedom. Frost portrays freedom 
as the outcome of the individual’s rights which stem from the double anarchy of 
the Global Civil Society (GCS) and the Society of Sovereign States (SOSS). 
However, Hegel’s insights reveal that Frost’s understanding of freedom 
undermines free will as the double anarchy fails to promote diversity and 
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pluralism but favours an understanding of freedom which is conditioned by 
democratic liberal ideals.   
I.	  How	  Hegel’s	  Conceptualization	  of	  Free	  Will	  Unveils	  the	  Limits	  of	  
Foucaultian	  and	  Kantian	  Understanding	  of	  Freedom	  	  	  
 
Hegel’s immanent critique reveals that a self-determining or relativistic 
perception of subjectivity promotes an understanding of the real which rests on 
transcendental or arbitrary premises. This triggers an understanding of ethics and 
power as an empty and transcendental formalism which leads to a self defeating 
conceptualization of freedom. 
Let us remind that Hegel’s immanent critique succeeds in forming the 
critique of the real in its own terms after taking into consideration the 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and the dialectical method. The 
combination of Hegel’s system with his dialectical method avoids the dualism 
which separates: the subject from the object of knowledge; reason from reality; 
rationalism from empiricism; the universal from the particular, contributing to a 
non-transcendental conceptualization of the Absolute. In that respect, an 
understanding of immanent critique which is premised on the notion of Spirit 
(Geist) provides us a more complete understanding of subjectivity and empirical 
reality after exposing the contradiction between reality and its true essence. This 
part will explain how this approach of Hegel’s immanent critique can enrich our 
understanding of ethics and freedom after eliminating this contradiction which 
exacerbates the disparity between existing reality and its true nature. Hegel’s 
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) overcomes this disparity after promoting an 
alternative understanding of subjectivity and free will. According to Hegel, 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is formed within the state and contributes to the 
development of the subject’s self-consciousness and free-will as a process 
comprised of three moments. This enriched understanding of subjectivity and 
freedom overcomes the limits of Foucaultian and Kantian thought. 
To be more precise, this section will firstly bring to our attention the 
flaws of Foucaultian subjectivity, power and freedom that where analyzed in the 
previous chapter. Secondly, it emphasizes on Hegel’s understanding of freedom 
within the realm of Spirit (Geist), commencing with the important discrimination 
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Hegel draws among the three moments of will. After arguing that each moment 
of will promotes an incomplete idea of freedom, Foucaultian thought is 
undermined since his understanding of subjectivity and freedom echoes these 
incomplete moments of will. Thus, the analysis of Hegel’s free will makes clear 
why Foucaultian thought is self-defeating since Foucault’s understanding of 
freedom fails to emancipate the subject. Foucault’s failure to promote a free 
subject stems from his flawed understanding of  power and subjectivity which 
reflect only one of Hegel’s three moments of will, depriving the subject of the 
process that enables her to form a free will and actualize it within the state. 
Finally, a few additional comments will be raised which describe how Hegel’s 
conceptualization of freedom differs from Kant’s after stressing the implications 
of Hegel’s alternative understanding of the subjectivity and freedom.  
The previous chapter, highlighted a number of flaws entailed in 
Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity, power and freedom. In the Subject of 
Power it appears as if Foucault ‘invents’ freedom out of necessity. He treats 
freedom as power’s ‘tool’, incorporated to accommodate the government of 
power relations. Foucaultian ‘freedom’ assists the development of a domain 
which renders possible the subject’s ‘agency’. It was argued that the exercise of 
the subject’s freedom was restrained within a very specific domain, the limits of 
which were dictated by power. Therefore, at the very same moment that the 
subject’s ‘agency’ emerged within the limits of this domain, power assumed the 
control of the subject. 1 In that sense, Foucault’s freedom becomes nothing but a 
tool, utilized by power which allows just a set of (predetermined) options within 
a specific domain, permitting -if at all any- a very limited form of agency. Thus, 
Foucault’s ‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating 
the subject.  
Moreover the projection of power as neutral and the purposeless 
succession of one power regime for another is not a process which liberates the 
subject. As Taylor notes, elaborating a specific domain where the individual is 
given the opportunity to exercise his freedom, acts in fact as a domain where the 
individual submits himself under control. The Power – Subject relation takes the 
form of a Doctor - Patient respectively. Such relation is founded on the 
                                                
1 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject of Power’, Critical Enquiry 8 (Summer 1982), 781-782 
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presumption that one knows (Doctor/ Power) and that the other has the 
overwhelming interest in taking advice (Patient/ Subject). Therefore, a Doctor-
Patient relation cannot be neutral because although both parties are constrained, 
the first part (Doctor/ Power) dominates the other restricting the subject’s agency 
and freedom.2 Paradoxically again, Foucault’s ‘neutral’ power produces a subject 
which is not free but oppressed.  
In the next section, Foucault’s understanding of power, subjectivity and 
freedom will be further undermined by Hegel’s conceptualization of free will. 
Hegel approaches freedom as a process via the three moments of will within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel’s discrimination of the three moments of will 
disclose how the shortcomings of Foucaultian thought emerge.   
Hegel’s	  Conceptualization	  of	  Freedom	  
This section focuses on Hegel’s conceptualization of free will as found in 
the Philosophy of Right. Although emphasis here is drawn on the three moments 
of will, the next section examines in further detail how freedom is formed within 
the realm of Spirit (Geist) after implicating Hegel’s notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) and the state.   
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel after describing what freedom is via the 
three moments of will, he holds that the state is the necessary ground which 
allows men to actualize freedom. In more general terms, as Luther mentions, the 
Hegelian concept of right concerns free will and its realization, which requires 
transition to practice. The state, is at the heart of Hegel’s political philosophy as 
it is the ground where Hegel’s idea of freedom actualizes.3  
 Unlike liberalism, freedom for Hegel is not a quality of an individual, but 
a process. A process of acquiring self-consciousness and knowledge. According 
to Hegel, the acquisition of free will is a process which presupposes three 
moments:  
1. Indeterminacy;  
2. Transition to determination (differentiation, finitude, particularization);  
3. The will as the unity of these moments (1) and (2).4 
                                                
2 Charles Taylor, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, Political Theory, Vol. 12 (May 1984), No 2, 
165-168 
3 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009, p.104 
4 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 20 
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In further detail, the first moment (Indeterminacy) includes the element of 
pure indeterminacy. In that sense the will here is content-less. The individual 
does not participate or is nowhere to be found here and it is the will-in-itself, 
belonging to itself. In this moment, the will’s content is not subject to any 
restriction. Its content is immediately presented by nature, needs desires and 
impulses. Here, the will is not in a state of freedom, it is content-less as the will 
of unrestricted infinity and absolute abstraction or universality.5 
The second moment (Determination), includes the transition from a state 
of undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation and  determination, positing 
will with a content. Although the will here is the product of an Individual’s 
(subjective) decision, still, it is not free as well as it sticks to a ‘selfish’ state of 
fixity. In Hegel’s words ‘the ego steps in principle into determinate existence 
through this positing of itself as something determinate’. This poses as the 
absolute finite moment, where the individual’s ego is particularized.6 
In the third moment the will is the unity of the previous two moments 
which brings us to a state of true freedom as it combines the moments of will-in-
itself and for-itself. In this moment, as Hegel notes, ‘the will transforms into a 
particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to universality i.e. its 
individuality’.7 In that sense, the will is not something complete and universal 
prior to its superseding and idealising this determination. The will is not a will 
until this self mediating activity, returns to itself.8 
The Hegelian moments of will could be described in more simple terms 
as follows; every self-consciousness knows itself: Firstly as universal, as the 
potentiality of abstracting from everything determinate; and Secondly as 
particular with a determinate object content and aim. Still the first two moments 
are only incomplete forms of freedom. For Hegel, freedom is an ever lasting 
process, while constantly remaining a moment our self-consciousness and self-
knowledge (γνώθι σε εαυτό)9. Thus, freedom for Hegel is not when our decisions 
are influenced -if not controlled- by impulses, desires and choices dictated by the 
maximization of pleasure. This is immediate will, corrupted and not subject to 
                                                
5 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 21 
6 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 22 
7 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 23 
8 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 24 
9 Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, 25-27 
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the individual’s self-conscious control, thus not free.  
Before criticizing Foucault’s conceptualization of Freedom from a 
Hegelian perspective, it is necessary to summarize in more approachable terms 
the first two moments of will. These two moments of will, which manifest an 
incomplete form of freedom, bear similarities with Foucault’s understanding of 
freedom, indicating the flaws of his approach whilst explaining how Foucault’s 
paradoxical conclusions emerge.   
What Hegel appears to be arguing is that the first moment of will, 
includes the element of pure indeterminacy. In that sense the will here is content-
less. The individual does not participate or is nowhere to be found and it is 
simply the will-in-itself, belonging to itself. The first moment of will is 
responsible for the absence of subjectivity. The second moment of will includes 
the transition from a state of undifferentiated indeterminacy and the lack of 
subjectivity, into differentiation and the determination of the subject. However, 
the will here is not free on two accounts: a) Such will is the product of an 
Individual’s (subjective) decision, which it is not free as it sticks to a ‘selfish’ 
state of fixity which is not emancipating as the will becomes restrained by the 
‘Egotistic’ subject; b) The egotistic subject maintains a false impression of 
acquiring freedom via its ability of free choice. However the real question for 
Hegel lies in what determines the agents options and decision. An agent does not 
enjoy freedom via unobstructed choice because his actions and determinations 
are grounded in his drives, desires and inclinations. The defect of this conception 
is that it stops at something given from the outside: it stops at drives and desires, 
the content of which is not determined internally but externally, not by the agent 
but the nature. The agent is not fully self-determining because the material of his 
reflexion and deliberation, the menu from which he chooses is given by nature 
and not determined by him/herself. It is precisely these two incomplete moments 
of free will which expose the shortcomings and paradoxes of Foucault’s theory.  
Explaining	  Why	  Foucaultian	  Freedom	  Fails	  To	  Emancipate	  the	  Subject	  
 
Here, it will be argued that Foucault’s understanding of freedom is self-
defeating since it fails to emancipate the subject. Quite on the contrary 
Foucaultian ‘freedom’ becomes a means that allows the perpetuation of power’s 
 133 
control over the subject. Hegel’s insights, reveal that the failure of Foucault’s 
freedom to promote a free subject, stems from his flawed understanding of 
subjectivity and power which fail to examine reality without transcendental or 
arbitrary means. Taylor’s and Rose’s analysis, at the previous chapter revealed 
how the portrayal of Foucaultian power as neutral rests on transcendental 
premises and nourishes a relativistic notion of subjectivity that lacks self-
consciousness. Taylor dismissed the Foucaultian idea of neutral power on two 
accounts: Firstly, the treatment of power as neutral and the succession of power 
regimes as purposeless cannot be seen as liberating due to the relativism it 
entails. Moving from one context to another, without purpose, denies the 
subject’s conscious agency. As Taylor holds, while it is certainly not the case 
that all patterns of activity are issued from conscious action, yet all patterns have 
to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action.10 In that sense the 
Foucaultian ‘neutral’ power produces a subject which is not free but relativistic 
and controlled by the changing power regimes.  
Taylor’s remarks, no matter how useful they are, they fail to explain why 
Foucaultian thought renders the subject’s free will impossible. The Foucaultian 
subject’s relativism, echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as indeterminacy. 
Hegel’s understanding of free will makes clear that Foucault’s relativistic 
subject, since it is alienated from itself and the control of its will, represents an 
incomplete form of subjectivity since it fails to acquire self-consciousness and 
freedom. This lack of consciousness and the subject’s failure to control her will 
is reflected on Foucault’s treatment of freedom. In the case of Foucaultian 
freedom, the domains which form the subject (disciplinary, sexuality etc) as well 
as the options which stem from these domains, provide the subject with a range 
of ‘free’ choices which are in fact beyond the control and determination of a self-
conscious subject. These options are provided by an external domain beyond the 
subject’s influence, thus the subject’s consciousness ceases to be self-determined 
but externally regulated. As Patten notes, an enquiry on what constitutes freedom 
should go beyond the notion of unobstructed choice. If we bear firmly in mind 
                                                
10 Taylor, ‘Foucault on Freedom and Truth’, 167-168 
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that the content of what one wills is a given one, it follows that she is determined 
by it and in this very respect she is no longer free.11   
At this point it is necessary to illustrate the differences between the 
Hegelian and the Kantian notion of freedom since Kant too does not equate 
freedom to unobstructed choice. Hegel’s analysis of freedom bears some 
similarity with Kant’s since they both argued that neither the subject’s natural 
will nor the subject’s ability of unobstructed choice-making leads to freedom. 
However, their differences will be stressed below after developing a more 
detailed analysis of Hegelian freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist) that 
implicates too the notions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the State.   
 
Differences	  Between	  Kantian	  Freedom	  and	  the	  Hegelian	  Understanding	  
of	  Freedom	  Within	  the	  Realm	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	  
 
According to Kant, the subject alone is able to seize freedom. The 
Kantian subject reaches freedom alone via the exercise of reason, understating 
the influence of the senses, dispositions and social institutions. Here it is 
suggested that Kant’s conceptualization of freedom is founded on two 
problematic themes. Firstly, the Kantian subject is perceived in the form of the 
individual ego that is autonomous and self-determining. Secondly, Kant’s 
categorical imperative, upon which his notion of freedom rests, is abstract and 
vacuous, reproducing an empty formalism. On the other hand, Hegelian thought 
overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom after putting forward an 
alternative account of subjectivity and freedom which is tied with his concept of 
Spirit (Geist) and are determined by his notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the 
state.  
Kant’s understanding of freedom prioritizes reason over desire or other 
dispositions, while drawing emphasis on the individual’s capacity to acquire 
freedom alone. For Kant, human freedom rests on the individual’s ability to be 
self-determining, acknowledging that human nature already entails a finite 
rational will. Therefore, rational will is according to Kant the source of human 
freedom. His conception of freedom relates to free choice as independence from 
                                                
11 Alan Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 49-51   
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determination by sensuous impulse. Thus, the basis of duty or moral obligation is 
found in an abstract, a priori concept of reason. Hence, no external authority is 
necessary to constitute or inform of the demands of morality. For Kant, duty is 
not tied to social expectations or laws. Instead Kant treats duty as an action one 
performs whilst being fully rational. For Kant, being moral consists of knowing 
the right action and not acting because of social pressure. According to Kant, 
performing a right action via reason and the ability to seize freedom is within the 
capacity of each rational being alone. This unconditional moral obligation is 
founded on a maxim that each individual has an a-priori reason to obey. 
According to the categorical imperative a rational being ‘acts only in accordance 
with that maxim through which one can at the same time will that it becomes a 
universal law’.12  
On the contrary, Hegelian freedom stresses both the importance of the 
individual, the community and of the social institutions towards the formation of 
an individual’s self-consciousness, and freedom. Since Hegelian philosophy rests 
on the notion of Spirit (Geist), this allows Hegel to overcome the problematic 
themes of Kantian thought, after: a) putting forward a theory which is neither 
descriptive nor prescriptive that rejects abstract a-priory or normative claims; b) 
developing an understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which overcomes empty 
formalisms, values or abstract behaviorisms. 
Regarding the first thematic, Hegel rejects abstract a-priori or normative 
claims, as his philosophy is neither aiming in putting forward a descriptive 
account of concepts or events nor in prescribing values in a formalistic way. The 
Hegelian philosophical system is tied with the concept of Spirit (Geist) which 
challenges the treatment of the subject as self-dependent individual who is able 
to put forward normative truths. Hegel rejects such normative truths in an 
attempt to indicate a dynamic relation between the subject and the theoretical 
object. As Hutchings notes, for such relation to be dynamic the subject as theorist 
should not have a pre-determined or fixed point of view, treating the object of 
study as passive. In other words, the theorists must recognize themselves as 
patients and participants in the processes they seek to understand and judge.13  
                                                
12 Timothy C Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 128-
132 
13 Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, 101-103 
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To be more precise, in the first three chapters of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel questions claim-making authorities, whereas in chapter four, Hegel 
questions self-ascribed authorities. According to Hegel, self-consciousness, must 
always be provisional. Self-consciousness should not be projected as a 
motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. In paragraphs 167 and 175, Hegel unveils the 
double nature of self-consciousness (consciousness of an object as this-such and 
the non-positional consciousness awareness of my taking it to be this-such). 
Thus, after refuting the theorists self-certain consciousness, Hegel attempts to 
indicate the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object 
which dismisses any pre-determination or fixity on behalf of the subject  and 
ceases to treat the object of analysis as passive.14 In other words, as Taylor notes, 
Hegel, protested against Kant’ view of man, dismissing the motionless tautology 
of ‘I = I’. According to Hegel, rationality and self-consciousness is not 
something a man starts with, but something he comes to. Unlike Kant, this means 
two things: First, beyond the hierarchy of the forms of life there is a hierarchy of 
the modes of thought. As a person’s rational consciousness of herself grows, her 
mode of expression of this self-consciousness evolves. Also, the fact that 
rationality and self-consciousness is something that a person achieves rather than 
starts with, means that she has a history. Moreover for Hegel, as it is clearly 
indicated in the Philosophy of Right, this ascend up of a ladder is formed by the 
society’s parts (family, civil society and state) which contribute to the 
development of man’s self-consciousness and ultimately freedom within the 
realm of community. 15  Thus, Hegel’s understanding of freedom, is not 
associated with the individualist notion of self-determining subjectivity but it is 
formed through an ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state.   
Hegel developed ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in order to promote an 
alternative conceptualization of Kantian morality which is founded on a vacuous 
and abstract understanding of duty and reason. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is a form 
of customary morality, the content of which is derived from particular social 
institutions (family, civil society and is actualized in state. Thus, ethical life is 
developed in accordance to the customary ethics of particular social institutions 
                                                
14 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 104-109 
15 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
20-21 
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(family, civil society) within state and is not based on abstract universal 
principles. Therefore, the subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself 
with society within the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Immanuel Kant equated 
the subject to a self-determining individual and argued that a person becomes 
free when she acts via her reason, rather than senses or whims, in accordance to 
the categorical imperative. The application of categorical imperative16 is founded 
on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is emancipating. 
However that content of this sense of duty is vague in Immanuel Kant’s 
thought.17 Hegel gives a concrete content to Immanuel Kant’s seemingly abstract 
requirement of freedom. The categorical imperative is a vague universal duty 
which promotes and sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity which is 
alienated from society. On the contrary, Hegelian freedom and subjectivity 
overcomes the alienation of the self-determining subjects which nourishes the 
tension between the individual and society and promotes the understanding of 
freedom via ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Therefore, Hegel’s understanding of ethical 
life as a customary morality, formed within a particular community, succeeds in 
providing a content to abstract empty principles whereas it reconciles the subject 
with the social institutions, transforming her as an organic part of the whole, 
cultivating the citizen’s fulfillment and affinity within the state.18 
As Patten notes, Hegel’s aim was to reconcile modern Europeans to the 
central institutions and practices of their social world. Hegel’s project involves 
an alternative understanding of freedom which gives people a reason to reconcile 
with their social institutions, after indicating that these institutions and practices 
are necessary for the full actualization of their freedom.19  
Patten argues that there is a strong Kantian element in Hegel’s conception 
of freedom. Both Kant and Hegel are not treating freedom as an unobstructed 
choice-making capacity. However Hegel departs from the Kantian framework 
since he does not solely associate the development of freedom with the notion of 
reason. Where Kant, for instance looks to an abstract principle like the 
                                                
16 Immanuel Kant, affirms the existence of  an absolute moral law via the categorical imperative. 
The application of categorical imperative is founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a 
sense of duty which is emancipating, instead of the individual desires which prohibit the subject’s 
self-control and determination. 
17 Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity,128-132 
18 Luther, Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, 135-140 
19 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 72-73 
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categorical imperative, to determine how the subject’s freedom emerges, Hegel 
instead develops a richer and more concrete account of freedom. Unlike Kant, 
according to Hegel freedom is formed by the three moments of will and 
actualized by the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state. In that sense freedom 
for Hegel can only be seized within the community and the practice of ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit), rather than the individual alone. Moreover, Hegel’s conception 
of freedom, takes a considerably more accommodating stance towards the 
agent’s contingently given desires and inclinations than is usually thought. As 
Patten adds, Hegel thinks that the Kantian view of freedom underestimates the 
ethical significance of various emotions and feelings. One aim of the ethical life  
(Sittlichkeit) is to integrate dispositions such as love, honor in one’s estate and 
patriotism into a theory of freedom and ethics.20  
To be rational, self-determining and free in the Hegelian sense, an agent 
must strive to integrate his choices into a rational harmony with his desires. 
According to Hegel there are particular dispositions, feelings and motivations 
that it is necessary for an agent to have in particular situations. Thus, Hegel lays 
emphasis not exclusively on reason but on dispositions too. This is a just 
requirement as it signifies that these dispositions or desires ought to be 
essentially our own, that we as subjects are supposed to have identified ourselves 
with their content. The member of an estate, a corporation, should have 
dispositions such as rectitude, honor and loyalty, whereas the citizen should be 
motivated by patriotism and civic virtue. Hegel rejects Kant’s proposition that a 
moral action should be motivated by reason or duty alone rather than an 
inclination or desire of the agent. Hegel thinks that doctrine of the ‘duty for the 
duty’s sake’ not only makes it difficult to understand how there could be any 
action at all but also seems to underestimate the ethical significance of certain 
emotions and dispositions.21 For Hegel only when an agent performs the right 
action with the right disposition (not any contingently given desire) does the 
agent obtain an awareness of the rationality of his activity and becomes a 
rationally self-determining free subject.22 
                                                
20 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 45-48 
21 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 54-59 
22 Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 69 
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As Franco notes Hegel’s anti-Kantian thesis is clearly expressed in the 
Nuremberg Philosophical Propaedeutic. Hegel argues there that the freedom of 
man, regarding the natural impulses, consists not in the disposal of such impulses 
altogether and thus striving to escape from his nature; but in his recognition of 
them as a necessity and as something rational. In realizing them accordingly 
through his will, he finds himself constrained only in so far he creates for himself 
accidental and arbitrary impressions.23 
Franco stresses that Hegelian third moment of will is the unity of abstract 
universality and particularity. In this moment, we are not one-sidedly within 
ourselves but willingly limit ourselves with reference to another while 
acknowledging ourselves in this limitation. In simpler terms, Hegel’s idea of 
‘being with oneself in another’ encapsulates his revision of the Kantian idea of 
freedom as rational autonomy. The Kantian emphasis on self-dependence never 
successfully incorporates the otherness or particularity. Hegel’s concept of 
freedom aims to redress this Kantian defect after breaking down the opposition 
between self-dependence and otherness or determinacy. As Hegel puts it, the 
freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist) is a process, not merely an absence of 
dependence on the other won outside of the other but won within the other and 
actualized within the state.24 
Previously, after stressing the differences between Kant’s and Hegel’s 
approach to freedom, it was argued that Hegel’s analysis was able to overcome 
the shortcomings of Kantian thought, after incorporating the understanding of 
freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Kant’s self-determining account of 
subjectivity and the empty formalism of the categorical imperative was rectified 
through Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom that is actualized in the 
state and formed within a particular community via his notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit). The next part elaborates on the contribution of Hegel’s 
understanding of freedom and subjectivity after exposing how certain scholars 
nurture a problematic conceptualization of freedom in the field of IR thought.  
                                                
23 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom,167 
24 Franco, Hegel’s Philosophy of Freedom,160-162 
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II.	  How	  Hegel’s	  Insights	  Expose	  the	  Non-­‐Emancipating	  Effects	  of	  
Freedom	  in	  IR	  Thought	  and	  the	  Nourishment	  of	  Liberal	  Ideals	  
Introduction	  
 
The concept of freedom is not extensively analyzed in the field of IR theory. On 
the contrary it appears that the term freedom is applied uncritically without prior 
elaboration. Recent work of Chandler, Sen and Frost refers to freedom, however 
their approaches promote a defective understanding of freedom, the flaws of 
which are easily detected from a Hegelian perspective.  
Chandler attempts to rethink agency and freedom via Amartya Sen’s 
understanding of ‘development as freedom’. Sen promotes the conceptualization 
of freedom as capabilities in order to challenge the liberal-economical 
conceptualization of development. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights on free will, 
allow us to understand that Sen’s and Chandler’s understanding of freedom does 
not only fail to emancipate but also assists the promotion of liberal ideals.  
Regarding Frost, although his approach is influenced by the Philosophy 
of Right; he dismisses the metaphysical aspects of this work and ignores Hegel’s 
account of free will.  Frost’s point of departure is the reconciliation of the 
individual with the community but unlike Hegel, Frost’s understanding freedom 
is not attributed to the development of the subject’s self-consciousness via ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) in the state within the realm of Spirit (Geist). According to Frost 
freedom stems from the   
the double anarchy formed by the Global Civil Society and Society (GCS) of 
Sovereign States (SOSS). Frost dismisses freedom as a process of acquiring self-
consciousness and identifies freedom in the form of agency that emerges from 
the individual’s acquisition of human rights, promoted by the GCS and the 
SOSS. However, from the Hegelian perspective of free will, Frost’s 
understanding of freedom reflects solely the second moment of will which is not 
emancipating since the options that form agency are beyond the subject’s 
control. Moreover, since these options are a product of a particular understanding 
of GCS, they rest on democratic liberal ideals and Frost’s understanding of 
freedom perpetuates them. Thus, Frost develops an account of subjectivity which 
obstructs free will but instead promotes democratic liberal ideals and an non-
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emancipating account of freedom. At the next chapter it will be analyzed how 
exactly Hegel overcomes the non-emancipating and coercive effects of liberalism 
after re-approaching certain liberal traits, such as the market economy and 
private property from the perspective of Spirit (Geist). 
The	  Shortcomings	  of	  Sen’s	  and	  Chandler’s	  Understanding	  of	  Freedom	  
From	  The	  Hegelian	  Perspective	  of	  Free	  Will	  
 
Although Hegel’s detailed elaboration of free will is found in the 
Philosophy of Right, it was already argued that the Phenomenology of Spirit 
should be treated as the point of departure in order to comprehend Hegel’s 
understanding of free will within the realm of Spirit (Geist). This helps us 
understand that the subject as a theorist cannot operate in abstraction from the 
particularity of the object of analysis and in this regard, the understanding of 
freedom cannot be founded on abstract ideals. In our case, this does not only 
imply that the theorist is necessary implicated in international politics, but also 
that the theory is inherently political.  
Therefore, Hegel after treating freedom as a process within the realm of 
Spirit (Geist) which entails the three moments of will, he associates the 
actualization of freedom with the state. The main themes of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right are the discrimination of the three moments of will and the development 
of freedom within the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is the customary 
morality of the community. Hegel proceeds to the distinction of the will in three 
moments -universality, particularity, individuality- as well as the realm of society 
in three parts; family, civil society and the state. 
Again, it is stressed that Hegel’s objective is neither descriptive nor 
prescriptive and he is certainly not putting forward a regulative theory of inter-
state relations from an observer’s point of view who wishes to provide rectifying 
directions.25 Hegel’s insights are applied here to underline the shortcomings of 
certain scholarly perspectives which promote a non emancipating account of 
freedom, informed by self-determining subjectivity or arbitrary will that leads to 
subjection and the triumph of liberal ideals.  
                                                
25 Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era, 101 
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Finally, the previous part revealed that Hegel’s alternative 
conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity within the realm of Spirit (Geist) 
underscores the limits of Foucault’s and Kant’s conceptualization of freedom. 
Foucault and Kant rest on a self-defeating understanding of freedom which 
occurs when: i) the subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-determining 
individual which reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and ii) freedom is 
understood as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. What this understanding 
of freedom misses is the failure to acknowledge that a subject’s ‘free’ options 
emerge from a particular domain, which is beyond the subject’s control. These 
remarks will be useful to expose the shortcomings of Sen’s, Chandler’s and 
Frost’s approaches which are inspired by Kant’s and Foucault’s insights. 
Sen promotes the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities in order to 
challenge the liberal-economical understanding of development. He holds that 
the expansion of a person’s capabilities, enhances the individual’s agency and 
freedom which ultimately triggers development. Chandler is in accord with Sen’s 
approach whereas he appears to be attributing to Sen’s theory, a richer 
conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity. Instead, it is argued that both 
Sen’s and Chandler’s approaches entail flaws according to a Hegelian 
perspective as their conceptualization of freedom is not emancipating and assists 
the promotion of liberalism.  
For Sen, un-freedom can arise either from inadequate processes (violation 
of voting principles or other political or civil rights) or inadequate opportunities 
(capability to escape premature mortality or involuntary starvation). Sen’s 
analysis of development treats the freedoms of individuals as the basic building 
blocks. Attention is paid to the expansion of the capabilities of persons to live the 
kind of lives they value and have reason to value. These capabilities can be 
enhanced by public policy. The direction of public policy can be influenced by 
the effective use of participatory capabilities by the public. Sen’s understanding 
of development is associated with the individual’s agency as a member of a 
public and as a participant in the economic social and political actions.26 
Sen’s analysis presents the idea that the enhancement of human freedom 
is both the main object and the primary means of development. The objective of 
                                                
26 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14-19 
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development relates to the valuation of the actual freedoms enjoyed by the 
people involved. Sen insists that individual capabilities crucially depend on, 
economic, social and political arrangements. In making appropriate institutional 
arrangements, the instrumental roles of distinct types of freedom, providing both 
adequate processes and opportunities, have to be considered. The ends and 
means of development, call for placing of freedom at the centre of the stage. 
People have to be actively involved, not as passive recipients of the fruits of 
development programmes. On the contrary the state and society should 
strengthen and safeguard human capabilities which permit them to be actively 
invoked.27 
Sen’s conceptualization of ‘development as freedom’ emerges in an effort 
to evaluate development. Freedom as capabilities, provides Sen a more complete 
measure to evaluate development. Sen identifies a general approach that 
concentrates on the capabilities of people to do things – and the freedom to lead 
lives – that they have reason to value. In this sense the capability approach has a 
breadth and sensitivity that gives itself a very extensive reach, beyond the current 
liberal or economical conceptualization of development which limits the 
evaluation of development in terms of civil rights or financial figures. Thus for 
Sen, a person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative  combinations of functioning 
that are feasible for an individual to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom 
which allows an individual to achieve alternative functioning combinations.28  
Such an understanding of freedom as capabilities, assists in promoting an 
active form of agency according to Sen. Individuals are not seen merely as 
patients to whom benefits will be dispensed by the process of development. 
Responsible adults must be in charge of their own well being, deciding 
themselves on how to apply their capabilities. However, the capabilities that a 
person has is not entirely depended on the individual but on the nature of social 
arrangements too.29  
Sen concludes that the acknowledgement of the role of human qualities in 
promoting and sustaining economic growth, tells us nothing about why such 
economic growth is sought in the first place. If instead the focus is on the 
                                                
27 Sen, Development as Freedom, 53 
28 Sen, Development as Freedom, 77 
29 Sen, Development as Freedom, 288 
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expansion of human freedom to live and the kinds of lives that people have 
reason to value, then the role of economic growth, in expanding these 
opportunities, has to be  integrated in that more foundational understanding of 
the process of development as the expansion of human capability to lead more 
worthwhile and more free lives.30 
Chandler’s article is less concerned with critiquing development as an 
economically driven policy discourse and control. His approach seeks instead to 
consider Sen’s work in a broader context of the understanding of human subject 
itself, particularly as it is articulated at the limits of liberalism. For Chandler, 
Sen’s approach assists in highlighting how these limits are articulated on the 
metaphysical terms of the inner life of the subjects of international development 
policy interventions. Chandler agrees with Sen that development does not have a 
fixed external or a particular materialistic form of measurement, whereas he adds 
that as freedom looses its materiality, becomes relocated to the interior life 
capabilities of the individual.31   
Chandler is in accord with Sen again regarding the critiques of the market 
based liberal conception of the rational autonomous individual who is capable of 
assuming responsibility for its own development. For Sen the individual is the 
only agent of development but the individual is a vulnerable subject needing the 
enabling or empowering of external agency. Thus, development -understood in 
terms agential capabilities- cannot be measured materially because these 
capacities are internal to the individual. In that sense, Sen’s understanding of 
development as freedom necessitates an appropriate environment for a subject to 
seize reason and freedom. Chandler argues too that the subject of development 
rests entirely on internalization judged on the basis of the individual’s 
development and the use of reasoned agency. Thus development for both 
Chandler and Sen is measured within the individuals inner achievement of 
‘freedom’ where freedom is treated as a continuum, the goal of which is never 
reached. Therefore, they both claim that ‘development as freedom’ promotes an 
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31 David Chandler, ‘Human Centered’ Development? Re-thinking ‘Freedom’ and ‘Agency’ in 
Discourses of International Development’, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 42. 
No. 1, 16-17 
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understanding of freedom which is not liberal as it does not rest on autonomy, 
self-government or democracy.32  
For the capabilities approach of freedom, there is no such thing as the 
universal liberal subject. Here the subject is autonomous but not free. The subject 
is autonomous as a choice making actor, but never truly capable of making a free 
and reasoned choice. Freedom -as choice making capacity- needs to be expanded 
constantly. Therefore, Chandler argues that the agent-centered approach of Sen is 
conceptualized not in political legal terms but in terms of social empowerment, 
contending that a lack of freedom can exist as much in a wealthy liberal 
democracy.33 
Nevertheless, as Chandler notes, according to Sen, political freedom and 
market economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate 
individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression. 34  The 
assumption is that without development individuals will not be free. Here none 
of us are free from the need for development. Development is the process of 
altering the social milieu which shapes our capacities and capabilities for free 
choices. Therefore, the goal of policy-making becomes the enabling and the 
empowering of this subject, of expanding its capabilities and capacities. 
Expanding capabilities infinitely is tied with Chandler’s conceptualization of 
subjectivity that lacks fixity. Therefore according to Chandler, the capabilities 
approach dismisses a fixed conceptualization of the subject.35  
Challenging	  the	  ‘Emancipating’	  Effects	  of	  Development	  as	  Freedom	  	  
 
Before exposing the shortcomings of  ‘Development as Freedom’, an 
important distinction needs to be made between Sen’s conceptualization of the 
free agent and Chandler’s conceptualization of the free subject he attributes to 
Sen. Chandler appears to be attributing to Sen a richer conceptualization of 
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freedom and subjectivity. According to Chandler, Sen’s subject can be perceived 
beyond the limits of liberalism. As freedom too is no longer conceptualized in 
the formal liberal sense, freedom appears as a continuum, a non-finite process 
which lacks external measurement or determination while it appears to be 
influenced by the subject. Chandler stresses that development can only be 
measured within the individual’s inner achievement of ‘freedom’. Freedom here 
is not defined in terms of autonomy, democracy or in a liberal sense. Chandler’s 
conceptualization of freedom, he attributes to Sen, empowers the human subject 
and places freedom under its control. However, it is doubted here that Sen 
promoted such an understanding of freedom and subjectivity. According to Sen 
the individual is the building block of freedom as capabilities. Sen never appears 
to have approached the subject from a deep philosophical perspective in terms of 
its self-determination or self-consciousness while associating that  to freedom.  
From a Hegelian perspective, both Sen’s and Chandler’s approaches 
entail flaws since their conceptualization of freedom is not emancipating. Sen’s 
interpretation of  freedom as the expansion of the subject’s capabilities,  allows 
the individuals to live the kind of lives they value. Enhancement of human 
freedom is the main object of development. Sen, insists that individual 
capabilities crucially depend on, economic, social and political arrangements as 
unfreedom stems from inadequate political processes or inadequate social 
opportunities. Moreover Sen stresses that the state and society should strengthen 
and safeguard human capabilities which permit them to be actively invoked. The 
capabilities that a person has don’t entirely depended on the individual but on the 
nature of social arrangements too. However, it should be noted that Sen later 
admits that, the role of economic growth is important in expanding the 
opportunities which relate to the expansion of human freedom in terms of living 
and promoting the kinds of lives that people have reason to value. Moreover, 
Chandler stresses too that Sen contends that political freedom and market 
economic competition are to be valued because they help facilitate individual 
choice-making capacities and enable their expression. 
In brief, Sen’s analysis involves the set of flaws which according to 
Hegel form an incomplete conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom that 
allows the promotion of liberal ideals. It is reminded that these flaws are 
associated with: a) The treatment of subject as an independent self-determining 
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unit; b) The non-emancipating understanding of freedom which emerges when 
freedom is perceived as an unobstructed choice-making capacity formed either 
by the undetermined will or the self-determining subject’s; c) the determination 
of ‘free’ options by a particular domain which is beyond the subject’s control.  
As it was previously argued, the treatment of freedom as a form of 
unobstructed choice-making within a domain of predetermined options is not 
emancipating. The exercise of such freedom which forms a subject within a 
particular domain beyond the subject’s control, does not contribute to the 
development of the subject’s self-consciousness and freedom. An agent is not 
necessarily free when choosing without obstruction as his actions are not always 
a product of self-determination. As Hegel notes, the defect of this conception is 
that it stops at something given from the outside: it stops at motives whose 
content is determined not by the agent but by an external domain. An enquiry on 
what constitutes freedom should go beyond the notion of unobstructed choice. If 
we bear firmly in mind that the content of what one wills is a given one, it 
follows that he is determined by it and in this very respect he is no longer free.  
Moreover, the conceptualization of freedom as capabilities has an 
additional weakness. Taylor, while criticizing the limits of Foucault’s 
understanding of freedom, brings to our attention an important theoretical insight 
which applies here too, as it challenges the emancipating effects of 
‘Development as freedom’. Taylor stressed that the prerequisite of elaborating a 
specific domain where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his 
freedom, acts in fact as a domain the individual submits himself under control. 
According to Taylor the whole idea of defining freedom and subjectivity within a 
domain turns to be a strategy of causing control. A similar parallel could be 
drawn here to argue that the promotion of ‘development as freedom’  and 
freedom as capabilities -defined from a particular domain- turns out to be a 
strategy of control in the name of development as ‘freedom’.36 
Regarding this matter, the first annual UN Human Development Report 
refers to the way development enlarges peoples choices. ‘Development is more 
than GNP growth, income, wealth and producing commodities. Human 
development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical of 
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these wide ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated, to 
have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. Additional 
choices includes political freedom, human rights and personal self-respect’.37  
Although the emphasis of these choices is not solely on an economic 
ground,  it is clear however that what is promoted as options are values stemming 
from the democratic liberal state paradigm. Thus the enlargement of people’s 
choices is not necessarily emancipating, as these options emerge from a 
particular domain which serves to promote the influence and amplification of 
particular  (western liberal) values.  Again, it is reminded that Sen admits that the 
role of economic growth is important in expanding the opportunities which relate 
to the expansion of human freedom. Moreover, Sen contends too that political 
freedom and market economic competition are to be valued because they help 
facilitate individual choice-making capacities and enable their expression. 
On the other hand Chandler treats ‘Development as Freedom’ as an 
ongoing process of empowering the individual. This empowerment is not 
measured in external outputs but internal such as the capability of free choice via 
a wide spectrum of options. As the capabilities cannot be measured from external 
outputs, freedom for Chandler becomes infinite, undetermined, a goal that is 
never reached. Therefore, both development and the process of achieving 
freedom become internal processes within the subject. The subject, argues 
Chandler, becomes autonomous as a choice making actor but never truly capable 
of making a free and reasoned choice because freedom -as a choice making 
capacity- is infinite.  On that score, he agrees with Sen that freedom is a quality 
that might be missing to everyone, regardless the politico-economic background. 
Thus, Chandler treats the human subject as an entity lacking determination, 
bearing an infinite freedom with unlimited capabilities beyond measurement. 
However, Hegelian insights disclose that the subject which emerges from 
Chandlers reading of ‘Development as Freedom’ is not free. The notion of an 
infinite freedom which lacks determination is not emancipating. Chandlers 
understanding of infinite freedom echoes Hegel’s first moment of indeterminate 
will. According to this moment such indeterminacy is responsible for nourishing 
the absence of subjectivity. Hegel contends that a will -or in Chandler’s case a 
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conceptualization of both subjectivity and freedom- which is infinite or lacks 
restriction and purpose, is neither liberating nor capable of forming a subject as a 
free agent. Therefore in this case too Chandler’s reading of ‘Development as 
Freedom’ fails to promote an emancipating form of freedom. 
Chandler’s indeterminacy is perilous as the indeterminate will nourishes 
the absence of subjectivity and does not prevent subjection. In this moment, 
although freedom as well as the capabilities which form it, are not subject to any 
restriction, the real question for Hegel is what is the content of these capabilities. 
If such content is influenced by external factors -beyond the control of a self-
conscious subject- then such freedom is not emancipating. Here, Chandler’s 
freedom is content-less, informed by unlimited capabilities, but what determines 
the content of these capabilities? If their content is beyond the individual’s self-
conscious determination then it runs the risk of being informed by the dominant 
liberal paradigm. Although it is not suggested that Chandler necessarily promotes 
a liberal understanding of development as freedom, however his treatment of 
freedom as indeterminate is perilous, since nothing forbids liberal values to 
permeate the domain of capabilities.  
Moreover it needs to be added how Chandler’s understanding of 
indeterminate freedom might lapse to relativism. Again it is reminded how 
valuable is the inclusion of universality and particularity as well as the 
association of freedom with the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state within the 
realm of Spirit (Geist) that Hegel’s philosophical system promotes, which 
incorporates historicism without lapsing to relativism. Hegel’s insights although 
they do not provide a prescriptive account of subjectivity and freedom, yet they 
helps us trace the shortcomings of certain approaches and warn us how they 
might unintentionally assist the promotion of liberal ideals as in Sen’s and 
Chandler’s case.  
The	  Shortcomings	  of	  Frost’s	  Understanding	  of	  Freedom	  From	  a	  
Hegelian	  Perspective	  	  
 
Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom and subjectivity, 
exposes the shortcomings of Frost’s thought. Although, Frost’s thought is loosely 
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inspired by Hegel’s, yet Frost’s conceptualization of freedom is completely 
different from Hegel’s and ends up promoting liberal ideals.  
Let us remind that the previous part stressed how Hegel’s discrimination 
of the three moments of will disclose that a self-defeating understanding of 
freedom occurs when: i) the subject is perceived as a relativistic or a self-
determining individual which reflects Hegel’s incomplete moments of will; and 
ii) freedom is understood as an unobstructed choice-making capacity. Frost’s 
constitutive theory is inspired by Hegel’s insights without taking into 
consideration his philosophical system of Spirit (Geist). Frost celebrates the 
reconciliation of the individual with the state, but unlike Hegel, he argues that the 
maintenance of the sovereign state system is compatible with the individual’s 
rights. However, this is exactly where the limits of Frost’s thought commence. 
The shortcomings of Frost’s theory could be summarized as follows: a) Frost 
perceives the subject as an independent self-determining unit, acknowledging as 
subject the individual holder of rights. This notion of subjectivity reproduces 
Hegel’s second (incomplete) moment of will as determination which fails to 
formulate the subject’s free will; b) Frost’s subject reflects only the second 
(incomplete) moment of will that treats freedom as an unobstructed choice-
making capacity, the options of which are not controlled by the subject; c) The 
options which constitute Frost’s notion of freedom are determined by the Global 
Civic Society and the Society of Sovereign States which are beyond the subject’s 
control and rest on liberal ideals.  
Thus, Frost’s approach after neglecting Hegel’s notion of free will that is 
actualized in the state within the realm of the Spirit (Geist), develops an 
alternative conceptualization of freedom. Frost dismisses Hegel’s three moments 
of will and instead praises the anarchy formed by the Global Civil Society (GCS) 
and the Society of Sovereign States (SOSS) as responsible for constituting the 
individuals as free subjects of rights. Having already stressed that Frost’s notion 
of subjectivity is problematic, below it will be showed how Frost’s 
understanding of freedom is not emancipating. Frost’s notion of subjectivity is 
associated to the self-determining individual as a bearer of civic rights and 
liberties whereas his perception of freedom rests on the individual’s privilege of 
unobstructed choice making capacity. However, Hegel’s insights make clear that 
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these choices which stem from a predetermined domain, namely the anarchy of 
GCS and SOSS, in fact restrict the subject’s freedom and annul free will.  
 
Frost’s	  Conceptualization	  of	  Anarchy,	  Global	  Ethics	  and	  Freedom	  
 
As Frost himself summarizes, he sets out a theory of IR which is: 1) 
Holistic, assuming that individuals are participants in two major global social 
practices, the Global Civil Society (GCS) and Society of Sovereign States 
(SOSS); 2) analyses that from an internal point of view, focusing on ourselves as 
participants in these practices and comprehending our own actions and those of 
others insofar as we understand their ethical dimensions. For Frost, international 
relations are always ethically informed, but this aspect is often hidden.38 In order 
to participate in the international domain, then an actor, has to be what one might 
call ‘ethically literate’. In order to participate, one has to understand the terms of 
ethical debate in the practice within which one finds oneself.39 
Frost contends that an engagement with ethics is not an option for 
participants but a pre-condition for their participation.  He acknowledges as 
participants the states and individuals, understood as entities that are constituted 
as actors of a certain kind within specific global social practices. For Frost, these 
constitutive practices are themselves underpinned by thick sets of ethical values 
which constrain in severe and complex ways the actions of the actors. Engaging 
in international relations requires making ethical claims for oneself and to 
recognize the ethical standing of others. A practice of such engagement exists 
where we find individuals or states offering to one another explanations and 
justifications for what they do by referring to a commonly accepted set of ‘rules 
of the game’.40  
According to Frost what distinguishes his constitutive theory from other 
forms of social theory is that one cannot make sense of human action and 
interaction without paying attention to the social practices within which they take 
place. In order to do this an insiders perspective is necessary to understand the 
                                                
38 Mervyn Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 2009), p.ix   
39 Frost, Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations, 9-11 
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criteria actors use in interpreting and criticizing their actions and those of others. 
What is involved, according to Frost, is paying attention to the forms of 
reciprocal recognition that we encounter within social practices. These criteria 
determine who is to count as a participant and what would count as adequate 
reason to expel a participant from practice.41  
According to Frost anarchy is an important feature towards constituting 
these global practices and the formation of ethics. The GCS and the SOSS are 
ethically justified as they form a double anarchy which establishes an 
arrangement that promotes diversity and pluralism. The value here is the 
relationship of free states to one another and the diversity it makes possible. As 
the values of liberty, pluralism and diversity are promoted within the realm of the 
anarchical SSOS and GCS , this has far reaching consequences for what actors in 
this anarchy are entitled to do. They are required to do what advances these 
values and refrain from doing what undermines them. In pursuit of their policies, 
the actors of anarchy are only entitled to use those means which nurture and 
protect liberty and diversity.42  
In a few words, Frost argues that the GCS and the SOSS form a double 
anarchy. This form of anarchy promotes pluralism and diversity which 
constitutes the participants as free agents. The free actors are understood as 
subjects of rights. Anarchy does not indicate that individuals or states interact 
without adhering to any social rules. In anarchical societies, the actors are strictly 
constrained by the rules of social practice within the anarchy. Frost argues that 
there good reasons in support of institutions which are anarchical in shape. 
Namely, he provides three reasons in support of anarchy and the anarchical form 
of GCS and SSOS: Firstly; within this form the participants are constituted as 
free actors. In GCS, rights holders adhere to set of social rule which specifies 
that they grand to one another a set of fundamental rights. It seems reasonable to 
assume that rights holders value the anarchy for precisely the reason that in it 
they are constituted as having a specific set of freedoms.43 
Secondly; in anarchical society, the participants as rights holders, are 
each free to pursue their own vision of the good. According to Frost, the impact 
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of anarchy is positive in two ambiguous dimensions which relate to the nature of 
diversity and pluralism; a) Diversity often triggers antagonisms as agents often 
promote their particularity, thus anarchy provides the rules of co-existence for a 
number of actors who, without that set of rules, might soon fall into violent and 
on-going conflict; and b) anarchy promotes tolerance towards diversity and 
pluralism, encouraging agents to exercise their freedom by pursuing diverse life 
plans. Thirdly; anarchical societies promote free agency by nurturing pluralism. 
Anarchy encourages the emergence of a diverse universe of actors while 
attributing freedoms to them. As each actor decides how to exercise such 
freedoms is precisely what according to Frost forms free agency within the realm 
of anarchy.44 
	  The	  Defects	  of	  Frost’s	  Freedom	  From	  A	  Hegelian	  Perspective	  
 
From a Hegelian perspective, Frost’s theory and his emphasis on anarchy 
ends up promoting a form of freedom and agency which is not emancipating.  
Once again we came across the same flaws which consists of: a) The 
conceptualization of the self-determining subject as bearer of rights and 
freedoms (echoing Hegel’s incomplete second moment of will); b) The 
conceptualization of freedom as an unobstructed choice making capacity; and c) 
The emergence of  ‘free’ options formed from a particular domain, which in this 
case stem from a particular conceptualization of the anarchic structure of GCS 
and SOSS. Below it will be supported that these flaws stem from Frost’s non-
metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s thought. Moreover, it will be analyzed 
how Frost’s account of freedom fails to emancipate the subject and serves the 
promotion of liberal ideals.  
Regarding the first point (a), Frost’s treatment of the subject as self-
determining undermines, portrayed by the individual as a right holder nourishes a 
non-emancipating account of freedom. The understanding of freedom as a 
subject’s   unobstructed choice-making capacity, brings us in mind Hegel’s 
second moment of will as determination which undermines the subject’s free 
will. Hegel notes that an agent is not necessarily free when is choosing without 
obstruction, as his actions are not always a product of self-determination. The 
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defect of this conception is that it stops at something given from the outside: it 
stops at motives whose content is determined not by the agent but by an external 
domain. An enquiry on what constitutes freedom should go beyond the notion of 
unobstructed choice. If we bear firmly in mind that the content of what one wills 
is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and in this very respect he is 
no longer free. In Frost’s case, the content of agency is determined and limited 
by the individual’s human rights and civic liberties.  
According to the second point (b), Frost’s understanding of anarchy as a 
form which establishes co-existence via diversity and pluralism, promotes a 
conceptualization of the agent’s freedom, as the exercise of a subject’s 
unobstructed will. Frost’s subject is perceived as the individual holder of human 
rights that reflects an autonomous and self-determining perception of 
subjectivity. Therefore, the notion of freedom that emerges from the double 
anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS, spawns a self-determining understanding of 
subjectivity that acknowledges as subject the individual right holder. The third 
point (c), is reflected when Frost equates freedom the individual’s rights that 
emerge within the specific domain of anarchy formed by GCS and SOSS. Frost, 
ends up promoting a form of freedom, the options of which are beyond the 
control of the agent; failing ultimately to transform this agent into a self-
determining and free subject. Below it will be examined why Frost’s 
(supposedly) Hegelian influenced theory ends up promoting a form of freedom 
and agency which nourishes liberal ideals and is not emancipating.   
The roots of Frost’s flawed account of freedom and subjectivity is to be 
found in his earlier work the Ethics in International Relations. In this work Frost 
explicitly states that ‘the outline of a constitutive theory given below draws 
heavily on Hegel’s political philosophy, but it is what may be termed a secular 
interpretation of his theory [...] constitutive theory does not require us to 
understand or accept Hegel’s metaphysical system’.45 Here it is argued that it is 
inconsistent -if not self-defeating- to adopt Hegel’s philosophical arguments 
without his metaphysics. The rejection of Hegel’s metaphysics ends up 
promoting a non-emancipating conceptualization of subjectivity and freedom.  
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Frost’s theory, just like Hegel’s, attempts to reconcile the individual with 
community. Particularly, Frost’s constitutive theory reconciles those settled 
norms relating to the preservation of the system of sovereign states with those 
norms connected to the notion of individual rights. Constitutive theory, unlike 
contract theory, does not seek to show that the sovereign state is a device which 
protects pre-existing rights.  It holds that rights are not things possessed by 
individuals prior to entering into social and political relationships. Rather it 
contends that a person is constituted as a rights holder within the context of a 
specific social relationship. Constitutive theory starts by asserting that a person 
only has value qua individual in a relationship of mutual valuation with another 
person or other people within a community.46 
Just like Hegel, Frost asserts too the transformation of an individual into 
free a social agent via the family, civil society and the state. A person who is not 
recognized within a family as an autonomous individual will not be able to 
develop into a free individual within the higher institutions of civil society and 
the state. As Frost argues, within the family, what individuals gained was 
consciousness of themselves as members of the whole. Within civil society the 
individuals gained consciousness of themselves as independent persons distinct 
from the whole. In civil society they experienced the law and other people’s 
competitive cooperation as necessary for the promotion of their own aims. 
Although civil society depends on the mutual recognition by the participant of 
one another as rights holders, the others on whom a person’s recognition depends 
are not experienced as co-determining a person’s individuality. They feel 
alienated. It is this tension between the individual and the whole which is 
resolved in the state. Within the state, people participate in the whole as 
members: as citizens. As citizens, they are accorded a form of mutual recognition 
by their fellow citizens, something which they lacked within the competitive and 
atomized civil society. As citizens, people know themselves to be constitutive 
parts of the whole and they are conscious that the whole of which they are part is 
constituted by them together with their fellow citizens. The state is the creation 
of its citizens and yet it is only in the state that an individual can be actualized as 
a citizen. The state is not to be confused with civil society. Frost notes just like 
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Hegel, that citizenship of a good state is not an option for a free person but is 
rather a precondition for the existence of a free person.47  
However what Frost’s ‘Hegelian’ analysis is missing is the contribution 
of Hegel’s metaphysics towards the formation of freedom and subjectivity. The 
Hegelian three moments of will substantiate how the free will and the self-
consciousness of the subject is formed within the interplay of family, civil 
society and the state. Frost’s failure to incorporate the metaphysical aspects of 
Hegel serve to promote a flawed understanding freedom and subjectivity based 
on the double anarchy of the GCS and on the SOSS that acknowledge as free the 
subject of rights. 
Here the concept of reflective identification is the key which Frost’s non-
metaphysical ‘Hegelian’ approach misses. This reflective identification is based 
on the three moments of will and is responsible for the emergence of the free 
subject within the community via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel contends 
that a self-conscious subject is formed through what Hardimon describes as 
reflective identification. Hegel’s reflective identification assists in conceiving of 
oneself as independent and of distinct from one’s social roles obtained within 
society in the sense that one thinks of oneself as having the capacity to abstract 
from any given social role. A person steps back from a social role when he 
considers how he relates to it. Stepping back is to question or evaluate it. One 
comes to conceive of oneself as a self by grasping that one has the capacity to 
step back from one’s social roles and by coming to form a general conception of 
oneself. In order to conceive oneself as a subject of consciousness, involves 
regarding oneself as an independent source of moral assessment and evaluation. 
It involves regarding oneself as having the capacity and right to access courses of 
actions on the basis of one’s own private, subjective judgment.48 
Hegel substantiates the compatibility of individuality and social 
membership through reflective identification. The act of abstraction contains 
within itself a moment of reflective separation between oneself and the role. 
Reflective identification is a form of identification. It is reflective in that it 
proceeds through the reflective actor of stepping back from a social role and 
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evaluating it from a position of indetermination. Towards this step the first 
moment of will prevails. Additionally, reflective identification proceeds to the 
second moment of will since identifying reflectively with one’s social role is to 
identify with such role as the self. Reflective identification provides a reflective 
means of bridging the gap between the self and its roles provided from the realm 
of community via the family, civil society and the state. Hegel thinks that one 
can be a perfectly good family member or citizen without reflectively identifying 
with these roles. However, he maintains that reflective identification formed via 
the three moments of will, represents something like the highest stage of social 
membership. In reflectively identifying with these roles (family, civil society, 
citizen), one absorbs these roles into one’s subjectivity, thereby actualizing one’s 
social membership through one’s individuality. Hegel’s conception of 
individuality and social membership can be thought of as a conception of 
individual social membership. Such an understanding of individual social 
membership which emerges from reflective identification contributes towards the 
development of the individuals self-consciousness, subjectivity and freedom.49  
However, reflective identification depends on Hegel’s metaphysics (that 
Frost rejects) and cannot be examined separately from Hegel’s concept of Spirit 
(Geist). Hegelian philosophy takes the form of a system which describes how the 
forms of consciousness evolve historically - upon which reflective identification 
depends - and promote an instructing process within the realm of Spirit (Geist). 
For Hegel, the evolution of the forms of consciousness, contribute to human self-
knowledge which serves as a means upon which of the Spirit’s (Geist) ‘actuality’ 
rests. According to Phenomenology of Spirit, the development of history and 
consciousness, reveal a teleological process which serves a goal.50 This goal is 
seized once the subject acquires freedom via the development of her self-
consciousness. The Hegelian philosophical system is tied with the concept of 
Spirit (Geist), challenging the treatment of the subject as self-determining 
individual.  Instead, Hegel promotes a notion of subjectivity that rests on the 
subject’s development of free will which is only actualized in the state via a 
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particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit) that serves as an instructive process within the 
realm of the Spirit (Geist).   
Another defect of Frost’s thought which stems from the rejection of 
Hegel’s metaphysics, associates to the shortcomings of his understanding of 
inter-state recognition. Although Frost’s implicates inter-state recognition as a 
form which encourages the diversity and pluralism among states within anarchy; 
instead Hegel’s insights unveil that Frost’s understanding of recognition ends up 
undermining this diversity and pluralism and annulling his conceptualization of 
freedom. Here, it is suggested that Frost’s notion of inter-state recognition 
promotes an ideological subjection.  
 Frost, by ignoring the notion of reflective identification draws emphasis 
on a form of freedom stemming from anarchy and inter-state relations. Frost 
dismisses the acquisition of self-consciousness as freedom and identifies the 
agent’s freedom as the unobstructed will formed in terms of the individual’s 
rights which emerge by the double anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS. Frost’s 
underscores the importance of the GCS and SOSS for the flourishing of the 
subject’s individuality and subjectivity. According to Frost, within the 
autonomous state all individuals are constituted as free citizens. But their 
citizenship can only be actualized once their state needs to be recognized by 
other states as autonomous. Frost’s constitutive theory claims to be projecting an 
alternative approach of recognition which is not biased as the colonial approach 
of recognition. Frost reject’s the colonial approach according to which colonies 
are not free, because their political entity is not recognized as autonomous. 
Instead, Frost argues that the notion of recognition of his constitutive theory is 
different. Due to the nature of anarchy which accommodates a set of social 
practices, recognition must be understood with reference to an individual’s or a 
state’s adaptability to these practices. Thus Frost claims that his recognition is 
not one of a ‘gate-keeping’ (recognizing one’s credentials to enter or being 
rejected and denied validity).  Recognition as gate-keeping raises a barrier 
according to which specific conditions need to be meet before entering. Frost’s 
recognition as he explicitly mentions ‘involves a commitment on my part to 
educate you in that practice [...] For your part, you recognize me as one who can 
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do this and you indicate your willingness to learn in any number of ways.’51 
However, Frost’s understanding of recognition is spurious and below it will be 
stressed how it paves the way to subjection and the promotion of liberal ideals.  
Frost’s conceptualization of recognition within the realm of anarchy 
undermines his celebration of anarchy as a neutral domain which promotes 
diversity and pluralism. This self-defeating form of anarchy’s neutrality, echoes 
Taylor’s criticism against Foucault’s ‘neutrality’ of power that lapses into the 
Doctor-Patient relationship. As it was previously mentioned, in the Discipline 
and Punish, Foucault treated power as a neutral force, responsible for the 
production of subjectivity. Similarly, Frost treats anarchy as a neutral domain 
which liberates and forms the subject as an individual right holder. Taylor argued 
that Foucaultian power cannot be neutral as that the Power-Subject relation is 
founded on the presumption that one knows (Doctor/ power) and that the other 
(Subject/ Patient) has the overwhelming interest in taking advice.52 A similar 
Doctor/ Power relation is entailed in Frost’s understanding of recognition 
according to which certain ‘politically correct’ states are called to educate and 
consult the rest. Thus, Frost’s conceptualization of anarchy as neutral, promoting 
diversity and pluralism is self-defeating. Surprisingly, as Sutch notes, Frost 
alludes to an example of an experienced chess player with a novice one to mark 
the interaction between developed and non-developed states. Frost, portrays the 
development of international relations as the progressive education by developed 
states of (willing) quasi-states that involves an initial recognition of the quasi-
states’ sovereignty until the novice becomes fully initiated in the rules of 
international relations.53  In Frost’s terms this is described as follows: ‘my 
concern is prompted by the fact that what I ultimately want is for you to become 
a fully competent player. That you want this too, is indicated by the fact that you 
actively seek to play with me’.54 
However as Sutch contends, Frost’s argument’s besides being presented 
in an abstract theoretical form, they have immediate practical relevance. They 
lead to the assertion that not all states (or people) deserve recognition as such and 
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that actors who do not receive this recognition (principally because they do not 
conform to the norms of international justice); may be legitimately challenged by 
the forces of international community. This is quite a claim as the first principle 
of prescriptive international relations, as promulgated by such bodies as the UN, 
is state sovereignty and this notion is coupled with a refusal to distinguish 
between different kinds of states. Any attempt to distinguish between those states 
who have earned the rights to autonomy and those that have not is totally 
unacceptable.55 This discrimination, becomes even more clear when Frost argues 
that for our individuality and freedom to be fully recognized we require both a 
fully developed state and recognition of that state by the international 
community. By a fully developed state, Frost means one in which the people 
recognize each other as citizens in terms of the law which they in turn recognize 
as being constitutive of them as citizens. The basic idea here is that the concept 
of sovereignty and what we now see as the correlative notions and individuality 
makes no sense to autocratic states.56 In that sense Frost promotes a particular 
understanding of individuality, freedom and state sovereignty that rests on 
democratic liberalism. At the next chapter, it will be elaborated how exactly 
Hegel differentiates from such a coercive understanding of democratic liberalism 
after situating certain liberal traits, such as the market economy and private 
property, in the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing to them educating effects 
which contribute to the formation of the subject’s free will within the state.  
Therefore, Frost’s understanding of recognition confirms the remark 
made earlier, that the ‘free’ options which stem from the domain the double 
anarchy formed by the GCS and the SOSS; are not emancipating and promote 
liberal ideals. Firstly, Frost’s conceptualization of the subject as self-
determining; secondly, his understanding of freedom as the individual subject’s 
unobstructed choice-making capacity; and thirdly, his elaboration on the 
subject’s ‘free’ options which stem from a domain beyond the subject’s control; 
violate the Hegelian principles of free will.  
Frost’s dismissal of Hegelian metaphysics ended up promoting a flawed 
understanding freedom and subjectivity. Instead of considering the notion of 
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reflexive identification within the realm of Spirit as the basis of free will; Frost 
portrayed the development of freedom as the outcome of the individual’s rights 
which stem from the double anarchy of the GCS and the SOSS. However, 
Frost’s treatment of anarchy as neutral while implicating the inter-state 
recognition as a form which encourages the diversity and pluralism among states; 
in fact undermines this diversity and pluralism while promoting a subjecting 
understanding of freedom.  
To be precise, Frost’s notion of recognition fails to promote diversity, 
pluralism and freedom since the agents can only secure their participation in the 
anarchical system of GCS and SOSS after complying to specific social practices. 
These social practices in spite of the fact that they emerge from an anarchical 
realm, they cannot promote the agent’s freedom. The options of this freedom are 
predetermined and not neutral as they stem from a particular conceptualization of 
the anarchic structure of the GCS and the SOSS that rests on liberal democratic 
ideals. Therefore in Frost’s context, freedom is seized only within this particular 
domain of anarchy that is not neutral but influenced by the democratic liberal 
institutions which exercise control via the process of recognition. Therefore, 
Frost promotes a form of freedom that, although it stems from consent, it is not 
emancipating as the ‘free’ options provided are beyond the control of the agent.  
Conclusion	  
 
This chapter demonstrated that Hegel’s attempt to conceptualize subjectivity and 
freedom without arbitrary or transcendental means, promoted an alternative 
understanding of free will as a process which stems from the development of the 
state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Unlike Hegel, the Foucaultian notion of power 
and the Kantian conceptualization of the subject rest on transcendental premises 
which contribute to a self defeating understanding of subjectivity and freedom. 
The first part unveiled how Hegel’s conceptualization of free will exposes the 
shortcomings of Foucautian and Kantian thought. After elaborating on Hegel’s 
three moments of will, the limits of Foucaultian conceptualization of freedom 
and subjectivity were easily detected. For Hegel, the three moments of will are 
interconnected and form a process which contributes to the subject’s free will 
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within the state. In that respect, the Foucaultian understanding of freedom which 
echoes one of the three moments fails to promote the subject’s free will.  
Specifically, Foucault treated freedom as power’s tool and ended up 
establishing the control of power over the subject. Also, it became clear that the 
treatment of Foucaultian power as neutral and the succession of the power 
regimes as purposeless, contributed to the perpetuation of power’s control over 
the subject. Hegel’s insights disclosed that since the Foucaultian subject’s 
formation is tied to these (purposeless) power regimes, it is deprived of the 
ability to develop self-consciousness and becomes relativistic. The Foucaultian 
subject’s relativism, echoes Hegel’s first moment of will as indeterminacy which 
fails to form the subject as a free agent. Also, since the options of Foucault’s 
freedom stem from predetermined domains (such as disciplinary, sexuality etc); 
this deprives the subject of the ability to control these options and acquire self-
consciousness. Thus, just as Hegel’s account of free will suggests, an agent of 
unobstructed choice-making ability is not free when the options provided are 
predetermined and beyond the control of the subject. In this sense the domains 
which form the Foucaultian subject (disciplinary, sexuality etc) provide the 
subject with a range of ‘free’ choices beyond its control which undermine the 
subject’ consciousness process and negate free will.  
Unlike Foucault, Kant does not equate freedom to the capacity for 
unobstructed choice. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights suggest that the Kantian 
notion of freedom fails to promote free will too. Unlike Kant, for Hegel free will 
cannot be determined by the individual subject alone but instead it evolves as a 
process within the realm of Spirit (Geist), implicating the notions of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) and the State. Thus, from a Hegelian perspective, Kant’s 
conceptualization of freedom is founded on two problematic themes: Firstly, the 
Kantian subject is perceived in the form of a self-determining individual; and 
secondly, Kant’s notion of freedom is seized when the subject’s actions are not 
determined by sensuous impulses but when they comply to the categorical 
imperative which represents an abstract and vacuous basis of duty and moral 
obligation. In that sense, Kant’s notion of freedom rests on an abstract principle 
which reproduces an empty formalism. On the other hand, Hegelian thought 
overcomes the flaws of Kant’s understanding of freedom after putting forward an 
alternative account of subjectivity and freedom which is not abstract but 
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implicates the notions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state. Ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) represents the actualization of freedom as self-consciousness within 
the state, reconciling the individual with the community via the family, civil 
society and the state. Thus, Hegelian freedom is neither vacuous nor founded on 
abstract universal principles; but formed via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in 
accordance to the customary ethics of particular social institutions within state.  
In that respect Hegel’s attempt to examine reality without transcendental 
or arbitrary means triggered an alternative conceptualization of subjectivity and 
freedom which is superior to Kant’s and Foucault’s. The critique of Kantian and 
Foucaultian thought revealed a triptych which is responsible for promoting a self 
defeating conceptualization of freedom, the implications of which are met in IR 
thought too. This triptych is comprised of the following flawed perspectives: a) 
The conceptualization of the individual subject as a self-determining unit; b) The 
understanding of freedom as an unobstructed choice-making capacity formed 
either by the undetermined will or the egotistic subject’s determined will; c) The 
emergence of a subject’s ‘free’ options from a particular domain, which are 
beyond the subject’s control. These remarks contributed towards exposing the 
shortcomings of Sen’s, Chandler’s and Frost’s approaches.  
The second part elaborated on the contribution of Hegel’s understanding 
of freedom and subjectivity after exposing how certain scholars nurture a 
problematic conceptualization of freedom in the field of IR thought. Chandler, 
Sen and Frost all refer to freedom, but their approaches promote a defective 
understanding of freedom. Chandler attempts to rethink agency and freedom via 
Amartya Sen’s understanding of ‘development as freedom’. Sen promotes the 
conceptualization of freedom as capabilities in order to challenge the liberal-
economical conceptualization of development. Nevertheless, Hegel’s insights on 
free will, allow us to understand that Sen’s and Chandler’s understanding of 
subjectivity and freedom do not only fail to develop the subject’s self-
consciousness but also assist the promotion of liberal ideals they aspired to 
critique. The promotion of ‘development as freedom’ and freedom as capabilities 
echoes (c) since freedom is defined from a particular domain which (just as 
Foucault’s theory) turns out to perpetuate the control of the subject in the name 
of development as ‘freedom’. Such freedom is acknowledged as an unobstructed 
choice making capacity whereas the options which comprise it are derived from 
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a domain which is beyond the control of the subject. To be more precise, the 
options of  ‘development as freedom’ are also found in the UN annual Human 
Development Report which are inspired by a liberal democratic rhetoric. Thus, it 
becomes clear that since Sen’s perception of the subject as a self-determining 
individual [echoing (a)] and Chandler’s treatment of freedom as an unobstructed 
choice-making capacity [echoing (b)], negate free will.  
Regarding Frost, although his approach is loosely inspired by Hegel; he 
ends up promoting a notion of freedom that fails to emancipate the subject. As 
Frost dismisses Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), he inevitably ignores the three 
moments of will and contributes to a non-emancipating account of freedom. 
Thus, Frost’s rejection of the three moments of will is responsible for his flawed 
account of freedom which echoes certain aspects of the triptych. Frost treats the 
subject as a self-determining bearer of rights [echoing (a)]. However Frost’s 
subject capacity to will without obstruction does not render the subject free as the 
‘free’ options stem from the double anarchy of the Global Civil Society and the 
Society of Sovereign States. Therefore such notion of freedom is not 
emancipating as it stems from a particular conceptualization of the anarchic 
structure of the Global Civil Society (GCS) and the Society of Sovereign States 
(SOSS) that rests on liberal democratic ideals. In that respect, Frost’s approach to 
freedom is far from neutral. On the contrary such approach to freedom suits the 
states’ which support the democratic liberal institutions of the GCS and exercise 
control via the process of recognition. Therefore, Frost promotes a form of 
freedom that is not emancipating since the ‘free’ options are beyond the control 
of the agent. Such promotion of freedom [echoes (c)] fails to emancipate the 
subject since the ‘free’ options are restricted within the democratic liberal 
domain of the individual’s rights.  
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CHAPTER	  4:	  Hegel’s	  Contribution	  Towards	  an	  Alternative	  




This chapter elucidates Hegel’s contribution with regard to the conceptualization 
of citizenship. His method of immanent critique as well as his notion of Spirit 
demonstrate that the distinction between the universal and the particular 
dimension of citizenship is misleading. Let us recall that the introductory chapter 
analyzed how immanent critique allow us to avoid the separation between: i) the 
subject and the object of knowledge and ii) the universal and the particular 
dimension which nourishes an empty formalism and vacuous supranational 
norms. This chapter explains how the points (i) and (ii) are associated to the 
shortcomings of the approaches to citizenship which separate the universal from 
the particular dimension.   
Specifically, the current chapter tackles the following questions: 
1) How does the method of immanent critique reveal the shortcomings of 
the universalist approaches to citizenship which ignore the particular 
dimension? 
2) How do the insights stemming from Hegel’s philosophical system of 
Spirit (Geist) overcome the shortcomings of the universalist approaches 
to citizenship? 
3) How does Hegelian thought enrich our understanding of citizenship?  
 
These questions suggest that the current chapter elucidates how Hegel’s 
philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) promotes an alternative understanding of 
subjectivity and ethics with regard to the state and the public sphere which 
enriches our understanding of citizenship after accommodating the universal and 
the particular dimension. Immanent critique treats the incorporation of these 
dimensions as the key which allows us to reconsider reality not with arbitrary or 
transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality itself. In that 
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respect, the notion of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to promote an alternative 
account of patriotism, ethics and subjectivity premised on the reality of our 
empirical world after reconsidering the effects of market economy and private 
property. Thus, Hegel’s insights contribute to a more complete approach to 
citizenship without transcendental premises after accommodating the universal 
and the particular dimension.  
Therefore this chapter after scrutinizing the universalist approaches to 
citizenship unveils the contribution of Hegel’s immanent critique while 
explaining in theoretical terms why it is necessary to consider the philosophical 
system of Spirit (Geist) and the notion of Absolute. Both i) the subject and the 
object of knowledge; as well as ii) the universal and particular dimensions, are 
embodiments of the Absolute which should not be separated. The combination of 
these dimensions is equally essential for the self-realization of the Absolute. This 
becomes clearer in Hegel’s conceptualization of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Hegel 
contents that the subject seizes self-consciousness and freedom via the 
development of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the realm of history and the state.  
The following analysis affords insight into how Hegel’s approach 
incorporates both dimensions of universalism and particularism – dimensions 
which dominant perspectives on citizenship maintain as separate. However, it is 
stressed here that such a distinction between the universal and the particular is 
misleading. After analyzing the pitfalls of approaches to citizenship which adopt 
just one of these two dimensions, an alternative account will be proposed, as 
influenced by Hegel. The Hegelian approach incorporates both particularism and 
universalism and this contribution stems from the fact that his theory neither 
promotes a descriptive nor a prescriptive account of citizenship. Instead, Hegel’s 
insights assist in understanding citizenship by elaborating on how the individual 
is reconciled with the social institutions through the development of a particular 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit).  
This chapter entails two parts. The first one stresses the flaws of the 
approaches which adopt solely a universal dimension addressing to the first (1) 
and second (2) question. The second part addresses to the third (3) question and 
describes how a Hegelian-influenced approach rectifies the theoretical flaws of 
this incomplete understanding of citizenship after accommodating both the 
universal and the particular dimension.  
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I.	  The	  Shortcomings	  of	  Ignoring	  the	  Particular	  and	  Universal	  dimension	  
of	  Citizenship	  
How	  Immanent	  Critique	  Unveils	  the	  Limits	  of	  Universalist	  Perspectives	  
on	  Citizenship	  
Introduction	  	  	  
 
This part is divided into into two sections. The first section analyses how 
immanent critique exposes the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to 
citizenship. As Buchwalter stressed, ‘immanent critique evaluates reality not 
with alien principles of rationality but those intrinsic to reality itself’.1 With this 
insight in mind, an analysis of certain universalist approaches to citizenship takes 
place which examines whether the theoretical premises of these approaches are 
transcendental or immanent. It will become clear that the cosmopolitanism of 
these approaches rests on certain norms and values such as equality, freedom, 
human rights and morality which are portrayed as universal. However an 
immanent critique of these approaches, undermines their theoretical vigor after 
challenging the ‘universalism’ of the norms and values these approaches convey. 
An immanent critique of these approaches reveals that these norms and values 
are founded on purely transcendental grounds which are detached from reality. 
Therefore these approaches promote a misleading set of values and norms which 
are transcendental and lack a particular empirical content. Such an understanding 
of norms and values promotes a prescriptive understanding of citizenship which 
is misleading as it stems from the separation of the subject-theorist from the 
object of theory since the subject-theorist is perceived as a self-determining and 
autonomous.  
In that respect such  universalist accounts of citizenship tend to identify 
the citizen as a self-determining, rights-holding unit where rights are 
acknowledged as universal due to the promotion of supranational values, such as 
equality and liberty. Immanent critique reveals that; firstly, the values and norms 
                                                
1 Andrew Buchwater, Dialectics, Politics and the Contemporary Value of Hegel’s Practical 
Philosophy (Abington: Routledge, 2012), 42 
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of these universalist approaches have transcendental premises which ignore the 
empirical reality; and secondly, these cosmopolitan scholars fail to realize that 
what they portray as universal is in fact a universally projected particularity 
which triggers social exclusions. These scholars, after treating the subject as a 
self-determining agent, adopt a prescriptive understanding of citizenship which 
takes uncritically for granted the transnational and impartial status of these 
universal values and norms.  
The first section challenges the universality and transnationalism of such 
values both in theory and practice, undermining the universal status of 
citizenship based on human rights and cosmopolitan values. In terms of theory, a 
critique leveled at a number of approaches, certainly not exhausted here, which 
emphasize solely a universalist dimension of citizenship. The universalist 
approaches which will be scrutinized here are those of Held, Archiburgi, Kaldor 
and Habermas. Works by Archibugi, Held and Kaldor focus on democracy and 
individual rights (liberty and equality) in order to support a cosmopolitan 
approach to citizenship on the basis of the ‘universality’ of human rights and 
democracy. However, these scholars take for granted the concepts of rights, 
equality, liberty and their universal effects without further elaboration, attributing 
them an unchallenged supranational status. However from the perspective of 
immanent critique, this supranational status is misleading since: i) it stems from 
separating the universal from the particular dimension and nourishes an empty 
formalism which renders these supranational norms vacuous;  and ii) these 
approaches seize a prescriptive theoretical dimension which separates the subject 
from the object of knowledge, acknowledges the subject-theorist as a self-
ascribed authority while projecting a subjective-particular perspective as 
objective-universal with socially excluding effects. Therefore, the following 
analysis contends that the ‘universalist’ concepts of  (human) rights, equality, 
liberty require a thorough examination. The supranationalism and impartiality of 
human rights, equality and freedom will therefore be challenged not only 
theoretically (by quoting Marx), but also practically through reference to the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, thereby exposing the 
socially-exclusive effects of human rights.  
The second section focuses on Habermas’s Kantian inspired approach 
and demonstrates the contribution of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit 
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which unveils the limits of Kantian freedom and ethics. In that respect this part 
tackles the second question and reveals how Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) 
overcomes the shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship. 
Initially, it is argued that although certain parts of Habermas’s thought implicate 
particularism, universalism ultimately supersedes them. While at times 
Habermas stresses the importance of nation-states, his argument ultimately 
appears to be promoting the formation of a global civil society constituted by 
universalist-based norms. Furthermore, this section demonstrates that Habermas 
advances his universalist argumentation by employing only specific parts of 
Kantian thought, in spite of the fact that Kant does not necessarily support 
universalism at the expense of the (nation) state’s sovereignty. Neglecting a 
holistic approach to Kant, Habermas appears to be applying only certain Kantian 
ideas (for example, the categorical imperative) which serve his universalist 
argument. Habermas therefore bases the potential for universal citizenship on a 
global civil society formed by universal norms that are founded on a Kantian 
understanding of subject, duty and freedom.  
However, as Hegel notes, the categorical imperative is a vague universal 
duty which is not premised on empirical reality. Therefore, Hegel’s insights 
show that Kantian thought, promotes a particular understanding of freedom 
which sustains a self-determined form of subjectivity, alienated from society and 
the state. Hegelian freedom as formed by ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the 
state, overcomes the alienation of the (Kantian) self-determining subject which 
nourishes the tension between the individual and society. Ultimately, Hegel 
forms a more balanced approach to citizenship which incorporates both 
universalism and particularism and reinstates the importance of state and nation.   
On	  The	  Universalist	  Approaches	  of	  Held,	  Archibugi	  and	  Kaldor	  	  
 
Certain conceptualizations of citizenship, in the discipline of International 
Relations, although by no means related in full here, emphasize purely the 
universalist dimension of citizenship. Among them. Archibugi, Held and Kaldor 
focus on democracy and individual rights (liberty and equality) in order to 
support an exclusively universalist approach. On the contrary, it will be argued 
here that universalist approaches simply adopt the concepts of ‘democracy’ and 
 170 
‘individual rights’ along with the values of ‘equality’ and ‘liberty’, without 
further elaboration or interrogation. Instead, the definition of these concepts 
needs to be examined thoroughly. Here, the projection of human rights as 
universal will be challenged after questioning the impartiality of (liberal) 
freedom and equality. The exclusive implications of (liberal) freedom and 
equality will likewise be exposed  by citing Marx.  
Archibugi’s cosmopolitan system envisages not only the existence of 
universal human rights, protected by the states, but also the creation of a 
mandatory core of rights that individuals may claim, alongside a set of duties in 
relation to global institutions. In terms of these rights, world citizens undersign 
certain duties which enable global institutions to perform a function of temporary 
replacement and substitution in relation to national institutions. 2  This 
cosmopolitan model thereby entrusts civil society to interfere in the domestic 
affairs of another state. Through cosmopolitan democracy, Archibugi argues, it is 
possible to build a world-order fully capable of providing democracy.  
Accordingly, he maintains that a cosmopolitan institution could coexist together 
with the sphere of the states, but would override states in certain realms of 
activity. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ here succeeds in  capturing the dual reference 
to the citizens of the world and those of the existing states.3 
Kaldor, on similar terrain of cosmopolitan law and rights,  also seeks to 
legitimize intervention. For Kaldor, the key to this lies in ‘cosmopolitan law 
enforcement’ - a concept located somewhere between soldiering and policing. 
Kaldor uses the term cosmopolitan in a broad sense, referring to notions such as 
tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy, and treating them as 
universal and capable of forming a body of cosmopolitan law.4 Such approaches 
promote an exclusively universalist understanding of citizenship.  
Held in turn contends that at the heart of such a cosmopolitan conception 
of citizenship, is the idea that citizenship can be based not on exclusive 
membership of a territorial community, but on general rules and principles such 
as democracy and human rights. Building on the fundamental rights of equality 
                                                
2 Daniele Archibugi , David Held D, Martin Kohler, Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies 
in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 214-215 
3 Archibugi , Held , Kohler, Re-Imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, 216-217 
4 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, (Stanford University Press, 2010), 124-126 
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and freedom of all human beings, cosmopolitan citizenship underwrites the 
autonomy of each and recognizes their capacity for self-governance.5 
 
Towards	  Undermining	  the	  Impartiality	  and	  Transnationalism	  of	  Human	  
Rights,	  Liberty	  and	  Equality	  
 
At this point attention is turned to the so-called ‘universalist’ rights of 
liberty and equality. These are often seen as universal, impartial and 
undiscriminating values which form the cornerstone of human rights and liberal 
democracy. Accordingly, advocates of universalism such as Archiburgi and 
Held, utilize the terms liberty and equality to project their universalist argument 
without elaborating on the definition of  these concepts. Rather, their 
conceptualization is taken for granted. Liberty and equality are treated 
uncritically and their universalist effects are based on their supposedly impartial 
and undiscriminating characteristics. Contrasting this is the analysis of  Marx 
who was among the first to challenge the impartial origins as well as the 
undiscriminating effects of equality and liberty. 
 In the Grundrisse, Marx reveals the social implications of so-called 
‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. He argues that these two notions  in fact serve the 
purposes of the market and maintain social inequalities alongside the unfreedom 
of the individual. After acknowledging the exchange value6 system as liberty’s 
and equality’s particularist point of departure, Marx argues that liberty and 
equality are not impartial values. Instead, they are principles which service 
market imperatives and paradoxically, generate results which are the antithesis of 
those they declare. Therefore, the ignorant individual, under the illusion of being 
                                                
5 David Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!’, New Political 
Economy, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 2006, 173 
6 What is the exchange value system? Every commodity is the objectification of a given amount 
of labour time. The value of the commodity is different from the commodity itself. The 
commodity is a value (exchange value) only within exchange; value is the commodity’s specific 
exchangeability. Considered as values, all commodities are qualitatively equal and differ only 
quantitatively, hence can be measured against each other and substituted for one another. Two 
commodities such as cotton and oil, are different by nature, have different properties, are 
measured by different measures. Once they are considered as values they cease to be 
incommensurable. ExchangeValue is their social relation, their economic quality. See, Karl 
Marx, Grundrisse, (London: Penguin, 1993), 140-141 
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free and equal, voluntarily participates and contributes to the unfree and unequal 
exchange value system.  
According to Marx, the transaction of exchange values via money is the 
real source of notions of equality and freedom – notions which in practice 
promote inequality and unfreedom. For Marx, (in)equality and (un)freedom are 
rendered possible when each individual owns the product of her labor,  and is 
transformed into a proprietor and a worker at the same time. Money and the 
attendant notion of ‘exchange value’ becomes the social mediator connecting 
unsocial individuals.7 As Marx notes, individuals are simply and singularly 
conceived of as exchangers. As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore 
that of equality. The two exchangers might hence appear in the different roles of 
buyer and seller.  A worker who buys commodities for X money, appears to the 
seller in the same function, in the same equality (ie.in the form of X money), just 
as would the king who performs a similar purchase. All social distinctions 
between them are extinguished. Where money here appears as the general 
commodity of contracts, all distinction between the contracting parties is 
extinguished. It is impossible to find any trace of distinction once the 
commodities which they exchange become equivalent as exchange values.8  
Marx criticizes (in fact he goes so far as to characterize as fools) the 
proponents of the exchange value system who treat it as a system of universal 
freedom and equality. Marx contends that a proper response to this delusion is 
the argument that the exchange value or the money system is in fact the system 
of equality and freedom that in effect perpetuates inequality and unfreedom. The 
imposition of such an exchange value system upon the individual leads to his 
very unfreedom. The reality that the individual has an existence only as a 
producer and a proprietor of exchange value implies the whole negation of his 
natural existence.9 
Marx’s analysis is significant as it challenges the impartial and 
undiscriminating effects of liberty and equality taken for granted by Archibugi, 
Kaldor and Held. Against these thinkers, Marx exposed equality and freedom as 
instruments of the market that in fact succeed in promoting inequality and 
                                                
7 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, (London Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), 17-18 
8 Marx, Grundrisse, 239-241 
9 Marx, Grundrisse, 243-246 
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unfreedom. Thus, Marx’s insights unveiled the non-universal effects and 
characteristics of equality and freedom by arguing that they serve as mediums of 
the (liberal) capitalist exchange value system which undermines their treatment 
as universalist and socially-undiscriminating values. This final point is again 
reflected in the French Declaration where a particularist conceptualization of 
rights and citizenship is portrayed as universalist, triggering socially-exclusive 
outcomes. 
 
How	  the	  Universalism	  of	  Human	  Rights	  is	  Perverted	  in	  Practice:	  the	  
Shortcomings	  of	  the	  French	  Declaration	  
 
The supposed universalism of rights will be challenged here both in 
theory and practice through reference to the shortcomings of the ‘French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789)’. This document is widely 
regarded as the theoretical cornerstone of human rights’ universal status. 
However, the French Declaration’s universal and undiscriminating character will 
be challenged here on the same basis as Archiburgi, Kaldor and Held’s 
argument. Similarly, it will be argued that the French Declaration’s treatment of 
equality, liberty and rights as universal and undiscriminating, in practice 
promotes inequality, exclusion and oppression.   
According to Marx, the ‘universality’ of rights as expressed in the French 
Declaration does not permit the formation of a universal community. Quite 
conversely, the declaration promotes the importance of individual rights with the 
effect of perpetuating discrimination and social inequality.  
Marx, in the essay On the Jewish Question, argues that liberty is the right 
to do and perform everything which does not harm others. The limits within 
which the individual can move without harming others are determined by law, as 
the boundary between two fields. Liberty as regarded here is that of the 
individual as an isolated monad who is withdrawn into herself. As Marx notes, 
the right to freedom is not based on the association of individual with individual, 
but rather on the separation of between them. It is therefore the right of 
separation, the right of the individual restricted to herself. Further, he argues, the 
practical application of the right of the individual to freedom is the right of the 
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individual to private property. The latter  consists in the right to enjoy and 
dispose of one’s resources as one wills, without the regard of other individuals 
and independently of society; that is, the right of self-interest. In this matter, 
equality is constituted by the fact that the law is the uniform for everyone. 
Equality simply connotes equal access to the liberty described above. Individual 
freedom, together with this application of equality, thereby forms civil society. 
The formation of civil society in turn leads each individual to see in others not 
the realization, but the limit of her own freedom. The so-called ‘rights of man’ 
thus serve the egoistic individual  - that is, the individual as bourgeoisie and as 
the member of civil society.10  
In this respect, when examining Article Eight of the French Declaration, 
it becomes evident that the notion of security pervades civil society. This 
therefore suggests that civil society exists only to guarantee the preservation of 
its members’ property and rights. As Marx previously noted, the so-called ‘rights 
of man’ do not extend beyond the egoistic individual as a member of civil 
society. For Marx, such an individual withdrawn into herself, her private interest 
and private desires separated from her community. Thus the ‘rights of man’ 
become individualist, self-centered and opposed to community. Such an 
understanding of rights promotes a fragile notion of social coherence, as the only 
bond cohering citizens is that of natural necessity - need, private interest and the 
conversation of individual property.11   
Contemporary scholars such as Balibar, Douzinas and Kouvelakis refer to 
similar exclusive effects promoted by this understanding of community. These 
exclusions relate to the repercussions of ethno-national as well as domestic social 
exclusions. Below it is argued that the content of the French Declaration’s key 
terms ‘Man’, ‘Citizen’ and ‘Rights’ nourishes such exclusions. These emerge 
where rights are given a particularist reference point, associated with national 
sovereignty and individual property, instead of a more universal definition.  
More precisely: i)  it should be noted that although the French declaration treats 
‘Rights’ as universal, contemporary scholars such as  Balibar, Douzinas and 
Kouvelakis, contest this universality. On the contrary, they argue that the 
implementation of rights is associated with a particularist and exclusive 
                                                
10 Karl Marx, Early Writings, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 227-229 
11 Marx, Early Writings, 230 
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tendency. Kouvelakis approaches rights from a Marxist perspective, emphasizing 
the repercussions of property. He observes that Marx examines four natural 
rights: equality, liberty, security and property, or the rights of the ‘egotistic’ 
individual, and argues that they  can all be reduced to the concept of property.12 
Similarly, the importance of property is evident in Balibar’s work. After quoting 
Florence Gauthier, Balibar observes that a rupture occurred in the French 
revolution between: a) the Jacobins (who focused on the pursuit of universal 
egalitarianism and the promotion of freedom as a universal right) and b) the 
Thermidorians (who focused on the reciprocity of rights and the untouchable 
character of private property which substitutes the determinate social foundation 
for the natural, universal foundation of citizenship). Therefore, as Balibar notes, 
the problem of the French Declaration is reflected in the distinction between the 
Jacobins and the Thermidorians which suggests that the French revolution was 
realized jointly by the bourgeoisie and the non-bourgeoisie masses as an ongoing 
relation of alliance and confrontation.13  
ii) With regard to the term ‘Man’, Kouvelakis contends that the ‘Man of 
the Declaration’ refers in fact to the property owner. ‘Man’ is therefore 
interpreted in an exclusive manner by the architects of the declaration itself. For 
if the ‘Man’ of the declaration is the property owner, it follows that the person 
without property is revealed as a lesser entity, with fewer privileges and rights.14  
According to Marx, the term ‘Man’  which the French declaration implicates to 
found a notion of citizenship does not reveal the truth of ‘Man’ but instead, 
conveys social discrimination and exclusion  as it is devoted to the materialism 
of the bourgeoisie society.15  
iii) After  noting articles One and Three of the French Declaration16, 
Douzinas focuses on the notion of the ‘Citizen’ as bearer of human rights. 
Douzinas observes that rights are declared on behalf of the universal ‘Man’, but 
that the real recipients are the members of the newly-emerging nation states. The 
                                                
12 Stathis Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’, The South Atlantic Quaterly 104:4, 
Fall 2005, 709 
13 Ettiene Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After 
Marx, (New York: Rutledge, 1994), 40-44 
14 Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’,, 710 
15 Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship’, 712-713 
16 Article 1: Men are born and remain free  and equal in their rights; Article 3: The source of all 
sovereignty lies in the nation. 
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subject of natural rights appears to be an individual who is born in freedom and 
equality and enjoys a list of abstract entitlements -a person without history, 
tradition, gender, colour, religion, needs or desires. However, as Douzinas 
observes, metaphysics cannot legislate for the world and it is instead the national 
assembly which does so. Rights and legislation are the concrete result of 
decisions by citizens and law-making power belongs to the people. Birth into the 
human race generates certain  binding entitlements under the principle of 
autonomy, but it is the privilege of citizenship and its expression in national 
popular sovereignty that makes these entitlements real.17 Although the French 
declaration sets out the universality of rights, its immediate effect was to 
establish the power of the national state and its laws. As Douzinas argues, despite  
claims of universal rights and indiscrimination, the French Declaration was 
founded on the local sovereignty of the nation state and thereby perpetuated the 
exclusion of stateless or nation-less population groups such as immigrants. 
Like Marx previously, Balibar, Douzinas and Kouvelakis today observe 
that the promotion of the universality of rights and citizenship does not guarantee 
social equality, inclusion and stability. On the contrary, it entails exclusion. The 
analysis of the French Declaration’s shortcomings reveals that in practice, human 
rights and the understanding of universal citizenship were products of the 
bourgeoisie and therefore promote a liberal understanding of rights with 
excluding implications. Thus, the supposed human rights of equality and liberty 
fail to prevent either discrimination or social exclusion, undermining the 
impartial qualities they proclaim. 
A	  Critique	  of	  Habermas’	  Civil	  Society	  Approach:	  Does	  Universalism	  
Indeed	  Supersede	  Particularism?	  	  
 
Universalist conceptualisations of citizenship have so far been restricted 
to those of Held, Archibugi and Kaldor.  Until this point, exclusively universalist 
conceptualizations of citizenship advocated the feasibility of a global civil 
society, prioritizing democracy and (human) rights. However, the theoretical 
basis to these approaches is not especially resilient and its lacks the philosophical 
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depth of Habermas’ more detailed argument. The latter thinker by contrast 
develops an elaborate philosophical argument which is heavily influenced by 
Kant. Although Habermas refers to the particularity of constitutional patriotism, 
he seems to overemphasize the predominance of universalism via the key 
concept of democratic legitimacy. This legitimacy is for Habermas founded on 
communicative action that ultimately upgrades the importance of global civil 
society. However, Habermas’ pro-universalist argument is arises from a 
particular understanding of freedom and reason. This interpretation of freedom 
and reason stems from the Kantian conceptualization of the self-determining 
subject. Habermas projects this particular understanding of subject, freedom and 
duty as the basis of the formation of universal civil rights and duties. As Balibar 
notes, Habermas’ understanding of “universalism” can be described as a 
community without a community. According to Balibar, this understanding of 
universality is in fact pseudo-universal; it is founded on a particular 
understanding of reason and duty and a number of supposedly “common” values 
or norms (liberal bourgeoisie) which take the form of “all or nothing” and whose 
logic is assimilating.18  
Although Habermas’ work is influenced by elements that promote 
particularity (nation-sate) as well as elements that promote universality (global 
civil society), it will be argued below that universalism ultimately prevails in his 
thought. Specifically, Habermas contends that the formation of a universal civil 
society and citizenship is feasible only via the key concept of democratic 
legitimacy.  
Principally, Habermas argues that democratic self-determination emerges 
only if the state is transformed into a nation of citizens. It is the transition into the 
democratic state which transforms the subjects into citizens. National 
consciousness stands as the driving force of this transition. For Habermas, only 
national consciousness (turning the citizens into members who feel responsible 
for one another) can appeal in this context, over the comparatively dry and 
abstract rhetorical ideas of human rights. This, according to Habermas, leads to a 
double-coding of citizenship, as the term civil rights also implies membership of 
a culturally-defined community. Political mobilization depends on such cultural 
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integration.19 Cultural symbolism henceforth secures its own particular character 
(commonalities of descent, language, history etc.). Only the symbolic 
construction of a ‘people’, argues Habermas, makes the modern state into a 
nation state. Constructed through the medium of modern law, this territorial state 
depends on the development of a national conscience to imbue it with the 
cultural substrate for a civil solidarity. While remaining strangers to one another, 
members of the same nation feel sufficiently responsible for one another that 
they are prepared to make sacrifices (e.g. military service, redistributive taxation 
etc.).20  
In spite of the fact that Habermas refers to the necessity of national 
consciousness to forming civil solidarity, he simultaneously insists that the 
background to certain principles (such as the commitment to legal agreements or 
freedom) is universal as it does not presuppose any particularist (ethnic-national) 
elements.    
Habermas thus contends that citizens may be patriots who understand and 
uphold their constitution as an achievement in the context of their country’s 
history,  yet nevertheless interpret the freedom of the nation in cosmopolitan 
terms. This practice reflects what might be called a ‘universal patriotism’.  
However, according to Habermas, a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation 
must be accorded priority over an ethnocentric interpretation. By universal terms, 
Habermas implies the authorization and (Kantian) duty/obligation to enter an 
agreement establishing a balance of interests with other nations within the 
framework of a federation.21 This concept is associated with that of Habemas’ 
democratic legitimation which is attained through the legal citizen and not via 
the nation. According to his radically-democratic theory, the legitimacy of 
political authority can only be secured through broad popular participation in 
decision-making. Habermas considers that there exists a simple universal basis 
for the agreement on general normative principles  resulting from the role of 
‘communicative action’ in regulating and producing social life and the identities 
of social actors.22  Citizens thereby exercise their political autonomy as legal 
                                                
19  Jurgen Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001), 111-114 
20 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 62-65 
21 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 111-114 
22 Habermas, The Post-national Constellation: Political Essays, 62-65 
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(rather than ethnic) subjects. A legal code thus becomes necessary to provide the 
communicative presuppositions of a communicative/discourse-will formation.23 
According to Habermas, the democratic legitimation of decisions may be 
envisaged beyond the schema of the nation state. He stresses that the democratic 
process no longer draws its legitimizing force only from the individual’s political 
participation and expression of will. Rather, it is also  derived from the general 
accessibility of a deliberative process whose structure (beyond the nation state 
scheme) grounds an expectation of rationally-acceptable results.24 
Unveiling	  Habermas’s	  Contrived	  Selection	  of	  Kantian	  Ideas	  
 
Here, it will be argued that Habermas utilized specific elements of 
Kantian thought (eg. the categorical imperative) which served his universalist 
argumentation, while neglecting a more holistic approach to Kant. Contrary to 
this approach, Kantian theory does not necessarily favour a universal approach to 
citizenship at the expense of a particular state-centric one. Kant instead focuses 
on the importance of the state and its nation throughout his work, whereas he 
makes a distinction between categories of citizenship.  
As Balibar observes, Kant maintains that not all individuals are able to 
embrace citizenship. Thus, Kantian thought is not necessarily in harmony with an 
impartial universalist conceptualization of citizenship based on human rights. In 
his texts Kant draws a distinction between, ‘active citizens’ and ‘passive 
citizens’. According to this view, to become an active citizen, it does not suffice 
to be a party to a contract. Those who work in the service roles, as well as 
minors, children and dependents in general, lack civil personality as they are 
subjected and not truly independent.25  
Moreover, Habermas is not consistent with Kant insofar as he treats duty 
and the practice of honoring agreements as  purely universal in order to support 
his argument and stress the supremacy of global civil society. According to 
Habermas’ understanding of Kant, compliance with norms and voluntary 
commitment to legal agreements emerges from a universal sense of moral duty 
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motivated by reason. However, as Balibar stresses, any universalist theoretical 
attempt that qualifies the formation of universal laws and duties via the 
predominance of reason in fact neglects Kant’s ‘subjective moment’. For Kant 
meanwhile, the ‘subjective moment’ relates to the law’s  distinguishing of human 
actions into two classes; the legal and illegal. Yet this distinction can make sense 
only because individuals have the capacity to determine themselves by 
themselves and the ability to exercise choice. Thus, for such decisions to be 
made, a subjective and particular moment is necessary: that of the 
comprehension of juridical rules and the decision to apply them. This does not, 
however, accommodate adequately for a universalist treatment and instead 
necessitates this particular ‘subjective moment’.26  
Furthermore, the idea of the nation and its state assumes a primary 
position in Kantian thought and there is nowhere to be found a suggestion which 
implies their substitution by a supranational institution or society. In his essay 
Towards Perpetual Peace, the state is projected as fully sovereign. Moreover, 
Kant argues in favour of a federation of states, where each state maintains its 
distinctiveness. For Kant, each state or nation is unique and must be respected. 
Therefore, foreign nations or states must not interfere with or coerce in order to 
influence the domestic sphere of others.27 He suggests that the right of nations 
should be based on a federation of free states.28So too, his understanding of 
international right presupposes the idea of existence of many separate, 
independent states or nations. Nature guides states through their difference of 
language and religion, just as it leads men to natural hatred and conflict. 
However, just like man’s gradual evolution and cultural progression, this 
conflicted circumstance will lead gradually to agreement, mutual understanding 
and peace. Nature will thereby guarantee perpetual peace. This idea of ‘unsocial 
sociability’ which rests precisely on the differences among men and the nation 
states they inhabit and which later paves the ground for their co-operation, is also 
found in his essay Idea of a Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Intent.29 
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Here, Kant defines the antagonistic traits which often characterize men via the 
notion of ‘unsocial sociability’. This concept refers to the inclination to enter into 
a society linked with the general repulsion at such entrance, which constantly 
threatens to break up the society just entered. On the one hand, it produces a 
society of selfish individuals united and instantly divided by interest. The 
outcome of ‘unsocial sociability’ is the emergence of a moral reaction to this 
pathological society where the state intervenes to neutralize these passions. The 
state is thus for Kant the master of all masters as it is the only actor that may at 
once constrain and legitimate by virtue of its very conception. 30  Despite 
Habermas’s Kantian-inspired approach which promotes universalism and the 
supremacy of global civil society, a more detailed examination of Kantian 
thought subsequently reveals that Kant in fact stresses the importance of the 
sovereign nation state.   
Undermining	  the	  Universalist	  Effect	  of	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  from	  
a	  Hegelian	  Perspective	  	  
 
This section, addresses to the second question of this chapter and 
demonstrates how the consideration of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit  
(Geist) and the notion of Absolute challenges the universal dimension of 
Habermas’s Kantian-inspired approach after revealing the limits of Kant’s 
conceptualization of reason and duty.    
Let us recall that Hegel’s notion of the Absolute accommodates the 
universal and the particular dimension and in that respect provides a content to 
the empty form after reconciling empiricism with idealism. Hegel’s notion of 
Spirit (Geist) and his conceptualization of the Absolute allows him to treat reality 
as immanent and bridge the gap between what is ideal and what exists. Reality 
for Hegel is the unity of essence with existence. Moreover, after acknowledging 
the interplay of the subject with the object of knowledge, Hegel avoids a 
prescriptive transcendental approach which projects a particular perspective as 
objective-universal with socially excluding effects after treating the subject as a 
self-determining unit.  
On the other hand, Habermas’s approach utilizes the Kantian notion of 
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categorical imperative in order to support the feasibility of universal norms on 
the basis of a particular understanding of duty, subjectivity and reason. However, 
Habermas’s Kantian-inspired understanding of reason is founded on a flawed 
understanding of subjectivity, according to which the subject is self-determining. 
Such a notion of subjectivity disassociates the subject from the object of 
knowledge and encourages a prescriptive theoretical approach which downplays 
the impact of the empirical reality. Moreover, this Kantian inspired, prescriptive 
approach treats the subject as a self-determining unit and perceives citizenship in 
a transcendental vein based on an abstract notion of human rights and duties 
which disassociates reason from reality. Thus, such a prescriptive approach to 
citizenship downplays the interplay between reality and reason and projects a 
transcendental perspective as rational and universal which in reality triggers 
social exclusion. The impact of Kant’s transcendental treatment of reason, 
freedom and duty which stems from the perception of the subject-theorist as self-
determining, prevents the scholars from acknowledging that their Kantian 
inspired approaches not only convey liberal ideals but also promote a socially 
excluding form of universalism which in fact undermines cosmopolitanism they 
support. The following paragraphs elucidate the shortcomings of Habermas’ 
universalist dimension which rests on the Kantian notions of duty, reason and 
freedom.  
The Habermasian notion of the universality of norms stems from a 
particular (Kantian) understanding of reason, according to which only the use of 
reason (freed from desires and senses) allows us to determine law for ourselves 
and thus to become free. According to Habermas, the formation of global civil 
society is based on Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan’ sense of duty which is able to promote 
universal norms. This Kantian sense of duty is the categorical imperative. 
Habermas’s primary problematic is the question of how the individual 
overcomes the contradiction between private rights and public rights. He argues 
that the individual sacrifices her private rights in order to comply with a coercive 
legal order after submitting herself voluntarily to it. What secures this voluntary 
submission is the categorical imperative which also serves as the guide for such 
decision.   
In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that moral law 
must be a general formula, applicable in all situations and commanding actions 
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which stem from pure motives. Habermas takes this general formula to be 
universal and employs it to form his global civil society argument. In Kantian 
words, the categorical imperative is to ‘act only in such a way that you could 
want the maxim of your action to become the universal law’. The basis of 
Kantian (universal) moral law relates to the application of reason which sets men 
free. When we follow the demands of need, desire or circumstances, we are in a 
state of ‘heteronomy’ - our desires are not self-determined. Yet once we follow 
the categorical imperative, prioritize reason and choose maxims that might be 
universal laws, then we find ourselves in a state of ‘autonomy’. The use of 
reason allows us to determine our own law, and thus become free.31 At this point, 
Habermas utilizes the categorical imperative to promote the notion of a universal 
moral law and analyze citizens as purely legal subjects.  
The universalist dimension of Habermas’s argument becomes clear where 
he argues that citizens exercise their political autonomy as (universal) legal 
subjects and not as a result of their membership of a (particular) national 
community.32 In Inclusion of the Other, Habermas clearly states that there exists 
a universal basis for the agreement on general normative principles based on law 
and morality. To be precise, Habermas substantiates the universal basis for the 
agreement on norms as the outcome of the role of ‘communicative action’ in 
regulating and producing social life and the identities of social actors. For 
Habermas, the legitimacy of a political authority can emerge from such 
communicative action, which requires popular participation and democracy. 
Habermas links law, morality and legitimacy in order to stress the universalist 
dimension of norms. Habermas acknowledges that law provides rights via a 
coercive legal order. At this point, morality becomes necessary as it encourages 
citizens to submit themselves voluntarily to such a coercive order. This sense of 
duty stems from morality. However, Habermas adds that without the (liberal) 
private rights, citizens would not submit themselves voluntarily.33 These rights 
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that emerge from a coercive legal order cannot be implemented without broad 
popular participation and consent.34 This voluntary consent, as Habermas notes, 
emerges from morality, and thus law presupposes morality as morality 
presupposes the law.35 The categorical imperative therefore proves to be an ideal 
tool for Habermas with which to combine law with morality and to provide a 
universalist dimension to norms, thereby downplaying the impact of states 
(particularism) on the formation of norms.   
However, from a Hegelian perspective, the categorical imperative is 
treated as an empty formalism which is inadequate to form universal moral or 
legal principles. Hegel instead introduces an alternative conceptualization of 
reason and freedom. In the Philosophy of Right, freedom is approached as a 
process emanating from the three moments of will, found respectively in the 
three social institutions of the family, civil society and the state. The interplay of 
these three institutions is responsible for the development of the ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit). Ethical life Sittlichkeit) is a form of morality, the content of which 
is derived from the social institutions (family, civil society, state). Thus, the 
subject’s emancipation occurs once it reconciles itself with community within 
the realm of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is actualized in the state.  
Hegel attempts to promote an alternative understanding of freedom via 
his interpretation of the subject. In this manner, he provides a conceptualization 
of freedom and subjectivity which is more complete than Kant’s. In accordance 
with the categorical imperative, Kant equated the subject with a self-determining 
individual and argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, 
rather than senses or whims. The application of the categorical imperative is 
founded on the decision of the subject to act out of a sense of duty which is in 
turn emancipating. However, the content of such sense of duty is vague in Kant’s 
thought.36  Hegel gives a more concrete content to this seemingly abstract 
requirement of freedom. Where the categorical imperative sustains an incomplete 
form of subjectivity and alienates the subject from the community whilst 
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promoting a flawed account of freedom, Hegelian freedom overcomes these 
shortcomings. Kant’s self-determining understanding of subjectivity which 
nourishes the tension among individuals is countered by Hegel’s promotion of an 
alternative understanding of freedom which incorporates the notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) and the state.37  
The preceding analysis has served to expose the implications of 
Habermas’ contrived selection of Kantian ideas, as well as the limits of the 
categorical imperative. Habermas utilized the categorical imperative in order to 
support the feasibility of universal norms on the basis of a particular 
understanding of duty, subjectivity and freedom. However, Habermas’s Kantian-
influenced understanding of freedom is founded on a flawed understanding of 
subjectivity, according to which the subject is perceived in the form of the 
individual ego that is autonomous and self-determining. Such notion of 
subjectivity nourishes a flawed account of freedom based on the empty 
formalism of the categorical imperative and assists the promotion of liberal 
ideals as will be analyzed below.  
Moreover, from a Hegelian perspective, Habermas emphasis on the 
categorical imperative, dissociates the subject from the socio-political 
community while perpetuating a vacuous moral sense of duty. Upon this moral 
sense of duty, Habermas founds his understanding of the public sphere that rests 
on abstract universal norms, superseding history and ignoring the particularities 
of diverse social institutions. In other words, the universality of Habermas norms 
is founded on a particular understanding of subjectivity and reason which as 
Taylor argues, is too laden with western cultural influence (Kantian thought) to 
be universally applicable. Habermas abstract formulation of universal duty and 
morality meanwhile fails to substantiate a motivation on behalf of the agent.38 
Finally, Frazer’s analysis undermines the universality of Habermas’s approach 
by describing how the void of Habermas ‘universal’ norms (which determine the 
‘universality’ of the public sphere) ultimately assist the promotion of particular 
bourgeois interests and liberal ideals, and thereby of social exclusions. 
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From the outset, Taylor objects to Habermas’ essay Morality and Ethical 
Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?. In this essay, 
Habermas suggests that one can formulate concepts like universal justice, 
normative rightness and a moral point of view, independently of any vision of 
the good life, a concrete form of life or particular society.39 Habermas then 
discredits Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), arguing that it is 
unsurprising that the positions which proceed from the ethics (Sittlichkeit) of 
such concrete forms of life as the polis or the state have difficulty generating a 
universal principle of justice. On the contrary, Habermas suggests that this 
problem is less troublesome for discourse ethics, since the latter presumes to 
justify the universal validity of its moral principle in terms of the normative 
content of communicative presuppositions of argumentation as such.40  
However, Taylor emphasizes that the abstraction of Habermas’ discourse 
ethics fails to tackle the problem of the agent’s motivation. Specifically, Taylor 
notes that as an actor, the individual can always question why she should actually 
proceed according to a particular norm, namely, rationally. Why must she not 
deny this norm? This  question  can only be answered through ‘strong subjective 
valuations’ which in turn reinforces the neglected dimension of particularity. 
Habermas, however, wishes to limit himself to a purely proceduralist ‘universal’ 
ethics. We strive, according to his underlying principle, to reach a ‘universaly’ 
rational understanding. We must endeavour to replace non-rational mechanisms 
of action coordination with rational forms of reaching understanding. Yet, as 
Taylor notes, this demand also confronts the question of why the individual 
should strive for this. One might instead have other aims or other interests. Why 
then should she elect this rational understanding?41 
Moreover, as Taylor contends, Habermas’ particular understanding of 
reason undermines the universal validity of his theory. As Taylor observes, 
according to certain modern western theories (notably Kantian ones), the rule of 
right can be distinguished from people’s conceptions of happiness (Kant) and 
given a different, more secure foundation. This foundation might be in reason 
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itself, or the commitments involved in discourse. But this distinction is internal 
to one historical view.42 As DeSouza observes, Taylor’s critique of Habermas’ 
discourse theory of morality thus amounts to an accusation that it claims 
universal validity even though it depends on terms and distinctions that are 
‘internal to one historical view’. Examples of such terms and distinctions include 
a particular conception of rationality and a decentered understanding of the 
world– a western-centric understanding linked to the development of Western 
rationality. Habermas’ appears to confirm this when he admits his agreement 
with Max Weber, in particular, a version of his thesis on the universal cultural 
significance of Occidental rationalism. Thus, Taylor considers Habermas’ 
approach to be erroneous as it fails to acknowledge the extent to which his 
approach is affiliated with the particularity of the modern west and determined 
by the western rationalism (as opposed to by universalism).43 
Fraser’s approach reflects some of the points of Taylor’s critique by 
stressing Habermas’ attempt to neutralize the social differences of public sphere 
which ultimately promotes social exclusions and the interests of the liberal 
bourgeoisie. Frazer calls into question Habermas’ assumption that it is possible 
for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket status differentials and to deliberate 
‘as if' they were social equals. That is, the assumption that social equality is not a 
necessary condition for political democracy. However, she doubts whether these 
social differences can be effectively bracketed.44 Instead, Fraser argues that: ‘the 
discursive interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by 
protocols of civic traits and decorum that were themselves correlated and 
markers of social status […] these inequalities functioned informally to 
marginalize women and members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them 
from participating as peers’.45 
Fraser adds that misplaced faith in the efficacy of bracketing implies 
another flaw of Habermas’ public sphere. As she explains, his conception of the 
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public sphere assumes it to be a space of zero-degree culture; so utterly bereft of 
any specific ethos as to accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease 
interventions expressive of any and every cultural ethos. But this assumption is 
false, notes Fraser. In stratified societies, unequally-empowered social groups 
tend to develop unequally-valued cultural styles. The result is the development of 
powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of 
subordinated groups, both in everyday life contexts and in official public spheres. 
As Fraser observes, participation in the public sphere means being able to speak 
in one’s voice, thereby simultaneously constructing and expressing one’s cultural 
identity through a particular idiom and specific social traits. Moreover, public 
spheres themselves are not spaces of zero-degree culture, equally hospitable to 
any form of cultural expression. Rather, they exist in culturally-specific 
institutions. These institutions may be understood as culturally-specific rhetorical 
lenses that filter and alter the utterances they frame; they can accommodate some 
expressive modes and not others.46   
In this regard, Fraser quotes a number of scholars, such as Landes and 
Eley, who explain how Habermas’ approach in fact idealizes the liberal public 
sphere and promotes social exclusions, despite claims of the universalism and 
neutrality of the public sphere. According to Landes perspective, Habermas 
public sphere, notwithstanding the rhetoric of publicity and accessibility,  is 
constituted by a number of significant exclusions. For Landes, the key axis of 
exclusion is gender. She argues that the ethos of the new republican public 
sphere in France was constructed in deliberate opposition to that of the more 
woman-friendly salon culture that the republicans stigmatized as artificial, 
effeminate and aristocratic. Consequently, a new austere style of public speech 
and behavior was promoted - a style deemed rational, virtuous and manly. In this 
way, the masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the 
republican public sphere, as was the logic that led Jacobin rule to t formally 
exclude women from political life. 
Fraser notes that Eley extends Lande’s argument to support the thesis that 
exclusionary operations were essential to the liberal public sphere, not only in 
France but also in England and in Germany. In all these countries, gender 
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exclusions were linked to other exclusions rooted in processes of class formation. 
The soil that nourished the liberal public sphere was civil society, doing so via 
the emerging new congeries of voluntary associations that arose at the time. As 
Fraser maintains, this network of clubs and voluntary associations – 
philanthropic, civic, professional and cultural – was anything but accessible to all. 
On the contrary, it formed the arena, the training ground and eventually the 
power base of a stratum of bourgeoisie men, who were coming to see themselves 
as a ‘universal’ class and preparing to assert their fitness to govern. Thus, the 
evolution of a distinctive culture of civil society and of an associated public 
sphere was implicated in the process of bourgeois class formation. Its practices 
and ethos were therefore markers of distinction, ways of defining an emerging 
elite intended to displace the old aristocratic elites and rule the various popular 
and plebeian strata.47 Finally, Fraser observes an irony regarding Habermas’ 
account of the rise of the public sphere. Specifically, she highlights that:  ‘a 
discourse of publicity touting accessibility - based on rationality - and the 
suspension of status hierarchies is itself deployed as a strategy of distinction […] 
however, the relationship between publicity and social status is more complex 
than Habermas suggests since the bracketing and neutralization of status 
distinctions is not sufficient to neutralize the effects of these distinctions’.48 
It was previously explained that the universalism of Habermas’ public 
sphere rests on a sense of duty that draws on Kant’s categorical imperative. 
Although scholars such as Taylor and Fraser questioned whether Habermas’ 
approach was genuinely universalist, Hegel’s insights reveal that the failure of 
Habermas thought lies in his flawed account of subjectivity and the limits of 
Kant’s categorical imperative. Specifically, the categorical imperative promotes 
a flawed understanding of subjectivity according to which the subject is 
perceived in the form of the autonomous and self-determining individual. 
Furthermore, the categorical imperative rests on the development of an empty 
formalism which does not take into serious consideration the empirical world. 
The vacuity of the categorical imperative from which the public sphere’s 
‘universal’ sense of duty emerges explains how this void is filled by the ‘neutral’ 
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rhetoric of (human) rights which itself serves the interests of the liberal 
bourgeoisie.  
In other words, what we encounter here is a universally-projected 
particularity. Habermas’ Kantian-influenced understanding of the public sphere, 
despite its universal and neutral declarations which rest on the categorical 
imperative‘s sense of duty, entails an excluding logic. As has been discussed, this 
logic  is founded on western understanding of rationality and ultimately promotes 
liberal bourgeoisie interests and influence. Habermas’ failure to fulfil his 
universalist declarations is  inherently linked to the categorical imperative which 
forms a public sphere that promotes particular interests, excludes and neglects to 
politically-emancipate participating citizens. As noted in the previous chapter, 
Kantian reason and subjectivity contribute to a non-emancipating understanding 
of freedom. It has been argued above that an incomplete account of freedom is 
erected when Hegel’s three moments of will and notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) are overlooked. A non-emancipating understanding of freedom 
emerges when: a) the individual subject is perceived as a self-determining unit; 
b) the understanding of freedom is founded on the self-determining subject’s 
will; and c) the supposedly ‘free’ options stem from a particular domain which 
remains beyond the subject’s control.   
In Habermas’ case, freedom is conceptualized via the communicative 
action of the ‘universal’ public sphere. However, as it has already been argued, 
this public sphere is influenced by the principles of the bourgeoisie liberal 
democracy. Thus, the freedom this particular public sphere rests on is formed via 
a conceptualization of the subject as a private, self-determining individual. The 
‘free’ options which stem from the notion of ‘universal’ (human) rights are thus 
informed by liberal bourgeoisie objectives. Habermas ‘universality’ of the public 
sphere therefore depends on; firstly, the subject’s ‘voluntary’ submission that 
draws on the vacuous duty of the categorical imperative; and secondly, the 
particular notion of (human) rights. This framework fundamentally undermines 
the universality of the Habermas’s global civil society and subjects its 
participants to the control of the liberal bourgeoisie.  His understanding of global 
civil society subsequently fails to meet its universalist claims  where its approach 
rests on a western (Kantian)-inspired understanding of subjectivity and freedom 
that nourishes liberal bourgeois principles and promotes social exclusions. 
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The preceding analysis highlighted that the universality of Habermas’ 
norms was determined by a particular understanding of subjectivity and reason 
founded on the categorical imperative. It was noted that the categorical 
imperative triggered a vacuous sense of duty which failed to substantiate the 
agent’s motivation and self-consciousness. Moreover, it was emphasized that the 
void in Habermas’ universal norms promoted particular bourgeoisie liberal 
interests, and that these contributed to social stratification and the alienation of 
citizens (among themselves and from the state). Hegel’s analysis overcomes the 
shortcomings of Habermas’ approach by introducing the notion of patriotism 
which will be further analyzed in the following sections. This of patriotism 
emerges when Hegel incorporates an economical dimension into his 
understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nevertheless neither lapses into 
materialism nor reproduces liberal bourgeoisie ideals or the civic alienation of 
citizens.  
As Dickey observes, in the mid-1790s Hegel discovered political 
economy via the Scottish enlightenment and the thought of Ferguson, Steuart and 
Smith. Hegel’s reading of the Scottish scholars convinced him that a notion of 
ethical life cannot be formed only through religion. Religious creeds alone could 
not function as a motivational and cultural ideal as long as they failed to take  
account of the role of economy in shaping modern life. After 1794, Hegel treats 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as an ideal that must be situated within a historically-
specific constellation of socioeconomic forces. Nevertheless, Hegel’s objective 
was to rectify the bourgeoisie socio-economic implications associated with a 
purely materialistic approach to economy that lead to the promotion of liberal 
ideals and the alienation  of citizens. As Dickey argues, Hegel resisted the Scotts 
who insisted on treating individuals as social beings whose nature was essentially 
economic. So while he admired the Scotts for their materialistic sense of history, 
he aimed from the outset to alter their arguments, especially those who 
celebrated the materialism of the collective life.49 Hegel challenged not only the 
overly-economized bourgeoisie conception of ethical life, but also a purely 
religious conception of ethical life. Thus, Hegel’s conception of ethical life upon 
which citizenship rests is essentially formed through the interplay between the 
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moral and economic aspects of his thought. From this perspective, Hegel’s 
concern with values such as pride, courage and the notion of patriotism aim at 
redressing the purely-economic-materialist approach that produces egotistic 
citizens  alienated from their state.50 
Hegel had been committed from the mid-1790s to showing how the 
political dimension of the notion of citizenship emerged from the economical 
dimension. Just as Rousseau earlier drew a distinction between the terms citoyen 
and bourgeois, similarly, Marx in the essay On the Jewish Question argued that 
the rights of man reflect the bourgeoisie egotistic individual, withdrawn into 
herself and disassociated from the state.51 Hegel likewise employed the same 
distinction between Burger as citizen and Burger as bourgeoisie. However, the 
novelty in Hegel’s thought lies in his refusal to present this opposition between 
citoyen and bourgeoise in excluding terms. Instead, he attempted to reconcile 
these two concepts by suggesting how the former emerges from the evolution of 
the latter. As Dickey contends, Hegel offers the idea of courage and patriotism as 
the key to this conversion process from bourgeoisie into citoyen that highlights 
the political notion of the citizen reconciled with the state. As Dickey observes, 
Hegel employed another term for courage - the word tapferkeit. This substitution 
is extremely revealing for it signals the very specific political connotation Hegel 
wished to assign to ethical life (Sittlichkeit). In Hegel’s work, tapferkeit had its 
roots in the material dimension. Unlike for the moral formalists, Hegel’s 
tapferkeit did not emerge as a force or entity that was independent of this 
material dimension from its inception. Hegel instead presented tapferkeit as an 
empirically-rooted disposition.  Here, tapferkeit comes into play precisely at the 
point at which individuals were obliged for ethico-political reasons to move 
beyond the materialist realm. Thus, although tapferkeit had a natural origin, it 
was not naturally essential to individuals except insofar as they came to see 
politics as a way of developing their personalities beyond what was given to 
them – that is, by the purely materialist dimension. In this sense, the end of 
tapferkeit is an ethico-political creation that somehow emerges from the material 
dimension.52  
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Hegel had argued that the bourgeois conception of ethical life was 
politically null as it was devoid of non-materialist qualities. The bourgeois 
understanding of citizenship was seen as promoting political nullity since it 
failed to acknowledge the values of courage and patriotism. As Dickey argues, 
Hegel’s criticism to the bourgeois system was designed to change its 
sociocultural rather that its socio-economic orientation toward life. In that 
respect, Hegel’s critique was concerned less with encouraging individuals to 
preserve a socio-economic pattern of historical development than with providing 
them with a new sociocultural perspective within which economic development 
and commercial expansion might be pursued in both a civil and an ethical 
manner. Hegel had defined his philosophical task as one which gave new 
direction to the conception of ethical life. This new direction oriented away from 
the bourgeoisie materialist system of reality towards a system in which 
individuals might extend a political dimension  to an identity that was being 
formed within both a socio-economic and sociocultural framework.  Thus, 
Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) becomes an economico-politico-ethical ideal 
proposed as an alternative to the socioeconomic forces of the period.53 
II.	  A	  Hegelian-­‐Inspired	  Understanding	  of	  Citizenship	  Which	  Incorporates	  
Universalism	  and	  Particularism	  	  	  	  
Overview	  
 
This part addresses to the third (3) question posed earlier namely how Hegel’s 
thought enriches the conceptualization of citizenship. The previous sections 
underscored the limits of universalist approaches to citizenship. These 
shortcomings were linked to the unexamined universalist treatment of rights and 
values such as equality and liberty. Similarly, the weakness of Habermas’s 
universalism appeared to be associated with the categorical imperative. From a 
Hegelian perspective, the categorical imperative reflects an empty formalism and 
rests on a self-determining account of subjectivity. Specifically, Habermas’s 
application of the categorical imperative evokes a particular understanding of 
duty and reason which forms a public sphere that promotes liberal bourgeoisie 
                                                
53Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 218 
 194 
interests and triggers social exclusions. Habermas’ approach thereby projects a 
particularist understanding of the public sphere as universal.  This part 
elucidates: i) how Hegel’s approach overcomes the shortcomings which emerge 
after conceptualizing citizenship without accommodating the universal and the 
particular dimension; and ii) how Hegel informs our understanding of 
citizenship.  
Below, it will be argued that Hegelian philosophy allows us to move 
beyond the shortcomings which emerge from this delineation of citizenship. For 
now, it is sufficient to note that Hegel’s thought, as a result of an alternative 
conceptualization of freedom, permits the incorporation of the universal as well 
as the particular dimensions, giving rise to the notion of patriotism. This concept, 
tied to Hegelian freedom will be used to promote an alternative understanding of 
citizenship which reconciles the universal with the particular and the individual 
with the state.  
Before elaborating on his notion of patriotism, it will be elucidated how 
Hegel incorporates these exact dimensions of universality and particularity. It 
will subsequently be argued that the accommodation of universality and 
particularity is possible due to Hegel’s philosophical system which 
conceptualizes the development freedom via the three moments of will and the 
actualization of freedom within the state. Hegelian philosophy is linked to the 
concept of Spirit (Geist) and forms a theory which is neither prescriptive nor 
descriptive. This understanding of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to develop an 
alternative understanding of the will, duty, civil society and the state which 
overcome certain limits of Kantian and Rousseauian theory. Where the 
shortcomings of Kantian theory were described in the previous section, emphasis 
will here fall on Hegel’s formation of an alternative understanding of will, 
freedom, duty and state in order to overcome Rousseau’s flaws. These Hegelian 
insights inform an account of patriotism which is treated here as a more complete 




The	  Implications	  of	  Spirit	  (Geist)	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  Hegel’s	  Alternative	  Understanding	  
of	  Freedom,	  Subjectivity	  and	  Ethics	  
 
What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational 
Georg W. F. Hegel 
 
Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) reconciles universality and particularity 
and thus helps overcome the theoretical shortcomings of approaches to 
citizenship which separate these two dimensions. Broadly, the Hegelian notion of 
Spirit (Geist) contributes to an alternative conceptualization of the terms 
freedom, subjectivity, actuality and rationality. The fresh understanding of these 
terms permits Hegel to transcend the limits of previous approaches and instead: 
a) put forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive after 
rejecting abstract a priori principles and normative claims; b) form an 
understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which overcomes empty formalisms, 
values or abstract behaviourism, while reconciling universalism with 
particularism; and c) develop a sense of duty which is not coercive but 
emancipating as it reconciles the individual with the community and the state.  
The first two points (a) and (b) have already been analyzed above, whilst 
criticizing the shortcomings of the particularist and universalist approaches to 
citizenship. Below, some additional remarks on these points will be made which 
stem from a more extensive citation of the Philosophy of Right and from the 
insights of Boucher’s and Taylor’s work. However, the third point (c) is also 
crucial here as it hints at describe Hegel’s understanding of patriotism; a term 
upon which the Hegelian-inspired conceptualization of citizenship rests.  
With regard to the first point (a), as Taylor notes, Hegel dismissed the 
motionless tautology of ‘I = I’. According to Hegel, rationality and self-
consciousness are not innate, but qualities the individual arrives at. Moreover, for 
Hegel, as is clearly indicated in The Philosophy of Right, the evolution of self-
consciousness is inspired by social institutions (family, civil society and state) 
which ultimately contribute to the development  of freedom within the realm of 
community.54 Thus, Hegel’s understanding of freedom is not associated with the 
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individualist notion of a self-determining subjectivity, but formed through an 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state.   
Hegelian thought, as is noted in the Philosophy of Right’s preface, does 
not attempt to provide instructions on how a state ought to be. Rather, Hegel 
intends to show how the ethical universe within the state is to be understood. The 
task of philosophy is, according to Hegel, to assist in the comprehension of 
actuality, or ‘what is’. In order to comprehend ‘what is’, reason is necessary 
since ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’.55 Moreover, Hegel 
stresses that regardless of what happens, every individual is a child of her time. It 
is just as absurd to fancy that philosophy can transcend its contemporary world, 
he argues, as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap her own age. If a 
philosopher attempts to go beyond the world as it is and to build an ideal one as 
it ought to be, this world would exist only in her regard, as an insubstantial 
element where anything one willed may be built.56 
Instead, the concept of Spirit (Geist) allows Hegel to pursue a 
philosophical enquiry which is neither predictive nor prescriptive. The Spirit 
(Geist) assists Hegel to exhibit the rationality or reason which has informed the 
development of history. However, this rationality exhibits a capacity for real 
novelty and therefore its future course cannot be predicted. According to Hegel, 
it is thus not the objective of philosophy to construct ideals or to put forward a 
prescriptive theory, but to understand what is actual. The philosopher must not 
accept actuality as she finds it. Instead, her objective is to exhibit the underlying 
rationality or reason that has informed the development of history or the progress 
of Spirit.57 As Boucher notes, for Hegel the philosopher should not be satisfied 
with the empirical finiteness of the given, but must bring to the comprehension 
of the subject a conception of the unity and overall coherence exhibited in it. 
Only in relation to the whole can the phenomenal aspect of the subject reveal the 
reason immanent in it. Thus, Hegel’s understanding of actuality does not relate to 
an empirical account of facts. Actuality for Hegel is a technical term, not co-
extensive with existence. What is truly actual has an existence that is necessary. 
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Without the unity of the universal and particular nothing can be actual, even if it 
may be assumed to have existence.58 
With regard to the second point (b), Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) 
assumes the unity of the universe without denying its diversity and reconciles 
universalism with particularism. From this starting point, it is not necessary for 
Hegel to reconcile differences or overcome dualisms. It is not therefore with 
minds independent of their objects or with thoughts severed from the thinker that 
Hegel concerns himself, but with the process of thinking itself. Hegel dismisses 
knowledge stemming from self-ascribed authorities based on the perception of 
the subject as a self-determining unit. It is only through a critical description of 
the phenomena of knowledge that their validity can be revealed. In other words, 
an account of knowledge is not to be given in terms of its conformity to a pre-
existing formula, but instead as it actually emerges and develops. The purpose of 
this is to dispense with Kant’s mistaken dichotomy of knowledge between things 
as they appear to us and things-in-themselves. Therefore, the notion of Spirit 
(Geist) is responsible for a Hegelian account of theory which is neither 
descriptive nor prescriptive.59 According to Hegelian philosophy, the subject is 
not an independent self-determining unit that treats the object of analysis as 
passive. Rather, Hegelian thought promotes an account of knowledge which 
allows a critical description of the phenomena beyond pre-existing formulas as 
they actually emerge and develop within the realm of Spirit (Geist).  
Thus, Hegel’s puts forward the conceptualization of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) which overcomes empty formalisms while accommodating 
universalism with particularism, in order to overcome the flaws of Kantian 
thought. The latter’s self-determining account of subjectivity is responsible for a 
problematic sense of duty and freedom which form an abstract set of norms and 
moral values. As Hegel observes in paragraph 135 of the Philosophy of Right, 
Kant argued that a person becomes free when she acts via her reason, rather than 
senses or whims, in accordance with a sense of duty he terms the categorical 
imperative.60 However the content of this sense of duty is in fact an empty 
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formalism, argues Hegel.61 He instead provides a concrete content to Kant’s 
seemingly abstract requirement of freedom via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit).  
The third point (c) reflects Hegel’s effort to develop an alternative sense 
of duty which is emancipating whilst reconciling the individual with the 
community and the state. In the respect, Hegel’s intention was to overcome the 
limits of Rousseau’s thought according to which the will is associated with the 
individual, self-determining subject.62 This, argues Hegel, transforms Rousseau’s 
general will into nothing more than an association of individual wills which fails 
to promote a strong sense of cohesion in the state, while the sense of duty which 
emerges from the general will appears coercive and non-emancipating. The 
enriched understanding of will which informs Hegel’s concept of patriotism is 
crucial here as it assists in the promotion of an alternative account  of citizenship.   
According to Rousseau, upon entering into the social pact, each 
individual agrees to subject herself to conditions that apply equally to all. Here, 
Rousseau suggests that no member of the political community consequently has 
an interest in making conditions burdensome to others, since these conditions 
would become equally burdensome to the member herself. In that manner, David 
James interprets Rousseau’s statement ‘by giving himself to all, gives himself to 
no-one’ as follows: although each individual makes herself dependent on the 
collective body established by means of the social pact and law, at the same time 
she avoids becoming dependent on the arbitrary will of any particular individual 
or group of individuals within society.63 Nevertheless, when Rousseau refers to 
the implications of necessity and dependence among men, he alludes to the 
inequality and lack of freedom that emerges in society. The example of a 
voluntary form of association allows some obvious scope for free choice, yet the 
condition of interdependence which is triggered by the natural necessity and 
artificial needs which develop in society generates various social constraints..64  
For Rousseau, the development of new artificial needs increases the 
degree of dependence on other human beings, since each individual becomes 
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unable to produce the means of satisfying her needs by means of her own 
activity. Rousseau clearly considers that this loss of independence involves the 
transformation of dependence on things into dependence on other human beings. 
This second form of dependence is mediated by the dependence on objects that 
are taken to represent means of satisfying natural needs or the artificial needs that 
have taken on the appearance of needs. Rousseau argues that such dependence is 
responsible for the generation of inequality. Moreover, ever-increasing material 
inequality, according to Rousseau, represents a loss of freedom. As human 
beings become dependent on others for the satisfaction of their needs, at the 
same time, this dependence has come to assume one-sided forms, giving some 
individuals more power than others, and thereby generating inequalities.65  
Therefore, Rousseau locates the origins of political society in natural 
necessity. In the Social Contract, Rousseau suggests that the social pact itself is a 
result of necessity. Since men are no longer able to preserve themselves by 
means of their own powers, and in this sense to remain self-sufficient, human 
beings are forced to reach some kind of agreement with one another in terms of 
co-operation so as to preserve their lives and to satisfy their material needs. In 
this way, Rousseau argues that natural necessity determines the formation of 
political society in the shape of the basic conditions of human survival. The 
social contract in Second Discourse is likewise a product of necessity, born from 
the desire to overcome the state of war which arises in circumstances of material 
inequality. Hence, for Rousseau, necessity and rational deliberation go together, 
with some individuals successfully employing the capacity to reason in an 
instrumental fashion so as to secure their own lives and property in the face of 
dangers.  
Hegel launches his counter-argumentation against Rousseau in the 
Philosophy of Right, primarily in paragraphs 29 and 258. In paragraph 29, as 
James argues, Hegel objects to Rousseau’s treatment of will. Rousseauian will is 
not perceived as rational or having a being in and for itself within the realm of 
Spirit (Geist). Instead, the will is perceived as the particular will of the 
individual, the single will. As James notes, Hegel argues that the definition of 
right, especially popular since Rousseau, is supposed to be the will of a single 
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person in her own private self-will, not the absolute or rational will. For Hegel, a 
treatment of will as a private self-will is superficial and devoid of any speculative 
thinking.66 Against this, paragraph 258 is particularly engaging as Hegel both 
praises and criticizes Rousseau. He is praised for elevating the will to a principle 
of state. Yet subsequently, Hegel again argues that Rousseau considers the will 
only in the determinate form of the individual will and regards the universal will 
not as the will’s rationality in and for itself, but as the common element arising 
from the sum of individual, private wills.67 
As Hegel argues in the Philosophy of Right, if the state is confused with 
civil society and its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of 
property and professional freedom, then the interest of individuals as such 
becomes the ultimate end of this association. It follows then that membership of 
the state is optional. Yet Hegel stresses that the state’s relation to the individual 
is to be distinguished from this. Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as 
one of its members that the individual herself can achieve objectivity, genuine 
individuality and an ethical life. Unification is the true content and aim of the 
individual whose destiny is universal life within the state. Hegel then describes 
that rationality consists in the thorough-going unity of the universal and the 
particular. Specifically, he notes that the rationality of the state regarding its 
content and form respectively consists of the unity of objective freedom 
(freedom of the universal will) and subjective freedom (freedom of  each 
individual in her knowing and her volition of particular ends).68  
It has been previously noted that Hegel objected to Rousseau’s treatment 
of the will as the individual’s private will, according to which the universal will 
took the form of a ‘general will’ which proceeds from the individual will. The 
result is that he reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and 
therefore to a concept based on their arbitrary wills. In this manner, individuals’ 
opinions and capriciously-determined actions promote a sense of consent and 
abstract reasoning which destroys the absolutely divine principle of the state. At 
this point, Hegel criticizes the outcomes of the French revolution’s era of terror 
which stems from the application of abstract reason. In Hegel’s words: ‘when 
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these abstract conclusions came into power, they afforded for the first time in 
human history the prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a 
great actual state and its complete reconstruction on the basis of pure thought 
alone, after the destruction of all existing material. The will of its re-founders 
was to give it what they alleged was a purely rational basis, but it was only an 
abstraction that was being used, the idea was lacking and the experiment ended 
in the maximum of frightfulness and terror’.69 
In the Philosophy of Right (paragraphs 20 and 21), Hegel claims that 
abstract universality which is indeterminate in itself finds its determinacy in 
reflection which bears on impulses estimated, compared with one another and 
with a sum of satisfaction. Reflection invests this material with abstract 
universality. Abstract universality via reflection is transformed into a self-
determining universality. In having universality, the will is free not only in itself 
but also for itself.70  
Through reference to the French terror as the outcome of abstract reason 
(universality), Hegel argues that the will becomes free not only in terms of its 
form (universality), but also in terms of its content (particularity). The content of 
will, he argues, aims at the general good of all by securing the conditions of free 
agency in the world. Freedom for Hegel consists in obeying certain objectively-
valid norms or by acting in accordance with the legal or institutional 
embodiments of these norms within the state. Hegel describes how this 
compatibility between the self-determining will and the notion of constraint does 
not appear as contradictory, but as complimentary with the state. In the 
Philosophy of Right (paragraph 149), Hegel argues that a binding duty can 
appear as a limitation only in relation to indeterminate subjectivity or abstract 
freedom where arbitrary will and natural drives prevail. However, Hegel 
contends that the free individual finds her liberation in duty.71 It is through this 
argument that Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as emerging 
from the state via family and civil society is developed. Accordingly, ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) inspires the transformation of individual needs to reflect the whole, 
rather than merely the self. Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) shapes the individual’s 
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fundamental interests into a whole which then determines the function of laws 
and institutions. These are in turn viewed as rational, despite ultimately serving 
the individual’s interest. Thus, ethical life as informed by Hegel’s alternative 
conceptualization of free will acknowledges the purpose of duty and state 
(institutions) as emancipatory, rather than coercive.72  
Hegel does not reject the individualism of civil society, but regards it as a 
necessary yet contingent element of the actualization of the subject’s free will 
within the state. He views civil society as a sphere of mutual-dependence and 
influence in which human beings are educated towards a more universalistic 
standpoint by means of the practical constraints to which they are subject,  
though not necessarily conscious of. Hegel thus focuses on the economic and 
social forms of necessity that determine human thought and action. Necessity is 
regarded as performing an educative function. Hegel further offers a defense of 
civil society as against Rousseau’s critique, highlighting its role in educating the 
individual toward universality. According to Hegel, civil society is integral to an 
account of human perfection, whose final goal is the seizure of free will.73 
Thus, Hegel envisages a form of freedom that consists in the sense of 
absence of constraint which comes from being able to identify oneself with 
something other than oneself. It is arguably this idea of freedom that he alludes 
to when describing the disposition that he considers to characteristic of the 
modern form of patriotism. This form of patriotism is premised on individual’s 
‘particular interests’ that fall under the more general concept of welfare and form 
a part of the interest of the state as a whole. It is an individual’s belief that this is 
indeed the case which subsequently produces a feeling of trust towards the 
state.74 
To summarize, Hegel’s theoretical contribution lies in his overcoming the 
pitfalls which emerge from the distinction of citizenship between the universal 
and the particular dimension. Firstly, Hegel’s concept of Spirit (Geist) promotes 
an alternative perception of knowledge which exposes the methodological 
shortcomings of the universalist and the particularist accounts. Hegel puts 
forward a theory which is neither descriptive nor prescriptive and rejects abstract 
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a priori principles or normative claims. In this way, he stresses the importance of 
form and content which permit him to incorporate the universalist with the 
particularist dimension. Secondly, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) which informs 
his understanding of freedom via the three moments of will, allows him to 
transcend the flaws of Kantian and Rousseauian thought. Hegel’s alternative 
understanding of freedom (actualized in the state via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit)) 
unveils the limits of the Kantian sense of duty and morality upon which certain 
universalist approaches of citizenship rely. Hegel makes clear that neither a sense 
of duty nor moral values can be based on abstract universal principles, empty of 
content. He illustrates the perils entailed in such approaches by referring to the 
emergence of terror during the French revolution. With respect to Rousseau, 
Hegel objects to the former’s treatment of civil society which assumes a coercive 
state and a non-emancipating form of duty, thereby alienating the individual 
from the community. Hegel, after putting forwards his alternative 
conceptualization of free will, stresses that the state and social institutions 
gradually contribute to the individual’s seizure of self-consciousness and 
freedom while reconciling the individual’s interests with those of his fellow 
citizens’ and the state. Patriotism is the disposition which according to Hegel  
contributes to this reconciliation and reinforces the bonds of the individual with 
the community and the state.  
In the remaining part of this chapter it will be argued that Hegel’s 
patriotism serves as an ideal concept to encapsulate citizenship as it overcomes 
the flaws stemming from the division of citizenship. Hegel’s patriotism which 
incorporates both the particular and universal dimensions enables us to rectify a 
number of intellectual flaws which stem from the separation of these two 
dimensions. Hegel’s insights bring to our attention that these flaws are associated 
to: a) the treatment of subject as an independent self-determining unit; b) the 
non-emancipating understanding of freedom which stems from the individual 
self-determining subject; c) the application of abstract principles as normative 
truths which dictate and disorientate knowledge; and d) a problematic 
understanding values, ethics and duty stemming from relativism or empty 
formalisms. In other words, Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of freedom 
which informs his notion of patriotism constitutes a remedy for the 
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methodological flaws which limit the universal and particular approaches of 
citizenship.  
 
How	  Hegel’s	  Patriotism	  Promotes	  a	  More	  Complete	  Understanding	  of	  
Citizenship	  
 
Previously, it was described how Hegel promulgated a richer account of 
will comprised of three moments and actualized in the state in an effort to 
overcome Rousseau’s concept of general will. Hegel’s account of free will 
promotes a perspective in which: a) the individual is reconciled with the 
community and state; b) the duty and the state institutions cease to be perceived 
as coercive or as mediums of the individual’s unfreedom, but instead as means 
which provide freedom by integrating the interests of the individual with the 
community’s within the state; and c)  civil society, market and material 
necessities are not treated as undesirable social interactions which establish 
inequality and unfreedom, but as educative processes towards the individual’s 
seizure of free will within the state. These benefits of Hegel’s perspective derive 
from the concept of patriotism.  
Hegel uses the term patriotism in a manner that has limited resemblance 
to our contemporary use of the word. He describes the term as a disposition and 
denies that it relates to sacrifice, claiming instead that it contributes to an agent’s 
freedom. As he notes in The Philosophy of Right (paragraph 268) ‘patriotism is a 
political disposition, based on truth and a volition which has become habitual. As 
such it is merely a consequence of the institutions within the state, a consequence 
in which rationality is present just as rationality receives its practical application 
through action in conformity with the state’s institutions. This disposition is in 
general one of trust, or the consciousness that my substantial and particular 
interests are preserved and contained and in the interest and end of another. In 
this way, this very other is immediately not another in my eyes, and in being 
conscious of this fact, I am free’.75  
As Moland explains, far from suggesting that the individual should 
surrender his individuality to the state, Hegel’s patriotism in fact suggests that 
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one’s individuality, as a free self-conscious will, is in fact nurtured and protected 
by the state. Analyzing Hegel’s statement in depth, it becomes clear that 
patriotism is both a habit and a disposition; not a mere disposition, but a political 
disposition in the sense that, ‘the consciousness that my substantial and particular 
interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of another’. Patriotism 
is thus the truth that one’s interest is preserved and furthered in the greater 
project of the state - ‘a disposition that habitually recognizes that the community 
is the one’s substantive work and end’.76 This disposition does not take the form 
of participating in a social contract as a calculated exchange of favours, but of an 
attitude that promotes ‘wholehearted’ action. The transformation of this political 
disposition into a wholehearted action becomes possible where individuals seize 
their freedom via the ethical life which is itself developed within the limits of 
state.77  
Hegel’s patriotism is not, however, loyalty to the state. In his Lectures on 
Rechtsphilosophie, patriotism is associated with the role it plays in citizens’ 
freedom. The idea of patriotism contributes to an extension of the individual’s 
interest to include the community’s interests. Unlike Rousseau, who treats civil 
society (private property, market etc.) in a negative way, Hegel argues that 
individuals cannot develop an interest in the greater good unless they are allowed 
to own property and pursue their own particular interests in civil society. 
Interestingly, he speaks specifically of the individual valuing common good 
through property and the pursuit of individual interest.78 
In particular, Hegel stresses the educative function of the economic 
market and private property, as will be elaborated below, after reformulating 
civil society via the realm of Spirit (Geist). This reformulation serves the 
objectives of the patriotic political disposition which is the reconciliation of the 
individual with the state through the cultivation of free will.  
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On	  The	  Economic	  Market	  	  
 
Hegel’s concern appeared to be that of reconciling private freedom with 
public interest. However, his perception of civil society has not been well 
understood as it depends upon an approach to freedom as an evolutionary 
process advancing through the realm Spirit (Geist); another of Hegel’s concepts 
which is poorly perceived. Against liberals who treat civic duties toward the state 
as coercive, the Hegelian approach to freedom allows us to overcome the 
shortcomings of this method. From a liberal perspective, citizenship may 
resonate as burdensome as the state restricts certain private freedoms. However, 
a Hegelian account of freedom reveals how the private freedom of members of 
the civil society can be transformed into the kind of citizenship that concerns 
itself with common good.79  
In this manner, Hegel succeeds in synthesizing private freedom with 
public interest or common good. According to Hegel’s argument, the state in fact 
contributes to the real freedom that he identifies in the market system, against the 
libertarian idea that the state is a necessary evil. For Hegel, the development of 
freedom is not something that occurs automatically; it is a long-term project, an 
intellectual and practical effort. It is the state that completes the real freedom that 
Hegel identifies in the market system, contrasting the libertarian conception of 
the state. According to Hegel, one can be with oneself in the other with whom 
one identifies in such way that one feels no need to distinguish in terms of 
priority or importance. The citizen’s actualization of freedom reflects her 
interaction with others within the state, thus the individual is not the sole source 
of her own actualized freedom.80   
Hegel recasts the political economy model in such a way as to radically 
alter its significance. In doing so, he reveals how individuals are formed and 
educated by their economic interdependence through the market process. Hegel 
makes it clear that he has learned a great deal from the political economists of his 
day. In the Philosophy of Right (paragraph 189) he refers to Adam Smith and 
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David Ricardo, whose conception of the economy he more or less adopted, 
fusing it to the other two social realms (the family and the state).81 
Hegelian civil society does not take on a model of purely self-interested 
market behaviour which might well be inherently and permanently incompatible 
with his own notion of the state. Instead, he recasts the political economists’ free 
market model in a way that dramatically revises its significance from the outset. 
Hegel perceives the free market as one moment in the citizen’s educational and 
evolutionary process. What Hegel sets out to show is that individuals are 
‘formed’ or ‘educated’ by their economic interdependence. That is, that 
individuals are dependent on each other for the satisfaction of their self-
interested needs through the market process.82  
Hegel contends that such ‘education’, although it experienced as the 
operation of (economic necessity) upon the individual, is itself a process of 
liberation. This is the case firstly, because it makes increasingly clear that what 
the individual experiences as needs in fact reflect social attitudes and 
expectations rather than brute nature. Secondly, the individual’s involvement in 
the market system enables her in turn to participate in the world. Therefore as 
Hegel notes in the Philosophy of Right ( paragraphs 187-195) the way in which 
individuals conceive of their needs and develop their understandings and skills is 
governed by the way they participate in the economic system.83 The market 
becomes a mean enabling the individual to consider that her needs, expectations 
and participation in the world are also socially-determined,  where an 
understanding of freedom and subjectivity ceases to rest on self-determination.   
On	  Private	  Property	  	  
 
According to Hegel, alongside the market system, private property also 
serves as a means of the citizen’s education and evolution. Private property 
entails characteristics parallel to the ‘three moments of will’ which contribute to 
freedom and promote a non-individualistic or self-determining understanding of 
personhood. Hegel treats private property as a means to stress the communitarian 
dimension of personhood through the recognition it entails by others, as well as 
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its contribution to evolutions of self-consciousness which thereby promotes 
freedom. However, Hegel’s claim is not that property enhances (private) freedom 
as it broadens our opportunities. His claim is rather that property is necessary for 
the self-consciousness and mutual recognition that is integral to freedom. Private 
property is associated with exclusivity, usefulness and transferability. These 
characteristics of property are reflected in practices of taking possession, private 
use and alienation of property and bear resemblance to the three moments of 
will, which in turn contribute to formation of the individual’s self-consciousness 
and freedom. Private property thus helps constitute the individual’s self-
consciousness through exclusivity, usefulness and transferability as these actions 
encourage one to seize self-determination, to ‘make something’ of oneself and to 
objectively examine the self. Private property becomes a necessary element of 
freedom as it permits similar appraisals of the self as required for self-
determination. According to Hegel, as we acquire, use and alienate property we 
work on the self in a manner that demonstrates our freedom, both to ourselves 
and to others. Moreover, the freedom that private property promotes is that 
which requires us not merely to think of ourselves as different, but to identify 
that particularity in a public medium (goods held as property) which permits our 
recognizability by others.84 
Patriotism,	  Nation,	  Freedom	  and	  State	  
 
The previous analysis of Hegel’s view of the market and private property 
indicates how his alternative formulation of civil society via the realm of Spirit 
(Geist) and his enriched understanding of will helps to promote an alternative 
conceptualization of the state and citizenship in a way which overcomes the 
flaws of previous approaches. Hegel’ reformulation of civil society, paves the 
way for the individual’s acquisition of freedom within the state which ultimately 
reconciles the citizen with the community and social institutions. From that 
perspective, state institutions and the emerging sense of duty appear 
emancipating rather than oppressive. Patriotism reflects the political disposition 
formulated by these educational processes which in turn assists the cultivation of 
free will and promotes the individual’s reconciliation with the state. Patriotism’s 
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emancipatory dynamic emerges when Hegel describes it as a disposition which is 
rational, but which has become habitual. This argument may initially resonate as 
contradictory. For how can a habitual disposition which is unreflective be at the 
same time rational? 
Hegel explains this rational habit through reference to education. In the 
Philosophy of Right (paragraph 151A), Hegel notes that: ‘education is the art of 
making men ethical. It begins with pupils whose life is at the instinctive level and 
shows them the way to a second birth, the way to change their instinctive nature 
into a second, intellectual, nature, and makes this intellectual level habitual to 
them. At this point the clash between the natural and the subjective will 
disappears, the subject's internal struggle dies away. To this extent, habit is part 
of ethical life as it is of philosophic thought also, since such thought demands 
that mind be trained against capricious fancies, and that these be destroyed and 
overcome to leave the way clear for rational thinking.85 
Hegelian habitual education involves this integration of practical reason 
and instinct. This produces a transformed and spiritual behavior in individuals. 
As Gordon notes, the development of a rational habit has three key elements: 1) 
the teaching and practice of good habits; 2) critical reflection on those habits in 
the light of practical knowledge, 3) the resulting development of a consciously-
rational capacity for judging and acting rightly. Hegel conceived a disposition 
which united action with intention in the form of patriotism, in which a citizen 
has a truthful and rationally-grounded devotion to the state. Patriotism is a 
consequence of the institutions within the state - a volition which has become 
habitual.86 
Hegelian patriotism is grounded in freedom, but not of liberal 
individualistic kind. The freedom Hegel conceptualizes is the free will which 
reconciles the individual with the community and the state. Hence, Hegel claims 
that patriotism is the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is 
preserved and contained in the interest and end of another (the state) and the 
latter’s relation to me as an individual.  
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So too, Hegel argues that the conscious acknowledgement of the 
interdependence of state institutions with individual freedom emerges when ‘this 
other state immediately ceases to be another for me and in my consciousness of 
this, I am free’.87 We are liberated from the struggle against the state by 
acknowledging it as a necessary instrument to preserve and secure our individual 
self-consciousness as freedom. By acknowledging the interdependence of state 
institutions and individual liberty, we create the ground for the free acceptance of 
law and order. The state develops ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of the citizen. This 
means freely exercising choice as an act of will, a volition, to live with others in 
a constitutional state that embodies the irreducible collective elements of free 
life. Thus, the guarantee or basis of freedom and order in Hegel’s state is a 
freely-endorsed legitimacy, a free will embodied in patriotic habits rather than in 
force or coercion. Representational thought often imagines that the state is held 
together by force, but what it holds together is simply the basic sense of order 
which everyone wills. Hegel does not view the state as an instrument of 
centralized coercion. He notes that the state is based on the self-consciousness of 
citizens’ readiness to cooperate with each other that calls for increasingly less 
coercion. Here, neither coercion nor fear make citizens social and free. Rather, 
this is served by habit, volition and rationally-grounded truth, embodied in the 
irreducibly-collective institutions and practices of a modern state, like the rule of 
law’.88 
This understanding of freedom is reflected in the decision of citizens to 
fight for their country. As Gordon argues, Hegel counters the traditional idea that 
patriotism is revealed in the performance of extraordinary sacrifices for the state  
through his claim that patriotism is a volition which has become habitual. The 
basic sense of order that manifests this free acceptance of free life in a 
community is deeply connected to the unique institutions and practices of that 
community. In war, these institutions, practices and structures are threatened. 
Thus, by raising the ‘nullity’ of these entities to consciousness, war brings the 
habitual conditions of individuals’ ethical relations to consciousness. The 
citizens’ choice to fight for their country is not simply the result of unreflective 
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indoctrination but rather the unique opportunity to discover the rationale for a 
particular practice which produces a genuine capacity for practical judgment.89 
In this sense, Hegel’s view of the patriotic impulse to sacrifice for one’s 
country does not stem from a nationalist or chauvinist sentiment. Hegel desires to 
differentiate patriotism from nationalist dispositions by rejecting the newer 
nationalist strain of patriotism. This cannot become clearer then when Hegel 
criticizes Fries’ actions in the preface to The Philosophy of Right.90  
As Avineri comments, the immediate cause of Hegel's wrath was Fries' 
participation in a student festival in Wartburg. Because the student fraternities - 
the Burschenschaften - which organized the Wartburg festival were later 
ruthlessly repressed by the German governments, their actions received a 
posthumous halo of sanctity in the eyes of latter-day liberals. The truth of the 
matter, it is argued,  was that the ideology and actions of these fraternities pre-
figured the most dangerous and hideous aspects of extreme German nationalism. 
As Avinery observes, to present their aim as agitation for German unification is 
therefore simple-minded when in fact they were the most chauvinistic element in 
German society. It has been noted that, they excluded foreigners from their 
ranks, refused to accept Jewish students as members and participated in the anti-
Semitic outbursts in Frankfurt in 1819. So too, at the Warthurg festival they 
burned a huge pile of books by authors to whose work they objected.91 
This context provides us with hints that Hegel’s understanding of nation 
was not merely identified in terms of ethnicity, but instead incorporated both 
dimensions of universality and particularity. Hegel’s understanding of nation is 
informed by his concept of freedom within the realm of Spirit (Geist). In The 
Philosophy of Mind (paragraph 544) Hegel stresses that one sole aim of the state 
is to prevent a nation coming into existence as a mere union of independent 
private persons.92 Instead, Hegel argues that a state will be well-constituted and 
internally powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides with the general 
end of the state, so that the one can be satisfied and realized through the other. 
As Hegel notes  (paragraph 308), this unity is achieved within the nation-state 
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and accommodates both the universal and particular dimensions. The member of 
the state is a member of particular groups (eg. a social class) and  her 
characterization in this objective way  occurs only  when considering dealings 
with the state. A citizen’s character as universal implies that she is at the same 
time both a private person and also a thinking consciousness - a will which wills 
the universal. This consciousness and will, however, lose their emptiness and 
acquire content and a living actuality only when they are imbued with 
particularity, and particularity means determinacy as particular.93  
This again recalls the unity between content and form which reflects the 
moments of will.  Hence, the single person attains her actual and living destiny 
for universality only when she becomes a member of particular corporation, 
class, society, nation and so forth. The incorporation of the universal and 
particular dimension is important as it provides a content and living actuality to 
the sense of duty, rights, ethics and justice. Duty and rights acquire this content 
once the individual is reconciled with the state and is no longer acting through 
coercion or as the result of contract, but as the result of free will. In the 
Philosophy of Right (paragraph 261), Hegel argues that: ‘in the process of 
fulfilling her duties, the individual must somehow attain her own interest and 
satisfaction or settle her own account, and from her situation within the state […] 
A right must accrue to her whereby the universal cause becomes her own 
particular cause. Particular interests should certainly not be set aside, let alone 
suppressed; on the contrary, they should be harmonized with the universal, so 
that both they themselves and the universal are preserved’.94 Hegel further notes 
(paragraph 260) that substantive freedom is actualized in the state, claiming 
that:‘concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its 
particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit 
recognition for their right but they also pass over of their own accord into the 
interest of the universal. The result is that the universal does not prevail or 
achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the co-
operation of particular knowing and willing’.95  
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These points underscore how the concepts of right and duty require a 
content and a form, entailing respectively the dimensions of particular and 
universal. Both dimensions are accommodated through the actualization of 
freedom in the Hegelian state. Patriotism becomes the appropriate disposition to 
assist the individual to seize freedom in the state within the realm of Spirit 
(Geist). This analysis affords insight into how Hegel’s approach overcomes the 
limits of Kantian and Rousseauian theory. Hegel’s moments of free will 
associate the actualization of freedom with ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in the state, 
providing a concrete content to Kant’s abstract sense of duty and morality. 
Moreover, Hegel’s free will via the notion of patriotism succeeds in 
incorporating the universal and the particular dimension, while reconciling the 
individual with the community and the state by identifying duty and social 
institutions as emancipatory rather than coercive. From this perspective, civil 
society, the economic market and private property acquire the form of educative 
processes which assist the individual to acquire free will within the state by 
integrating the individual with their fellow citizens, social institutions and state. 
In distinguishing the three moments of will and the three social institutions of 
family, civil society and state, Hegel does not aim to treat each moment of will or 
social institution separately, but as complementary in the form of an evolutionary 
process. Such complementary treatment contributes to viewing each moment of 
will and each social institution as partaking in a process which leads to the 
actualization of the individual’s subjectivity and freedom within the state. 
Finally, Hegel’s concept of patriotism assists in forming an alternative 
understanding of citizenship which incorporates the universal and particular 
dimensions, overcoming the limits of prior accounts  that distinguish between the 
two dimensions. Hegel’s alternative conceptualization of the will, freedom and 
the state within the realm of Spirit thereby avoids: a) the treatment of the subject 
as the a self-determining unit; b) a non-emancipating approach to freedom; c) the 
application of abstract principles as normative truths; d) a problematic 
understanding of values or ethics stemming from empty formalisms; and e) an 





This chapter after putting forward three questions stressed that the 
conceptualization of citizenship without incorporating the universal and the 
particular dimension is misleading. Specifically the chapter was divided into 
three sections each of which addressed to one of the three questions.    
The first section demonstrated how immanent critique reveals the 
shortcomings of the universalist approaches to citizenship which ignore the 
particular dimension. Immanent critique which rests on Hegel’s notion of Spirit 
(Geist) and the Absolute prevents us from separating i) the subject from the 
object of knowledge and ii) the universal from the particular dimension which 
nourishes an empty formalism and vacuous supranational norms. Immanent 
critique helps us acknowledge the interplay of the subject with the object of 
knowledge and bridge the gap between what is ideal and what exists. This in turn 
prevents us from adopting prescriptive approaches which trigger social 
exclusions after projecting a transcendental perspective as universal with socially 
excluding effects. Universalist approaches customarily identify the citizen as a 
self-determining rights-holder unit. Here, the approaches of Archibugi, Held, 
Kaldor and Habermas were analyzed. Archibugi, Held and Kaldor acknowledged 
human rights as universal by virtue of the promotion of supranational values, 
such as equality and liberty. However, it was argued that these approaches lacked 
an in-depth analysis of the concepts of right, duty, equality and liberty. So too, 
the supra-nationalism and impartiality of human rights, equality and freedom was 
challenged not only theoretically (by quoting Marx), but also practically by 
referring to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen to expose 
the exclusive effects of human rights.  
The second section revealed how Hegel’s notion of the Absolute and the 
Spirit (Geist), allows us to overcome the shortcomings of the Kantian inspired 
universalist approaches to citizenship. Therefore, considerable attention was 
given to analysis of Habermas’ who is influenced by Kant. From a Hegelian 
perspective, the weakness of Habermas’s conceptualization of a global civil 
society appears to arise from the categorical imperative as well as the 
understanding of reason and duty. Moreover, Taylor and Fraser challenge 
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Habermas’ universalism by noting that it rests on a particularist (western) 
understanding of reason and duty that is projected as universal and thus promotes 
liberal bourgeoisie ideals which in turn trigger social exclusions. Hegel’s insights 
make clear that Habermas’ theory lapses to a liberal account of universalism 
where the conceptualization of universal norms is based on the Kantian sense of 
duty – a duty which is in itself vacuous and rests on an individualistic, self-
determining understanding of subjectivity.  
The last section revealed how Hegelian thought enriches our 
understanding of citizenship. This part contends that Hegel’s approach enables us 
to surmount the pitfalls which emerge from the distinction of citizenship into the 
universal and the particular dimension. By contrast, a Hegelian-inspired account 
of citizenship incorporates both universal and particular dimensions. It is Hegel’s 
alternative conceptualization of freedom which permits this accommodation. 
Hegelian freedom (actualized in the state) does not rest on the self-determining 
subject but is perceived as a process within the realm of Spirit (Geist). According 
to Hegel, it is via the state that the previously empty, Kantian sense of universal 
duty acquires a particular dimension, actualizing through the ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) of a community. Such an understanding of subjectivity and ethics as 
developing within the limits of particular (national) communities ultimately 
succeeds in reconciling the individual subject with social institutions and 
bridging the gap between the universal and particular.  
Once Hegel approaches freedom as an evolutionary process that forms 
the subject, not as private individual unit but as an entity acquiring its self-
consciousness through the communal institutions of family, civil society and 
state, then the understanding of free market, property, nation and state is altered. 
As was noted above, the concept of Spirit (Geist) helps us to approach this 
actuality, not as a finite account of empirical facts, but as the underlying 
rationality informed by the development of history or the progress of Spirit. 
Ultimately, this Hegelian-inspired conceptualization of citizenship makes 
a significant theoretical contribution as it allows us to overcome: a) the treatment 
of subject as an independent self-determining unit; b) the application of abstract 
principles as a priori truths which dictate and disorientate knowledge; and c) a 
problematic understanding of values, ethics and duty stemming from empty 
formalisms. In other words, Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) and 
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his notion of the Absolute overcomes the shortcomings of the universalist 
approaches to citizenship after accommodating the universal and the particular 
dimension while considering too the interplay between the subject and the object 
of knowledge.  
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CHAPTER	  5:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  of	  Hegel’s	  
Conceptualization	  of	  Citizenship:	  On	  the	  Alternative	  




The previous chapter analyzed theoretically how Hegel’s insights enrich our 
conceptualization of citizenship after incorporating the universal and the 
particular dimension. This chapter demonstrates the explanatory strength of 
Hegel’s approach to citizenship in empirical terms through a case study. The 
addition of a case study also reveals the non-transcendental dimension of Hegel’s 
notion of Spirit (Geist) which reinterprets the conjunction of reason and reality 
with norms which are part of the reality. These norms are portrayed via the 
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which emerges from the state and forms a self-
conscious, patriotic subject. Thus, Hegel perceives citizenship as an immanent 
process which stems from the development of the subject’s consciousness and 
freedom within the ethical realm of the State. As the Spirit (Geist) actualizes via 
the subject’s self-consciousness, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) contributes to the 
actualization of Spirit within reality, bridging the gap between idealism and 
empiricism while accommodating the universal and the particular dimension. 
This chapter is divided into three parts.  
The first part focuses on Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
stressing how it neither separates the universal from the particular nor the subject 
from the object of knowledge after considering the interplay between the market 
and the economy with the particular sociopolitical institutions in Singapore. 
Singapore is referenced as a case study since the island-state clearly reveals how 
Hegel incorporates certain liberal institutions such as the primacy of private 
property and of the market economy without holding them responsible for 
alienating the citizen’s interests from those of the state. Therefore although 
Hegel’s theory is informed by certain liberal traits yet it overcomes the tension 
between the private and the public sphere that liberal approaches nourish after 
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sharing the same traits. It is also emphasized that Singapore is not treated as a 
model state but as an example which exposes the impact of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) on the development of Singapore’s citizens consciousness and 
freedom. Via ‘the system of needs’ and the notion of ‘recognition’ Hegel does 
not divorce the economy and the market from ethics, bridging the gap between 
empiricism and idealism and ultimately renders the private sphere compatible 
with the public sphere. In that respect, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) portrays an 
alternative conceptualization of citizenship as a process which highlights the 
transformation of the citizen into a self-conscious patriot who seizes freedom 
within the state.   
The second part commences with a critique of a Foucaultian inspired 
approach to citizenship. This part demonstrates the superiority of Hegel’s 
conceptualization of freedom after revealing the explanatory limits of 
Foucaultian freedom with regard to Singapore’s citizens. Although the flaws of 
Foucaultian freedom were theoretically explored in the third chapter, this part 
exposes them too empirically, after criticizing the Foucaultian approach of 
citizenship in Singapore, from a Hegelian perspective. The point of reference of 
this Hegelian inspired critique is Terence Lee’s Foucaultian analysis of 
Singaporean citizenship. Terence Lee contends that the Singaporean government 
functions via coercion and argues that through the politics of governmentality the 
Singaporean citizens are ‘freely’ subjecting themselves to the state in return for 
social order, cultural control and economic prosperity. This Foucaultian sense of 
freedom will be challenged here not only theoretically from a Hegelian 
perspective but also empirically after showcasing examples which illustrate the 
lack of free/ voluntary subjection in Singapore.  
In the third part it is noted that most scholars stress how the prioritization 
of materialism and economic capitalism in Singapore results in the government’s 
failure to establish social cohesion after nurturing self-centered, materialistic and 
opportunistic citizens. However, these deterministic effects of the economical 
and materialist dimension are challenged empirically and theoretically from a 
Hegelian perspective. It is emphasized that the Philosophy of Right entails too a 
materialistic and an economic dimension which assumes an educative role that 
assists the development of the citizens’ self-consciousness and freedom. Hegel 
after perceiving market economy and materialism within the realm of Spirit 
 219 
(Geist), he attributes them an educative effect which contributes to the 
reconciliation of the citizens with their state. Nevertheless, Hegel does not 
dismiss the idea of private property, economic market and civic rights but 
reinterprets their effects from the perspective of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
within the realm of Spirit (Geist). In that respect it is argued that Hegel’s 
approach, successfully differentiates from the liberal perspectives on citizenship 
after overcoming the dichotomies between the private and the public sphere as 
well as the tensions between the citizen’s interests and the state.  Here, the 
inclusion of a case study adds value to these points since the Singaporean 
government without being liberal, prioritizes the promotion of materialistic 
welfare based on the capitalist market economy but it would be inaccurate to 
suggest these policies form citizens who are exclusively self-centered, materialist 
and disinterested towards their state. On the contrary, a number of examples 
suggest that a civic awakening emerges in Singapore that gradually affects the 
Singaporean’s self-consciousness which serves to reconcile them with their 
society, affirming Hegel’s approach. 
 
I.	  On	  Sittlichkeit	  and	  The	  Implications	  of	  Associating	  the	  Economy	  With	  
the	  Sociopolitical	  Institutions	  
Introduction	  
 
This chapter after introducing the case study of Singapore reveals the superiority 
of Hegel’s approach to citizenship in empirical terms, based on his notion of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit).  It is stressed that Singapore is neither treated as a model 
state which echoes the type of state Hegel portrayed in the Philosophy of Right, 
nor does the Singaporean society represent an ideal type of ethical type 
(Sittlichkeit). Instead, Singapore is used as a case study which empirically 
exposes the contribution of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as a process which enriches 
our understanding of citizenship. Singapore serves as a topical example which 
exposes the impact of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) on the development of the 
Singaporeans self-consciousness after attributing an alternative understanding to 
the economy and the market. Moreover, the application of a case study also 
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demonstrates that although Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is 
tied to the notion of Spirit (Geist), yet he conceptualizes citizenship without 
arbitrary or transcendental means but with norms which are part of the reality.  
The following paragraphs demonstrate that the superiority of Hegel’s 
approach to citizenship: i) rests on accommodating the universal and the 
particular dimension; ii) without separating the subject from the object of 
knowledge. These two insights - unlike empiricism and liberalism - prevent 
Hegel from divorcing economics from a cultural socio-political dimension which 
separates the public from the private realm, overcoming the flaws of prescriptive 
and descriptive approaches to citizenship. Hegel’s notion of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) conveys the aforementioned insights and enriches our 
conceptualization of  citizenship.  
The significance of these two insights becomes clearer in the third part of 
this chapter which reveals the explanatory limits of certain perspectives on 
citizenship which ignore these insights and celebrate the deterministic effects of 
the liberal market economy. These approaches misleadingly contend that the 
capitalist market economy in Singapore has transformed the Singaporeans into 
materialist driven, antagonistic agents with limited social cohesion who are 
alienated from their state. However these approaches downplay the interaction 
between the economy and the sociopolitical institutions in Singapore, ignoring 
the economy’s educative effects on the civic awakening of the Singaporeans.  
Since Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) entails both insights - (i) 
and (ii) - Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship blends the private with the 
public realm as well as the universal with the particular dimension without 
separating the economy from the particular sociopolitical institutions of the state. 
The Hegelian treatment of ‘economic action’ which rests on ‘the system of 
needs’ and the notion of ‘recognition’, demonstrates how ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
entails both the first (i) and second (ii) insight. These insights insulate ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) from the shortcomings of descriptive and prescriptive approaches to 
citizenship which convey liberal ideals and a misleading absolutism based on 
natural law which separate the public from the private realm and divorce the 
sociopolitical dimension from the economical.   
As Dickey argues, Hegel noted how the systems of political and civil law 
had historically grown up around the idea of property with the result that patterns 
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of socioeconomic relations were finding sanction in the sociocultural and the 
political sphere. According to Dickey, Hegel divided ethical life  (Sittlichkeit) 
into physical and spiritual needs, arguing that as a real historical force, political 
economy has created a system of universal mutual dependence in relation to 
physical needs and labour. Dickey highlights the phrase ‘a system of universal 
mutual dependence’, because it implies that through the universal dynamic of 
economic production and consumption, men form patterns of interaction, 
forming a particular notion of social solidarity within the state.1  
Therefore Hegel did not only bridge the gap between universalism and 
particularism but also the gap between empiricism and idealism after putting 
forward an understanding of citizenship which underscores the interplay of 
reason with the natural needs and dispositions.  
Hegel just like Rousseau, employed the same distinction between citizen 
as citoyen and the citizen as bourgeois. The first one (citoyen) highlights the 
agent’s political dispositions whereas the second one (bourgeois) underscores the 
agent’s prioritization of materialistic needs. Instead, of separating them Hegel 
attempted to reconcile these two concepts by suggesting how the former emerges 
from the evolution of the latter. As Dickey contends, Hegel offers the idea of 
courage (Tapferkeit) and patriotism as the key to this conversion process from 
bourgeois into citoyen. In Hegel’s work, Tapferkeit had its roots in the material 
dimension. Tapferkeit comes into play precisely at the point at which individuals 
were obliged for ethico-political reasons to move beyond the materialist realm. 
Thus, although Tapferkeit had a natural origin, it was not naturally essential to 
individuals except insofar as they came to see politics as a way of developing 
their personalities beyond what was given to them – that is, by the purely 
materialist dimension. In this sense, the end of Tapferkeit is an ethico-political 
creation that somehow emerges from the material dimension.2  
Hegel had argued that the bourgeois conception of citizenship - on which  
empiricist and liberal approaches rest - is politically null. For Hegel the 
bourgeois notion adopts just the universalist dimension, lacks a particular content 
and conceptualizes citizenship as politically null since it failed to acknowledge 
                                                
1 Laurence Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 223-224 
2Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 225-227 
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the values of courage and patriotism. Hegel’s alternative account of knowledge, 
as perceived within the realm of Spirit (Geist), allows him to bridge the gap 
between empiricism and idealism and rectify the flaws of the liberal and 
empiricist approaches. Locke’s liberal argument that society exists for the sake 
of the protection of property, tells us more about the structure of Locke’s own 
society than the actual origins of society. Hegel’s objection to the empiricism 
reflected in Locke’s liberal theory is that it is caught in self-contradiction. The 
contradiction enters when empiricism is no longer willing simply to leave itself 
as an anti-philosophy but aspires to become a philosophy. As Smith stresses, an 
empirical philosophy is an oxymoron.3 For if it remains true to itself, an 
empirical attitude would have every right to assert itself against theorizing and 
philosophizing and to treat the mass of principles, ends, laws, duties and rights as 
not absolute but as distinctions important to the culture which its own vision 
becomes clear to it. But if empiricism expects to generate findings that have 
more than limited validity, it will have to import principles that cannot be 
discovered in experience alone. Thus, despite the empiricists’ claims to have 
build their theories of natural rights on the simplest and most elementary needs, 
their methods of determining these needs are already ‘theory loaded’.4 
As Dickey argues, Hegel’s criticism to the empiricist bourgeois system was 
designed to change its sociocultural rather that its socio-economic orientation 
toward life. In that respect, Hegel’s critique was concerned less with encouraging 
individuals to preserve a socio-economic pattern of historical development than 
with providing them with a new sociocultural perspective within which 
economic development and commercial expansion might be pursued in both a 
civil and an ethical manner. Hegel had defined his philosophical task as one 
which gave new direction to the conception of ethical life. This new direction 
oriented away from the bourgeoisie materialist system of reality towards a 
system in which individuals might extend a political dimension to an identity that 
was being formed within both a socio-economic and sociocultural framework. 
                                                
3 Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 68 
4 Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, 69 
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Thus, Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) becomes an economico-politico-ethical 
ideal which reconciles idealism with empiricism.5 
As Hermann-Pillath and Boldyrev note, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist), 
which permits the reconciliation of empiricism and idealism, enriches our 
approach to economy and citizenship. For Hermann-Pillath, the majority of the 
liberal economists subscribe to the standard model of individual rationality 
which rests on the self-determining subject, dismissing the interaction between 
the subject and the object of knowledge. Therefore these economists adopt a 
descriptive axiomatic approach which is generates the criteria of truth based on 
biological mechanisms and natural needs, downplaying the impact of the 
sociopolitical dimension. However, as Hermann-Pillath notes the forms of 
human social life in modernity have become increasingly independent from the 
biological mechanisms or physical needs whereas human individuals are free to 
create whatever forms of life they chose, such as gender roles that are 
independent from biological sex. However these creations of human spirit are not 
based or arbitrary individual whims and desires but reflect the historical 
evolution of political communities within the realm of Spirit (Geist).6  
For Hegel what is rational and universal is not epistemological but a 
social achievement of a historically grounded and institutionally actualized form 
of life. Hegelian thought challenges natural law theories or liberal inspired 
approaches to economy and citizenship which adopt abstract criteria for 
institutions like social welfare or happiness. Instead, Hegel is seeking a historical 
explanation of institutional evolution blending idealism with empiricism. Hegel 
does not treat rationality as a norm imposed from an abstract external authority 
but as a historical progression within the realm of Spirit where the rationality and 
freedom of the subject evolves within the state. Indeed what is rational and 
universal for Hegel is not an epistemological characterization but a social 
achievement of historically grounded and institutionally actualized forms of life. 
Hence his approach avoids abstract normativity.7 
Therefore the sociopolitical institutions determine our actions as much 
our biological forces and needs. According to Hegel, what is real and 
                                                
5 Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 218 
6 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing 
the Social (New York: Routledge, 2014), 13 
7 Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social, 16 
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ontologically relevant in action is not immediate. Nor is the full awareness of the 
intention associated with the action itself. Although the preferences are 
endogenous to these actions they cannot be seen as causes of action. The full 
awareness of the intention that is associated with the action is gradually 
unfolding. In the economic context, all human agents are learning in the process 
of action and the preferences must be conceptualized as endogenous to this 
process. They cannot simply be seen as causes of action because actions cause 
preferences in the course of action mediated learning. We cannot define the 
economic action merely as a choice of means to pursue given ends since the ends 
and the preferences only emerge and evolve within and through the action. The 
action becomes what the subject self-consciously wills by transforming (the 
universal) immediate desire or intention and putting it into the social space 
(particular) where it needs to be recognized.8  
As Hermann-Pillath argues, individual learning is impossible outside of a 
particular social milieu – that is all human learning is social. In the Philosophy of 
Right, Hegel referred to individual action in such a way that an individual has an 
existence in the form of ‘the will of others’. This means that the subject’s free 
will is only possible as a relational fact whereas the action involves a social 
categorization of its purposes. Thus, the subject’s self-consciousness and 
freedom is: Firstly, an achievement of certain institutional forms; and secondly, it 
is both historically and systematically mediated by these forms. Hegel refuses to 
postulate certain types of rational behavior a priori as is often done in 
contemporary economic analysis but rather traces the evolution of modern 
subjectivity, thus making individual rationality endogenous and depended in its 
evolution upon the whole system of modern economic and political institutions.9 
Hegel’s conceptualization of (economic) action blends sociopolitical 
institutions with the economy whereas this interaction is attributed to the ‘system 
of needs’ and ‘recognition’. The ‘system of needs’ and ‘recognition’ contributes 
to the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nourishes the development of the 
subject’s self-consciousness within the state. According to Hegel, socioeconomic 
organization shapes consciousness. As Dickey notes, since humans are initially 
                                                
8 Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social, 17 
9 Herrmann-Pillath and Boldyrev, Hegel Institutions and Economics: Performing the Social, 19-
20 
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bonded together for the sake of their physical well being and because this 
arrangement afforded them material comfort, they define their social interaction 
in economic terms or what Hegel termed as ‘the system of needs’.10 Hegel 
acknowledged labour as crucial for men in two ways: Firstly, labour was central 
to the constitution of the ‘system of needs’ in a physical sense. One can preserve 
herself by cooperating with others. Therefore, labour becomes a crucial tie 
between the satisfaction of individual needs and the goal of social action.  
Secondly, Hegel claimed that labour was social in another sense, via the system 
of recognition. The validation of one’s objective social-being depended on 
receiving recognition (eg legal privileges and rights) from others for what one 
earned from one’s labour.11  
Therefore, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) allows us to acquire 
a more complete understanding of citizenship after blending the economical with 
the sociopolitical dimension which reconciles the private with the public realm. 
Moreover, ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does neither separate empiricism from 
idealism nor universalism from particularism after acknowledging the interplay 
between the subject with the object of knowledge. In that respect, Hegel’s 
approach to citizenship is neither prescriptive nor descriptive and certainly not 
transcendental, in spite of the fact that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is associated with 
the notion of Spirit (Geist).  
The following paragraphs introduce the case study of Singapore in order 
to expose empirically that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is an insightful concept which 
is not transcendental despite its association with the Spirit whereas its 
contribution lies in considering the interplay between the economy and the 
state’s sociopolitical institutions.  This interplay allows us to take notice of the 
civic awakening that takes place in Singapore which the descriptive (liberal) 
approaches to citizenship failed to notice, after separating the public from the 
private realm while treating the subject of knowledge as a self ascribed authority 
which examines empirical facts via transcendental norms. In that respect 
Singapore is not cited as an example of a model state compared to the one 
portrayed in the Philosophy of Right. Singapore is used as an example which 
empirically demonstrates how our understanding of citizenship is enriched when 
                                                
10 Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 242 
11 Dickey, Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of the Spirit 1770-1807, 246 
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we consider the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which accommodates the 
universal and the particular dimension without separating the subject from the 
object of knowledge, affording an understanding of reality without 
transcendental norms.  
On	  Spirit,	  the	  Interplay	  of	  the	  Subject	  with	  the	  Object	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  
Singapore	  
 
Singapore is referenced as an example which demonstrates empirically 
the dynamism of Hegel’s understanding of knowledge via the notion of Spirit 
(Geist), suggesting that that his approach is not transcendental. The examination 
of Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship via the case of Singapore signifies the 
dynamism of his understanding of knowledge in regard to the civic 
transformation of the Singaporean citizens. Also the case of Singapore allows us 
to anlyse how exactly Hegel differentiates from the liberal approaches and 
overcomes their limits. As Weil notes the Spirit, upon which Hegel’s 
understanding of knowledge is founded, is not transcendental but complemented 
by the empirical reality which allows the Spirit to externalize and mark its 
progress. Hegel argues in the Philosophy of History that the Spirit’s trajectory 
and movement is not a simple repetition of itself but the changing exterior which 
the Spirit creates for itself in its ever-changing forms. This trajectory is 
essentially progress. The Spirit by sublimating and preserving reality, attains at 
the same time the essence, the thought, the universal of what it was a mere 
existent. Weil observes that Hegel repeats something similar in the Philosophy of 
Right arguing that the completion of a process in which the Spirit apprehends 
itself, is at the same time its externalization and the act by which it rises higher.12  
Just as the functioning of the Spirit (Geist) necessitates its externalization 
and its trajectory which is reflected on reality; here the empirical case study of 
Singapore is introduced in order to examine how the implications of Hegel’s 
understanding of the citizen’s progress and transformation are reflected on 
reality. This case study further helps us to approach the Hegelian account of 
knowledge within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which is contingent, evolutionary 
                                                
12 Eric Weil, Hegel and the State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 113 
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and bridges the gap between idealism and empiricism after providing a 
(particular) content to empty (universal) forms.  
However, the application of Hegel’s theory neither serves to describe nor 
to prescribe how citizenship in Singapore is ought to be. As Weil observes, the 
trajectory of the Spirit signifies that the old form is obsolete because it is 
understood, because it could be understood, because it has given all that it could 
give, because it reached its final stage and it forced its way to reality. Hegel 
stresses the implications this has upon the understanding of knowledge, at the 
beginning of the Philosophy of Right, in a passage which - as Weil mentions - is 
probably the most quoted of all his texts but yet one that readers often fail to 
comprehend.13 According to this passage Hegel argues: ‘Let us say one more 
word about this habit of giving recipes [instructing on] how the world is ought to 
be. Philosophy in any case, always arrives too late. As the thought of the world, 
it appears only when reality has finished its process of formation and is all done. 
When philosophy paints its grey on grey a form of life must have grown old, and 
it cannot be rejuvenated with grey on grey; it can only be understood. The owl of 
Minerva spreads it wings with the fall of dusk’.14 
Hegel, after refuting the theorist’s self-certain consciousness, attempted 
to indicate the dynamic relation between the theorist and the theoretical object 
which dismisses any pre-determination or fixity on behalf of the subject and 
ceases to treat the object of analysis as passive.15 Thus from Hegel’s analysis it 
becomes clear that a self-determining subject is detached from the empirical 
world, alienating the form from its content. Or in Hutchings’ words, a non-
dynamic subject-object relation uses as a point of departure abstract normative 
claims formed by the subject and provides a fixed descriptive account of theory 
which seizes universality but dismisses particularity.16 As it was analyzed in 
chapter two, Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) re-establishes the dynamic relation 
between the theorist and the theoretical object which ceases to be treated 
passively. However it is recalled that the evolution of the Spirit necessitates its 
externalization as the Spirit’s trajectory is reflected on reality. Similarly, as it 
                                                
13 Weil, Hegel and the State, 114 
14 Georg W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), 12 
15 G. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 104-109 
16 Kimberly Hutchings,  International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1999), 101-103 
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was noted earlier in order to stress the dynamism of Hegel’s conceptualization of 
citizenship, the case of Singapore will be analyzed below which reflects the 
transformation of the Singaporean citizens’ with regard to the public sphere and 
the state. 
The case of Singapore in particular was chosen on two grounds. Firstly, 
Singapore poses a unique case study which is easily analyzed. Specifically, the 
analysis of Singaporean citizenship becomes much easier to examine given 
Singapore’s small size and the very local nature of national discourse (4 million 
people live on a island of 680 square kilometer) as well as the state’s limited 
history, restricted media outlets and means of political expression.17 Also, the 
understanding of the civic discourse is easily followed after focusing on the 
domestic frameworks, including political speeches or statements, newspapers 
and popular culture. Given this framework, our analysis of citizenship in 
Singapore is be grounded not only on academic literature but also prominent 
policies, public documents, national debates and examples of civic activism 
which shape Singapore’s citizenship and illustrate the country’s contingent 
national identity.   
Secondly, Singapore poses as an interesting case study whose 
distinctiveness renders it beyond comparison. Singapore was selected as it is a 
non-western state where capitalism is successfully embedded without sharing the 
traits of liberal democracies. On the contrary, as Mutalib argues, Singapore is an 
illiberal democratic state which is governed by the same political party since the 
country’s independence but yet boasts a corruption-free government which has 
been efficient in securing high standards of living and welfare for the 
Singaporean citizens.18 Just as Hegel’s approach espouses certain liberal traits 
such as the significance of both private property and market economy without 
celebrating liberalism; similarly Singapore is an illiberal capitalist state where 
private property and market economy is embedded. Thus, as will be argued 
below, Singapore becomes a case study which stresses the limits of the liberal 
approaches while verifying the insights of Hegel’s approach to citizenship. This 
                                                
17 Randolph Kluver and Ian Weber, Patriotism and the Limits of Globalisation: Renegotiating 
Citizenship in Singapore, Journal of Communication Inquiry 27:4 (October 2003), 375  
18 Hussin Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore 
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becomes clear after illustrating the progressive civic transformation of the 
Singaporean citizens into non-individualistic and non-materialistic utility 
maximisers who gradually appear more willing to sacrifice their private interests. 
This transformation, which Hegel’s approach explains more effectively than a 
liberal one does, appears to overcome the tension between the private and public 
sphere which the liberal approaches sustain.    
Key	  Historical	  Facts	  of	  Singapore	  	  
 
Before we engage with Terence Lee’s Foucaultian inspired approach; it is 
important first to bring into attention certain historical elements regarding 
Singapore. The historical and socioeconomic conditions under which Singapore 
seized independence, influenced both the decision-making as well as the power 
monopoly of the People’s Action Party (PAP) which governs until today. The 
PAP focuses on the concepts of pragmatism and meritocracy which dominate 
Singapore’s political scene.  
Many analysts stress the challenges of economic survival that Singapore 
had to face as a young independent state due to the scarcity of resources and the 
island-state’s multinational population synthesis. Long before Singapore’s 
independence, the state was facing problems of economic survival due to the lack 
of natural resources as well as the island’s small and mutli-ethnic population. It 
was widely believed that these problems would intensify on the event of political 
independence, therefore initially the Singaporean government sought merger 
with Malaysia.19  
The problems of economic survival and security intensified a few years 
later when Singapore was forced out of the Federation of Malaysia and 
reluctantly gained independence in 1965. Also, the British unilateral 
announcement and action of pulling out the military bases in 1971 instead of 
1974, served both as two unexpected events which surprised the PAP 
government. In order to cope with them the PAP engaged to a determined 
                                                
19 Bilveer Singh, Politics and Governance in Singapore: An Introduction, McGraw-Hill 
Education, 2012, p.24 
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attempt to industrialize urgently in an effort to secure Singapore’s economic 
survival.20  
On another matter, Singapore’s multi-ethnic population has always been 
recognised as a source of potential unrest by the government, therefore attempts 
were made to tone down ethnic bias. Chinese cultural assimilation was 
recognised as non viable, as Singapore is situated in the Malay archipelago. 
Furthermore, an economic development which would guarantee Singapore’s 
economic survival, required a relatively long period of political stability and a 
secure environment. This was the only possible way to attract foreign 
investments by ensuring investors and skilled workers that it was safe to make 
long term plans with a minimum of uncertainty. There appeared no other choice 
but to tone down the cultural elements in order to enhance the state’s socio-
political stability.21  
PAP’s government argued that due to the peculiarity of Singapore’s 
historical and social conditions the, prioritization of survival via the state’s 
economic growth was the sole political option. If Singapore were to survive, the 
population was to be transformed into a tightly organized and highly disciplined 
citizenry all pulling to the same direction with a sense of public spirit-ness and 
self sacrifice.22 The achievement of economic growth was estimated to promote 
high standards of living, political stability and racial harmony ensuring 
Singapore’s survival and success.23  Thus, Singapore’s interests, according to the 
PAP were defined within the discourse of the state’s  survival. The discourse on 
survival was fed by an amount of uncertainty triggered by elements such as: a) 
economic viability; b) the state’s self-perception as fragile Chinese enclave in the 
Malay sea; c) Domestic difficulties in employment; d) poor public health and 
housing conditions.24 
 
                                                
20 Jon S. T. Quah, In Search of Singapore’s National Values (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 
1990), 18 
21 Quah, In Search of Singapore’s National Values,11 
22 Beng Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 
1995), 18 
23 Quah, In Search of Singapore’s National Values, 20-21 
24 Chua, 1995, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, 108 
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Is	  PAP’s	  Rhetoric	  of	  Pragmatism	  Neutral	  or	  Coercive?	  
 
The prioritization of survival in Singapore promoted a ‘pragmatic’ policy, 
which according to PAP is neutral and ideologically free which aims at 
maximizing economic growth and security in Singapore. Although, Beng Chua 
Huat and Kenneth Paul Tan critically argue that pragmatism functions as 
ideology, this it is not necessarily acknowledged by the PAP government.25 A 
number of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s statements provide us the 
impression that Pragmatism is treated by the PAP as a neutral, non-ideological 
political approach, in the sense that it beyond stratifications such as  right or left, 
liberal or socialist. Thus, this ‘pragmatic’ attitude which places itself beyond 
ideological stratifications is considered by the PAP government as a neural and 
ideologically-free position which permits itself to be flexible. As mentioned 
earlier, Lee Kuan Yew’s and PM Lee Hsien Long’s statements serve as a 
constant reminder of pragmatism’s ideological-free content as well as PAP’s 
undisputed alignment with Pragmatism: 
 
‘(our beliefs are) empirical, pragmatic and practical rather that grounded in ideology. If 
a policy did not work, it was changed. The most we would try, was three years. Then we 
cut looses and changed. That’s the story of 35 years, one of never ending learning. What 
works and what doesn’t work’26 
 
‘We are pragmatists. We do  not stick to any ideology. Does it work? Lets try it and if it 
works fine. If it doesn’t wok toss it out try another one. we are not enamoured with any 
ideology. Let the historians and PhD students work their doctrines. I am not interested in 
theories per se’.27 
 
‘PAP is a pragmatic party, ready to take in all good ideas’28 
 
                                                
25 see Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore and Kenneth Paul Tan, 
‘Meritocracy and Eliticism in a Global City: Ideological shifts in Singapore’, International 
Political Science Review (2008) 
26 Melanie Chew, Leaders of Singapore (Singapore: Resource Press, 1996), 139 
27 ‘Excerpts of an Interview with Lee Kuan Yew’, The New York Times, Aug. 29th 2007 
(accessed on 14th June 2012) 
28 ‘PM Lee: Government is planning beyond 2020’, Asia One News, Apr 5th 2011 (accessed on 
14th June 2012) 
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Certain scholars such as Mutalib, argue that PAP’s monopoly of power 
on the basis of survivalism and pragmatism, give the impression that the 
government in Singapore often adopts policies which often end up coercing the 
Singaporeans.29 However, Terence Lee challenges this approach, arguing that 
governmentality in Singapore is exercised by the PAP in a manner that does not 
coerce but on the contrary nourishes the Singaporeans’ consent towards the 
government’s actions. According to Lee, Singaporean citizens have been co-
opted and disciplined to vocalize ‘freely’ their cultural and political support for 
the acceptance of the status quo as formed by the PAP.30 
On the contrary, as Mutalib’s arguments provide the impression that 
PAP’s exercise of political power, often becomes coercive. Specifically, the idea 
of democratic elections which represent the foundational stone of the citizen’s 
active and unobstructed civic participation has been openly challenged by 
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew in the past. The following quotes provide 
sufficient proof: 
 
 ‘with a few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to new 
developing countries [...] What is good government? This depends on the values of the 
people. What Asians value may not be necessarily what the Americans or the Europeans 
value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of 
Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective 
and efficient in protecting its people and allowing opportunities for all to advance 
themselves in a stable and orderly society where they can live a good life and raise their 
children to do better than themselves’31 
 
‘I say without the slightest remorse that we could not be here, would not have 
made the economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters – who 
your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit (or where you spit), 
                                                
29 Hussin Mutalib, Parties and Politics: A Study of Opposition Parties and the PAP in Singapore 
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30 Terence Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore (London: Routledge, 
2010), 148 
31 Lee Kuan Yew, ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Realities’, Open Speech, Tokyo Nov. 10, 
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or what language you use... it was fundamental social and cultural changes that brought 
us here’.32 
 
Moreover, Lee Kuan Yew is both sceptical and critical of the electorate 
body’s ability to think clearly and vote according to the best of its interest. After 
1984 elections, when for the first time PAP lost parliamentary seats since 1963, 
Lee signaled his despair with the one man one vote system, hinting that he 
wished to see the system changed. During a speech in 1884 Lee mentioned that, 
if there is a ‘freak election’ result and the coalition forms a government, all the 
reserves are available at their disposal. In such case, he argued that twenty five 
years of work, savings, will be unwisely spent within five years and then we are 
another broken back country. This stood as the rationale for the introduction of 
the Elected Presidency institution in 1991 after revising the constitution. The 
Elected Presidency institution can be better understood if we link it with the 
broader characteristics of Singapore politics and PAP’s objectives. The PAP’s 
goal of preserving its political worldview and principles relating to the 
economical management of Singapore. PAP seems unprepared to allow the 
opposition or the general populace to decide on what is best for the long term 
survivability and stability of the state.33 
Furthermore, media control in Singapore by the PAP does not leave room 
for completely unrestrained political expression. Especially, when it comes to the 
mass media, PAP exercises a far-reaching influence upon newspapers or TV 
broadcasts. The media monopoly under the Singapore Press Holdings can’t help 
but provide the impression of the Singaporean press as a guided press.  After the 
1958 general election, the new government initiated many new measures to 
ensure that its political opponents do not exploit the media to disrupt its 
management of the country. The PAP argued that the mass media influence is 
powerful and that such an influence should be tailored and channeled towards the 
nation building process. According to Lee’s statements, the press must be 
subordinated to the primacy of purpose of an elected government, it is not 
possible to sustain the moral fibre of society if everything goes. The role of the 
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media is to inform people of the government policies, not to encourage them to 
oppose government.34  
However, such media control often triggers a social fear of unrestricted 
political expression, especially during the past. Such fear sometimes often leads 
to what Mutalib describes as ‘caution syndrome’.  For Mutalib the caution 
syndrome provides an additional factor that may help to explain the relatively 
low degree of political participation. The sources of such syndrome are many. 
One of  them is the Internal Security Act (ISA). By this Act the government is 
empowered to arrest and detain people without trial in order to prevent domestic 
political and destabilising threats.  It has often been invoked to arrest political 
opponents or ‘leftist activists’.35  
Another example of the ‘caution syndrome’ relates to the politics of 
General Elections. Despite government’s assurances that votes are secret, the 
existence of serial numbers on the first cop of the ballot papers continues to 
worry segments of population. This system enables the government to know the 
voting patterns of voters residing in HDB blocks. As Mutalib argues, half the 
strength of the PAP comes from the strength it has instilled in the minds of the 
people. Dr Chee Soon Juan general secretary of the SDP referring to the powers 
of the Internal Security Department, characterises it as secret police. Dr Chee 
Suan Soon argues that the ISD is empowered to arrest anyone who is not acting 
in the manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore’.36 
Nevertheless, if one wishes to remain impartial, it is noteworthy and 
important to mention that such governmental control ceases to exist when it 
comes to accessing internet-resources and academic research or publications, as 
many Singaporean academics have admitted.37    
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II.	  A	  Foucaultian	  Approach	  to	  Citizenship	  in	  Singapore	  	  
 
Unlike Mutalib, Terence Lee argues that PAP’s political power is not 
necessarily coercive but on the contrary manages to secure the Singaporean’s 
consent. According to Lee, the Singaporean citizen body has been formed and 
disciplined to express ‘freely’ their cultural and political support for PAP’s state 
of affairs. However, our main concern here regarding Lee’s approach is 
expressed with the following question: Is a Foucaultian approach of citizenship - 
as founded on governmentality - adequate to explain the formation of the 
necessary social cohesion which triggers the citizens’ reconciliation with the 
state and among themselves? 
 Terence Lee contends that the common view of Singaporeans as 
frightened or fearful of authority, is no longer accurate. He argues that there may 
have been some elements of fear enabled by the coercive powers of the founding 
by PAP government but this is arguably no longer the case. In a society that has 
been centrally managed and culturally controlled via the discursive application of 
technological auto-regulation which ensures ‘the automatic functioning of 
power’, citizens provide a non-coercive and free political support for the PAP. 
What this means is that Singaporeans have chosen and accepted overtly or 
tacitly, but nonetheless ‘freely’ to be subjected to the principles of 
governmentality. Thus, governmentality assists in promoting a shared sense of 
subjectivity among Singaporeans which unifies them while prescribing their 
personal lives, their ethical systems as well as their political evaluations; while 
providing them the impression that their actions are free. For Lee, governmetality 
promotes a political and cultural control which forms Singaporean citizenship as 
the majority of the individuals residing in the city-state recognise and buy into 
the principles of governmentality. With the politics of governmentality, and 
cultural control the Singaporeans should be seen as neither as self-censoring nor 
self-regulating. Instead Sigaporeans have learned to automatically subject 
themselves to the rationality of governmentality in return for social order, 
cultural control and economic prosperity.38 
                                                
38 Lee, The Media Cultural Control and Government In Singapore, 148-149 
 236 
To be more precise, Lee puts forward the Foucaultian inspired idea of 
cultural citizenship and applied it on the Singaporean context. He suggests that it 
is more productive to consider the impact of culture and how Singapore’s 
authoritarian or illeberal ‘success’ has much to do with the regulation of culture. 
He aim is to make sense of what might be perceived as governmentality in 
Singapore by rationalising the links between democratic ideals and authoritarian 
practices both of which claim to govern in the name of freedom/ democracy. Lee 
emphases on the cultural regulation and control of citizenry in Singapore. 
Governmentality is an activity that aims to shape, guide or affect the behavioural 
or cultural conduct of the person. The governmental goal is to get members of 
populations to behave and conduct themselves in ways which fit the 
determinations of what has been prescribed as desirable by the government.39  
Lee adopts Miller’s definition of cultural citizenship, according to which 
citizenship is an open technology a means of transformation ready for definition 
and disposal in disperse ways at dispersed sites. It is a technology that produces a 
‘disposition’ on behalf of the citizens not to accept the imposition of a particular 
form of government passively but to embrace it actively as a collective 
expression of themselves.40 Thus, culture becomes for citizenship an apparatus of 
rule and political legitimacy. Administration of culture serves as a mean of 
controlling the social and political dimensions. This would be done via the 
regulation of behaviour, the actions of citizens who are publicly positioned as 
free individuals. However, these individuals are perceived by their administrators 
as incoherent in respect to their social, cultural and political choices. Hence the 
need for well-crafted governmental strategies and programmes are aimed in 
‘automizing and normalizing the individual to manage oneself via self-
regulation’. The government of oneself, which minimizes the need for direct 
political intervention, is enabled through the invasion of an array of what 
Foucault calls ‘technologies’. Government is a contact point where the 
technologies of power (determine the conduct of individuals and submits them to 
certain ends) interact with the technologies of the self (permits individuals to 
effect by their own means or autonomy or via means of technologies of power a 
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Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 12 
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certain number of operations on their own bodies, thought, conduct etc.) to bring 
individuals into subjection and subjectification.41 
 
Governmentality,	  Pastoral	  Power	  and	  Cultural	  Citizenship	  	  
 
Lee adds that the governing of the self as a cultural citizen is done 
through the technologies of truth. Governing is really about normalizing specific 
state and governmental objectives, so that they are seen as rational, logical, 
popular and morally desirable. Ultimately, these governmental objectives are 
seen as truths. When such technologies of truth become available to the state, 
they are both individualizing and totalizing. This ability to produce a 
universalizing truth is known as pastoral power.42 It is reminded here that 
Foucault introduced the concept of pastoral power in the journal article The 
Subject of Power. According to Foucault, this form of power categorizes the 
individual, marks her by her own individuality, attaches her to her own identity, 
imposes a law of truth upon her. It is a form of power which makes individuals 
subjects.43  
Lee clearly focuses on sections which describe the interplay among 
power, governmentality and individuation found in the Subject of Power without 
alluding to Foucault’s notion of power relations. In that respect, for Lee 
(Foucaultian) power is less a confrontation between two adversaries, but more a 
question of government.44 ‘Government’ did not refer only to political structures 
but to the government of children, of souls, of communities, families, the sick 
etc.  To govern is to structure the possible field of action of others. Consequently, 
according to Foucault, ‘government’ does not entail confrontation between 
power and freedom but a complicated interplay. In this game, freedom, may well 
appear as the condition for the exercise of power, since freedom must exist for 
power to be exerted.45  
Terence Lee refers to examples of such freedom, granted by the PAP 
government in Singapore. These examples relate to expression of freedom; 
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firstly, in the form of creativity within the cultural domain and secondly in the 
form of feedback by the Singaporean citizens regarding their satisfaction over 
PAP’s governance within the political domain. This reflects the government’s 
effort to promote active citizenship and convince the public that there is political 
freedom of expression. 
To be more precise, regarding cultural policy in 1988 PAP formed the 
Advisory Council on the Culture and the Arts and developed a report according 
to which culture and arts give a nation its unique character. Immediately after 
that the Ministry of Information and Arts was founded with the mission to help, 
inform and educate as part of a national goal to build a society that is 
economically dynamic, socially cohesive and culturally vibrant. There are many 
examples of new public places that were designed to reflect state aspirations. 
Singapore’s grandest performing Arts Venue Esplanade opened in October 2002 
amidst a multi-million dollar fanfare. The esplanade comprises of a series of top 
rated latest and best performance halls and art spaces. The Esplanade quickly 
became Singapore’s most conspicuous demonstration that a cultural sector exists 
in Singapore and that the government envisioning of Singapore as a cultural 
bridge to the world. Lee admits that Singapore’s cultural policy has everything to 
do with staying on top as a focal node in the late capitalist world system of the 
new millennium.46  
Regarding the freedom of political expression PAP launched on 19th 
October 1997, the project ‘Singapore 21’. This was an attempt to redefine 
citizenship as embodying a sense of ownership. It seeks to enhance the citizens 
participation in public affairs. It has been depicted as a large-scale exercise 
involving 6,000 ordinary Singaporean in the form of a survey commissioned by 
the authorities to gauge public opinion and reinforce freedom of expression in 
Singapore.  In fact Lee suggests that feedback makes policy formulation in 
government a more informed process ensuring above all that is relevant. It also 
makes policy implementation a more effective process as it enhances public 
receptiveness based on a better understanding of the government’s actions.47 
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The	  Shortcomings	  of	  a	  Foucaultian	  Account	  of	  Citizenship	  in	  Singapore	  
 
However the question posed here is whether this form of freedom - 
promoted in the form or artistic creativity and political expression - is actually 
emancipating and if it promotes a sense of social cohesion among Singaporeans 
as well as a reconciliation between themselves and their State. In other words 
does a Foucaultian account of cultural citizenship guarantees an efficient form of 
citizenship in Singapore? 
As it has been previously argued, from a Hegelian perspective Foucault’s 
understanding of subjectivity and freedom is problematic as it does not 
emancipate the subject. It has already been noted that in the Subject of Power it 
appears as if Foucault ‘invents’ freedom out of necessity. He treats freedom as 
power’s ‘tool’, incorporated to accommodate the government of power relations 
via the development of a domain which renders possible the subject’s ‘agency’ 
and simultaneously permits the exercise of power’s control upon the subject.48 In 
that sense, Foucault’s freedom becomes nothing but a tool, utilized by power 
which allows just a set of (predetermined) options dictated within a specific 
domain, permitting -if any- a very limited form of agency. Paradoxically, 
Foucault’s ‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating 
the subject.  
Moreover, let us remind that as Taylor suggested the projection of power 
regimes as neutral and purpose-free succession of power regimes is a process 
which does not necessarily liberate the subject. As Taylor notes, elaborating a 
specific domain (in our case the ‘Singapore 21’ feedback and the domain of 
artistic creativity) where the individual is given the opportunity to exercise his 
freedom, acts in fact as a domain where the individual submits himself under 
control. The Power – Subject relation takes the form of a Doctor – Patient 
respectively. Such relation is founded on the presumption that one knows and 
that the other has the overwhelming interest in taking advice. Therefore, a 
Doctor-Patient power relation cannot be neutral because although both parties 
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are constrained, there is a domination on the part of the Doctor/ Power which 
restricts the subject’s agency and freedom.49  
Terence Lee in fact admits indirectly that the limits of this domain of 
freedom are predetermined by the government. Regarding the domain of culture 
and arts, Lee argues that the Renaissance City Report appears less interested in 
the development of culture and arts in Singapore from an exclusively artistic 
standpoint. Rather it is more attuned to the economic activity and political 
longevity of Singapore in an increasingly competitive global era. The 
monumental cultural hall Esplanade serves a kind of duality that has two aspects, 
one aspect is to promote the cultural policy of the government.  The function is 
to support the Government’s cultural policy such as arts festivals and the other is 
to promote commercial cultural events. Thus, the freedoms of artistic creativity 
are limited to serve the objective’s of government whereas the scope of ‘free’ 
artistic options are determined  by the PAP’s agenda of maximizing commercial 
and economic success.50  
Similarly regarding the freedom of political expression, ‘Singapore 21’ 
served as a domain which determined the limits of such expression. Lee suggests 
that Singapore 21 is deemed an exercise of pseudo-participation. The PAP in 
what could be seen as tacit collaboration with the local government controlled 
press ‘Straits Times’, interpreted the feedback as encouraging and instructive. 
The concept of feedback is understood quite simply as the expression of one’s 
views of public policy. However, this feedback is designed not so much to 
replace a top-down mode of rule but to manage dissenting voices or public 
dissonance. Lee adds that this new rhetoric about cultivating civil participation in 
Singapore and active citizenship is in effect a public relations exercise aimed at 
establishing a credo that endorses the existence of political boundaries. As a 
result the political and cultural boundaries that govern political exchanges and 
debates in Singapore termed as Out of Bound Markers (OBM) remain firmly 
itched in the minds of many Singaporean citizens and observers.51 
An example worth mentioning which designates the effect of OBMs and 
the limits of ‘free’ political expression is the Catherine Lim case. Her political 
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commentary in the form of feedback on 20 November 1994, in ‘Straits Times’, 
contended that Prime Ministers Goh Chok Tong promise of an open, consultative 
and consensual leadership style had been abandoned in favour of the 
authoritarian style of his predecessor Lee Kuan Yew. Goh reacted the following 
day arguing that Lim went beyond the pale. Goh argued that political 
commentators should expect strong rebuttals from the government if they 
attacked specific politicians or policies. Specifically, he mentioned that ‘if a 
person wants to set the agenda for Singapore by commenting regularly on 
politics, the government’s view has been that the person should only do this in 
the political arena. If people believe that the contestant’s policies are right, when 
the government knows they are wrong, the contestant is not there to account for 
the policy’.52  By invoking the concept of the OBM the government is able to 
restrict public participation and filter commentary on any aspect of politics 
deemed problematic. The effect is that any feedback or political viewpoint that 
gets through government controlled and mediated sensors, real or imagined, is 
un-debated and poorly considered. Under these circumstances the freedom of 
expression is curtailed whereas ‘Singapore 21’ and the OBM’s mark the domain 
of this limited free political expression.53 
On	  Foucault’s	  ‘Freedom’	  and	  ‘Neutral’	  Exercise	  of	  Power	  in	  Singapore	  	  
 
It appears that the whole idea of providing freedom within the limits of a 
previously determined domain, paradoxically turns out to be a strategy of power 
which allows itself to perpetuate control in the name developing a ‘free’ subject 
or in Singapore’s case a citizen that ‘freely’ consents to PAP’s actions. Terence 
Lee already provided certain hints regarding PAP’s provision of limited freedom 
as an instrument to amplify social control. Here the Foucaultian understanding of 
citizenship which is based on a problematic account of subjectivity, freedom and 
power will be further undermined. More specifically below will be shown that 
PAP in Singapore: a) nourishes a non-neutral form of Power which serves to 
perpetuate the government’s control while negating the emergence of ‘free’ 
subjectivity; and b) forms a predetermined domain of ‘free’ options which is 
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responsible for nourishing the egotistic subject that is un-free as it lapses to 
Hegel’s second  moment of will as determination since it associates free will 
with the individual. Such understanding of subjectivity echoes Hegel’s critique 
that Rousseau’s  general will as the collectivity of individualist wills can not 
secure a reliable form of reconciliation between the state and the citizens as well 
as among the citizens themselves. the sum of all the individualist subjects’ wills.    
Thus, below it will be argued that a Foucaultian account of citizenship 
ends up undermining: a) the social cohesion among the citizens, something 
which is obvious in Singapore; and b) the reconciliation between the 
Singaporean citizen and the state.  
Regarding the neutrality of power, it was already suggested that PAP’s 
political leaders insisted that pragmatism is politically a neutral concept and 
flexible as it accommodates a revisionist conduct of politics which is reflected on 
the political  contingency over the content of the Singaporean National values. 
However, an empirical analysis of scholars such as Beng Chua Huat and Kenneth 
Paul Tan, reveals that the conceptualization of pragmatism is dictated by a purely 
economical dimension, transforming pragmatism into a product of materialist 
and capitalist foundations. 
For Beng Chua Huat, the government attempted to develop a policy 
which accommodated both multiculturalism and multilingualism which 
prioritized Singapore’s survival. According to PAP pragmatism guided the 
party’s political objectives, forming a ‘non-ideological identity’. In selecting the 
values that would express the Party’s and Singapore’s identity, the choice has 
fallen that it would appear as non-ideological. The government’s claim is that the 
strategies form the logic of the needs of a developing Singapore and are thus 
eminently practical rather than based on any ideological claims. Against internal 
and external threats the government has one solution: economic development.54 
As Beng Chua Huat stresses, the origins of PAP’s pragmatism are at once 
historical, material and conceptual. The historical and material constraints were 
determined by the domestic economic situation which emerged after Singapore’s  
independence. The government of the newly emerged country identified its 
survival in purely financial terms. The economic is privileged over the cultural, 
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because economic growth is seen as the best guarantee of social and  political 
stability, necessary for the survival of the island-state. PAP continues to argue 
that continuous economic growth is the wellspring of Singaporean life, thus all 
aspects of policy conduct are harnessed to this endless pursuit. This instrumental 
rationality, dictated by economical thought, forms the kernel of PAP’s policy. As 
Beng Chua Huat summarizes the substance of PAP’s pragmatism is founded on: 
a) The nature of Industrial relations which according to 1968 Industrial Relations 
Act, prohibited unions from bargaining or protesting against the minimum 
standards set by the Act, in order to stabilize the labour costs and promote the 
attraction of foreign investments; b)emphasis on education as human capital; c) 
the embedding of multiculturalism; and d) finally the promotion of meritocracy 
which is held responsible for allocating the appropriate positions in the complex 
division of labour of the industrial work place.55 
Christopher Lingle even describes PAP’s political governance as 
authoritarian capitalism. He argues that there are many government obstructions, 
interferences and involvements in domestic commercial activities. The 
government is extensively involved in real estate markets, including a massive 
public housing program. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) pursues 
active foreign exchange interventions to guide exchange rates, as much to sustain 
an export oriented industrialization policy in order to held inflation check. 
Foreign banks are allowed to incorporate in Singapore but they are not licensed 
to compete in domestic banking.56 According to Lingle, this solely economical 
conceptualization of Pragmatism, which is based on PAP’s authoritarian 
capitalism, urges Singaporeans to behave like the economical man dictated by 
material considerations according to which consumerism is celebrated.57 
Kenneth Paul Tan is another scholar who associates PAP’s pragmatism 
with capitalism. In Singapore, ideology is disguised via pragmatism whereas 
pragmatism is substantiated within a purely capitalist framework that prioritizes 
the attraction of foreign investments. The rhetoric of pragmatism has been 
constructed and reconstructed. It has adapted to cope with internal 
contradictions. It is argued that the one party dominant state is the result of 
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‘pragmatic’, continuous and flexible policy conduct rather that the outcome of 
fixed ideologically restrained ideas. The rhetoric of pragmatism links 
Singapore’s impressive and yet fragile success with the island-state’s diachronic 
success of attracting global capital. In turn, attracting global capital relies on 
maintaining a global political system dominated by an experienced, technocratic 
and meritocratic PAP government. The government, consolidated its power as a 
highly interventionist and entrepreneurial state by luring foreign investors with 
generous tax incentives, industrial infrastructure and political stability. The PAP 
has for the most part enjoyed high levels of political legitimacy based on 
economic policies that have delivered growth and provision of material well 
being for the state’s citizens in conditions of permanent vulnerability. At the 
logical level, PAP government has been able to manage the hegemonic discourse 
of survival and success, producing slogans that remind the citizens how 
Singapore developed.58    
PAP has effectively propagated, the idea that it is more important for a 
small country with limited resources and talent to have a meritocratic, pragmatic 
and economically oriented government than one that is limited by principles of 
accountability, checks and balances. By promoting meritocracy and pragmatism 
for creating the right conditions for economic success, the PAP government has 
been able not only to justify its democratic deficit but also to produce ideological 
resources and an authoritarian structure for the maintenance of the one party 
dominant regime. In ‘pragmatic’ terms, Singapore’s considerable economic 
success is justification enough for PAP’s authoritarian means.59 
HDB	  Housing	  Project,	  Education	  and	  Social	  Control	  in	  Singapore	  
 
The previous analysis showed that the pseudo-neutrality of pragmatism 
serves to perpetuate PAP’s control over the citizen body. Other means which 
exacerbate this social control are associated with the public housing project 
(developed by Singapore’s Housing and Development Board - HDB )  and 
education.   
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For PAP the development of public housing was essentially a process of 
physically putting people in their places. According to Tremewan, during the 
first period of PAP’s government (from approximately 1950 to 1966), the 
opposition leaders put in prison while mostly the labour and lower middle classes 
were forced into public housing to improve their standards of housing but also to 
isolate them from political mobilization. In the second period from 1966 to 1978, 
housing estates were rapidly expanded. PAP focused on social control by 
keeping these classes in their flats and blocking all alternative forms of 
subsistence. Finally, the main task during the 80s was to neutralize new forms of 
protest arising from more than a decade of industrialization and intensified 
labour exploitation and inequality of Singapore’s industrial boom.  The emphasis 
of social control moved to welfare, especially housing and education, as the PAP 
sought to nourish political obedience and consent of the Singaporeans. 
According to Tremewan the public housing project acted as a powerful 
regulatory mechanism of obedience and control. The institution of the public 
housing succeeded in undermining PAP political opposition after providing to 
their potential source of electoral power -the labour and lower middle classes- 
public housing and cultivating their dependence upon the PAP to secure 
accommodation and paying of the mortgage. Moreover, political resistance was 
further by tying housing to loyalty to the PAP-state.60  
For Tremewan the political function of public housing became one of the 
main mechanisms which the PAP cemented its political supremacy, disrupted the 
social base of political opposition and guaranteed labour power for its economic 
strategy. Housing resettlement gained greater urgency already before Singapore’s 
independence from the Malaysian Federation when the PAP’s schism took place 
in 1961. When the leftist members of the PAP where dismissed by the party 
Leader Lee Kuan Yew, the ousted members formed the Barisan Socialis party 
that acted as PAP’s political opposition. Thus, the PAP had to undermine both 
the traditional urban and rural bases of the left in order to survive politically. The 
Lee faction came to realize the value of forced resettlement in state controlled 
housing after destroying the traditional social organization which could never 
                                                
60 Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore (London: 
Macmillan Press LTD, 1994), 70-71 
 
 246 
hope to control. The public housing programme indeed coincided with a genuine 
need for substandard housing to be replaced but the need was met by the PAP in 
such a way as to neutralize opposition an induce political loyalty. The main 
political effect of the housing policy was the production of a working class 
dependent on the PAP state for housing and dependent on wage labour to pay for 
it. The former was achieved through the physical destruction of all other forms of 
cheap housing and through forced resettlement. The latter was achieved through 
the elimination of the traditional means of housing and the imposition of a 
comparatively HDB rental.61 
As Tremewan stresses, the PAP after putting the Singaporean citizens in 
their places physically, the government had to ensure that they stayed there. The 
PAP made sure that there was no alternative housing for the middle and the 
labour class which comprised the majority of the population. Moreover, by 
means of the land acquisition act 1966, the PAP state gave itself the power to 
expropriate private rights in land titles. The PAP state could acquire land not just 
for specific public purposes but for any residential commercial or industrial 
places.62 The HDB ownership ended up in politicizing the acquisition of public 
housing because it did not lead to greater independence for householders but less. 
For instance, the HDP imposes limitations on the number and family status of 
people who can live in the units, has to approve their renovation, rental and 
resale, forbids the conduct of business in the units and has the right to evict 
residents found guilty of morally inappropriate behaviour even without 
compensation. This fear and the mechanisms which tie people into it have 
become one of the central pillars of the PAP state’s social control via the HDP 
public housing scheme.63 
Moreover, Hill’s and Kwen Fee’s argument adds a biopolitical dimension 
to the HDB project. In its policy of allocating flats, the HDB attempted to 
institutionalize what was declared the traditional family model. According to 
PAP the provision of public housing is only available to households. Young 
single individuals and divorcees are excluded and even in the case of older single 
people who are presumably never going to marry, eligibility to rent depends on 
                                                
61 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 45-49 
62 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 53 
63 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 57-58 
 247 
agreement to share with another person. A potential reason for this might be 
related to the avoidance of welfarism on behalf of the government. However, 
another reason for this may be related to PAP’s attempt to exercise further social 
control over population via the institution of family. This dimension underlines a 
biopolitical exercise of control by the PAP as the satisfaction of a basic need - 
that of accommodation - is determined by the individual’s decision to form a 
family while such a housing scheme assists the promotion of family ties.64  
According to Tremewan, Singapore’s educational system has been 
another mean of PAP’s exercise of coercive control. After Singapore’s 
independence, PAP subjected education under a centralized educational system 
and adapted it according to the needs of foreign capital. English, the language of 
foreign capital would be indisputable and sole language of merit. Facilities in 
English would be the ostensible neutral criterion for placing Singaporean to their 
social places. But since English was the language of the Chinese and Indian 
middle or upper classes, an educational system which promoted English would 
reinforce the connections between the elites regardless class, language and race. 
English would unite the middle and upper classes across ethnic divides while 
excluding the working class of all races. Moreover, mathematics, science and 
technical subjects were emphasized by the PAP state as the basis of education for 
nation building and industrialization. In 1966 mathematics and science were 
required to be taught in English. To this end Singapore’s educational system 
deprived all except the elites a formal education in their own cultural and 
linguistic traditions. Communal factors or race and language were systematically 
correlated with class position throughout the bilingual policy, while emphasis 
was placed on science and technology. It cannot be easily doubted that the 
Singaporean government makes a deliberate use of the education system for 
purposes of social engineering.65 
According to Tremewan, the PAP emphasizes on the principles of 
equality of opportunity and meritocracy in order to mask the social inequalities 
and control which the educational system of Singapore nurtures. The principles 
of equality of opportunity, theoretically serve to neutralize the differences among 
                                                
64 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 122-123 
65 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 95-96 
 248 
races, religion, class or linguistic heritage. What an individual did with this 
opportunity was dependent on personal merit. There was constant emphasis on 
merit as the criterion for upward mobility and privilege. According to this 
reasoning, equality of opportunity logically leads to social inequality since 
individual abilities differ. According to PAP the recognition of individual merit 
leads to a just society. Thus, a just society is an unequal one.66 
However, as Kenneth Paul Tan adds, the value of meritocracy assumes a 
very important role as pragmatism’s crutch. Meritocracy ensures that the 
appropriate people seize the right positions in order to secure a prosperous 
administration and ensure Singapore’s continuous economic growth. For Tan, 
meritocracy can be transformed into pretense to promote inequality and elitism, 
justifying –in the case of Singapore- authoritarian government and its pro-
capitalist orientations. Meritocracy contains inherent contradictions. According 
to the principle of non-discrimination: a selection must be blind to race, gender, 
sexuality age or class differences. However ignoring these differences may serve 
to deny their real influence on the prospects of the candidates. Meritocracy, in 
trying to isolate merit by treating people with fundamentally unequal 
backgrounds as superficially the same, even conceals the real advantages and 
disadvantages that are unevenly distributed to different segments of an inherently 
unequal society, a practice that perpetuates this fundamental inequality.67  
Meritocracy is less interested in giving everyone a chance to earn the 
right to a job but more concerned to reveal the best person for the job. In that 
sense, meritocracy is a mechanism for resource allocation: it is not a matter of 
equality of opportunity but of finding the right persons for the job and paying 
them salaries that they deserve. However the ‘winners’ of the contest that 
meritocracy promotes though initially convinced of their deservingness to win, 
may grow secretly diffident and begin to misdirect their energies on preserving 
their positions by eliminating competitors. This may in fact promote negative 
characteristics such as arrogance, mistrust, deceit and vanity. The dangers of 
such meritocracy in the case of Singapore are also evident in the political field. 
As the politicians’ wages are very high, the intentions behind the motives of 
individuals who wish to involve in politics may vary. The idea that money will 
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draw the ‘best’ people into politics and give them fewer reasons to be corrupt 
ignores the possibility of people going into politics for the wrong reasons. The 
lure of personal prestige and monetary gain can produce a dangerously intelligent 
and self-interested class of political elites who will readily compromise the 
national interest to satisfy their own needs and who will have the unchecked 
power to do this indefinitely perpetuating their power.68  
On	  the	  Approaches	  which	  Predetermine	  the	  Negative	  Civic	  Effects	  of	  
Materialism	  and	  Economy	  in	  Singapore	  	  
 
The previous sections undermined pragmatism’s neutrality while 
indicating how the public housing, education and the values of multiculturalism 
and meritocracy in fact assist the perpetuation of the PAP’s elite exercise of 
power and social control. In other words, exposing pragmatism’s materialist and 
capitalist background which signifies its lack of neutrality, while arguing how 
public housing and education serve as the means of PAP’s coercive exercise of 
power, in fact undermines Terence Lee’s Foucaulian approach of ‘free’ 
Citizenship.  
Below reference will be made to a number of approaches which attribute 
the lack of strong social cohesion in Singapore to PAP’s prioritization of 
materialist and economic objectives.  A number of scholars predetermine that the 
embedment of the economic and materialist dimension is responsible for 
undermining the social cohesion of the Singaporean citizen body and for failing 
to establish the reconciliation of the Singaporeans with their state. However, in 
contrast to what is being stated in this section, the second part of this chapter 
elaborates how Hegel promoted an alterative understanding of materialism and 
economy within the realm of Spirit (Geist). Hegel after taking into consideration 
the Spirit (Geist), he treats market economy and private property as the means of 
an educative process which in fact gradually contribute to the Singaporeans’ 
social cohesion and reconciliation with their state as certain events suggest.   
Unlike Hegel, not only academics such as Ortmann, Kluever and Weber 
but also politicians such as the previous prime minister Goh Chok Tong, attribute 
to materialism and economy Singapore’s fragile social cohesion.  
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At first, Ortmann argues that PAP’s materialist driven policy of 
Pragmatism nourishes an individualist centered subject, a phenomenon which is 
locally described as kiasuism. Ortmann stresses that it is not surprising that 83% 
of Singaporeans consider materialism a national trait (in contrast, only 63% 
considered the fair treatment of fellow citizens to be a part of the national 
culture). This materialism has found its expression on the concept of kiasu or its 
offspring kiasuim, often described as the national fixation in Singapore. Meaning 
‘the fear of loosing out to others’ it refers to the prevalence of materialism and 
rapid individualism in Singapore.69 Kiasu is a Hokkien term and designates a 
sense of competitive anxiety among Singaporeans. Kiasuism is generally 
associated with hyper-individualism and hyper-competition despite the PAP’s 
official pronouncements on the virtues of communitarianism. It is increasing the 
object of soul of younger Sinaporeans. Moreover kiasuism is also reflected in the 
aspirational (materialistic) desires of Singaporeans often described as the  5 C’s 
(Cash, Credit Cards, Condominiums, Country Clubs, Cars). The Singapore 
dream - especially among young Singaporeans - has always been about the 5 C’s. 
This pursuit of material wealth combined with the kiasuism’s originating need to 
be No1 has created the competitive and individualist-centered Singaporean. 
Everything that revolves around the Singaporean ego is measured in terms of 
costs and benefits, the ‘what I will gain by doing this’. Such mentality informs 
the contemporary Singaporean kiasu psyche.70 
As Ortmann argues, the overwhelming materialism and individualism in 
Singaporean society, indeed concerned Singaporean government. He 
distinguishes two phases which determined Singapore’s national values. 
Interestingly, during the second phase PAP made an effort to promote an 
alternative set of communitarian values via moral education, in order to reinforce 
a stronger sense of Singaporean identity and boost social cohesion. The first 
phase commences with Singapore’s independence in 1965. PAP promoted 
pragmatic values which were geared towards economic growth, stressing the 
necessity of Singapore’s integration to the global economy. The government then 
introduced measures which promoted a sense of national identity and social 
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cohesion via materialist centered welfare means. The idea of a harmonious 
society that was collectively working to achieve prosperity, along with the 
massive public housing scheme (HDB), the promotion of  national symbols like 
(flag, national anthem) and the annual national day celebrations. The party even 
came to be called the national party and its leaders tied  PAP’s achievements to 
the national development. For Ortmann, PAP’s pragmatism based on 
‘survivalism’, materialism and economic development, stresses the lack of 
Singapore’s social cohesion.71 
Similarly, Kluver and Weber note, it is not surprising that the national 
identity forged on economic progress, would have little emotional or 
motivational hold on the populace. Indeed this very economic progress and the 
values of entrepreneurship and the opportunism within the framework of 
pragmatism, contributed to the undermining of national cohesion in Singapore 
and a trend to emigrate.72 
The perception of high emigration rates (there is a lack of statistics) 
suggests that the attachment which young educated Singaporean’s feel toward 
their homeland is very small. 73   Indicative is the Quiter-Stayer debate as 
described by Singapore’s previous prime minister Goh Chok Tong. The Quitter – 
Stayer Debate began when Goh Chok Tong, criticized whether the Singaporeans 
who enjoyed the good economic times would quit the country during the 
economic downturns. One of the critical issues facing the government  then was 
a ‘public relations’ battle for the hearts of a crowd that is able to pack their bags 
and get a job and house outside Singapore, should they feel  unhappy with what 
their country has to offer. In a front page report with title ‘PM: Asks young 
Singaporean will you help?’ Goh Chok Tong expressed his concerns against well 
educated young Sigaporeans who become self-centered and refuse to give a 
helping hand when the country faces severe challenges. Yet, as Kluver and 
Weber stress, PAP’s value of meritocracy is self-defeating regarding the 
promotion of social cohesion in Singapore. It is the very same government that 
rewards merit, projects multiculturalism and labels Singapore as  global city who 
is responsible for nurturing less loyalty to the country it represents. From kasuist 
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individualist perspective of Singaporeans, dictated by PAP’s meritocratic ethical 
code of conduct, Singapore’s talents are doomed to emigrate and go where the 
opportunities exist since meritocracy links talent to success. Thus this myth of 
economic progress based the materialism of pragmatism and meritocracy 
undermines the Singaporeans social cohesion and loyalty to the state.74  
 
III.	  Revisiting	  the	  Implications	  of	  Materialism	  and	  Economy	  On	  




The previous part challenged theoretically and empirically a Foucaultian account 
of citizenship in Singapore. Such a Foucaultian driven approach does not provide 
sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that the PAP’s exercise 
of governmentality nourishes a non-coercive sense of consent which transforms 
the Singaporean citizens into ‘free’ subjects. Moreover, it was stressed how 
PAP’s pragmatism, founded solely on materialism and economic capitalism, 
nurtures an individualist, materialist and opportunist form of citizenship which 
undermines the citizens’ social cohesion as well as their reconciliation with the 
state.  As it was already argued such a portrayal of the Singaporean citizen is 
defined in academic literature with the term kiasuism, whereas in the PAP’s 
rhetoric in terms of the ‘Quitter-Stayer’ debate. Therefore, Singaporeans are 
often stereotyped in academic literature as kiasuist self-centered citizens who do 
not (supposedly) care about a more open society but the for the bigger flat and 
bigger car.75 These social traits are considered to be perilous by the PAP and 
were reflected in the ex-prime minister’s Goh Chok Tong’s concerns, that these 
Singaporeans would potentially quit the country during the economic downturns 
after enjoying the good economic times.   
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Many scholars tend to accuse the government’s prioritization of 
economic and materialistic policies as responsible for nurturing these 
individualistic kiasuist traits of the Singaporean citizens which undermine 
Singapore’s social cohesion. In other words it appears that these scholars often 
attribute to PAP’s economic and materialist driven policy, a deterministic effect 
upon the formation of an individualistic, materialist and opportunistic subject 
that refrains from questioning the PAP’s governance. However this begs for the 
following question:  
Do empirical facts verify this deterministic impact of the PAP’s 
materialist and economic prioritization upon the formation of such an 
individualist, materialist and opportunist Singaporean subject?  
If certain empirical facts fail to verify that, how does Hegel’s systematic 
philosophy allows us to re-interpret the impact of PAP’s policies and undermine 
the pre-determinism of the materialistic and economical dimension upon the 
formation of the subject as purely opportunistic and self-centered. Just like 
Rousseau, Hegel too includes a materialist and an economic dimension in the 
Philosophy of Right, via the system of needs, the market and private property. 
However, Hegel’s understanding of these notions is not based on liberal 
premises. Instead, he ascribes an alternative impact to economy and materialism, 
after incorporating the system of needs, the market, and private property within 
the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing to them an educative effect which arouses 
the subject’s self consciousness and freedom. Thus, the question that is raised 
here is the following: 
How is that reflected in Singapore?  
After elaborating further on Hegel’s economic and materialist dimension 
of his philosophical system within the realm of Spirit (Geist) it will be argued 
that the stereotypical treatment of most Singaporeans as kiasuist or ‘quitters’ is 
inaccurate. Below, after providing sufficient empirical and theoretical evidence 
from a Hegelian perspective, it will be argued how the PAP’s materialistic and 
economic driven policies do not necessary form an individualist, materialist and 
disciplined Singaporean. Empirical evidence will be provided to suggest that 
there are forms of political and cultural resistance in Singapore which are 
selfless, communitarian and materialist-free as they aim to critically awake their 
fellow Singaporean citizens and intellectually emancipate them.  
 254 
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In this part, any deterministic theory of the effects of economy and 
materialism upon the formation of the subject will be challenged. The materialist 
and economic dimensions are not responsible for solely nourishing an 
individualist, opportunistic citizen lacking communitarian values. Below, 
Hegel’s perspective unveils an alternative set of implications associated with the 
economic and materialist dimension. For Hegel, after incorporating economy and 
materialism, within the realm of Spirit (Geist), these dimensions serve as a 
medium of educating the citizens in a process which assists them to acquire self-
consciousness and seize a form of subjectivity that helps them reconcile with 
their fellow citizens and the state.  In other words, an understanding of the 
Singaporean citizen beyond the kiasuist or ‘quiter’ interpretation as certain 
empirical evidence suggest too.   
Via the concept of Spirit (Geist), Hegel dismisses pre-existing formulas 
and prescriptive or descriptive theoretical approaches. In the same manner, 
prescribing or predetermining the impact of economy and materialism upon 
citizenship and subjectivity are challenged from a Hegelian perspective. Hegel’s 
notion of Spirit (Geist) signifies a process and an evolution and as such economy 
and materialism serve as mediums which can assist the development of the 
subject’s self-consciousness while simultaneously reconciling her with the fellow 
citizens and the state. Hegel incorporates the system of needs, the market, and 
private property within the realm of Spirit (Geist), attributing them an educative 
effect which arouses the subject’s self consciousness and freedom. The previous 
chapter analyzed in detail how Hegel’s alternative treatment of materialism, 
private property and the economy emerged after taking into consideration the 
notion of Spirit (Geist). 
Let us recall that according to Hegel the subject’s self-consciousness and 
freedom is tied to citizenship and the state. For Hegel, self-consciousness is 
neither something that happens automatically, nor something that the subject’s is 
capable of aquiring by herself. For Hegel, the subject’s self consciousness is a 
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long term project, an intellectual and practical effort which is formed via ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) in the State. The state completes the real freedom that Hegel 
identifies in the market system, in contrast to the libertarian idea of the state. The 
economic market assists the citizen’s actualization of freedom via the interaction 
with the others within the state, thus the individual is not the sole source of his 
own actualized freedom.76 Hegelian civil society, has not taken over a model of 
purely self-interested market behaviour which is incompatible with the state. 
What Hegel sets out to show is how individuals are ‘formed’ or ‘educated’ by 
their economic interdependence.  
Economic interdependence encourages the subject to overcome her self-
centeredness as it helps the subject to realize that (material) needs in fact reflect 
social attitudes and expectations whereas the subject’s involvement in the market 
system, enables her to participate in the world.77 For Hegel, private property too 
is treated as a means to stress the communitarian dimension of personhood and 
its contribution towards self-consciousness which promotes freedom.78In that 
respect, Hegel’s understanding of property is fundamentally anti-utilitarian and 
anti-liberal as he challenges self-determining subjectivity, permits state 
intervention and acknowledges the educative effects of the market and property 
after incorporating them within the realm of Spirit (Geist). 
The previous paragraphs stressed how the materialist and economic 
dimension of Hegel’s philosophical system of Spirit (Geist) seeks to overcome 
the self determining understanding of subjectivity after distancing itself from the 
liberal economic and materialist perspective. The first part of this chapter 
elucidated that after approaching from the perspective of Spirit (Geist) the 
system of needs, the market and private property, they assume an educative role 
which informs the state’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and contributes to the 
development of the subject’s self-consciousness. The analysis below, attempts to 
confirm empirically the implications of Hegel’s alternative role of the economy, 
market and private property. Hegel’s insights are applied to explain the civic 
transformation of the Singaporean citizens beyond their stereotypical treatment 
as self-centered, materialistic and opportunistic individuals.  
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Below, an analysis takes place which challenges empirically the 
approaches which celebrate the predetermining effects of the economy and 
materialism. The previous part elaborated how certain scholarly approaches tend 
to stereotypically associate PAP’s economic and materialist policies with a form 
of citizenship that is materialist, individualist and opportunist. This 
understanding of Singaporean citizenship is often met in academic literature with 
the terms ‘kiasu’ while in political argumentation is reflected via the ‘quiter-
stayer’ debate.  
After referring to these stereotypical approaches which attribute the 
individualism and opportunism of (kiasu) Singaporeans to their government’s 
economical and materialist priorities; empirical evidence will be applied to 
undermine them and confirm from a Hegelian perspective how economy and 
materialism do not have a predetermining effects upon citizenship formation. 
Instead, after taking into consideration the notion of Spirit (Geist), it will be 
suggested that it is more accurate to treat the economy and its materialist 
dimensions as means of a process with indeterminate results. Moreover, from a 
Hegelian perspective it is argued here that these dimensions may potentially 
serve as educative means which assists the formation of a self-conscious subject 
within the limits of the state, who is reconciled with the community, does not 
hesitate to take risks in order to promote the community’s interests at the expense 
of her private benefits. Examples of cultural resistance and civic forms activism 
tend to suggest how despite the embedded materialism and economic priorities of 
the Singaporean government and society, these traits have actually contributed to 
gradually awake civically some Singaporeans as Hegel’s approach suggests. 
Examples like that undermine the stereotypical treatment of the Singaporean as 
purely kiasu and the determining negative civic effects of economy and 
materialism.   
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  Policies	  of	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  Survivalism	  
 
Below takes place a brief overview of PAP’s policies which were dictated 
by the objectives of materialism and economic survivalism. It will be explained 
how these policies led certain academics perceive Singaporeans as kiasuist  
citizens who are only concerned about materialistic benefits and private interest- 
and how some surveys verify these conclusions regarding a part of Singapore’s 
population. Yet, it will be suggested here that it is misleading to argue that PAP’s 
materialistic and economic survivalism driven policies have necessarily the 
determining kiasuist effect upon Singaporeans. In this regard, reference to a 
number of examples will take place which implies how a number of selfless and 
civic oriented forms of cultural resistance and civic activism emerged which 
aspire to critically awake Singaporeans from their materialist lethargy. It is 
interesting to see how the stereotype of the Singaporean kiasu doesn’t apply to 
the protagonists of these forms of resistance and activism who often act in peril 
of prosecution; but also to the rest of the population, as a part of it supports such 
unconventional reactions.   
The previous part - after quoting Huat, Mutalib and Tan - unveiled how 
PAP’s political rhetoric of pragmatism is not neutral but has instead materialistic 
and capitalist economic foundations. Below a description of PAP’s policies 
during the 80s, 90s and the last decade will be provided in order to describe how 
their materialist and economic premises, nourished among the academic and 
political circles the narrative  of the kiasuist Singaporean which fueled the 
‘quitter-stayer’ debate.   
Previously reference was made to Ortmann, Kluver and Weber, according 
to whom the PAP’s prioritization of economic survivalism and materialism has 
contributed to the lack of a particular Singaporean identity, nourishing citizens 
who are materlialist and opportunistic. Velayutham notes too, that the PAP 
government’s creation of a cosmopolitan global city, rationalized in economic 
terms, reflects this managerial and opportunist intent. In that respect it is often 
argued that as Singaporeans aspire to achieve greater economical upward 
mobility through the material advantages of financial globalization that PAP 
embraces, their cultural identity appears weak to anchor them home and prevent 
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them from seeking opportunities elsewhere. 79  These fears were expressed 
politically in the form of the ‘Quitter-Stayer’ debate as the Singaporeans may 
easily flee while seeking greater materialistic advantages. The Quitter - Stayer 
Debate began when Goh Chok Tong asked whether the Singaporeans who 
enjoyed the good economic times would quit the country during the economic 
downturns. Goh Chok Tong expressed his concerns against well educated young 
Singaporeans who become self-centered and refuse to give a helping hand when 
the country faces severe challenges.80 
As Velayutham suggests, PAP’s policies through the last decades have 
been formed in respect to an economical and materialist dimension.81 However, a 
few years later, not only the Asian values were abandoned but also any cultural 
attempt to develop a distinctive cultural identity in Singapore. After the 1997 
Asian financial market crash, the discourse on the promotion of Asian values in 
Singapore was no longer seen as a fruitful basis for Singapore’s own economic 
growth and social development since Asia became associated in the global 
economy with nepotism, corruption and economic mismanagement. While 
Singapore escaped the crisis the question of identity re-emerged. The 
government’s anxieties this time were not so much the erosion of cultural 
traditions but had more to do with sustaining the Singapore’s viability as a nation 
state in its attempt to plug into the global economic system. After that, the 
question for PAP became is how to produce effective citizens in the era of 
economic globalization while retaining its benefits.82  
After the 90s a number of policies followed while PAP was making 
efforts to tackle the issue of how to form Singapore as a global city while being a 
home to its citizens and keeping them committed. ‘Singapore 21’ and 
‘Renaissance Singapore’ emerged as two policies which aspired to change the 
character of Singaporean-ness. As Velayutham stresses both of them were 
premised on economic capital accumulation and materialism.83  
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Beyond the perspectives of certain scholars who the treat the Singaporean 
citizens as individualistic and opportunistic, certain surveys stress too the 
Singaporeans’ materialism and lack of civic virtues. According to a survey 
Velayutham puts forward, in response to the question ‘Do you feel Singapore is 
your home?’ most respondents suggested that Singapore was home simply 
because it was their country of birth, where their family and friends are and 
where they had grown up and spend most of their lives. However, on deeper 
reflexion, a more complex story emerged when respondents spoke about the sorts 
of factors which contributed to their identity and belonging to the Singapore 
nation. With remarkable consistency, most respondents in the survey indicated 
that Singapore’s economic achievements and progress, its political stability and 
efficiency as compared to Singapore’s Asian neighbor’s, its standard of living 
and the clean, safe and green living environment, were the factors contributing 
most to their sense of identification as a Singaporean. Also, respondents 
frequently remarked upon Singapore’s comfort, modern conveniences, high 
standard of living, economic and political stability. Singapore urban 
infrastructure and public programmes speak volumes in terms of efficiency, 
cleanliness and comfort. These materialist indicators generated among 
Singaporeans a deep sense of pride and provided a point of identification with 
the Singapore’s materialistic achievements rather than cultural traits.84  
Moreover, the Singaporeans orientation towards material embetterment is 
evident, according to the same survey, to the tendency of emigration among 
some of them due to the limited opportunities of upward social mobility in terms 
of status and lifestyle choices. The tendency to emigrate on such grounds 
indicates that some Singaporeans lack a sense of moral obligation towards the 
nation. For other Singaporeans the motivation to leave is primarily dictated by 
the anticipation of the high costs of running a car or medical care in Singapore. 
For others, the prospect of a new and relaxed lifestyle or the desire to experience 
something different in terms of a new job, career opportunities and a lower cost 
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of living. Also some interviewees placed much importance on material 
possessions (such as owing a house and two cars) which are more affordable 
elsewhere, as the reason behind their emigration.85  
For most scholars, the findings of such surveys suggest that while the 
materialist economical achievements of the nation can function as a source of 
pride, materialism can never be a key ingredient for the emergence of a deeper 
affective nationalism in Singapore. Instead, it is argued that the embedded 
materialism and economic rationale, nourishes citizens who celebrate 
materialism and opportunism just as the findings on the reasons behind 
Singaporean’s emigration suggest. The conclusions of such analyses and surveys 
serve to proliferate the perception of the kasuist Singaporean. 
However how accurate is it to describe the Singaporeans as individualist 
and materialist? Here is it argued that most approaches which acknowledge the 
Singaporeans as solely kasuist, materialistic and opportunistic are based on the 
perspective which stresses the deterministic effects of Singapore’s economic 
survivalism and materialism. In contrast to that, below an analysis take place on 
the issue areas of culture, arts and civic activism in order to undermine the 
perspectives which advocate the deterministic effects of economic survivalism 
and materialism upon the citizens. In that manner, Hegel’s insights on the 
economic and materialist dimension within the realm of Spirit (Geist) become 
relevant as he dismisses their predeterministic effect and treats them as means to 
an evolutionary processes  which allows the citizens to seize self-consciousness 
and ultimately free will.  
Contested	  Approaches	  Regarding	  Culture’s	  Implications	  in	  Singapore	  	  
 
In this part it will be shown how the debate on culture is a contested field 
as certain scholars suggest how arts are manipulated by the PAP in order to 
promote financial benefits for Singapore. Unlike the previous scholars, some 
other argue that art is a medium which contributes to the Singaporeans’ social 
and critical awakening - overcoming their opportunistic and individualistic 
kasuist traits - after criticizing the shortcoming of PAP’s policies indirectly but 
efficiently.  
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Lily Kong, Brenda Yeoh and Velayutham are scholars who contend that 
the field of culture and arts in Singapore contributes to the promotion of 
economic or materialist related values and benefits. The first two argue that 
initially the PAP neglected arts. Currently the PAP uses arts as a mean to assist 
Singapore’s Economic development, regional prestige and nation building. Kong 
and Yeoh claim that culture is under the control of the state and serves the means 
of the state as the PAP ends up controlling the artists while tampering with their 
creativity and free expression.86 For Kong and Yeoh during the 1990s the PAP 
engaged in more rigorous policies took place in order to harness the economic 
potential of the arts. Government initiatives in terms of industrial & cultural 
policy, cultural tourism policy, urban cosmetics policy were initiated in an effort 
to make Singapore more attractive to tourists and visitors who might end up 
staying and bringing in investments with them.87 
Velayutham, argues too that after 1990 the policies of ‘Singapore 21’ and 
‘Renaissance Singapore’ treated art related services as economic activities in 
their own right. For Velayutham especially ‘Renaissance Singapore’ appeared to 
prioritize an economic rationale while utilizing culture to serve this objective. 
The aim to become a cosmopolitan global city had according to PAP the 
following objectives: a) to attract global capital and to be seen as the kind of 
place that can do business creatively and well in the new global economy; b) to 
produce a class of cosmopolitan and creative professional Singaporeans who can 
operate successfully in the global economy; c) to attract the best foreign talents, 
to come and work in Singapore; d) to attract more tourists; e) to create a place of 
identification and affective attachment among Singaporeans, especially the 
cosmopolitan professional class. In that respect, for  Velayutham, ‘Renaissance 
Singapore’ utilized the dimension of arts and culture to promote or brand 
Singapore as a cultural hub for the international public opinion.88 
So far it was stressed, according to certain scholars, that the PAP used art 
as a medium for the perpetuation of Singapore’s financial profits. Kong, Yeoh 
and Velayutham exacerbated the deterministic effect of economy upon the form 
of art that is nourished in Singapore, a form of art that tampers with the 
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Singaporean artists’ creativity while killing any attempt to express freely and 
criticize the government.  However, below it will be argued how certain artistic 
groups and companies have emerged in Singapore, the members of whom 
develop provocative performances which aspire to critically awake the 
Singaporean despite the risks of prosecution and censorship. Such Singaporean 
artists certainly don’t fit the description of the opportunistic, individualistic and 
materialist Singaporean, as they took advantage the dimension of art’s economic 
globalization in Singapore in order to form international collaborations and 
perform plays which aim to raise civic awareness and indirectly criticize PAP.  
On	  Arts	  and	  Civic	  Awareness	  	  	  	  
 
Unlike Lily Kong, Brenda Yeoh and Velayutham for Alvin Tan arts in 
Singapore are neither strictly under the PAP’s control nor promote the party’s 
political objectives. As Alvin Tan argues, political theatre challenges the 
dominant ideology that sustains the way things are in Singapore. For art to be 
effective it must be challenging established or reductive perceptions and mind-
sets. It needs to transgress social mores or more conventional forms. Singaporean 
government strategically censors art of this kind. In effect, censorship creates an 
atmosphere of fear that limits the people’s capacity to think outside of the box. 
To escape the state, artists often look for new ways of creating art. Since 
‘realistic’ theatre is highly accessible and therefore highly susceptible to 
censorship, many artists in Singapore  have turned to avant-garde and 
interdisciplinary theatre.  For the professional theatre company, ‘The Necessary 
Stage’ (TNS) which was founded in 1987, this type of postmodern and avant-
garde performances became the key to challenge the Singaporean established 
norms while attempting to harness the dynamics of globalisation. In this regard, 
creating indigenous work from the scratch would seem to be unproductive. In the 
Singaporean context, the ‘exotic’ foreign element adds value to productions, 
easily justifies higher ticket prices while ensuring full houses. TNS quickly 
realised that internationality ensures quality, drawing recognition and economic 
capital which then secures the sustainability of a theatre company.89  
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Every year in March since 1997 TNS organizes its own arts festival 
sponsored named youth explosion which eventually became one of Asia’s largest 
international fringe festival. This festival aims to bring the best of contemporary, 
cutting edge and socially engaged works to the Singapore audiences’. TNS 
reaches out to co-producers or venue presenters in the region, creating works that 
are socially engaged, innovative and yet accessible at regional and international 
levels. Having worked for over two decades with Singaporean actors from 
different backgrounds, TNS has developed a working methodology which that 
integrates multiple languages and cultures whilst  using different artistic 
disciplines. Examples of such performances which aspired to critically awake 
Singaporeans after intriguing their civic awareness while inviting to think 
beyond an individualist and materialist perspective are the following: Completely 
With/Out Character, Mobile and Elena’s Nightmare. In 1999, Completely 
With/Out Character was amono-drama that featured a late AIDS patient. The 
performance included a live interactive question and answer session which 
involved the participation of the audience. Moreover this interaction was not 
limited in the theatre but extended to emigrant Singaporeans from other parts of 
the world who communicated with the actors and the audience via a real time 
chat room. This popular performance after involving the participation of the 
audience, attempted to bring into public attention the problem of social exclusion 
of HIV patients, the civic responsibilities towards them while stressing the PAP’s 
failure to cope with that problem.90  
Mobile poses as another good example of how TNS has dealt with this 
problem of enriching the artistic process through international collaboration. 
Mobile’s script is about Thai and Filipino women who are employed as foreign 
domestic workers or prostitutes in both Japan and Singapore and revolves around 
the social and cultural implications of this. The examined issues include, the 
cultural displacement, the need to support families back home and the 
discrimination they face due to economic disparity which goes mainly unnoticed 
both in Singapore and Japan. TNS organized field-work trips in Bankong and 
Chiang Mai in order to tackle with these issues more efficiently.91 
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Elena’s Nightmare was another performance based on a real event which 
escaped public attention in Singapore. The plot is about a Filipino domestic 
worker, who discovered she was pregnant when she arrived in Singapore and 
was asked by the agency to go for an abortion or else she should be sent home. 
Plays like these certainly draw attention to the lack civic protection which affects 
a certain group of immigrants in Singapore.92 
As Alvin Tan notes, this vision of global  theatre moves away from some 
of the ideals of political theatre as it does not involve direct confrontation with 
the government, but their objectives are similar. For example TNS theatrical 
performances avoid directly commenting on party politics. Instead through 
ingenuity and creativity TNS’s global theatre can deal indirectly, though no less 
efficiently, with issues  that are potentially confrontational or controversial. Such 
globalized form of art in Singapore tends to face less constraints when their 
works implicate many artists from different countries. But working together 
helps these artists to invent new devises to communicate or transmit sensitive 
issues and taboo subjects. Also the collaboration of this kind can enable 
suppressed voices to escape censorship by staging such works in partner 
countries away from the violence of local censors.93    
For Alvin Tan the benefits of TNS globalizing art are many. After taking 
advantage of the globalization of theatre and arts, TNS managed to attract greater 
(international) audience, something which also assist to attract more Singaporean 
audience as in Singapore  an artist’s value rises with greater internationalization 
in the estimation of the Singaporeans. Alternative performances such as the 
Mobile and Elena’s Nightmare, allow the artist and the audience to explore the 
effects of immigration and trade agreements on the quality of everyday life in 
countries of the Asian region and uncover the stories of ordinary people that have 
been silenced by official governmental accounts. TNS through fieldwork 
research, interviews, role-playing improvisation and methods of interactive 
theatre which includes the participation of the audience, seeks to intrigue critical 
awareness. Via the critical debates with audience in the Completely With/Out 
Character performance, after a  voice is given to ordinary people’s stories, the 
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audience itself transforms from passive recipient to an active commentator on 
civic matters.94 
These are examples of how TNS plays raise the spectators’ critical 
awareness after unveiling socially intriguing real stories while asking the 
audience to participate, think critically and raise their voices via experimental 
interactive performances. Although this might not reinforce directly a more civic 
minded Singaporean account of citizenship, yet it serves as an attempt to 
reconcile the Singaporeans with their society and think beyond  an individualistic 
and opportunistic  manner. This critical social exercise echoes Hegel moments of 
self-consciousness where the subject is gradually dismissing its self-determining 
characteristics and assumes a more complete account of consciousness which 
incorporates the other as well as the (social) environment. Hardimon describes 
this Hegelian process of the consciousness evolution as reflective identification. 
Reflective identification is based on Hegel’s  -the three moments of will - which 
comprise a necessary process before a subject is able to seize self-consciousness 
and ultimately freedom within the sphere of the community and the state.95 
Hegel’s moments of will are indetermination, determination and the combination 
of both assumed via the formation of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state.   
 Hegel’s reflective identification assists in conceiving of oneself as 
independent distinct from one’s social roles obtained within society. In that sense 
one can think of oneself as having the capacity to abstract from any given social 
role. A person steps back from a social role when he considers how he relates to 
it. Stepping back is to question or evaluate it. One comes to conceive of oneself 
as a self by the capacity to step back from one’s social roles and by coming to 
form a general conception of oneself. In order to conceive oneself as a subject of 
consciousness, involves regarding oneself as an independent source of moral 
assessment and evaluation. It involves regarding oneself as having the capacity 
and right to access courses of actions on the basis of one’s own private, 
subjective judgment. This process includes the interplay of indetermination and 
determination.96 Hegel substantiates the compatibility of individuality and social 
membership through reflective identification. The act of abstraction contains 
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within itself a moment of reflective separation between oneself and the role. 
Reflective identification is a form of identification. It is reflective in that it 
proceeds through the reflective actor of stepping back from a social role and 
evaluating it from a position of indetermination. Towards this step the first 
moment of will prevails. Additionally, reflective identification proceeds to the 
second moment of will since identifying reflectively with one’s social role is to 
identify with such role as the self. Reflective identification provides a reflective 
means of bridging the gap between the self and its roles provided from the realm 
of community via the family, civil society and the state.97  
Although the Singaporean state currently tends to resemble more to the 
Hegelian civil society of the individual centered subject, it is reminded that for 
Hegel this is not a finite situation but part of a process. TNS’s efforts are not 
characterized by an individualist self-determining form of subjectivity but one 
which renders individuality and social membership compatible. TNS cannot 
form ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by itself. Nevertheless TNS via successful 
performances such as Completely With/Out Character is efficient in reconciling 
the Singaporeans with their social environment and its shortcomings while 
asking them to question their role and intervene. The interactive nature of 
theatrical performances which encourage the audience to switch from the passive 
role of the spectator who contemplates on the event to the active one of a 
commentator who seeks to participate and intervene. This process echoes 
Hegel’s interplay of indetermination-determination which is portrayed by the 
reflective identification. Again it is stressed that although this can not form 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) by itself; yet it is a useful medium of social exercise 
which helps Singaporeans reconsider social problems from a different angle after 
revising their earlier perspective which stemmed from a fixed and deterministic 
understanding formed by their particular social role or position.   
The TNS artists, some of whom faced censorship and threats of 
prosecution from the government, as well as the audience of avant-garde 
performances are certainly not portrayed by the stereotypical image of the 
opportunist, self-centered and materialist Singaporean. The art scene in 
Singapore was able to evolve into this avant-garde and critical stance only after a 
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materialist development had taken place which secured Singaporean’s welfare. 
Singapore’s financial development paving the way for the appropriate 
infrastructures which allowed artist to express themselves in forms varying from 
commercial to alternative ones which aspire to raise social awareness. Therefore 
as Dickey’s suggests echoing Hegel, this material dimension of social existence, 
afforded the Singaporeans an opportunity to reconsider their true telos in the 
sense that it provided them with a ‘reflective moment’ which allows them to 
think critically and choose just what kind of citizens they wish to become and 
what form of state is appropriate. 98  
On	  TalkingCock.Com	  and	  Civic	  Reaction	   
 
Beyond the sphere of arts, other forms of political reaction evolved which 
often confronted PAP’s objectives. The very popular satirical blog 
TalkingCock.Com certainly challenges the distinction of the Singaporeans 
between ‘Heartlanders’ and ‘Cosmopolitans’ as well as their opportunistic and 
materialist traits. The efforts of the  
TalkingCock.Com crew were characterized civic awareness and risk taking as 
they often openly challenged certain PAP’s policies like the restriction of 
Singlish.  
The name ‘talking-cock’ is a Singlish phrase which means ‘to engage in a 
idle banter or to talk nonsense’. Everyone who works on TalkingCock.Com 
related events does not get paid. Most of the Singaporeans who got involved had 
never done these things before. As Goh notes Singaporeans taking risks and for 
nothing but the fun of it something which is strange as often Singaporeans are 
portrayed as opportunists.99 The academic and political narrative in Singapore 
has it that the majority of the Singaporeans share the characteristics of the 
individual-centered and materialist Singaporean. However, for the 
TalkingCock.Com crew clearly there is a mismatch in experiences after getting 
involved with politically marginal social commentators like taxi drivers, various 
actors, crew members musicians and writers could not be described as apathetic.  
While many of them could easily be characterized as of a lower education and 
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socioeconomic status, they nevertheless demonstrated a creative mind capable of 
acquiring, sharing applying and creating new knowledge; A connection with 
their roots in engaging with activities whose objectives were unrepentantly 
selfless while prioritizing the benefit of Singaporean community. While it is not 
denied that bourgeois political dilettantes and materialist monomaniacs exist, 
Goh and Joyceln believe that gross generalizations and polarizing labels hinter, 
rather than help. Singaporeans who were demonstrating vital citizenship traits 
might nevertheless find themselves bumping up against existing cultural policies. 
For the TalkingCock.Com crew a more constructive approach is to ask how we 
can make the space for citizenship performance more inclusive and ensure a 
diversity of expression.100 
Goh and Joyceln believe that TalkingCock.Com gave the opportunity for 
marginalized Singaporeans to express themselves on political issues which the 
system had denied, indicating that their portrayal as civically indifferent or 
kasuist  is inaccurate. The PAP set up over the years in order to remedy the 
image of inefficiently consultative via  ‘the feedback unit’, the ‘Singapore 21 
committee’, ‘the economic review committee’ and the ‘remaking Singapore 
Committee’. Serving on or speaking before government initiated committees is 
considered the pinnacle of citizenship contribution. However, committees 
present significant barriers to the participation of ordinary Singaporeans. 
Average Singaporeans views cannot be heard since these Singaporeans are 
unlikely to sit on such committees. They are generally unable, according to the 
PAP, to access the required substratum of data to meet the demand of ‘having a 
good understanding of the issues at hand before they can sensible take part at the 
discussions’ and may be impaired by their lack of efficient command with the 
English language. Then one must think what alternative channel exists for the 
Singaporeans to express themselves? In that manner, for Goh and Joyceln, the 
contribution of  that TalkingCock.Com was invaluable and the fact that 
‘TalkingCock.Com–The movie’ film made it into the screens suggests that 
alternative channels are available.101 
The TalkingCock.Com crew was also deeply aware that the history of 
Singaporeans constitutionally protected right to free speech was capricious at 
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least. Also the case of Catherine Lim and the threatening words of Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew ‘everybody now knows that if you take on the PM, he will have to 
take you on’ were taken into serious consideration. Yet the TalkingCock.Com 
team took the risk and carried on with this effort. TalkingCock.Com was formed 
partly as a response to the governments anti-Singlish stance. Goh said that if 
Singlish were allowed to proliferate the nations global competitiveness would be 
affected. In that respect, television and radio programmes were vetoed for 
Singlish and naturalistic dialogue was attempted to be eradicated by the PAP. 
The TalkingCock.Com team decided to make Singlish the cornerstone of this 
activist project. The battle with the government begun when the ‘TalkingCock - 
The Movie’ was submitted to the censors. The Film Publications Department 
(FPD) demanded one scene to be cut and that the film should bear a rating of NC 
16 preventing Singaporeans below 16 to watch it. Ultimately, although the film 
was projected at the cinemas it was not allowed to be released on VCD and 
DVD. Moreover, as the Singlish restriction continued to be enforced, the film 
was denied airing on TV because of excessive Singlish.102 
The conclusion which can be drawn from TalkingCock.Com’s civic 
intervention is that the stereotypical treatment of most Singaporeans as 
materialists, opportunistic and civically indifferent or purely kasuist is inaccurate 
and misleading.  
For the TalkingCock.Com team the assumption that the Singaporeans are 
by nature politically apathetic must be deconstructed. Considerable research on 
citizenship in international settings support Carole Paterman’s argument that it is 
wrong to suggest that certain segments of society – especially the citizens of the 
lower socio-economic status as naturally politically apathetic. Instead there are 
structural reasons for that feeling that it is not worth being active.  The PAP 
portrays as civic liberation policies the recent relaxation of restrictions on 
casinos,  bungee jumping and bar top dancing. However these are hardly 
activities that will change the landscape of civic participation in Singapore, 
because they only invite Singaporeans to be consumers rather than engaging in 
meaningful acts of self-expression. The Singaporeans might strike as naturally 
apathetic because there are not efficient practices of citizenship participation and 
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expression. Moreover, as the PAP limits the scope of cultural resources available 
to us for expression via censorship or the restrictions against Singlish, this 
undermines civic participation and enjoins Singaporeans to be embarrassed by 
our own cultural resources. When citizens have been denied self-designed forms 
of citizenship performance, when their own languages is restricted from the 
public sphere and when they have never experienced how their views can have 
an influence, they cannot justifiably be characterized as  politically and civically 
indifferent.103 
On	  The	  working	  Committees	  and	  Civic	  Intervention	  	  
 
Beyond the civil reaction triggered by the TalkingCock.Com, the 
‘Working Committees’ serve as another example of civic interference on behalf 
of the Singaporeans. As it has already been noted, both examples serve to 
undermine empirically the stereotypical treatment of Singaporeans as materialist, 
opportunist and civically indifferent citizens. The outcome of the Marxist 
Conspiracy event often prevented many social groups from civic intervention. In  
1997 some members of the Geylang Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers who 
campaigned to improve the working conditions of foreign workers were detained 
under the draconian Internal Security Act. This episode has come to be known as 
the ‘Marxist Conspiracy’ because the detainees were accused by the state of 
conspiring to turn Singapore into a Marxist state. The memory of these events 
has since festered in the minds of civil society activists as the source of culture of 
fear. Nevertheless, such fears did not stop the a group of Singaporeans to form 
the Working Committee (TWC) and Working Committee 2 (TWC 2).104 
 TWC and TWC 2 despite the fear of the government and other barriers 
to civic activism are presented as creative forms of civil society engagement and 
political risk-taking in contrast to the PAP’s warnings. The TWC was formed in 
late 1998 as a network of individuals and civil society organizations. Its chief 
aim was to build up networks in civil society’s so as to contribute to civic 
participation and intervention. Contrary to the governments’ statements that 
citizens who want to participate in politics should join a formal political party, 
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TWC was trying to make the point that citizens could participate in politics as 
citizens, without needing formal affiliation with the traditional political 
machinery. Fully aware that the question of TWC’s legitimacy would be 
problematic due to its legal status, TWC’s founding members went as far as they 
could to maintain transparency, frequently through the use of the internet. They 
believed that doing so would prove that TWC had nothing to hide.105 
TWC2, unlike TWC, was chaired by a nominated member of parliament 
NMP Braema Mathiaparanam and was structured in a clearly defined and 
hierarchical fashion. While focused on the issue of foreign domestic workers, 
members were also cognizant of the need to empower civil society and hence 
develop a workable model of activism that could deal with some of the more 
controversial issues of governance in Singapore. The founding members were 
therefore eager to create a model that was also open and fluid in an 
organisational sense, welcoming volunteers from almost all walks of life to take 
part in such activities.106 
Foreign domestic workers could also take part indirectly. TWC2 
chairperson Mathiaparanam, had already been an established public figure and 
vocal critic of the state since her days as a journalist in the Straits Times. Popular 
among civil society activists and Singaporeans from many segments of society, 
she was well known for her hard hitting approach and was much respected for it. 
It was a good strategy to capitalized on her popularity to gain access to policy 
makers and stakeholders that would have otherwise been denied. TWC2
 astutely recognized that the key to improving the situation for foreign 
domestic workers laid in constructively engaging other more powerful 
stakeholders. Numerous private dialogues and meetings have taken place with 
representatives from the Bangladeshi, Indonesians, Filipino communities, the 
ministry of Manpower, employment agencies and other NGO’s and voluntary 
welfare organizations. The aim of these dialogues was to establish more channels 
of communication among the stakeholders with a view to improving the welfare 
of foreign domestic workers. Although no laws were actually made or changed, 
TWC2 maintained legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the state,  effectively 
raised public and government awareness on issues regarding the violation of 
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foreign domestic workers’ rights while encouraged official intervention to 
resolve these problems.107 
It becomes clear how not only arts but also activist groups circumvent 
governmental fear and gradually contribute in order to stimulate the Singaporean 
public’s civic awareness while providing channels of alternative civic expression 
and participation. All these examples serve to undermine the academic and 
political treatment of the Singaporeans as individualist, opportunistic and 
materialistic subjects who are civically indifferent after failing to reconcile with 
their community.  
 
On	  the	  AWARE	  Saga	  and	  its	  Social	  Implications	  in	  Singapore	  
 
Previously, it was noted that most scholars contend that the prioritization 
of economic and materialistic objectives transformed Singaporeans into a 
kiasuist society or what Hegel defined as civil society which is comprised of the 
egotistic, individualistic and self-determining subjects. However for Hegel, civil 
society comprises a part of a process which ultimately contributes to the 
development of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the realm of Spirit (Geist) that 
allows the reconciliation of the citizens among themselves and with their state. 
Clearly the TNS, the TalkingCock.Com, the Working Committee and the 
Working Committee 2 although they do not pose as strong cases which can 
contribute to the emergence of Singapore’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit), nevertheless 
they served as mediums and channels which allowed Singaporeans to 
contemplate on civic matters and develop perspectives beyond a kiasuist and 
self-centered point of view. Here, it is suggested that these mediums encouraged 
Singaporeans to think in communitarian terms, reconsider or debate about 
controversial social issues and participate in civic affairs against government 
positions, often putting their personal interests at stake. These civic activities 
cannot be dismissed as deeds of a disaffected minority of intellectuals, artists or 
activists. Instead, they should be treated as actions that gradually paved the way 
for greater civic participation and public criticism against sensitive issue areas 
like ethics and religion which until recently were under strict governmental 
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control and the formation of public opinion was dis-encouraged, if not 
prosecuted.  
Below, it is argued that what is described by the scholars as the ‘AWARE 
SAGA’ is a social event in Singapore which reflects an evolution of the public 
participation regarding public matters of great importance such as religion and 
ethics. The Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) is an 
NGO which promotes gender equality and the succession of its executive 
committee triggered a chain of social events in Singapore. This chapter contends 
that the AWARE saga designates a ‘spill-over’ effect of the previous civic 
activism efforts regarding social ethics and religion to a greater extend in 
Singapore which triggered significant public participation, media coverage but 
surprisingly a mild governmental intervention. After describing what the 
AWARE Saga is and its social implications upon Singapore, it is argued that for 
the first time the Singaporean public was actively involved to an incident about 
religious and ethical matters which until recently the Singaporeans where not 
allowed to critically intervene on such matters. Moreover, what is important 
about the AWARE saga is the level of social interaction among the supporters of 
the competing religious and ethical perspectives which reflect an intense social 
struggle within the Singaporean public sphere over the right of the Singaporeans 
to debate and define the values of their nation.  
Thus, the AWARE Saga represents a culminating point in the history of 
civic activism in Singapore which designates the gradual interference of the 
Singaporeans towards the formation of public ethical and religious issues which 
signify an exception from the typical materialist and individualistic behavior. 
Here, the AWARE saga represents an example which undermines the 
deterministic implications of economy and materialism which transform the 
subjects into egotistic, materialistic and opportunistic citizens. Instead, the 
AWARE saga appear to confirm Hegel’s approach according to which the 
economic domain constitutes a foundation upon which a more complex system 
of socio-cultural values can be erected that contributes to the formation of ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit). 
As Chong argues, on the 28 March 2009 a group of Christian women 
took over the country’s most well known women’s rights group sparking a chain 
of events that no only impacted the nation but also forced many to re-examine 
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the way they viewed civil society politics in Singapore. There were already signs 
that it was not going to be another routine evening when an unexpectedly large 
number of people attended the annual meeting of the Association of Women for 
Action and Research (AWARE) many of whom were new faces having only 
joined the NGO in recent months. Of the 12 available seats on the executive 
committee (Exco), the new members captured nine, leaving the so-called old 
‘guard’ shocked and confused. The new members of the Exco, six out of nine of 
them, attended the same church, the Anglican Church of Our Saviour (COOS). In 
addition, the local media, found them to hold anti-homosexual and anti-abortion 
views. Dr Thio Su Mien, came forward to introduce herself as the mentor of the 
new Exco. Thio, also a member of COOS, told the reporters that she encouraged 
the women to take over AWARE because she felt it had shifted its focus from 
gender equality to the promotion of homosexuality and lesbianism. She also 
challenged the AWARE’s sex education syllabus, under the Ministry of 
Education’s sex education programme, for encouraging local students to see 
homosexuality in neutral terms in stead of negative.108 
In the meantime, the Singaporeans begun to take sides as the saga 
attracted attention via extensive media coverage. An online ‘Save AWARE 
Campaign’ petition was formed to urge supporters to attend the extraordinary 
general meeting (EGM) scheduled for 2 May to consider a vote of no confidence 
on the new Exco. A variety of blogs accused the new Exco of orchestrating a 
hostile takeover to further their own agenda which is affiliated to fundamentalist 
churches. Members of the public contributed to the debate on several levels. 
Some questioned the role of the media in playing up the saga, some supported 
the new Exco’s agenda but condemned the way it came to power, some 
celebrated the public interest the saga attracted as a demonstration of civic 
passion, while others deplored the old guard’s neutral stance on homosexuality 
as symptomatic of society’s eroding moral values. Overall, the saga triggered a 
diversity of approaches among the Singaporean public not only in terms of the 
AWARE’s take over but also regarding issues about religion and ethics broadly. 
Due to the media coverage, by the time of the EGM, AWARE’s membership had 
soared from 300 before the saga to 3,000 just before the EGM, with both camps 
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urged its supporters to join up and make their voices heard. At the end of the 
EGM the motion of no confidence was passed 1,414 votes to 761.109 
The debates that the AWARE saga sparked where intense, controversial 
and stimulated the participation of the Singaporean citizens opinion on sensitive 
public matters. The aftermath of the AWARE saga triggered public discussions 
ranging from the place of religion in civil society, gay rights, the processes of 
citizenry mobilization, the activist role of the media and the undeniable liberal 
voice in contemporary Singapore. As Chong observes ‘never before had a single 
event ushered so many issues into the public sphere and lured the Singaporeans 
to actively contemplate and participate in the determination of sensitive public 
issues’.110  
Unlike Chong, Chua treats the AWARE saga strictly as the triumph of the 
liberal values and of the social classes which promote them, understating the 
broader civic effect the saga had in Singapore. For Chua, the AWARE has 
always been a liberal institution. While the PAP government appeared to grand 
legitimacy to AWARE’s gender equality, the AWARE has undoubtedly upset the 
conservatives who insist on ‘men at work and women at home’ and who are 
unable to publicly voice their objections in the face of a liberalizing culture in 
Singapore. Chua appears to be identifying the public participation stemming 
from the AWARE saga as purely liberal. He argues that the logic of meritocracy 
which promotes liberal economic individualism and the liberal individual rights 
were heavily restricted by the laws of the Singaporean government which govern 
race and religion. The AWARE saga, according to Chua, made this liberalism 
visible which was previously diffused and veiled by the obsessive criticism of 
the PAP’s authoritarianism.111  
However, Chong does not treat the AWARE as the triumph of liberalism. 
According to Chong, what escapes Chua’s attention is the transformation of the 
PAP state’s political objectives. Initially, the PAP ever since it seized the power, 
governed as a morally conservative state that guarded the Singaporean 
population against the ills of the pornography, liberal sexual attitudes and 
individualist lifestyle values. Such a morally conservative state valued the ideals 
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of cultural conservativism, dominant heterosexual values, traditional institutions 
like the nuclear family unit as well as the patriarchical structures. Nevertheless, 
as Chong observes, the PAP’s policies regarding moral issues changed. In 2007, 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s speech indicated that the PAP state no longer 
desired to play a leading role when it came to issues of morality.112 In the PM’s 
words  ‘when it comes to issues like economy, technology, education we better 
stay ahead of the game, watch where people are moving and adapt faster than 
others but on the issues of moral values we will let others take the lead, we will 
stay one step behind the front line of change; watch how things work out 
elsewhere before we make any irrevocable moves’.113  
This speech suggests that the moral agenda in Singapore is no longer 
strictly determined by the government but on the contrary it invites broader 
public participation. In that respect, the debates on ethical and religious issues 
are not necessarily monopolized by liberal perspectives. Instead the public sphere 
in Singapore, appears to accommodate contending approaches on matters which 
affect ethics and religion. As Chong argues, within Singapore’s public sphere, 
both the moral conservatives and the liberals alike have sought to make 
themselves heard. In fact he treats the AWARE saga as a competition between 
moral conservatives and liberals. Thus, Chong concludes that the previous 
understanding of Singapore’s civic society may no longer be adequate to 
accommodate the emerging contours of cultural forces and identity politics that 
are setting the scene for a more confrontational and uncompromising inter NGO 
as well as society-state relations.114  
Moreover, another argument which suggests that the outcome of the 
AWARE saga does neither reflect a triumph of the liberal middle classes nor the 
triumph of the liberal objectives has to do with the PAP state’s indirect 
intervention. To begin with, the fact that the PAP state still indirectly intervenes 
undermines any argument which suggests that liberal values have permeated 
Singapore.  
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The media sparked the government’s attention regarding the rationale 
behind the take over of the AWARE which triggered later PAP’s indirect 
intervention. When the Singaporean media begun to focus on the new guard’s 
anti-homosexuality position, the media circulated the information that 
information that Thio identified AWARE’s comprehensive Sexuality Education 
Programme (SEP) for schools as a key factor that motivated the new guard and 
its supporters to join the AWARE  and influence the organization. The 
programme had elements in the trainer’s guide which suggested that 
homosexuality was perfectly normal, a fact then unknown to the Ministry of 
Education which had originally accepted the SEP. Ghani and Koh argue that the 
government was skeptical and considered a crossing over of religion into secular 
space in this instance would set a precedent for other faith groups to do likewise 
in the future. The PAP government chose to intervene: Firstly, by annulling the 
SEP; Secondly, by choosing intervene indirectly via the National Council of 
Churches (NCCS). The chairman of the National Council of Churches, 
Archbishop Dr John Chew, making what is now widely seen and commended as 
a timely and pivotal intervention he stated that the NCCS did not condone 
churches getting involved in the saga for pulpits to be used to mobilize and 
support or form secular organizations. As Ghani and Koh contend, it is clear that 
the government would be willing to adopt a light tough and not proceed to direct 
intervention at the first sign of trouble. It would make the pre-emptive behind the 
scenes strike if religion were perceived to be involved in political 
mobilization.115  
The previous paragraphs described why the AWARE saga portrays a 
transformation of the civil society and of the government in Singapore regarding 
the sensitive public issues of ethics and religion. This transformation is more 
appropriately deciphered by Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) 
rather than a liberal perspective which treats the saga as a mere struggle for the 
promotion of liberal freedoms by a particular class. Again, from a Hegelian 
perspective, the dimensions of economy and materialism, within the realm of 
Spirit (Geist), serve as  mediums of educating the citizens in a process which 
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assists  them to acquire self-consciousness and seize a form of subjectivity that 
helps them reconcile with their fellow citizens and the state.  
As Chong stresses the AWARE saga is the very child of economic 
growth and of  the social classes it has engendered. Over forty years of mass 
education, economic progress and world travel have nurtured an increased 
attentiveness to one’s personal rights and heightened sensitivity to 
encroachments on progressive values. It would be wishful thinking to expect a 
sophisticated and cosmopolitan minded polity to display the same manner of 
political faith their parents did especially when ethical and religious issues strike 
so deeply into matters of identity. In this widened civic space, which the PAP 
government is becoming gradually sympathetic, the diverse social classes are 
expected to express themselves politically through the prism of identity politics 
like religious values, notions of morality, sexual politics and ideological 
worldviews. Chong argues that religion, race and ethics are no longer treated as 
sacred sites in multicultural Singapore or out of bounds from external critique. 
This allows identities, values and ethics to form without challenge while the 
greater leeway granted to more liberal spheres like local theatre and the arts to 
articulate sexual politics and alternative lifestyles, serving as sites a site where 
intellectual energies may converge. Such sites have allowed identity politics to 
develop and mature and have become crucial spaces for mobilization and 
activism. And the AWARE sage should be understood in that context. Not as a 
one off aberration of a middle class ready to push the political envelope but as a 
specific condition of the whole Singaporean society where the identity politics 
offers an alternative to party politics in the effort to influence public policy.116 
Chong’s remarks on the implications of the AWARE saga appear not 
only to resemble but also to confirm Hegel’s insights regarding the emergence 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the State. From the perspective of Spirit (Geist), 
economy and materialism are mediums which gradually assist the promotion of 
the subject’s self-consciousness in the State. This process of acquiring self-
consciousness is reflected in the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which is formed within 
the limits of the state.  In the Singaporean context the AWARE saga serves as a 
leverage which precisely demonstrates an attempt to gradually formulate a 
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particular ethical life (Sittlichkeit) in Singapore resting on the intervention of 
both the Singaporeans and their state. This participation of Singaporeans in the 
public sphere in terms of ethical and religious issues, challenges the stereotypical 
treatment of the Singaporean as materialist, civically indifferent and individualist 
citizens. Moreover this civic participation paves the way to a greater civic 
transformation in Singapore since the Singaporeans will be able to reconcile 
further with their state and among each other within their public sphere as they 
are actively encouraged by the state to participate and formulate it.  
Conclusion	  
 
This chapter demonstrated empirically the contribution of Hegel’s insights with 
regard to the conceptualization of citizenship in Singapore. Singapore was 
neither cited as an example which resembles to the state portrayed in the 
Philosophy of Right nor as an ideal example of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 
Singapore was used as a case study which demonstrates how Hegel’s notion of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) can enrich our understanding of citizenship. The first 
part elucidated that the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) allows us to enrich our 
understanding of citizenship after: i) accommodating the universal and the 
particular dimension; and ii) without divorcing the subject from the object of 
knowledge. The first insight encourages the interplay between empiricism and 
idealism which most approaches separate and blends the economic with the 
sociopolitical dimension. The second insight prevents the treatment of 
citizenship with prescriptive or descriptive terms and overcomes the 
shortcomings of the approaches which treat the theorist as a self-ascribed 
authority who examines reality with abstract norms. These approaches to 
citizenship rest on an abstract notion of economics which dictates the citizens’ 
actions. Such approaches contend that the capitalist market economy in 
Singapore has transformed the Singaporeans into materialist driven agents with 
limited social cohesion who are alienated from their state. Unlike these 
approaches, Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) allows us to acquire a 
more complete understanding of citizenship after blending the economic with the 
sociopolitical dimension, attributing to the market and the economy an educative 
civic effect. Hegel’s notion of citizenship rests on the notion of patriotism which 
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stems from ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and assists the subject to acquire self-
consciousness and freedom after reconciling the private with the public realm 
within the state.  
The second part challenged theoretically and empirically a Foucaultian 
account of citizenship which rested on Foucault’s notion of governmentality and 
freedom. Terence Lee promoted a Foucaultian approach of citizenship in order to 
argue that the PAP state’s exercise of power is not coercive as it cultivates a 
sense of social consent among Singaporean citizens. However, such a notion of 
consent, which is founded on Foucault’s understanding of freedom and 
subjectivity, was challenged from a Hegelian perspective. Hegel’s insights 
helped us to show that the idea of providing freedom within the limits of a 
previously determined domain, paradoxically turn out to be a strategy of power 
which allows itself to perpetuate control in the name of developing a ‘free’ 
subject. Therefore, Foucault, treats freedom as power’s ‘tool’ the limits of which 
are restricted by a particular domain, determined by power. Thus, Foucaultian 
‘freedom’ becomes a means of controlling rather than emancipating the subject. 
Indeed, in the Singaporean context, the PAP’s provision of ‘freedom’ within a 
predetermined domain of the arts and the ‘Singapore 21’, ended up as a means to 
control Singaporean citizens.  
Beyond the shortcomings of Foucaultian freedom and subjectivity, 
Hegelian thought showed too that a Foucaultian account of neutral power fails to 
promote an understanding of citizenship which secures the necessary social 
cohesion among the citizens. It was noted that, the projection of Foucaultian 
governmentality as a neutral form of power, was neither neutral nor contributed 
to the emancipation of the subject. In the Singaporean context, the PAP’s 
governance, as founded on ‘neutral’ pragmatism, has in fact materialist and 
capitalist foundations. Many scholars such as Ortmann, Kluever and Weber 
argued that PAP’s pragmatism - which prioritizes materialism and the capitalist 
economical development in Singapore - is responsible for undermining the social 
cohesion and the reconciliation of the Singaporeans with their state. In that 
respect, these scholars predetermine the negative civic implications of economy 
and materialism after attributing the emergence of kasuism to PAP’s ‘pragmatic’ 
governance. For Ortmann, Kluever and Weber the embedment of materialism 
and individualism in the form of a national social trait termed as kiasuism, 
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undermines the Singaporeans’ social cohesion. It is not surprising that 
politicians, judging from the emigration tendencies, expressed publicly their 
concerns via the ‘quitter-stayer’ debate in Singapore. Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong repeatedly criticized the Singaporeans who after enjoying the good 
economic times would potentially quit the country during the economic 
downturns.  
The third part challenged from a Hegelian perspective both empirically 
and theoretically the deterministic effects of economy and materialism on the 
Singaporean citizens. Academic literature on Singapore, tends to stress how 
PAP’s pragmatism which is founded solely on materialism and economic 
capitalism, nurtures an individualistic, materialistic and opportunistic citizen. 
Such a stereotypical portrayal of the Singaporean citizens which stresses their 
self-centeredness and materialism holds them responsible for the loose social 
cohesion among the Singaporeans themselves and with their state. Most scholars 
tended to accuse the government’s economic and materialistic policies of 
nurturing these individualistic traits which undermine Singapore’s social 
cohesion. The terms kiasuism and ‘quitter’ tend to monopolize the debate, 
stressing the Singaporean’s opportunistic and materialistic traits. Thus, the 
economic and materialist dimension is treated by most academics as having a 
deterministic impact upon the formation of a particular subject that is civically 
indifferent and being characterized by such opportunistic and materialistic traits.  
However, these deterministic effects of the economical and the 
materialist dimension were challenged here empirically and theoretically from a 
Hegelian perspective. Hegel includes too the dimensions of economy and 
materialism in the Philosophy of Right. Yet, he ascribes an alternative impact to 
economy and materialism, after incorporating them within the realm of Spirit 
(Geist), attributing to them an educative effect which arouses the subject’s self 
consciousness and freedom. Hegel’s theoretical insights were enriched with 
empirical evidence which undermined the stereotypical kiasuist treatment of the 
Singaporeans as materialistic and self-centered or as opportunistic ‘quitters’. 
This empirical evidence was extracted after designating examples of civic 
activism and indirect government criticism which stemmed from the avant-garde 
arts, internet blogs and NGOs. It became clear how The Necessary Stage (TNS), 
TalkingCock.com, The Working Committee (TWC) and Working Committee 2 
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(TWC 2), after circumventing governmental fear, intrigued civic awareness and 
provided channels for civic participation, rendering the image of the 
individualist, materialist and opportunistic Singaporean citizen inaccurate.  
However, what is fascinating about these instances of civic activism is 
how they gradually led to a more significant event which attracted greater civic 
participation regarding religious and ethical issues. This event was described 
here as the ‘AWARE saga’ and its importance lies on encouraging the public to 
scrutinize certain religious and ethical issues which were previously excluded 
from public criticism. After the AWARE saga, the government permitted the 
public to scrutinize these sensitive issues, paving the way for the transformation 
of the civic sphere in Singapore after encouraging greater public participation. 
Thus, the AWARE saga marks a transformation of the civil society and of the 
government in Singapore. This is more successfully described by Hegel’s 
understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) rather than a liberal perspective which 
treats the saga as a mere struggle for the promotion of civic freedoms. The civic 
evolution in Singapore can be paralleled to Hegel’s alternative treatment of the 
material and the economical dimension as Spirit’s (Geist) educative means which 
promote the subjects’ self-consciousness through their affiliation with society. 
Hegel substantiated the compatibility of individuality and social 
membership through the development of the ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The 
emergence of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which contributes to the subject’s 
emancipating form of self-consciousness within the state, initially rests on the 
material and economic dimension of social existence in civil society. It remains 
to be seen how things will evolve in Singapore as the subject’s transformation 
into a free self-conscious citizen who is reconciled with the state and the 
community is an on-going process. As Hegel stresses in the Philosophy of Right, 
philosophy arrives too late and cannot be applied to prescribe or to describe. 
According to Hegel, philosophy helps us to understand only after the course of 
events played out.117 Therefore we cannot predetermine or guess the course of 
Singapore’s evolution, only understand it.  
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EPILOGUE	  
The	  Relevance	  of	  Hegel	  Today	  
 
More often than not the question is posed why do Hegel’s perspectives on 
political philosophy which date back to the early 19th century, still matter today 
when examining current political affairs? Before summarizing the contribution of 
this dissertation, a number of contemporary examples will be put forward which 
stress a series of contradictions and undesirable effects that from a non-Hegelian 
perspective remain paradoxical and unresolved.  
For instance, how does humanitarian aid or anti-terrorist aid exacerbate 
poverty and terrorism? Moreover, which were the deeper motives which urged 
young British to flee from Britain and become jihadists and how does morality 
may serve as a smoke screen for immoral actions? From a non-Hegelian 
perspective the following four examples seem to puzzle and appear paradoxical.  
Firstly, on 6th May 2013 the documentary Fatal Assistance was released. 
It did not take as its subject the 2010 earthquake in Haiti that left 250,000 dead 
but the misdirected international relief efforts. Haiti, despite the humanitarian aid 
remains a symbol of unfixable misery and the Fatal Assistance casts some light 
on the damage done by international aid agencies ‘whose well meaning but 
ignorant assumptions turned a nightmare into an unresolvable tragedy’.1 This 
documentary illustrates that the problem lies on the fact that the promised aid 
was never allowed to be controlled by the Haitians themselves. Haiti’s reputation 
for corruption, is one reason NGOs and foreign aid government officials insist on 
doing everything themselves. The well-meaning young internationals from 
various relief agencies flooded the country, convinced their fresh ideas would 
save the island, despite their fundamental ignorance of the place and its people. 
This documentary describes how the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 
(IHRC), co-chaired by former president Clinton, appears to be criticized by 
another IHRC member, Suze Percy Fillipini, who blasted the commission for 
ignoring the 12 Haitian members, whose voices were rarely consulted. This 
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documentary illustrates how the misapplication of financial aid has the opposite 
results and fails to promote welfare.   
Secondly, an analysis published at the Boston Review on 11th June 2014, 
contends that Obama’s 5 billion Counterterrorism Fund will actually support 
terrorism. President Barack Obama announced a $5 billion Counterterrorism 
Partnerships Fund, which will allow US military to train, build capacity, and 
facilitate partner countries on the front lines. This counterterrorism policy aspires 
to disengage U.S. troops from foreign entanglements and fill the gap by 
supporting the efforts of America’s local allies to fight terrorist groups. However, 
as Alex de Waal contends, this approach makes the world a more dangerous 
place. From West Africa to Central Asia, American money has been poured into 
funding, training and equipping counter-terrorist special forces. This in turn has 
contributed to corruption, conflict, the growth of police states and a more 
complicated and deeply entrenched terrorist threat. In aid-recipient states where 
terrorism is present but the threat is low, providing economic and security 
assistance to combat terrorism based on the presence of terrorists, or the severity 
of its threat, actually risks increasing the expected future level of terror in that 
target state. As De Waal explains, firstly, the government receiving the funds 
may manipulate counter-terror operations for its own political purposes; secondly, 
with militarized counter-terrorism: violence antagonizes the local people and 
local young men flock to extremists from desperation or revenge; thirdly, 
Generals, security chiefs, and their political masters become addicted to these 
funds, which foster a “deep state” that is beyond the reach of public scrutiny and 
democratic accountability; and finally, the national ruler who is receiving the 
funds finds them so useful that he cannot afford to defeat terrorist groups, 
because that would deprive him of national budget. In that respect, De Waal’s 
analysis stresses that anti-terrorist aid contributes to the spawning of terrorism.2  
Thirdly, a video was released on 20th June 2014 with title ‘There is No 
Life Without Jihad’ featuring three British men with distinctly English accents, 
sitting before the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The 
three men in the recruitment video directly appealed for other westerners to join 
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them fighting Jihad and stated their intention to join the war in Iraq. One man, 
Abu Bara Al Hindi insists that joining the group will cure the stress and 
depression of living in the west. He cries ‘are you willing to sacrifice the job you 
have got, the big car you have got? […] to all my brothers living in the west, I 
know how you feel from when I used to live there. In the heart you feel 
depressed. The cure for the depression is Jihad. All my brothers, come to jihad 
and feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness we are feeling’3. One may 
wonder what (or the lack of what) drove the three young men to radicalize and 
adopt the Jihadist ideals, judging from their testimonies? 
The last example is set on 11th April 1961 during the course of 
Eichmann’s trial, the Nazi war criminal. Arendt notes that during the trial’s 
session num. 105, as Eichmann was attempting to justify his acts, he remarked 
that he was simply acting out of respect for the principle of the Categorical 
Imperative arguing that his principle was such that it can become the principle of 
general laws. Upon further questioning he explained that from the moment he 
was charged with carrying out the final solution he had ceased to live according 
to Kantian principles and he had consoled with the thought that he was no longer 
the master of his deeds and he was unable to change anything. As Arendt 
comments, although Kant never intended to say something of the sort, yet she 
contends that the ambiguity of the categorical imperative triggers 
misunderstanding and misapplication.4  
The previous examples from a non-Hegelian perspective strike one as 
paradoxical, irrational or odd. The unfavorable effects of humanitarian and anti-
terrorist aid, the ambiguity of a moral sense of duty and the difficulty in 
comprehending the drives which urged the young men to abandon their states 
and fight for a religious cause abroad, suggest that the way we conduct politics 
and theorize on political and international affairs is incomplete. From a Hegelian 
perspective, these examples suggest that any attempt to acquire knowledge, 
theorize and form policies from the perspective of a self-ascribed authority or a 
fixed notion of agency is misleading. Moreover, the description of these 
examples reflect the shortcomings which emerge when a policy is formed 
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without considering both the universal and the particular dimension of the 
sociopolitical issues a policy intends to tackle. Similarly, these examples also 
make clear that when the ideals or values which drive these policies or decisions 
espouse only the universalist dimension, the result is an empty formalism which 
contributes to an incomplete account of knowledge and a misleading ethical 
conduct. As Beiser observes, for Hegel the universals exist only in particular 
things.5 Any universal concept or value such as reason, ethics or nation is 
embodied in the culture and language of a community at a specific place and 
time.6 This demonstrates the perils of projecting policies, values or ethics as 
cosmopolitan from a purely universalist perspective.  
In particular, regarding the first two examples, these foreign aid and anti-
terrorist policies do not take into consideration the domestic particularities of the 
countries they are addressed to. In the first case the Haitian government is 
ignored and in the second case an attempt takes place to replicate US war 
dictums and tactics to foreign armies without paying attention to particular socio-
political contexts or the domestic civil-military-government relations. If an 
analysis or a policy formation is based on abstract universalist ideals while 
neglecting the particularities of the domestic sphere, then the conduct of 
interventionist policies is incomplete and misleading. As Hegel describes in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, the knowledge which stems from the subjects as self-
ascribed authorities who treat object of study as passive from the perspective of 
abstract categories or principles is incomplete and misleading.  Trying to 
implement policies or draw decisions based on (abstract) universalist political, 
social or military principles is misleading since these policies and decisions rest 
on an a priori sense of rationalism or values which are disassociated from the 
empirical dimension, divorcing the form from its content. In that regard, the 
undesired effects of antiterrorist and humanitarian aid stem from the fact that this 
particular dimension is neglected.  
The same applies to the case of Eichmann. As Smith argues with respect 
to Eichman ethical behavior consists solely in the willingness to act out of an 
abstract principle. This allows one to see in a particularly stark form the lengths 
to which acting ‘for the sake of duty’ without any particular specification might 
                                                
5 Frederick Beiser, Hegel, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22 
6 Frederick Beiser, Hegel, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 23 
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be put. However, from a Hegelian perspective, the Kantian sense of duty is 
misleading since it rests on a self-determining perception of subjectivity and an 
abstract (universal) notion of reason and ethics, detached from social institutions. 
Kant’s self-determining subject forms an incomplete notion of will which is not 
necessarily free or moral since the subject is not self-conscious and thus not in 
control of the motives behind her ‘free’ actions or decisions. In that regard, 
according to Hegel, an understanding of self-consciousness and freedom which is 
based on the abstract universalism of the Categorical Imperative is misleading 
and detached from social institutions. As Smith notes, the implications of the 
categorical imperative are alarming and promote this one-sided attention to the 
individual’s independence from the will of the others and from external 
authority.7 On the other hand, Hegel’s notion of freedom which is actualized in 
the state via the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the notion of patriotism, overcome 
the limits of Kant’s approach and reconcile individuals with the society and state, 
accommodating both the universal and the particular dimension.  
Hegel’s notion of freedom and patriotism which reconciles the 
individuals with their state, casts some light on the motives of the young Brits. 
The young Brits felt alienated from their society in a community which 
prevented them from seizing their consciousness and free will. Their contempt 
for the western life style which prioritizes a big car and a good job, reflects 
Hegel’s civil society which nourishes an incomplete moment of will; the will of 
the self-determining egotistic subject who is not free but subjected to her 
individual-centered drives and desires. The young Brits’ despair, which 
transformed them into jihadists, stemmed from their way of life in Britain which 
focuses on materialist ideals that nurtures an antagonistic society of selfish 
individuals who fail to control their will, contributing to depression. This lack of 
selfless ideals and communitarian values was filled by radical Islamic ones 
which encourage them to dismiss their individualism and identify themselves 
within a greater cause. The use of the plural pronoun ‘we’ when the young Brit 
                                                
7 Steven B Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1998),78-79 
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says ‘come to jihad and feel the honour we are feeling, feel the happiness we are 
feeling’,8 stresses this communitarian dimension.     
Hegel’s notion of patriotism reflects similar communitarian ideals, 
stressing that the sole aim of the state is that a nation should not come to 
existence as a mere union of private persons or private wills.9 For Hegel a state is 
well-constituted and internally powerful when the private interest of its citizens 
coincide with the general end of the state. For Hegel, patriotism nurtures selfless 
values which reconcile the citizens with their community and the state. The state 
contributes to the formation of the subject’s self-consciousness since the 
acquisition of free will is a process achieved within the realm of a particular 
community, permitting the incorporation of universality with particularity while 
providing a content to the empty form. Hegel’s notion of patriotism assists an 
understanding of the deeper motives behind the young jihadists. Blaming 
radicalization is inadequate. Radical Islamists exploited the citizens’ 
disassociation from the state and society as well as the void of self-less values 
and attempted to fill it. The young Brits frustration of the British life-style, the 
big cars and the good job suggests that such a materialist environment which 
lacks selfless ideals is antagonistic and un-hospitable and fails to promote their 
self-consciousness and free will.  
On	  The	  Contribution	  of	  this	  Dissertation:	  How	  the	  Exercise	  of	  
Hegel’s	  Immanent	  Critique	  Reveals	  the	  Shortcomings	  of	  Certain	  IR	  
Approaches	  
 
The analysis of these examples designated that the conduct of policies 
which disassociate the particular dimension from the universal while depending 
on empty formalistic values and principles without content, rest on a misleading 
way of acquiring knowledge. Separating the subject from the object of theory, 
triggers an inaccurate account of knowledge which relies on an incomplete 
understanding of subjectivity, self-consciousness and free will.  
                                                
8 Haroon Siddique Jihadi Recruitment Video for Islamist terror group Isis Features three Britons, 
The Guardian, Saturday 21 June 2014 
9 Georg W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 272 
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The shortcomings of these examples demonstrate that separating: 1) the 
subject from the object of theory; 2) the universal from the particular dimension; 
and 3) rationalism from empiricism as a method of acquiring knowledge, lead to 
an inaccurate evaluation of socio-political events which trigger inappropriate 
policies and actions. The exercise of Hegel’s immanent critique revealed the 
limits of certain approaches to IR, citizenship, security and ethics which 
conveyed the aforementioned separations and promoted a misleading 
understanding of the sociopolitical reality based on arbitrary or transcendent 
norms. Specifically, the criticism of Foucaultian and Kantian inspired IR 
approaches which ended up examining reality with arbitrary or transcendent 
means, demonstrated the superiority of Hegelian thought and the value of 
immanent critique. The five chapters of this dissertation unveilled the 
contribution of immanent critique which rests on the consideration of Hegel’s 
notion of Spirit (Geist). The exercise of immanent critique scrutinizes the 
theoretical basis of certain IR approaches and demonstrates that they rest on an 
inaccurate understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, freedom, reality and reason.  
To be more specific, the first chapter stressed that the exercise of 
immanent critique allows us to understand how an inaccurate understanding of 
subjectivity, leads to an incomplete account of knowledge. The implications of 
such a misleading understanding of knowledge and subjectivity were examined 
from the perspective of interstate relations, war and security. This chapter 
revisited previous Hegelian inspired IR approaches and promoted an alternative 
understanding of Hegel’s ideas on interstate relations and security after treating 
the Phenomenology of Spirit as the point of departure. Driven by Hutchings’ 
approach it was suggested that the Phenomenology of Spirit should be used as the 
point of departure to comprehend the Philosophy of Right. From that perspective 
it became clear that Hegelian thought is not celebrating Realist ideals. Following 
Hegel’s thought as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit it was clear that an 
inaccurate account of knowledge emerges from a flawed understanding of 
subjectivity. Then, Hegel’s insights from the Phenomenology of Spirit were 
applied to the issue area of security studies. Hegel’s understanding of 
subjectivity as a process portrayed by the evolution of the forms of 
consciousness within the realm of Spirit (Geist), paved the way to argue that the 
subject should not be separated from the object of theory. The separation of the 
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subject from the object of theory accommodates only a descriptive or a 
prescriptive approach to knowledge which treats the subjects as a self-ascribed 
authority who evaluates reality based on transcendental or arbitrary norms. Such 
evaluation nourishes a misleading account of knowledge and reality. In 
particular, the exercise of immanent critique revealed that the (neo)realist, the 
Copenhagen and the Critical school of security studies reproduce a problematic 
account of knowledge due to their: a) flawed understanding of subjectivity; and 
b) problematic  treatment of the theorist-object of theory relation.  
The second chapter revealed the limits of appropriating Foucautian 
thought to IR. After delineating the debate between the approaches which 
promoted the application of Foucaultian thought to IR and those which 
challenged such application, Hegel’s insights revealed that the Foucaultian 
inspired IR approaches undermine the formation of the subject’s self-
consciousness and negate free will. Pasha, Manokha, Reid, Edkins and Pin-Fat 
celebrated the contribution of Foucault to IR thought, arguing that Foucaultian 
ideas provide an alternative understanding of  (a non-liberal) subjectivity, war 
mobilization, human rights and power. On the other hand Neil, Debrix and 
Richmond contended that the adaptation of Foucaultian thought to a particular 
discipline - such as the IR - violates the contingency of Foucault’s theory. Selby 
and Chandler even observed how Foucaultian inspired post-structuralists 
promoted liberal cosmopolitan ideals instead of undermining them. Although the 
contribution of the scholars who challenged the application of Foucault’s ideas to 
IR is invaluable, yet these scholars failed to trace the limits of Foucaultian 
thought itself.  
On the other hand, Hegel’s immanent critique unveiled that Foucault 
unsuccessfully attempted to reconsider reality without transcendental means via 
the notion of power and formed a flawed account of subjectivity which renders 
knowledge and subjectivity relativistic. The relativism of Foucault’s notion of 
power is guilty of nourishing a problematic account of subjectivity and freedom 
since it fails to promote the self-consciousness of the subject. Foucault’s 
treatment of power as neutral and contingent ended up controlling the subject 
after rendering it relativistic. This relativism which stems from Foucault’s 
transcendent form of power as well as the purposeless succession of power 
regimes forms a subject that lacks self-consciousness and free will. In that 
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respect Foucaultian IR thought fails to promote a free agent who self-
consciously: mobilizes to conduct war, resists to power regimes and overcomes 
the coercive implications of the (liberal) human rights regimes.   
The third chapter elaborates how Hegel’s immanent critique unveils that 
Foucaultian, Kantian and IR thought promote a self-defeating understanding of 
freedom which rests on transcendental premises. Unlike Kant and Foucault, 
Hegel’s alternative understanding of freedom as a process, does not rest on 
transcendental premises but stems from ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the state. 
Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which nourishes the subject’s free will, accommodates 
the universal and the particular dimension without separating the subject from 
the object of knowledge, disclosing how the non-emancipating effects of 
Foucaultian and Kantian freedom emerge. For Hegel, free will is a process which 
emerges via ethical life (Sittlichkeit) within the state. According to Hegel each 
moment of will promotes an incomplete idea of freedom. Foucault’s and Kant’s 
understandings of freedom and subjectivity proved to be self-defeating as these 
reflect one of these incomplete moments of Hegelian will. The previous chapter 
described how the purposeless succession of power regimes nurtures a 
relativistic subject, whereas this chapter stressed that Foucault’s notion of power 
is responsible for portraying as ‘free’ the options stemming from power’s 
predetermined domains (such as disciplinary, sexuality etc). Thus, since these 
options are beyond the control of the subject, power regimes serve to restrict 
rather than emancipate the subject. The Kantian account of freedom fails to 
emancipate the subject too. Kant’s treatment of the subject as self-determining 
separates the subject from the object of knowledge whereas the notion of the 
Categorical Imperative - upon his motion of freedom rests - is vacuous and lacks 
a particular content as it relies only on the universal dimension. For Hegel, free 
will cannot be determined by the subject alone but instead it evolves as a process 
within the realm of Spirit (Geist) which implicates the notions of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) and the State. Hegel’s Ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and the state are 
abstract or universalist but  represent the actualization of freedom within a 
particular state, filling the vacuity of Kant’s sense of duty and ethics. 
Additionally, Hegel’s insights revealed that certain IR approaches 
promote too a non-emancipating understanding of freedom. Specifically, this 
chapter analyzed how Chandler’s, Sen’s and Frost’s treatment of freedom is 
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defective and assists the promotion of liberal ideals which lead to social 
exclusions. Sen’s and Chandler’s promotion of ‘development as freedom’ 
reproduced the limits of Foucaultian freedom, failing to emancipate the political 
agents. Their conceptualization of freedom, just like Foucault’s, predetermines 
the subject’s ‘free’ options (alluding to the options which are compatible to the 
liberal democratic values). Frost too, although he is inspired by Hegel’s thought, 
nevertheless he dismisses the notion of Spirit (Geist) and promotes a non-
emancipating form of freedom. Frost argues that freedom stems from the 
international anarchic state system. However, Hegel’s insights reveal that Frost 
does not perceive international anarchy as neutral but under the influence of 
democratic liberal institutions which necessitate the agents compliance to a 
liberal domain of individual’s rights. 
The fourth chapter stressed how an immanent critique of certain 
universalist or cosmopolitan perspectives on citizenship unveiled their 
transcendental theoretical premises. In that respect that chapter underscored that 
a conceptualization of citizenship which does not take into consideration the 
universal and the particular dimension is incomplete. The immanent critique of 
Archibugi’s, Held’s and Kaldor’s universalist theories on citizenship revealed 
that their approaches examined reality from a transcendental perspective.  
Archibugi’s, Held’s and Kaldor’s approaches rested on the universalism of 
human rights and the transnationalism of values such as equality and freedom. 
However, the universalism of these perspectives was challenged after arguing 
that these values and (human) rights are neither transnational nor impartial but 
transcendent and excluding. After criticizing Archibugi, Held and Kaldor, 
Habermas’s flawed universalism was exposed too. Hegel’s insights made clear 
that Habermas’s theory - which rests on Kant’s categorical imperative - 
conceptualizes the universal norms based on the Kantian sense of duty which is 
vacuous and rests on a self-determining understanding of subjectivity. This 
notion of subjectivity, separates the subject from the object of knowledge, 
perceives reality with transcendent norms and promotes a misleading account of 
knowledge. In that respect Habermas’ approach promotes a liberal driven notion 
of universalism with excluding rather than universal effects. 
Unlike the previous approaches to citizenship, this chapter stressed that 
Hegel’s conceptualization of citizenship incorporated the universal and the 
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particular dimension. Hegel’s notion of patriotism is a disposition which assists 
the subject to develop her self-consciousness and free will within the state. 
Hegelian freedom is actualized in the state and does not rest on the self-
determining subject but on ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which emerges from a 
particular community within the limits of a state. In that respect Hegel’s 
alternative understanding of citizenship which associates with ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) succeeds in reconciling the individual subject with the social 
institutions and ultimately bridge the gap between the universal and the particular 
dimension.  
The previous chapters stressed the implications of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) and Spirit (Geist) on Hegel’s alternative understanding of 
subjectivity, freedom and ethics and citizenship. The last chapter is significant as 
it demonstrated that Hegel’s notion of Spirit (Geist) is not transcendental. This 
chapter stressed that Hegelian thought combines idealism with empiricism and 
accommodates the universal with the particular dimension which in turn 
transforms our understanding of knowledge. The case study of Singapore was 
introduced in order to demonstrate the empirical dimensions of Hegel’s 
alternative understanding of knowledge, subjectivity, patriotism and citizenship. 
Singapore is not used as a model state which portrays the state of the Philosophy 
of Right. The case study of Singapore was added in order to expose empirically 
the contribution of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as a process which enriches our 
understanding of citizenship after attributing an alternative understanding to the 
economy and the market. Unlike the liberal inspired analyses on citizenship, 
Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) reveals that economy and the market 
do not necessarily alienate the Singaporeans from their state. According to 
Hegel’s understanding of citizenship the implications of the economy and the 
market can explain the civic transformation of the Singaporeans which reconciles 
them with their state. Thus, Hegel’s insights challenge the shared perspective of 
most scholars who argue that the social cohesion in Singapore is undermined due 
to the government’s prioritization of the capitalist economy and materialism.  
A Hegelian inspired perspective on citizenship challenges the 
predetermining effects of economy and materialism that are often held 
responsible for the formation of materialistic, self-centered and opportunistic 
citizens. Hegel includes too the dimensions of economy and materialism but after 
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incorporating them within the realm of Spirit (Geist), he attributes to them an 
alternative impact which has educative civic effects to the citizens. In order to 
reinforce this point, empirical evidence was introduced which undermined the 
stereotypical treatment of the Singaporeans as materialistic and self-centered 
(kiasuist) individuals. This empirical evidence designated examples of civic 
activism and indirect government criticism which stemmed from the avant-garde 
arts, internet blogs and NGOs. However, it is described how these instances of 
civic activism led recently to a more significant event. The event known as the 
‘AWARE saga’ encouraged public scrutiny over certain religious and ethical 
issues, paving the way for the transformation of the civic sphere in Singapore. 
Thus, the ‘AWARE Saga’ marked a transformation of the government and the 
Singaporeans beyond the stereotypical kasuist characteristics. This transition 
more closely reflects Hegel’s understanding of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) than the 
liberal perspectives which treats the ‘AWARE Saga’ as a mere struggle for 
liberal rights. This civic evolution in Singapore appears to justify empirically 
Hegel’s alternative treatment of the economy and the market, demonstrating the 
educative civic effects they have on Singaporeans. Instead, it was clearly 
demonstrated that Hegel’s understanding of knowledge which avoids the 
separation of the subject from the object of theory and accommodates the 
universal with the particular dimension, forms a more complete account of 
citizenship that is tied with the notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit).  
In that respect, the objective of this dissertation was to reinstate the 
contribution of Hegelian thought to IR, after undermining the previous 
intellectual efforts which treated Hegel as a proto-realist thinker. Here, it was 
stressed that Hegel’s insights regarding the understanding of knowledge, 
subjectivity, free will, ethical life and the state can add much value to IR thought 
and overcome the limits normative or critical approaches which are often 
inspired by Kant’s and Foucault’s thought. Unlike Foucault and Kant, Hegelian 
thought not only accommodates both the universal and the particular dimension 
but also avoids to separate the subject from the object of theory which forms 
self-ascribed authorities that promote misleading prescriptive or descriptive 
approaches.  
The exercise of immanent critique revealed the shortcomings of Kantian 
and Foucaultian thought. It has been noted that the application of Kantian 
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thought in order to support the universality of certain norms and (human) rights 
was based on a vacuous sense of duty which contributed to the promotion of 
liberal ideals with socially excluding effects. Similarly, the application of 
Foucaultian thought as a mean to promote the particularist dimension, nurtured a 
relativistic account of subjectivity and knowledge which (intentionally or not) 
paved the way to the permeation of liberal ideals. The shortcomings of 
Foucault’s and Kant’s thought relate to the separation of: i) the universal from 
the particular dimension; and ii) the subject from the object of theory which 
promote a misleading understanding of knowledge and reality that rests on 
transcendental or arbitrary norms. The contribution of immanent critique rests on 
disclosing this problematic conceptualization of reality and knowledge found not 
only in Foucaultian and Kantian thought but also in the normative and critical 
approaches which ignore the interplay between idealism and empiricism. Thus, 
this dissertation highlighted that the superiority of Hegelian thought lies on 
considering the interplay between the subject and the object of knowledge, as 
well as the combination of the universal with the particular dimension which 
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